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| June 20, 2006 | Tuesday | Jumadi-ul-Awwal 23, 1427 |
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Frontier budget
Gang leader’s arrest
More than compassion for refugees
Imprisoned in chaos
FOR millions of uprooted people, World Refugee Day on June 20 is a day like any other spent waiting in remote camps and settlements for a chance to go home. The wait can take years or even decades, and usually requires an end to fighting in conflicts so obscure that they rarely make the pages of our newspapers.
GOING by the frequency with which statements demanding a new constitution are made in Pakistan, it would appear as if making or unmaking the basic law is child’s play. From this point of view, PPP leader Amin Fahim’s statement on Sunday opposing the framing of a new constitution seems based on wisdom and realism. It is true, of course, that our politicians have paid scant regard to all that the word constitution stands for. In Pakistan, constitutions have been abrogated, held in abeyance, mutilated beyond recognition and trifled with to suit political expediency or personal ambitions. But all said and done, the 1973 Constitution has managed to survive all crises and dictators. To Gen Ziaul Haq, the 1973 Constitution’s basic fault was that it was Bhutto who had managed to have it unanimously passed by the National Assembly. Yet those who voted for it included the very religious parties which later formed the clique that helped Ziaul Haq perpetuate his dictatorial rule for 11 years. Some of the mutilations inflicted on the Basic Law by Ziaul Haq, including Article 58-2b, were later undone — ironically by one of his protégés, Nawaz Sharif. But the Constitution nevertheless showed extraordinary resilience and saw four general elections (those of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996) held within a matter of eight years. There was an orderly transfer of power each time through a process which, if not interrupted, could have strengthened democracy and brought political stability to Pakistan. The process was interrupted in October 1999 when the military intervened.
As in 1977, so also since 1999, the military has carried out sweeping changes in the Constitution, making wholesale amendments, stripping the Basic Law of its parliamentary character, reducing the prime minister’s position to that of a subordinate to the military and allowing Gen Pervez Musharraf, through the 17th Amendment, to remain both head of state and army chief. Yet all these constitutional deviations and aberrations do not detract from the 1973 Constitution’s intrinsic worth. Indeed, they make a strong case for the restoration of the Basic Law in its original form. Those who demand a new constitution seem to miss this point. Let us note that, unlike the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, the 1973 one has survived two military coups. The dismissal of the Nazimuddin ministry, followed later by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, set the precedent for other authoritarian rulers and Bonapartists to tamper with the Constitution to perpetuate their rule. What is more, they found collaborators in the judiciary and among politicians. If those who swore to abide by the Constitution and uphold its sanctity were true to their oath, Pakistan’s history would have been different.
The very idea of a new constitution is senseless. Some changes in it, may be. For every generation feels the need for making changes in the Constitution through the process provided for in the Basic Law itself so as to adjust to changing political and economic realities. But to think in terms of making a new constitution will amount to opening a Pandora’s box. In fact, given the divisive nature of our politics and the nature of distrust and disharmony characterising inter-provincial relations, it would be unrealistic to believe that a national consensus can be developed on a new constitution. What our politicians should, instead, focus on is doing away with the aberrations introduced into the Basic Law through the Legal Framework Order and restoring to the 1973 Constitution its democratic and parliamentary character.
ON the face of it, the NWFP finances for 2005-06 look much better than in previous years, having a record outlay of nearly Rs 96 billion and a development fund of Rs 26.63 billion. The figures show an overall increase of 26 per cent over the last fiscal year, and a rare surplus of Rs 13 billion. But these happy tidings do include some jugglery: a net deficit of Rs 3.8 billion in capital receipts will eat into the surplus pool. Then, on top of the shopping list are 13,450 new jobs in the social sector — mostly jobs that should have been created a long time ago. The new appointments and the raised salary and pension bills will be partially funded from the surplus, born out of the Frontier’s enhanced share in the federal divisible pool under the latest NFC award, and not the result of better financial management or an increase in provincial revenue. Also, a total of Rs 25.4 billion going to the 24 district governments may be considerably higher than the amount that trickled down to local governments in the last fiscal year, but not much in real terms. The practice of giving up to Rs 10 million for development to each MPA in the previous years has been discontinued, may be for good reasons, but there is little to suggest that the districts’ needs for additional funding have diminished. Reliance on transfer of funds to Peshawar from Islamabad, handouts in the form of subventions, hydro-power royalties and international loans and grants remain part of the adage that says: “some things never change”.
