THE reports about our water supply situation are so contradictory and confusing that ordinary citizens do not know what really to believe about the water situation in the country.

On the one hand, water shortages are being reported across the country in cities like Karachi, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and even in some sectors in Islamabad, where people are simply not getting water in their taps. Front-page newspaper pictures of the cracked and dried-up portions of Rawal Lake and the half-empty Simly reservoir seem to confirm the official view from the Meteorological Department that yet another drought is at hand.

Meanwhile, the Capital Development Authority (CDA) has said it was planning to get much-needed water for the twin cities from the Ghazi Barotha Hydel Project. The 10 Corps, Rawalpindi, is reported to have decided at a meeting to fetch water from Jhelum River through tankers to overcome water shortage. Last but not least, the prime minister appealed to the nation last week to offer special Friday prayers for rain to beat the imminent water crisis.

On the other hand, other sources tell us that there is actually no water shortage. The Indus River System Authority (Irsa) reportedly told a recent meeting chaired by the federal minister for water and power that the water situation had considerably improved, both the inflow into the Indus and the storage at Tarbela and Mangla (80 per cent of our water resources is said to be dependent on snow melt, the rest from rainwater). But Irsa’s views were apparently strongly challenged by the Punjab irrigation minister who said that Irsa was “creating confusion about the availability of water”.

At the same time, water management experts in Islamabad last week claimed in a Dawn report that there is actually enough water for the Capital city if only the CDA would manage the supply better by plugging leakages (which reportedly accounts for 60 per cent of total water supply in Islamabad!) and by installing water meters to encourage consumers to use water more prudently.

Similarly, another Dawn report quoted the Small Dams Organization (SMO) of the Punjab Department of Irrigation and Power as claiming that the existing storage at Rawal Dam is sufficient to meet the requirements of Rawalpindi for the coming two months until the monsoons in July. (The SMO built and looks after some 31 small dams in the Punjab.)

So, is there actually a water crisis or not? And if there is no water shortage, then why are the taps dry? If there is a shortage, is it really tantamount to a drought situation?

More importantly, is this water crisis, if there is a crisis at all, actually due to a significant drop in the water supply (due to lower rainfall and lower snowfall last winter), or is it due more to mismanagement by the myriad of water managing agencies such as the CDA, Wasa, Wapda, Irsa, the water and power ministry, the irrigation ministry, etc.?

It appears that we have never quite been able to come out of the drought that first hit the country in 2001, when the impact of the record low snowfalls in 1999 and 2000 was first felt. But since then, apart from some stop-gap proposals, praying, and lots of arguing back and forth about the merits and demerits of small dams and big dams, we do not seem to have been able to decide on, let alone undertake, concrete measures to permanently overcome the apparently persistent drought.

One stop-gap measure, proposed by the government in March 2001, was to melt glaciers with either laser or charcoal to deliver water to drought-stricken farmers. This proposal was immediately shot down by scientists, government officials and environmental groups.

No doubt Pakistan is predominantly an arid region with low rainfall and high solar radiation over most parts of the country. But we have been blessed with two main rainfall periods, i.e., the winter rains from January to March and the summer monsoon from July to September.

Granted the fact that we may have had lower than normal annual snowfall/rainfall in the past seven years or so, which may have affected the overall availability of water. But simply blaming the elements for any shortfall in water resources does not help at all.

Rain patterns naturally vary from year to year but then it is up to our water planners and water managers to save water when it rains in the catchment areas in the rainy seasons and release it in the dry seasons (i.e., April to June and October to December). There is no use simply crying drought every year during the height of the dry season.

We also seem to be slow in reacting and responding to a fairly predictable calamity like a drought which, unlike an earthquake which strikes suddenly, is comparatively slow in onset since the process, caused by decreasingly low rain/snow fall, can be observed over months and years.

For instance, last week we were told by the Meteorological Department that a Drought Monitoring and Early Warning Centre had just started functioning in Islamabad with regional centres at Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar. We were also told that it would become fully operational only after the monsoon season of 2007.

