ANY policy statement emanating from Washington is always a matter of interest, but when it is as comprehensive and critical a document as a new national security strategy of the US, it is certainly an event of special importance to all foreign capitals. Therefore, President Bush’s new national security strategy, unveiled on March 16, needs careful analysis, even though it builds upon the earlier security document presented in September 2002.

In his accompanying letter to the American people, the president reiterates what his administration’s primary focus has been for the past years. In the very first sentence, Bush proclaims to his fellow-citizens and to the world: “America is at war.” He affirms that the 9/11 tragedy has made it imperative for the US to pursue “a war time security strategy”, and justifies this on the terrorism that has been fuelled by “an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder”.

In elaborating his new policy, the president builds on his earlier national strategy, wherein for the first time he had warned that the US would henceforth pursue a policy of prevention and preemption, if in the estimation of his administration, there was even a remote possibility of a threat arising to the US, at any point in time.

Since this strategy of pre-emption entailed going against recognized concepts of national sovereignty and independence, what the Bush administration had demanded was for the UN and other world bodies to conform to American requirements. Even more disturbing was the administration’s declaration that it would use the world body only when it would be supportive of his country’s national interests. On other occasions, it would simply ignore those international commitments and conventions, that did not suit its interests.

Having justified the invasion of Iraq primarily on this rationale of pre-emption, a clearly discernible shift towards the promotion of democracy and human rights was noticed. In fact, in his second inaugural address, President Bush referred repeatedly to his passion for democracy and freedom.

Consequently, it raised hopes and expectations, especially among those who had suffered enormously under oppressive regimes. Equally, it caused concern in capitals, where unrepresentative, authoritarian regimes held sway. This was particularly true of many Muslim states, which had pursued repressive policies, on the pretext that they were ensuring order and stability and thus countering extremist elements. They had, therefore, jumped enthusiastically on the American band wagon of the global war on terror, in the belief that such cooperation would shield them against any US interest in issues such as democracy and human rights.

This latest national security document continues to talk of these two goals: the pursuit of the war on terror and the promotion of democracy and freedom. In the chapter entitled, ‘Overview of America’s National Strategy’, the president states that it is US policy “to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.” He even argues that “the fundamental character of regimes” matters to the US, because the goal of its statecraft is to “create a world of democratic, well-governing states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”

While enumerating American successes in this endeavour, the paper speaks of positive developments in Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco. But this is of course, highly debatable, for little of substance has changed in them. After a few hesitant half steps, they appear to have receded back into their old “siege mentalities”, having succeeded in convincing the US that any liberalization would unleash far too many uncertainties. In other words, the risks were far greater than any advantage that may accrue from such a course. Of course, the election victories of Islamist parties in Egypt, Iraq and Palestine helped reinforce this point of view.

Not surprisingly, Afghanistan and Iraq find special mention in the paper. The lingering problems in the first are ignored, permitting the document to claim Afghanistan as a “success” for US policy, that “must be consolidated”. As regards Iraq, there is no admission that the invasion may have been based on questionable evidence, or that the strategy pursued thereafter may have been flawed. Fearing that any retreat from Iraq would enable the terrorists to claim that the US is “a waning power”, the administration remains determined to pursue its current political and security agenda there.

While discussing regional conflicts, the paper claims improved relations between India and Pakistan as a success for its policy of promoting regional understanding. Of special interest to Pakistan, may be the reference to US offering its “good offices” to resolve regional conflicts and its willingness “to play this role when appropriate”. However, such an initiative in South Asia is highly unlikely, especially now that the US has elevated its ties with India to a strategic level. It will, however, continue, as in the past, to encourage the South Asian neighbours to maintain their current normalization process. On the issue of national security, the policy paper reiterates the declaration first made in September 2002, that it will remain American policy to “anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power before the threat could do grave damage.” This is elaborated by the claim that even “if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack”, the US will not hesitate “to take anticipatory action.” This is, of course, a powerful reiteration of the Administration’s strong belief in the right of pre-emption.

Among the threats that continue to deeply worry the US, the proliferation of WMD, understandably, occupies a special place. It vows to counter WMD proliferation through “proactive counter-proliferation efforts”. To this end, the administration will not be deterred by international commitments, as evidenced by its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, when it wished to deploy ballistic missile defence. In this context, it claims that its May 2003 initiative, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which more than 70 countries have joined in, either voluntarily or through diplomatic persuasion, has been most successful.