The colossal task of rebuilding over 3,000km of the roads destroyed in last year’s earthquake and setting up new infrastructure in the affected districts will take away a big chunk of the ADP under various heads. While these priorities are well founded, the seemingly hefty development fund leaves little to address long-standing problems: shortage of drinking water and housing, for instance. Reproductive health and female education get slightly better funding this year, but given the magnitude of underdevelopment in these sectors, little change is expected. In short, needs remain bigger than the allocations made for the relevant sectors.
THE reported arrest of underworld don Abdur Rehman ‘Dakait’ has raised hopes of a split in the deadly gang war that has claimed dozens of lives in Karachi’s Lyari area in recent years. Rehman’s capture is unlikely, however, to extricate the impoverished locality from the grip of organised crime. Indeed, without official follow-up on this major breakthrough, his arrest may well serve to further the criminality of smaller groups which feared Rehman more than they did the police. Even more significant is the fact that Rehman is believed to be the frontman for less conspicuous patrons who remain at large and who may in due course nominate a successor.
What is imperative now is that Rehman lives to tell his tale, a sordid saga of murder, land grabbing, gunrunning, extortion and dealing in drugs spanning well over a decade. He is said to be wanted in scores of criminal cases in Sindh and Balochistan, and for many years plied his trade with impunity — thanks, it is said, to contacts in high places and the officials on his payroll. It is for this reason that, professional enemies apart, there are many who would wish to see Rehman dead before he starts spilling the beans — naming names and disclosing the full extent of his criminal network. According to police sources, there is “a long list of beneficiaries” who gained materially over the years from their ‘relationship’ with Rehman and his cohorts. Deaths in custody are nothing new in Pakistan. In January 2005, for instance, mafia don Shoaib Khan died in mysterious circumstances in the Karachi prison. One hopes that Abdur Rehman, with his history of ‘escaping’, does not meet a similar fate. Rehman’s arrest should be the first step towards bringing his accomplices and patrons to book.
When the guns finally do fall silent, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) helps refugees to pack up their meagre belongings and board trucks for the long journey home. But their problems are far from over.
This week, along with EU commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel, I am travelling to the Great Lakes region of Africa and to Liberia, where hundreds of thousands of people are making the brave choice to return to their devastated homelands. They join some six million other refugees worldwide who have made the same decision over the past four years, contributing to a 31 per cent decline in global refugee numbers since 2001.
This is good news, but what awaits these courageous people once they get home?
A recent survey of localities in the Democratic Republic of Congo to which refugees are supposed to repatriate following July elections showed that the return is likely to be even more of a struggle than life in exile.
Here in the camps in Tanzania and in neighbouring Uganda, refugees have shelter, food, water, medical care, and primary schools. Back home, in Congo’s Equateur province, 90 per cent of the population has no access to potable water. In South Kivu, 70 per cent of return areas are accessible only on foot; 80 per cent of schools no longer exist and the health care infrastructure is in a state of collapse. Parts of North Katanga have been deserted for years.
Under these circumstances, the international community owes returning refugees more than just a cooking pot and a handshake when they cross the border. We must continue to nurture their return and reintegration and to support the communities to which they are returning. Without adequate resources for development, institution-building and reconciliation, the fragile societies to which refugees return are very likely to unravel again.
Yet refugees and returnees are often omitted from broader development strategies aimed at getting such societies back on their feet. Donors see UNHCR and its partners as humanitarian agencies whose sole purpose is to deliver short-term relief assistance and then hand over to others. All too often, however, there have been gaps in that transition, and refugees who went home were unable to stay home.
Success in the peace-building stage is essential. We cannot wait for such societies to meet all the conditions for official development assistance. The international community needs to devote much more attention to the transition between relief and development, to rebuilding societies which have been ripped apart by violence. This is the rationale behind the UN’s newly-established peace-building commission.
As recent events in East Timor have shown, hard-won peace is often tenuous. According to the UN Development Programme, half of all countries emerging from conflict slip back into violence within five years. One of UNHCR’s major challenges is ensuring that returnees are not forced to flee again, a point that EU commissioner Michel and I are underscoring in our joint mission to Africa.
