Need for debate on defence budget
By Talat Masood
THE demand for opening up the defence budget and giving more details of it to parliament has grown over the years. Currently, legislators belonging to the government party are required to dutifully get the defence budget passed as a one-liner item, without any changes. The growing assertion of opposition leaders in defence matters is indeed a manifestation of the problem of the military’s dominant role in national affairs and the underlying tension in civil-military relationships.
As the struggle to establish a normal political system in the country gains momentum, this subject will acquire greater significance. Politicians want their due role in defence policy formulation, their views on the acquisition of major weapons systems and, above all, greater transparency in and oversight of the military affairs. They also feel that controlling the purse would be the most effective way of asserting their authority and reducing the influence of the army.
On the contrary, the armed forces maintain that there is nothing unusual about the current system, as many democracies too give few details of their defence expenditures. The example of India is cited but that country too is not very transparent about its defence spending.
It is argued that providing details of the budget would compromise security. In any case our politicians are so uninformed and disinterested that they can hardly contribute to the debate. There may well be some truth in all this, but the problem needs to be understood and addressed in a wider perspective. There are distinct advantages in giving more details about the defence budget.
Firstly, the politicians and the public in general would be more confident that the money apportioned for defence is being well spent and if there are differences over defence policy or priorities, these could be settled through debates and discussions.
Defence is an issue where national consensus and public support are vital. Besides, a major part of the defence expenditure does not justify secrecy. Approximately, 75 to 80 per cent of defence allocations relate to administrative expenses. The irony is that foreign countries, and especially our adversaries, are better informed about our defence expenditures than our own people.
In any event, where secrecy is justified it can be ensured by masking the provisions and providing details to the select committee on defence or any other appropriate body designated by the parliament or by the government.
Experience of other countries has shown that politicians once associated with defence matters, gradually acquire an understanding of the sensitivities involved even develop a high standard of expertise, which enables them to take the lead role in the parliament on defence matters.
It is important that our politicians take greater interest and develop an understanding of defence matters if they want to command respect and assert their parliamentary responsibilities of supervision. There are enormous benefits of having both military and civil input to the formulation of strategic policy and the allocation of resources.
Moreover, opening up the defence budget for debate and scrutiny could remove misunderstanding about several military issues and help in bridging differences between the civil and the military.
There is no doubt that armed forces are exercising a high level of departmental oversight and all defence expenditures are being subject to both internal and external audit, which largely ensures professional ethics and combat effectiveness.
The scrutiny carried out by the auditor-general is comprehensive, so that major irregularities, if any, are brought before the notice of the Public Accounts Committee. But what is lacking is the principle of checks and balances, which is the fundamental basis of a democratic polity.
Even in the existing pseudo-democratic scenario certain changes could be made to improve the level of transparency. As a beginning, the tri-service distribution of budget allocations could be made public. Payment of pensions should revert to the defence head as it logically falls under it. By hiding legitimate expenditures governments do not gain anything, apart from indulging in self-delusion.
Revenue and capital expenditures could also be shown separately. Parliament could be taken into confidence on major defence acquisitions and programmes. Expenditures on civil armed forces, Rangers, Coast Guards could be shown clearly.
Additionally, every effort should be made to reduce inessential expenditure. The lavish Cold War standards that was set by the Americans, when money was not an impediment, found their way with our military services as well during the 1980s and ‘90s and still continue to some extent.
Moreover, there are specific areas, such as logistics, training and personnel, where a combination of joint and lead-service approaches could result in substantial savings and enhanced efficiency. No doubt, restrictive policies of the world’s major weapon suppliers have restricted to a single source of purchases eliminating possibilities of competition.
Still there is considerable scope for streamlining our acquisition procedures and systems to achieve savings. Pakistan’s plans of progressively undertaking indigenization of sophisticated weapon systems such as armoured vehicles, fighter and trainer aircraft, missiles and submarines should be pursued and efforts to find export markets continue to amortise investment and reduce costs. Most of our defence industries require thorough restructuring and modernization to affect savings and remain competitive. The organisations concerned need greater autonomy and, at the same time, have to be subjected to greater accountability.
Regrettably, defence spending by India has increased manifold over the last decade. India’s increased spending is attributed to its ambitious modernisation programme that includes purchases of multi-role aircraft, submarines, airborne radars and other strategic and conventional systems.
To keep a relative balance Pakistan has also been increasing its defence allocations. The military feels that to defeat any credible offensive, our capabilities need to grow, because Indian military capabilities are growing and becoming more sophisticated at an incredible rate.
With India growing at a raped both economically and militarily, it will be harder for Pakistan to retain the relative balance of forces that it had tried to maintain in the past.
Military spending takes up nearly one-third of Pakistan’s budget and is one-sixth to one-seventh of India’s budget. This year it is expected to be 22 to 25 per cent higher than the 2005-2006 budget allocation of 223 billion rupees.
Pakistan armed forces are also engaged in new acquisitions. It is believed that the government has requested America for the purchase of 18 F-16s, with the option to buy another 18 aircraft in due course. Pakistan Air Force already has a long-term contract for the acquisition of J-17 multi-role aircraft from China.
Pakistan Navy is interested in obtaining F-22 Frigates from China and possibly a new class of submarines from France. Purchase of airborne radars from Sweden is likely to materialise soon. All this would be an additional burden of eight to nine billion dollars spread over the next five to six years on the exchequer.
No peace process can be durable unless India and Pakistan seriously address the problem of restraining their defence expenditures and move toward a conventional and strategic restraint regime. Meanwhile, the nature of threat in the region is changing. India and Pakistan face less danger from each other, but more from within.
The growing menace of insurgency facing Pakistan in Balochistan and the tribal belt are the result of years of neglect, fragile political institutions, lack of economic development and a highly volatile neighbourhood. The cumulative effect of these adverse factors has alienated some groups to a point where their anger has reached a bursting point, threatening peace and stability in large parts of country.
Similarly, India is beseeched with a surging insurgency covering nearly 116 districts and posing a great challenge to state authority. It is important for both states that while modernising their armed forces, they also adopt the concept of comprehensive security that encompasses economics, energy, and food and water security. Both states need to channel larger portion of their resources and energy in human and infrastructural development and relatively less in the acquisition of expensive weapons systems. For this a significant change in thinking and attitude on the part of the political and military leadership of the two countries is required. In the light of India’s global aspirations prospects of this materialising in the near term appear remote.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general.