Shouldn’t such a centre have started operation in the late 1990s when the first signs of reduced snowfall/rainfall in the country’s catchment areas was noted, or in 2001 when the first drought hit us?

Similarly, the 2001 drought which seemed to have descended upon us like a bolt from the blue was actually something which we should have braced ourselves for given the fact that record low levels of snowfall were recorded in 1999 and 2000, which obviously led to lesser snow melt in subsequent summers, a disastrous consequence given the fact that some 80 per cent of our water resources as well as 80 per cent of the supply to our main reservoir, Tarbela, are said to depend on snow melt.

Earlier on, we were told that small dams were the answer to our water problems. The CDA had been saying for several years that six small dams would be built to meet Islamabad’s future demands for water, while the Punjab minister for irrigation and power had said in August 2003 that 60 new small dams would be constructed in the Potohar region alone in the next 10 years to meet agricultural needs as well as provide drinking water, energize the groundwater level and promote fisheries in the region.

But now all these plans for small dams appear to have been sidelined because big dams like the Kalabagh and Basha dams are being vigorously portrayed as the ultimate solution to our water problems. But are they?

Big dams are difficult to maintain and their capacity can very quickly decrease due to sedimentation. This is exactly what has happened to Tarbela and Mangla. Without proper protection and management of natural resources, any new big dam may not be the ultimate solution to our water problems.

Proper protection and management of our natural resources means that we have to ensure that forests in the catchment areas are not denuded, that whatever rain that falls is properly preserved and stored in efficient dams/reservoirs, and that whatever available water supply we have is not wasted through wanton leakages, seepages, and other kinds of wasteful usages.

We can only expect our water problems to grow with time given the pressures of increasing population and development. Unless we are able to come up with permanent solutions to what seems to have become annual water shortages in our major cities (in our biggest and most important commercial city, Karachi, the shortage is practically perennial), we can only expect foreign agencies to continue to tag us with unflattering labels such as a failed state.

SOMETIMES it is actually tempting to agree with India’s critique of Pakistan that its obsession with Kashmir makes Islamabad’s diplomacy look rather unifocal. There are better arguments though than the patently Indian one to endorse the view that there is indeed an obsessive fixation that doesn’t allow Pakistan to look beyond Kashmir.

Often enough in recent weeks we have heard Kashmiri resistance leaders like Yasin Malik speak about a Nagaland-style dialogue between Kashmiris, including armed militants, and the Indian government. We haven’t heard of any response to this from either Islamabad or New Delhi.

As far as Islamabad is concerned its dispute with India is solely over the right of Kashmiris to opt for self-determination. It is unclear why, if the principle of self-determination is truly sacrosanct, it shouldn’t apply to, say, the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka. When we asked President Musharraf about this anomaly some time ago he claimed the issue was an internal affair of Sri Lanka. Well, remember that he was returning from a goodwill visit to Colombo the day he took power, after offering military aid to President Kumaratunga. So much for scrupulously avoiding interference.

It is true that both India and Pakistan once gave moral and political support to movements like PLO and SWAPO under the canopy of the Non-aligned Movement. But their sincerity towards the Palestinians’ right to self-determination has waxed and waned with time, instances of which are too embarrassing to recall here. And see how both India and Pakistan are currently looking for ways to thwart a popular uprising against the king of Nepal, and are virtually identically trying to find a way to keep the Maoists out of power and the king intact even if with ceremonial powers.

The moral of the story is that popular movements aspiring for self-determination or other democratic ways to savour sovereign rights may not necessarily get the approval of those that claim to otherwise support the moral principles involved in these quests.

This is where Yasin Malik’s suggestion that a Nagaland-style dialogue be initiated between the Indian government and Kashmiri militants runs into rough weather. The argument on its own is sound. India has been holding talks with Naga ‘rebels’, who are waging an armed struggle for independence. These talks have been held mostly in third countries.

So it makes for an ideal format for talks with Kashmiris too. Moreover, the Indian caveat on terrorism for such talks to commence doesn’t seem to apply to the Naga negotiations.