As the world’s biggest aid donor group, the European Union and its member states have a key role to play. The EU humanitarian aid department has always been a very relevant partner in UNHCR’s humanitarian actions.
The European Union must take a lead in efforts to bridge the relief-to-development gap, so that institutions can be rebuilt, former enemies can reconcile, refugees and displaced people can return, and peace can take root. This would indeed be something to celebrate on World Refugee Day.
The writer is the United Nations high commissioner for refugees and a former prime minister of Portugal.
NEARLY five years into a war between the United States and Islamic extremists, US policies and practices for arresting, holding, interrogating and trying enemy militants are in a state of disarray, unprecedented in modern American history. They shame the nation and violate its fundamental values. Consider:
* The US military and CIA are holding hundreds of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, Afghanistan and secret prisons elsewhere under starkly varying rules and conditions. Some were captured on battlefields, while others were turned over by foreign governments without legal process. Most detentions are not governed by any specific US law or international treaty, since the Bush administration has refused to apply the Geneva Conventions outside of Iraq.
* Some prisoners have argued their cases before military review boards as well as federal judges in Washington; some are held incommunicado and have never been visited even by the International Committee of the Red Cross. A number of US allies consider these practices immoral or illegal, and this has hampered their cooperation with American forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
* Guantanamo Bay has become a toxic symbol around the world of US human rights violations, a status magnified by recent suicides. No detainees have been transferred there in 21 months, and President Bush has said he would like to close the facility. But the Pentagon is spending millions to build a state-of-the-art penitentiary at the base. The administration seems to have no plan for how and where it will hold long-term detainees, or those convicted of crimes.
* The Bush administration has set aside or evaded the rules for prisoner treatment contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against Torture but has adopted no firm standards of its own. Hundreds of cases of abuses of prisoners have meanwhile been recorded since 2001, including dozens of homicides. A revised version of the Army’s interrogation manual has not been issued, nor has a broader Pentagon directive on detention.
Although Congress last year passed the McCain amendment, which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of any prisoner in American custody, Bush administration officials have not ruled out the use of practices such as “waterboarding,” or simulated drowning, which international authorities consider torture. * The United States has been holding key architects of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh, for several years. Yet none of these men has been brought to justice, and there has been no decision by the administration about whether, when or how they will be tried. The administration is using a system of military commissions to try some of the lesser accused terrorists it is holding at Guantanamo, but not a single trial has been completed and the Supreme Court is considering whether to declare part or all of the system illegal.
This political and administrative mess stems directly from Mr Bush’s decision in the weeks after Sept. 11 to take extraordinary measures against terrorism through the assertion of presidential power, rather than through legislation, court action or diplomacy. His intent was to exclude Congress, the courts and other governments from influencing or even monitoring how foreign detainees were treated. Senior officials, led by Vice President Cheney, argued that this policy would give the administration the flexibility it needed to fight the war effectively. Instead it has done the opposite: Mr Bush’s policies have deeply tarnished US prestige abroad, inhibited cooperation with allies and prevented justice for al-Qaeda.
Some exceptional practices, and some detentions outside the US criminal justice system or Geneva prisoner-of-war regime, are needed to fight a stateless enemy spread around the world. In private and occasionally in public, US democratic allies in Europe and elsewhere concede that not every Al Qaeda member captured abroad can be quickly charged with a crime or released. But the Bush administration’s lawless practices have so discredited it that it has lost support even for legitimate anti-terrorist measures. There has been no progress toward building an international consensus on how to stop terrorists before they can launch devastating attacks.
These problems grow worse rather than better as time goes by. International criticism of Guantanamo has intensified in recent months despite steps by the administration, the Supreme Court and Congress to improve conditions and rein in abuses. Meanwhile, the nature of the threat has morphed. The enemies that the United States and its allies now face often are not found on battlefields or in caves within failed states. Many are not affiliated with Al Qaeda but are citizens of the countries they attack, such as those who carried out or planned bombings in Madrid, London and (based on recent allegations) Canada. The rules for arrest, detention and trial used for Al Qaeda are ill-suited to such militants.
The way to repair the system lies in correcting Mr Bush’s exclusion of Congress, the courts and other governments. New laws and diplomatic protocols are needed to regulate the detention of some terrorist suspects. Courts must be given a role in overseeing those detentions and enforcing existing laws against abusive treatment.
— The Washington Post