THE July visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the US was hailed by both sides as a “historical watershed”. The true import of this visit, however, has not been sufficiently grasped by Pakistan, in particular the long-term adverse impact that growing Indo-US relations, especially in the context of a strategic partnership, would have on Pakistan.

Wide-ranging bilateral agreements, particularly those under the rubric of the “Framework for the US India Defence Relationship”, establish India as a major world power.

Of all the defence-related agreements, the most significant in its reach and impact has been the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI will confer on India a special status in the 44-member Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG), granting it permanent exemption from NSG guidelines which currently prevent India from purchasing nuclear reactors and bars nuclear cooperation with non-NPT members.

Major nuclear powers Britain, France and Canada are supportive of a special status for India, while Sweden has asked some “hard questions” and Brazil, Argentina and South Africa are at present opposed. The US is, however, determined to obtain the approval, as the proposal is “a key element of bilateral nuclear cooperation”, with India which it regards as “a strategic priority.”

President Bush is scheduled to visit India early next year and the administration is according the meeting high priority to securing NSG and US legislative approval needed for the implementation of this agreement. The next NSG session is scheduled in May 2006 but a special meeting would be convened to cross the hurdle. Congressional approval will be required before the meeting so that other nuclear suppliers may not beat US companies to the lucrative Indian markets.

The US proposal would effectively recognize India as the sixth nuclear weapons state and make it “assume responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantage as other leading countries in sensitive nuclear technologies.”

The agreement would require India to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place the civilian ones under IAEA safeguards and also sign an additional protocol allowing intrusive IAEA inspections of its military nuclear facilities. While initial reports indicated a “deep unease” on Capitol Hill with several legislations expressing concerns that the deal excessively benefited India and undermined international efforts for non-proliferation that US administration remains confident of congressional approval.

The lawmakers have been told that India’s nuclear weapons do not pose a threat to America’s security or geo-political interests. In fact, the strategic partnership is seen as advancing America’s strategic objectives in Asia and beyond. It is also being argued in some circles that the agreement is a part of a grand strategy being laid by the to prepare US for a conflict with China and constructing an anti-China coalition. “In that scenario India is even more valuable as a nuclear power rather than as a non-nuclear country.” This also explains the US policy to help India become, “a major world power in the 21st century.”

Ashley J. Tellis, an analyst of Indian origin with Carnegie Endowment, in a study entitled “India as a new global power. An action agenda for the United States” argues that India should be viewed as part of the solution to nuclear non-proliferation rather than as a part of the problem.” He goes on to recommend that “by integrating India into the non-proliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent, the US would place New Delhi at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also US interest in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term.”

The considerable opposition to the US-India nuclear deal on the Hill can be overcome with those strategic implications and India’s volte face in IAEA on the Iranian vote which has already softened US legislators’ concern. The Indian vote, in the forthcoming meeting in Vienna will finally set at rest their concerns. Nuclear experts and those committed to non-proliferation have expressed opposition to the deal in their testimonies before the International Relations Committee meeting on Oct 26, but their real impact is only academic.

There is no denying that there are considerable difficulties and opposition to the proposed deal, but looking at the broader picture of how both countries perceive the deal of permanent interest against their respective potential and strategic objectives, the agreement after initial hiccups would go through.

United States, in the words of under-secretary of state Nicholas Burns “considers India to be one of our most important partners worldwide. We have never had a relationship in nearly 60 years with India like the one we have now established.”

The NSG countries, after initial reservations, are also likely to defer to the US proposal. They may, however, seek more information from India, particularly on the classification of its civil and military reactors. India has 14 nuclear reactors and eight are under different stages of construction. Manmohan Singh in his forthcoming Moscow visit in mid-December into ask for four additional nuclear reactors for the Koodan Mulam atomic power plant, after the NSG impediment has been cleared.

The Indian declaration of a particular facility as civil or military could, however, pose problems. Canada is already watching how the CIRUS reactor set up by it would be categorized. It is not under IAEA safeguards. However, Canada did stipulate that it could be used only for peaceful purposes. Nonetheless, CIRUS has produced much of the weapons plutonium stockpile, and could produce up to 10 kilogrammes of plutonium in a year.

India is required to initiate actions on its part simultaneously with NSG and Capitol Hill actions to facilitate the process. India would file the declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA. Until now it had agreed to put only the new facilities, like the two Tarapur reactors and one Rajasthan under IAEA control.

India is also required to secure its nuclear material and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These actions are “different, complex and time consuming”, as Burns noted. The US action at the Hill would be concurrent to the Indian “taking the necessary steps to fulfil our agreement.”

While the US leadership has extended assurances to Pakistan that the nuclear deal with India is not against Pakistan, its serious implications for Pakistan’s security cannot be overlooked. Pakistan must persevere in its demand for being accorded a similar status at par with India. The Pakistani role in and contribution to the war against terror has been phenomenal and has vastly served US security interests. Why can’t the US reciprocate, by following to a non-discriminatory approach towards India and Pakistan? The China dimension of the emerging nuclear relations between New Delhi and Washington must be causing serious concern to Beijing.

Given our 40 years of close partnership with China, it would be worthwhile to convince China that a similar “strategic partnership” with Pakistan would redress the imbalance in the region to our mutual advantage. The selective application of the NPT by the US should also release China from any obligation not to follow the same course.

To pre-empt Pakistan getting a similar deal during his Washington visit, Manmohan Singh raised the bogey of “religious extremists” seizing Pakistan’s nuclear assets. “I have to be realistic enough to recognize the role that terrorist elements have played in the last few years in the history of Pakistan.”

Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran in a lecture explaining India’s vote against Iran at the Sept 24 IAEA meeting dilated on the same theme. He called for “a new global consensus on non-proliferation which can take into account new challenges, based on new and more stringent standards being observed in expert controls on sensitive technologies such as these involved in reprocessing and enrichment” and referred to Dr. A.Q. Khan as “a man who has been accused of running a global nuclear Wal-mart.”