Last week senior Naga representatives were accorded a hearing at the conference hall in Westminster by a group of MPs known as the British Parliamentarians for Self Determination. A summary of the Naga presentations would be useful to understand their contention and how it may be similar or different vis-a-vis the Kashmir situation.

Nagalim, the name for their unrecognised homeland, straddles 120,000 square kilometres. It is bound by India in the west, Myanmar in the east and the south and China in the north. It has a population of about four million, of which 95 per cent are Christians. Nagalim stands as a corridor between the two regions of the South Asia and South East Asia.

According to last week’s presentation, the Nagas claim to share a close racial, social, historical and cultural affinity with the South East Asian people.

“The Nagas are not Indians racially, historically, culturally and politically,” their leaders claimed.

It was in 1832 that the British colonial forces intruded into the Naga territory, where the Nagas put up tough resistance for 48 years. However, the British forces finally occupied a part of Naga areas, but the rest remained uncontrolled and unadministered, “which is as free as ever”.

On January 10, 1929, the Nagas under the banner of the Naga Club submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission sent by the British parliament to express their national aspiration. It stated that the Nagas should be left alone to determine their own future by themselves.

On July 15, 1947, Naga delegates met Mahatma Gandhi at Bhangi Colony, Delhi, where he stated: “Nagas have every right to be independent. I believe in the brotherhood of man, but I do not believe in forced marriage and forced union. If you do not want to join the union of India, nobody will force you to do that, the Congress government will not do that”.

Sri Rajgopalacharya, the first governor-general of independent India, told the Naga delegation in Shillong, “India wants to be friendly with the Nagas. Nagas are at full liberty to do as they like, either to become a part of India or be separated if it would be best for their interest to be isolated”.

After 67 years of British occupation, Nagas in the occupied areas declared independence on August 14, 1947, one day ahead of the Indian independence. This information was sent to UN with a copy to the government of India. UN’s acknowledgement was received from Salt Lake, USA. The cable read:

“Benign Excellency (.) Kindly put on record that the Nagas will be Independent (.) Discussions with India are being carried on to that effect (.) Nagas do not accept Indian constitution (.) The right of the people must prevail regardless of size”.

According to the Naga version, the Indian government betrayed the commitments given to the Naga delegates, refusing to recognise Naga independence on the plea that it was the handiwork of a few Naga leaders. In 1950, the Indian Constituent Assembly invited the Nagas to join the Union of India, which was rejected outright by the ‘Naga people’.

“The Nagas thereafter conducted a plebiscite on May 16, 1951, wherein 99.9 per cent voted in favour of sovereign independent Nagalim. The result was dispatched to the president and prime minister of India. It was also sent to the UN secretary-general.

“Suppressing the democratic and non-violent approach of the Nagas the government of India forcibly conducted the first and second Indian general elections in 1952 and 1957, but the Nagas boycotted both the general elections and many others.

“Thereafter, according to the Naga story, the Indian state started deploying hundreds of thousands of its armed forces to conduct military campaigns all over Nagalim beginning from 1954.

“In the process 250,000 innocent Nagas were killed. But their attempts to subdue the Nagas through military might were all futile exercises as the Naga people refused to accept the Indian constitution.”

In pursuit of its political strategy the government of India convinced some ‘opportunists’ to sign ‘the Sixteen Point Agreement’ that created the present Nagaland state in 1963. It was, however, rejected by the ‘Naga people’.

General Thimaya, the then chief of Indian Army who conducted military operations in Nagalim observed and declared, “a) Naga problem is political issue b) treating Naga issue as law and order problem would be wrong and c) therefore, it needs political treatment apart from military treatment”.

So the cycle of talks, followed by perceived betrayals goes on and on. There are so many similarities with Kashmir, and there are differences too. Is the movement for an independent Nagaland, which incidentally has the support of the Christian right in the United States, a revolutionary quest, or is it a revanchist idea out of tune with Indian democracy. Let there be a debate among our Kashmir-centric intellectuals. And call in Yasin Malik too.