When it comes to the likely challenges, the document lists these as Iran, North Korea and terrorists seeking WMD. Viewing nuclear proliferation, as “the greatest danger to US national security”, the administration will pursue the twin objectives of preventing states from acquiring the capability to produce fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons, and secondly, “to deter, interdict or prevent” any transfer of that material to “rogue states”, or to terrorists. To this end, the Administration will try to close the provision in the NPT, which it calls a “loop hole” that allows countries to produce fissile material that can later be used to make nuclear weapons.

The reference obviously is to Iran, but this is not the only concern the US has about this country. Iran is accused of virtually every sin under the sun. These are listed as pursuit of nuclear weapons, sponsoring terrorism, threatening Israel, thwarting the Middle East peace process, disrupting democracy in Iraq and denying freedom to its people. With an indictment as severe as this, it is no surprise to learn that the US will seek to challenge Iran’s “dangerous ambitions”. In contrast, North Korea, though it “poses a serious nuclear proliferation challenge” to the US, can continue to look forward to a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the problem”.

The section on China, India and Pakistan merits special attention. The first occupies considerable space, reflective of America’s growing concern over China’s increasing global influence. It is treated with some deference, when it is called upon to act “as a responsible member of the international community as it becomes a global power”. China is, nevertheless, accused of continuing to “hold on to old ways of thinking and acting, that exacerbates concerns throughout the world”. These are listed as continuing military expansion; aggressive trade policy; “locking” up energy supplies and supporting oppressive regimes. While the administration will continue “to encourage China to make the right strategic choices”, the US is prepared to act “against other possibilities.”

India, not surprisingly, receives the kind of praise and adulation that now emanates regularly from Washington. India is “a great democracy” with which their “shared values are the foundation of our good relations”. The two countries have also made great strides in transforming their relationship, because they share a commitment “to freedom, democracy and the rule of law”. The July 2005 Bush-Manmohan agreement is described as a “roadmap” that should enable India to “shoulder global obligations.”

The reference to Pakistan is brief and in passing. In fact, America’s limited agenda with Pakistan comes out when the document declares that “America’s relations with Pakistan will not be a mirror image of our relations with India.” So much for our expectations from the US. The usual nod to democracy is, however, reflected in the paper, when it states “we are eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure and democratic path.”

This strategy paper is important not only for the information that it contains but also because it reveals the philosophy that is likely to guide this administration for the rest of its term.

It is evident that the events of 9/11 continue to have a profound influence on the thinking of President Bush. In fact, he continues to view the world through the prism of that tragedy which helped his administration mobilize US public opinion behind a neo-conservative foreign policy. There is, therefore, a fresh reiteration of the strategy unveiled in the September 2002 document, namely his resolve and determination that America should never again be caught by surprise. It is on this premise that he justifies his uncompromising adherence to the philosophy of pre-emption, even if this were to lead to abridgement of some of those rights and privileges that the Americans have traditionally enjoyed; and a disdain for international treaties and obligations, that come in the way of American interests.

There is, however, a distinct lowering of the rhetoric in favour of democracy and freedom, that was so pronounced in Bush’s second inaugural address. Clearly, the expectation that the invasion of Iraq would usher in democracy to the region, was highly unrealistic. Instead, Iraq has damaged America’s moral authority and exposed its military limitations. And, to the horror of the Americans, the recent elections in Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Palestine have revealed the growing popularity and strength of Islamist parties. It is true that the US cannot expect to export democracy to the rest of the world. In fact, promoting democracy and freedom in Muslim countries, will never be easy, or risk-free. But fair, balanced and equitable American policies are more likely to encourage the growth of democratic institutions in Islamic societies, rather than adventures such as those in Iraq, or forced regime change in Iran.

IT should have been Pakistan’s initiative. But some of us Indians took it. Nearly 50, including two Lok Sabha members from Orissa and one former Delhi chief justice, laid flowers in Lahore at the Shadman Chowk, the spot where Bhagat Singh and his two comrades, Sukhdev and Rajguru, were hanged by the British 75 years ago. We delayed the ceremony by a day because of the Pakistan Day celebrations on March 23.

We did not publicise the Bhagat Singh martyrdom day purposely because some of my liberal friends in Pakistan had warned me that religious parties might react adversely. I had reason to suspect some outlandish reaction because when I had approached the Punjab (Pakistan) government some years ago for archival material for my book on Bhagat Singh they had told me that “they were afraid lest they should get entangled in the Sikh problem.”

