I CONCLUDED my article last Sunday with the observation that the “ground realities” of Pakistani politics militated against free and fair elections, and then asked if they could be changed or controlled. First and foremost of these realities is a feudalistic ethos that pervades even those politicians who are not great landowners.

It consists of the following main elements: subservience to the greater centres of power, shifting loyalties, intolerance of rivals, expectation of subservience from the lower orders, propensity to violence, disregard of the law, lack of commitment to the public interest, and readiness to corrupt and be corrupted.

Next is the personalization of politics, involving loyalty to primary social units such as family and clan (“biradari”), low proficiency in the arts of associating together (organization), ambiguous attitude towards democracy.

The bureaucracy in Pakistan has progressively lost the will to decline its political superiors’ calls for unlawful action. There was a time, more likely before than after independence, when a deputy commissioner or a superintendent of police could say to a provincial chief minister: “Sir, what you ask cannot be done because it is against the law.” But in the great majority of cases he does not say so any longer.

The army in Pakistan has come to relish the experience of dominating the country’s governance not only in the domain of high policy but also in that of administering detail. This is a fact so well known that nothing further has to be said about it.

Do these ground realities stand as a massive wall that cannot be breached, and there is no way around it? It may not be possible to abolish them for good, and that too in one strike. But I think their role can be mitigated and made largely inoperative in certain situations.

How did the 1970 election get to be free and fair? Were the ground realities so very different then? Not really; not that much. All of the earlier elections in West Pakistan had been rigged. Proceeding possibly from a miscalculation of the likely results, Yahya Khan decided not to interfere with the electoral process, meaning that he told public officials (intelligence agencies, police, and the civil bureaucracy) to stay out, and they did. In making their choices, a great many voters ignored the advice coming from feudal lords, tribal chiefs, and heads of clans and families. Their traditional dominance was ousted in West Pakistan by a new style of leadership and an exceedingly attractive ideology of which its chief spokesman (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) claimed to be the bearer. In East Pakistan an equally charismatic leadership, promising to bring dignity and affluence to its people, had the same effect.

This quick reference to the 1970 election is intended only to show that the ground realities under reference here can be made inoperative in certain situations. Can a situation similar to that of 1970 be replicated now?

There is no charismatic leader with widespread following in sight at this time. Neither Ms Bhutto nor Mr Sharif answers that description, and their participation in the next election is in any case problematic. Socialism, including the Islamic variety, has lately been in retreat and shows no signs of revival. Unspecific versions of Islam espoused by the MMA parties have never worked as a winning platform, and they are not likely to do any better next year.

But we still have the option of appealing to General Musharraf’s good sense and conscience. What shall we say to him? That depends on the assumptions we make about the man and his motivations. We can rule out greed, because by all accounts he is not misusing his office to make money. We can assume also that he means well, that he is patriotic and wants to do good things for the country.

What shall we say about his urges for power? There is no need to use denigrating terms such as “lusty” or “power hungry”; let us say only that he wants power, and that he enjoys exercising it.

We need not doubt that he is dedicated to the “national interest,” but we cannot assume that he always knows what it is. He may not assert publicly that he is indispensable, but he seems to believe that the country needs him for the foreseeable future, and that it faces critical issues (e.g., the “core” dispute with India, building Kalabagh dam), which he alone can settle. It is likely that he goes on to adopt the premise that his own interest in retaining power and the national interest are inextricably intertwined. He may then be lending his ear to flatterers in PML-Q and elsewhere who tell him that ends justify the means, and that he must keep power beyond October 2007 even if both “hook and crook” have to be employed.

If the above exposition of the general’s state of mind is valid, our task must then be, first, to convince him that his understanding of the national interest and its requirements, in some of its important dimensions, is incorrect, and that his policies are therefore not working. He seems to think that, above all, the country needs rapid economic growth, suppression of extremism and terrorism, and amicable relations with India.

These are indeed desirable goals, but all is not right with the way they are being pursued. The GDP may be increasing, but so is poverty. A substantial proportion of the country’s military force is employed to curb extremism and terrorism, but these troubles are gaining, not losing, ground. We hear not only that the government’s writ does not travel in parts of Balochistan and the tribal areas in the northwest, but that the Taliban have set up a ruling apparatus of their own in southern Waziristan, and that they are on the way to doing the same in the north. There are no signs that the core dispute with India will be settled to Pakistan’s satisfaction in any foreseeable future.

