Defence spending and development
By Vaseem Jafrey
LATELY, there have been references to the link between development and defence. The prime minister/finance minister has expressed the hope that defence expenditures will decline, releasing greater resources for economic development. It is indeed high time that the country’s defence strategy and its political, economic and social implications were debated freely, seriously and thoroughly.
To begin with, we may attempt to delineate the strategy for national security, pursued by the establishment, with the apparent approval or acquiescence of the nation:
— The principal or perhaps the only threat to our sovereignty and territorial integrity is from India.
— The threat is to be assessed on the basis of capability, and not intentions. This means that the current thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations is irrelevant for long-term defence planning. The position may change if basic causes of hostility are removed.
— To ensure national security, the country must maintain a minimum deterrent which, according to classic military doctrine, means that a ratio of one to three between military forces of the defender (Pakistan) and the aggressor (India) is essential for the safety of Pakistan. In actual fact, the ratio at present seems to be nearer 2.2 to three. The active duty uniformed strength for India and Pakistan was 1,325,000 and 620,000 persons respectively in 2004. Of course, measurement of relative military strength now includes, apart from manpower, considerations of weapon technology and nuclear capability, which is difficult to quantify.
— In case of war, substantive assistance from the UN, regional organisations and friendly countries cannot be relied upon.
— The use of a national militia has been thought of but has never been regarded as a substitute for conventional military force.
The implications of the defence strategy may now be considered. Minimum deterrence requires Pakistan to support a military force equal to at least one third of India, when the size of Pakistan’s economy is about one seventh of India. (Figures for the size of GDP in 2004 reported by World Bank are $691 billion for India, $96 billion for Pakistan). Clearly, the defence burden on the Pakistan economy is twice as much than on the Indian economy. As a corollary, India has more resources, as a proportion of GDP for socio-economic development, compared to Pakistan. India already has an edge over Pakistan in economic and social indicators and this will tend to widen in the long run.
International comparisons also show that the defence spending in Pakistan is much higher than the average. The low income group of countries to which we belong spends only 2.2 per cent of GDP on the military as compared to nearly five per cent by Pakistan. The claim made by the prime minister that defence requires only 3.7 per cent of GDP is grossly misleading as the recent reduction in the defence budget has been secured by transferring military pensions which account for 25 per cent of the defence budget to the general account. A computation of military spending, in accordance with internationally accepted conventions, would show that the ratio of military spending to GDP is near five per cent.
Apart from the large quantum of resources allocated to defence, there has also been a privileging of military expenditures, which renders it immune from public scrutiny and debate. In the case of defence grants, the National Assembly is given the bare totals and the usual budgetary details are withheld. There can be no meaningful discussion either in the legislature or media or public on the defence budget or related significant issues such as new weapon systems, which in most countries are open to public debate.
The finance ministry’s arguments are practically restricted to the total amount to be given to each service. The apportionment and use of the funds is left entirely to the discretion of the service chiefs. Thus defence spending is exempted from the financial scrutiny which is mandatory for all public expenditures.
In actual practice, over a long period of time, the high priority given to defence has meant that from the limited resources that the nation has, the government has first met the establishment demands for security and only the residue has been available for development and other civilian purposes. The consequence of this policy (which has never been explicitly acknowledged) is the lopsided development of the country.
Pakistan is now an important military power, with the seventh largest army in the world, one of the nine countries with declared nuclear weapon capability and possessing missile and other advanced weaponry. On the other hand, the country ranks 129th in the human development index with a miserable record in literacy, basic health, etc. We have achieved great military strength but the economic and social base remains very weak. The country has failed to rise from the low income group of countries.
An important political consequence of a strong modern army in a low income country has been that Pakistan has been under military rule for 32 years in 59 years since independence. There have been other contributory factors, such as division and corruption in political parties but principally Pakistan has been a prominent illustration of Chairman Mao’s dictum that political power lies in the barrel of the gun.
A significant cause of the setbacks suffered in promoting democracy and in strengthening civil society has been the disregard for the rule of law. There were many weaknesses in the social system but prolonged military rule has aggravated them. The repeated imposition of martial law, and the overturning of the Constitution, which is the basic law of the country has made a host of illegal activities such as tax evasion, respectable and acceptable. This has strengthened the retrogressive elements of society e.g. the feudals and mafias and encouraged them to persevere in their oppressive practices.
Since the massive requirements for a military of the requisite size was beyond the country’s resources, despite an exceptionally large allocation of domestic funds, Pakistan has been compelled to seek foreign military assistance. Almost all developing countries have sought foreign aid for development, and aid always comes with strings attached, but the conditionalities were of an economic nature and did not significantly constrain the recipient countries’ foreign policy. The military assistance now obtained by Pakistan involves obligations both in respect of external policies as well as matters in the domestic sphere. The maintenance of a minimum deterrent, intended to safeguard independence, has involved some loss of freedom both in foreign policy as well as internal affairs.
On future prospects, it is clear that no significant change in security strategy is contemplated by the establishment. Plans for modernisation and strengthening the military are being seriously pursued. As for economic and social development, there is much rhetoric but little concrete action. The promises made for the eradication of poverty are unlikely to be fulfilled because of lack of resources.
In Pakistan, we have considerable capacity for economic modelling. If a model for the future is drawn up realistically, based on past trends, it might show that while our military strength will increase, the economic and social base may become too weak to sustain the load, and that we then risk a collapse. This is what actually happened with the Soviet Union.
If it is any consolation, the international scene is equally depressing. While globalisation and economic restructuring has brought great prosperity to certain countries and the corporate sector and certain segments of society have become immensely wealthy, the condition of the poor and powerless of the world remains as bad as ever. The US, which produces one third of global GDP, is spending over $100 billion on promoting democracy, through the military, on two developing countries Iraq and Afghanistan while it can only spare $20 billion for the rest of the underdeveloped world. The West spends over $800 billion per annum on the military and armaments but only $60 billion on development aid. Despite all the rhetoric, dramatic gestures, theatre and celebrity involvement, the realities of the Third World poor will remain as depressing in 2015, as they are today, despite the millennium development goals.
There are no easy or obvious solutions to the complex problem faced by Pakistan of confronting a major military threat with inadequate resources and ensuring national security while promoting economic and social progress. All that one can do is to raise the issues, plead for a free and open debate and endeavour to reach a consensus on strategy which provides a balance between development and defence and is sustainable.
If there is any hope for the poor of the world, it is in disarmament and reduction in violence in both the domestic and the international spheres. I end, by quoting from President Eisenhower’s speech of 16 April, 1963:
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labourers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not the way of life in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.”


