Iraqi consensus

THE demonstration of unity by Iraqi leaders in Cairo on Monday is unprecedented. Muslims and Christians, Shias and Sunnis, and, of course, Kurds joined hands for the first time since the end of the Baathist regime to come out with a common stand on some crucial issues, including a time-table for “the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops”. The statement issued after the meeting did not name the US, but it is obvious that a decision to withdraw the American-led foreign troops must come from Washington. The Bush administration must take notice of this unanimous Iraqi demand, for it has repeatedly declared that it could not give a time-table for withdrawal because this could prove counter-productive. In fact, recently the US increased the number of its troops in Iraq from nearly 140,000 to 161,000. But this has not lowered the level of violence.

The joint statement does not confine itself merely to withdrawal. As a perusal of the statement will show, all Iraqi factions have agreed on a number of other points, including the release of the detainees and a programme of reconstruction for their devastated country. Reconstruction obviously cannot take place in a situation of anarchy, which is what one witnesses in Iraq these days. The country’s security apparatus is far from complete so that the responsibility for security devolves on the foreign troops. This has only strengthened the resistance and led to a high level of casualties both for foreign troops and civilians who are sometimes deliberately targeted by the militants, especially those led by Abu Musab Zarqawi, chief of Al Qaeda’s Iraqi chapter. The Cairo meeting thus rightly demanded the launching of a programme for rebuilding the Iraqi armed forces in a way that would enable them to control terrorism.

As for the Sunni minority, two of its demands have been met. First, President Jalal Talabani, who was in Cairo for the meeting, said Iraqi resistance had “a legitimate right” to resistance and offered an olive branch to “non-jihadi resistance”. Secondly, the conference called for a time-table for the withdrawal of occupation forces, which was a major Sunni demand. It remains to be seen whether the outcome of the Cairo conference will lead to a change in the Sunni attitude. The parliamentary elections and the ratification of the constitution by a popular referendum — with the turnout in both cases being 60 per cent — mean that the vast majority of Iraqis are willing to push the democratic process forward and live together as one nation. The Sunni leadership can make a vital contribution to the strengthening of the Iraqi state structure if it denounces violence and decides to join hands with the Shias and Kurds, who along with Christians, constitute 80 per cent of the population. United, they can defeat terrorism which has killed more Iraqi civilians than foreign troops. Iraq needs peace and sustained development so as to heal the wounds of war and move the country towards the position to which it is entitled by virtue of its size and resources and the ingenuity of its people. A failure of the democratic process could prove disastrous, accentuate fissiparous tendencies — especially in Kurdish north — and precipitate a dismemberment of Iraq. This would not be in the interest of the Arab-Islamic people and could in fact lead to a process of fragmentation of other Middle Eastern states.

Integrity is important

NOW that the donors have opened their purse strings and the availability of financial resources is not such a major constraint in the earthquake survivors’ relief and rehabilitation, the top concern of the people and the foreign donors is to ensure transparency and accountability. It is unfortunate but the fact is that Pakistan has such a deplorable reputation in terms of integrity and incorruptability that its credibility is now at stake. It is important that the government should devise a mechanism to ensure that not a penny of the money meant for relief and rehabilitation work is misused or wasted. We hear of committees being set up — sometimes one gets the impression that there is a surfeit of them which may not be something very good either as too many cooks can spoil the broth. With an “oversight committee”, a parliamentary committee, a system of third-party verification of contracts and procurement, an institutionalized parliamentary debate on a quarterly basis and a system of quarterly reporting to the Auditor-General by the Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) one should have been reassured that the funds will not be squandered or pocketed. But doubts remain.

It would be a sensible move if the government were to devise a system under which these committees will work. It would help if ERRA were to broadly announce the various heads under which expenditure is expected to be incurred. Sub-committees should manage each item and a weekly report giving each and every detail should be given to the sub-committee. More important, surprise checks and inspections should be provided for and facilitated if sub-committee members wish to investigate a matter. To allow wider participation in this process, the government should set up a website (which it has promised) and update it daily. This should give the details that are presented to the sub-committee. Finally, a complaint cell would also be handy and any one — survivor, donor, interested observer — can lodge a complaint if he is not satisfied with the level of transparency, the way the money is being spent or even the management of the website. This will at least reassure those who feel concerned.