The government’s writ also fails in other parts of the country. This is evident from the fact that far too many persons, including most of the public officials, feel free to act lawlessly as and when it suits their convenience. General Musharraf himself acts outside the law in that he exercises powers that the Constitution does not allow him. One cant blame others if they do the same.

It would not be wrong to conclude that the general’s possession of power over the last seven years had not done the country much good, a fact that should suffice to induce second thoughts on his part.

The most serious deficiency in his concept of the national interest is that it allows no more than perfunctory concern with politics. He says he favours democracy, and that the system he has put in place is democratic enough. Political forces other than PML-Q, as well as most commentators on public affairs, both domestic and foreign, reject this claim. His system is not a tyranny; it allows a fair amount of freedom of expression, but it is no more than a halfway house on an uncharted road to democracy.

Genuine democracy, based on free and fair elections and faithful adherence to the Constitution, must be reckoned among the country’s most vital and urgent needs and, as such, it must be regarded as the core of any viable concept of the national interest.

Let us set aside the philosophical case for democracy, and let us limit ourselves to saying with Winston Churchill that while democracy may be a troublesome form of government, it is the best of all the available options. I should like to add another consideration.

In the course of their developmental journey over the last one hundred years, our people have, as of about four decades ago, reached a stage where they do want to be governed by their chosen representatives. They feel they are entitled to it, and they will be content with nothing less. There is surely merit in the view that disaffection in Sindh, insurrections in Balochistan and Waziristan, and the general breakdown of law and order in the country can ultimately be traced to our authoritarian rulers’ persistent denial of the peoples right to representative and accountable government. The GDP may be rising, but in many other ways the country is going under.

We see indications that General Musharraf intends to deepen his alignment with PML-Q, a party led by a bunch of opportunists. His friends, if he has any, must try to persuade him to give up this option. As Kunwar Idris wrote last Sunday (March 26), and as several readers have said to me in their e-mail messages, this party’s show of strength in Lahore on March 23 was made possible partly by the police, who seized hundreds of buses and vans and forced them to take persons, in some cases even their own passengers, to the party’s meeting place.

There is no way this party can win a majority in the next election without rigging it, and rigging cannot happen without the general’s support or at least consent. If the election is rigged once again, the country’s political system will suffer severe disruption and may even fall apart. Does General Musharraf wish to take responsibility for that kind of an outcome?

One may ask how he will remain president beyond October 2007 if he does not align with PML-Q and does not enable it to win the next election through rigging. He might get re-elected if he were to be content with being a constitutional head of state, but he might not. In any case, another option should merit his consideration.

He is a soldier, a man of honour, a patriot, professing to be intensely dedicated to the national interest. He seized the government in October 1999, presumably believing that he would thus protect and promote the national interest. If it now transpires that he can retain power after 2007 only by crooked means that will devastate this country as a polity, he should be wiling to give it up.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US. E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

THE death sentence proposed for Abdur Rehman, an Afghan Muslim who converted to Christianity, has caused reverberations worldwide. The sentence is provided in Afghanistan’s penal code and endorsed by the country’s clerics. In the pause between the indictment and trial, Hamid Karzai’s moderate government was relieved of a painful dilemma when Italy offered asylum to Rehman.

Quite predictably, Pakistan’s orthodox clerics went along with their Afghan counterparts. But, refreshingly, important religio-political parties and their leaders stayed silent and aloof which is indicative of their indifference, if not dissent.

Killing a person for changing his religion is utterly incomprehensible to present-day liberal thinkers. To them, belonging to one religion or another, or none at all, is the choice of an individual and no concern of the state or society, much less an offence (if the individual converts to another faith) deserving of punishment. This is not only true for the liberal intelligentsia, but also for the vast majority of the adherents of any faith.

At a conference in America, this writer met a delegate from a Pacific island who was a Christian. His father was a Muslim and his mother a Christian. One child chose to follow the father’s faith and the other the mother’s. Along with a Hindu uncle, the family celebrated Eid, Christmas and Diwali with equal fervour.