After all, the ceremony was the first of its kind after the formation of Pakistan, although Bhagat Singh was a national hero. A few people from Shadman colony strayed in and watched what we did. But the friends I invited in Pakistan were not able to make it. Most of them were in Karachi to attend the World Social Forum. Still, there were many who could have come but did not. Communists were conspicuous by their absence. I suspect people, on the whole, were afraid.

This is in line with my reading of liberals in the subcontinent. They are willing to strike but afraid to wound. I saw how they caved in in my own country during the emergency when there was not even army rule. Today those very people are part and parcel of the government and serve as a channel for pressure and prize.

In the afternoon, there was a function in memory of the martyrs in the subcontinent. The hall was packed to capacity. However, the organisers were particular not to mention Bhagat Singh’s name on the invitation card. They did not want to come into the open. Still, it was brave of them.

My assessment over the years is that fear stalks the land called Pakistan. People are afraid to speak out in public what they say in private. None likes the “uniformed democracy.” Yet, none dares to hold a meeting or demonstration to point out that the dumb show of democracy is limited to what is permitted. No doubt, the press is free. People’s movement is free. But no party agitates against the ban on open political activity. Protest is confined to mere press statements.

What torments me is that the public is getting reconciled to the system of partial freedom. There are no stirrings to challenge it. Many liberals have joined the long list of beneficiaries. Thousands of people are willing to come to streets to protest on religious matters but none in the name of democracy. The control by the army and its agencies is so deep and so pervasive that the 2007 election may turn out to be another farce. Candidates to be elected may be sifted from the rest on the day of their nomination. It has happened in the past. Some may still be returned. But they will be nowhere near the majority. A free and fair election is difficult to envisage in Pakistan, whatever the US may declare.

I recall when I interviewed the then President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the beginning of 1972, asking him whether the army could come back. He laughed and said: “My people will come on the streets to fight the tanks.” After Pakistan adopted the 1973 Constitution, he said in a speech that the people, especially the brightest and the best among them, would protect it “with their blood and with their lives.” That did not happen. General Zia-ul Haq walked in easily. Pakistan’s long history of military rule has sapped people’s energy as well as their will to resist. Feudal as Pakistan society has been, it has become more feudal and less democratic even in its day-to-day life.

Nonetheless, if posterity were ever to record the reasons for the loss of democracy in Pakistan, India’s attitude would be blamed the most. From day one, the latter’s effort has been how to humiliate Pakistan. A country whose founder died early without building institutions was burdened with responsibilities of security. New Delhi’s fear did not allow Islamabad to settle down.

The Pakistan policy in India is framed by bureaucrats and implemented by bureaucrats who have not changed in the last 50 years. Unfortunately, at a crucial time between the two countries, the foreign office had ministers who were ex-bureaucrats. Nothing came out of meetings with Pakistan, which was equally obstructive and even obscurantist. The tragedy is that both New Delhi and Islamabad are guided by people whose minds are tainted.

When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered Pakistan a peace and friendship treaty, he was out of Delhi, away from advisers and experts. South and North Blocks are too oppressively intolerant to let a different point of view see the light of day. The issue of the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek which Manmohan Singh wants settled should have been out of the way long ago.

The controversy over the Baglihar dam would not have arisen if New Delhi had been transparent in its construction plans. After Manmohan Singh’s offer, confidence-building measures should be easier to settle. But my worry is that advisers and experts are going to come in the way because they are far distant from the prime minister’s thinking.

I wish we could separate Kashmir from the normalization with Pakistan. We have vainly tried to do so for years. Islamabad’s entire policy has been against de-linking because Kashmir has continued to be the point over which anti-India sentiments have been aroused. However, Manmohan Singh has himself suggested a way out. His ideas of helping Kashmir jointly can be given concrete shape by handing over all subjects, except defence, foreign affairs and communications to the Kashmiris on both sides of the border. The border should be made soft for people living in the two parts. They should be allowed to have their own air service to connect foreign countries or anything else jointly.

But for selling such a formula, there is need for people-to-people contact. Unfortunately, it is lessening because of visa restrictions. Whatever the statements, the governments in both countries issued fewer visas in recent months.

The inconveniences have increased manifold. The CID still bothers the people who meet visitors from the other side. Manmohan Singh’s offer has little meaning if the walls on the border are to remain as they are.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.