The evil that is ‘vani’

THE news that desperate parents of five daughters from Mianwali appealed to the president and the Supreme Court last week in a bid to save their daughters from the primitive custom of vani — under which girls/women are offered for marriage as compensation to settle debts or disputes — is a reminder of its ugly presence in our society. Now that these five girls are of marriageable age, and are well educated unlike their illiterate ‘husbands to be’, they have refused to marry them. But the other side is indignant and has rejected all offers of compensation; two of the girls’ brothers were even shot at and wounded and the culprits later released on bail. Sadly, we have become all too familiar with such practises. In 2002, a 20-year-old girl, who was married off when she was only four months old, rejected the marriage and was fined Rs300,000, a sum the family was only too happy to pay to secure her freedom. Only in February this year, a vani case was reported in Bahawalnagar where a two-year-old girl had been married to a 42-year-old man as some kind of ‘settlement’.

There are existing laws that prohibit child marriages or the giving away of a woman for effecting a compromise, and despite strong condemnation by Islamic scholars, human rights activists, jurists and political leaders, vani continues. None of this offers solace to the parents of these young women who have toiled hard to educate themselves in a society that does not quite approve of women’s emancipation. It is only when the Supreme Court takes notice of such cases that girls are saved from a cruel fate — which is what one is hoping for in this case too. The state must ensure that existing laws are strictly enforced while decisions on controversial laws like the Hudood Ordinance need to be promptly made. Those who practise vani must be given the maximum punishment.

Bland man’s bluff

THE row in Britain over the memoirs of a former ambassador to the United States would have made a little more sense had Sir Christopher Meyer’s book featured at least a few startling revelations. Going by the copious extracts published by The Guardian and The Daily Mail, it does not.

Newspapers, in such cases, tend to publicize the most sensational and salacious segments of a book. It’s reasonably safe to assume, therefore, that the highlights of DC Confidential are, essentially, Meyer’s personal opinions and observations, which range from the entirely predictable to the mildly interesting. We learn, for instance, that he doesn’t have a high opinion of some of Tony Blair’s senior-most ministers, including Jack Straw, who is described as a pygmy, and John Prescott, who allegedly lapses into malapropisms.

It is only marginally more entertaining to be informed that there’s a certain amount of confusion at No.10 Downing Street over what casual attire means. On the occasion of one walk in the woods with George W. Bush at a US presidential retreat, Blair squeezed into such a tight pair of corduroys that he couldn’t even put his hands in his pockets. Another time the first lady restrained “Bushie” from launching into a speech when it turned out the British prime minister had slipped away to change after realizing that he was the only person wearing jeans at the gathering.

This, clearly, is not the sort of information anyone could not have happily lived about. Nor is there a great deal to be gained from the knowledge that Bush “split his sides” at a private movie screening upon discovering that one of the main characters in Meet The Parents is called Gay Focker. However, to be fair to Meyer, petty gossip and low-level insults are not the mainstay of his autobiographical account. Given that he served as ambassador until the eve of the invasion of Iraq, he was inevitably involved in the machinations that preceded the war.

His main thesis in this regard can be summarized thus: The US was keen not to be seen as the lone aggressor. Since no other power of any significance was willing to take part in the unprovoked and illegal attack, this allowed Britain an unusual degree of leverage in Washington. Had he so desired, Blair could have prevailed upon the Bush administration to adjust his course. But he did not even try, because he was determined that his support for the US must be unquestioning and unconditional.

These claims back up what is already widely accepted about the Blair regime’s loyalty to the centre of power across the Atlantic. Meyer was, after all, present at many of the direct contacts between the two administrations. And it is certainly interesting to find out that, on being appointed to the Washington Post in 1997, his task was spelt out in no uncertain terms by Blair’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell: “We want you to get up the arse of the White House and stay there.” The sentiment is unsurprising, although it might have been more prudent to leave the metaphor to critics of New Labour’s special relationship with their American cousins.

Blair got along famously with Bill Clinton, and the turn-of-the-millennium regime change in the US was accompanied by apprehensions on the part of Meyer and his ilk that the British prime minister may find it hard to transfer his affections to a far-right Republican. But all such fears were banished once Tony met George shortly after the latter’s inauguration. It took 9/11, however, to consummate that affair. And they’ve never looked back. Not so far, anyhow.

There is some merit in Meyer’s contention that Blair could indeed have tried harder to influence the course of events instead of just going with the flow. However, his apparent belief that the march towards war wasn’t irreversible until the last few months, and that Blair and Bush hadn’t irrevocably set themselves on that course in early 2002, defies common sense and contradicts the available evidence.