The orthodox view clashes not just with liberal thought but with international conventions as well. The UN General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. Article 18, relevant to the subject, reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

Pakistan is a signatory to this declaration and so are most countries. Maybe Afghanistan is not. But the question to consider is whether the contents of the declaration are contrary to religious injunctions on the subject. The views and interpretations in answer to this question may differ but Muslims of all sects and persuasions agree that the Holy Quran is the final and complete code of life bequeathed to mankind for all times to come. The Quranic injunction that “there is no compulsion in religion” sums up in a few words what Article 18 of the UN declaration says in a long-winded sentence. Then, Sura Maida’s verse 92 enjoins: “Obey Allah and obey the Apostle, and beware (of evil): If ye do turn back know ye that it is Our Apostle’s duty to proclaim (the message) in the clearest manner.” Thus those who “turn back” are to be persuaded and not killed.

Verses 104-107 of Sura Anam reinforce this principle: “Now have come to you from your Lord, proofs to open your eyes: if any will see, it will be for (the good of) his own soul; If any will be blind, It will be to his own (harm): I am not (here) to watch over your doings. Thus do We explain the signs by various (symbols) that they may say, Thou hast taught us diligently, and that We may make the matter clear to those who know.

“Follow what thou art taught by inspiration from the Lord: There is no god but He: and turn aside from those who join gods with Allah. If it had been Allah’s plan, they would not have taken false gods: but We made thee not one to watch over their doings, nor art thou set over them to dispose of their affairs.” The emphasis in all these verses is on persuasion and proof, not imposition.

The same message comes through many other verses. Verse 86 of Sura Al-i-Imran, for instance: “How shall Allah guide those who reject faith after they accepted it and bore witness that the Apostle was true and that clear signs had come unto them? But Allah guides not a people unjust”. Those who reject Islam after accepting it, thus, are to be left to their own fate and not killed.

References to punishment for apostates do occur in the Holy Quran but only when, in addition, they plot or wage war. Verse 13 of Sura Tauba says: “Will ye not fight people who violated their oaths, plotted to expel the Apostle, and took the aggressive by being the first (to assault) you? Do ye fear them? Nay, it is Allah Whom ye should more justly fear, if ye believe.” And verse 33 of Sura Maida: “The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: That is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.”

For retracting from faith, unless followed by intrigue, murder or war, no punishment is envisaged in the Holy Quran nor was anyone punished in the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) or his righteous caliphs. The notorious Musailma Kazzab after apostasy turned rebel and aspired to share not just the prophethood but sovereignty as well. Likewise one scribe of the divine revelations, was ordered to be put to death for a political crime many years after abjuring Islam but he too was pardoned by the Holy Prophet on the intercession of Hazrat Usman.

The Quranic injunctions and the subsequent events, thus, heavily weigh against the punishment of death, or a lesser punishment, for apostasy. Disputations and conflicting interpretations aside, the humane spirit of the Islamic faith shines in our own Sufi Bulleh Shah’s cry of anguish: Masjid dhaa day, mandir dhaa day, dhaa day jo kuchh dhainda: / Ikk kisay da dil na dhaaven, Rab dilann vich rehnda

For the clerics who insist on killing we need to join poet Faiz in his prayer: Aaiye haath utthaain ham bhee / Hum jinhen rasm-i-dua yaad nahin Hum jinhen soze-e-muhabbat kay siva / koee but koee khuda yaad nahin. (Come let us also raise our hands in prayer, We who no longer remember ritual and prayer, We who know only the warmth of love, Know not any idol or any god)

And further: Jin ka deen pairavee-e-kizb-o-riya hai unko / Himmat-e-kufr miley, jurat-e-tahqeeq miley / Jin kay sar muntazir-e-tegh-e-jafaa hain unko / Dast-e-qatil ko jhatak deyney kee tawfeeq miley (Those whose faith is to perpetrate fraud and deceit, have courage to deny their faith, have courage to enquire, those whose necks await the fall of the cruel sword, have strength to shake the hands of the executioner.)

Pakistan has had enough of murder and terror at the hands of the extremists. It should hark back to its saints and sufis to create conditions of peace and tolerance where the tortured of other faiths seek asylum.