Meyer does not suggest that the war could, or should, have been avoided. He continues to believe that the aggressive course was justified. His dissent is restricted to the opinion that the invasion would have taken a different course had it been postponed until the autumn of 2003. Why? Because it would have allowed more time for post-war planning. And because it may have been possible to persuade Russia and France to change their minds about a second United Nations resolution, which could have taken care of the illegality factor.

As for the weapons of mass destruction, Meyer persists in the belief that they existed; he thinks they may have been spirited away to Syria or Iran. We have, of course, heard that one before, but not for a long time, because even the likes of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld would feel a trifle embarrassed about regurgitating that particular rumour.

Meyer is, of course, gravely mistaken: aggression in October would have proved as disastrous as it did in April. Postponement could, however, have proved advantageous in ways he appears incapable of envisaging. The huge popular push against the war in February 2003 may conceivably have evolved into a more coherent peace movement, thereby making it harder at least for Bush’s European partners to commit troops to the dastardly enterprise. Secondly, had the weapons inspections continued for a few months longer, the inability of Hans Blix’s gang to track down a smoking gun would have added to international anti-war pressure.

In pre-publication interviews, Meyer was earlier this month quoted as saying that he considered it ridiculous to pretend that the July 7 bombings were unrelated to Britain’s role in the Iraq war. At the same time, he implied that it was an acceptable price to pay for what was, despite its flaws, a noble enterprise. In his book he cites a French commander’s comment on observing the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War: “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre” - “It is magnificent, but it is not war.” He’s wrong again. It is war, and there is nothing remotely magnificent about it.

The Blair government’s attacks on Meyer during the past week have hardly dwelt on Iraq. Straw and Prescott, for instance, have both criticized him for revealing that former prime minister John Major, whom Meyer served as press secretary a decade ago, was in the habit of receiving him in his bedroom every morning while getting dressed. “Major would prowl the bedroom in his shirt-tails,” writes Meyer, fulminating about something in the Daily Mail or Sun. Occasionally I was summoned into the prime ministerial bathroom, where, as I spoke, he would discharge some ablution.”

Not a pretty picture, admittedly, but hardly a serious indiscretion. Straw and Prescott are obviously more upset by Meyer’s withering remarks about them, but presumably feel it would seem peevish to make a fuss specifically on that account. Others have, not entirely inaccurately, pointed out that some of Meyer’s comments give the impression of a Tory patrician looking superciliously down his nose at the Labour rabble. The concern has also been raised that it becomes difficult for ministers to speak frankly with civil servants if they suspect that anything they say may be taken down and used against them in a breathless memoir.

That’s an understandable fear, but it must be balanced against the culture of secrecy among western governments, whereby the public’s right to know is invariably honoured in the breach. Is this how supposed democracies should be run? The decision-making in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq is a case in point. The crucial intelligence, it was said, could not be shared with the people: they had no choice but to trust their leaders. That trust, it turned out, was thoroughly and repeatedly betrayed.

It would obviously be far more useful if the machinations behind this betrayal could be exposed now, rather than 30, 50 or 100 years hence, when they would be of interest primarily to historians. It recently emerged, for instance, that back in 1970 Richard Nixon had formally instructed his aides to say one thing about Cambodia but to do something completely different. This reminds us that mass deception isn’t a Bush invention, but it may have made a big difference if the American public had been aware of this before they re-elected Nixon in 1972.

DC Confidential appears unlikely to contribute very much to the public record, not least because the author is churlish about the Blair administration (as it failed to give him the importance he thinks he deserved) but largely uncritical of the more accommodating Bush administration. His is a subjective account, and he has a few axes (not to be confused with the axis of evil) to grind.

Meyer has been under pressure to resign as chairman of the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) on account of two conflicts of interest: entering into a pecuniary relationship with two newspapers and holding shares in an arms manufacturing company. His riposte that the 250,000 pounds sterling he has earned from The Guardian and the Mail will be divided among three charities has encountered the hurdle that one of those charities is run by his wife.

Meanwhile, in a distinctly undiplomatic and anti-democratic measure, a book titled The Costs of War has been relegated to the rubbish heap by the British Foreign Office. Its author is Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who represented Britain at the UN during the hullabaloo over Iraq, and the censorship is said to have been personally ordered by Jack Straw. Which inevitably prompts the suspicion that it must be more relevant, and possibly more readable, than Meyer’s somewhat pompous effort.

Email: mahirali1@gmail.com