WRITING in these columns on August 18, I had expressed the fear that the fundamental lack of moral and legal legitimacy in the invasion of Iraq would vitiate subsequent efforts to build a new political order. The best hope at the time seemed to be a grand compromise between Shia and Sunni Arabs on the one hand, and between Arabs and Kurds on the other, in writing the new constitution.

A just and equitable constitutional scheme might have blunted the sharp edge of the violent resistance generally attributed to Sunni militants even though its complete termination would almost certainly follow, and not precede, the departure of foreign armies.

The original justification of the invasion in terms of Iraq’s non-existent weapons of mass destruction and complicity in terrorism already stood discredited and discarded even by those who had constructed it. Since the latest rationale for Iraq’s occupation was democracy, one was more than willing to concentrate one’s mind on its pre-requisites and imperatives in Iraq’s specific situation.

The history of democratization in the 20th century permits a relatively easy categorization of available models. A study of all the three so-called waves of democratization locates Iraq unambiguously amongst states where the existing authoritarian order was overthrown by force to pave the way for democracy. This was the category where war, invasion or a violent internal upheaval, often assisted from outside, brought down a deeply entrenched regime.

Reconstruction of a new democratic order in such cases highlighted several common motifs. The single most important factor was the quest for new compacts amongst various components of the “liberated” society. It even included identification and inclusion of elements of the ancien regime in an experiment of “pacted democracy” in return for their wholehearted abandonment of the oppressive policies or ideologies of the past. In Iraq’s case, there was a large peripheral segment of the defeated Ba’athist party which was amenable to cooption in a new dispensation. It was comparable to Argentina, Spain and perhaps even Greece during their democratic transformation.

Indiscriminate programmes of “de-Baathification” enforced ruthlessly right across the military and political structures of the one-party state greatly weakened the chances of creating new pacts of democracy. The intentions of the occupation powers also came under suspicion when they were seen to be reverting to the post-Ottoman British colonial strategy of dividing Iraqi society on ethnic and sectarian fault lines.

It is now commonly recognized that during the long period in which European politics was secularized — a period beginning with the French Revolution and continuing up to and perhaps beyond the Second World War — religion was an active principle of political organization.

The division of European political imagination between Christian democrats and social democrats, effective alternatives to communism and fascism, alone illustrated this fact. But the main thrust of politics was the emergence of political parties on social and economic policies that cut across ethnic, sectarian and sub-national allegiances.

In Iraq of 1920s, the British chose instead to create imperial loyalties by accentuating divisions in the society. The sad history of British-introduced constitutional politics in Iraq from 1921 to the bloody republican revolution of July 14, 1958, was a bitter harvest of this policy of divide and rule.

In 2003, the new imperial power, the United States returned to the same tactic in a massive departure from the spirit of its own constitution. The new polity for Iraq rested on two pillars: creation of a loyalist autonomous Kurdish state within the state and a reconfiguration of Shia majority provinces into a virtual sub-federation with wide powers.

Many western analysts have been frankly sceptical of the claim that democracy was the driving force behind this new polity. In an article on prospects of democracy in the region published in Middle East Policy, Alan Richards made the following trenchant observation: “This is the final barrier, then to a transition to democracy in the Arab region: the world’s sole superpower does not really, want it to happen, pious neoconservative rhetoric notwithstanding.”

Writing in Foreign Policy, Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers thought that the United States wanted democracy in the Middle East only “up to a point”. Noting that the new emphasis on democracy was a sharp reversal of several decades of steadfast support for many autocratic regimes in the region, they argued that, although this desire for democracy may be heartfelt, “the United States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbours stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power”. It is widely feared that free and unfettered elections will bring to power parties and people who would not have much enthusiasm for the American agenda.

Closer to the US objective in Iraq is the viewpoint of some Arab commentators who cannot be accused of being anti-American. They have suggested that what was being attempted was not democracy as generally understood but a much-needed transition to constitutionalism. It will legitimize the invasion and create a state apparatus that can advance US interests without the present level of troops in the country.

Many of these commentators, however, share a common apprehension. They consider the heavy reliance on Kurdish separatism and an opportunistic trade off between Shia dominance in most of the provinces with their expected subordination to the US regional agenda as a fragile basis.

The former may generate fears of Kurd-related instability in Iran, Turkey and Syria and, at the end of the day, the Shias may prove to be too Islamic, too nationalistic and too pro-Iranian for President Bush. Sunnis and Shias alike have multiple identities which co-existed and happily interacted during centuries of Ottoman rule and they still may not countenance a sectarian fragmentation of their common nation state. In fact the forbearance shown by the Shia leadership in the face of grave provocation by some mindless militant gangs in Iraq endorses this optimistic view.

The parliament will be elected on the basis of proportionate representation. This is encouraging alliances and common lists in all the three constituencies. On the face of it, it looks like an ominous battle order but, paradoxically, it may facilitate a mediation of differences later on. The major Shia parties, including the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was formed by Iraqi exiles in Iran and which I had then the opportunity to study in some detail in Tehran, the Da’awa Party of Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafri and the party of Sadr, have come together under the umbrella of the United Iraqi Alliance. A notable development is that the former prime minister, Iyad Allawi, a Shia leader whose links with British and American intelligence agencies have been widely exposed in the western media, has entered the arena on a non-sectarian and non-ethnic ticket. There are other secular parties in the field too. On their part, the Sunnis now have a coalition of three parties with a common list. The two globally-known Kurdish movements have also decided to put up an agreed list. Proportionate representation may well produce a House principally divided on sectarian and ethnic lines but with enough presence of moderates willing to mark out the common space necessary for the survival of Iraq as a single viable state.

Amongst several other factors that impinge on the Iraqi situation, four need to be mentioned in particular. First, the Sunni participation in the elections in December may not reduce the level of violence. This phalanx of resistance probably sees no virtue in the electoral process at all; at best, some moderate elements may consider militancy and constitutional procedures as two dimensions of the same struggle.

Secondly, the US-led reconstruction effort is beginning to flag. The security costs have made a big dent in the available funds. Furthermore, the operation has been neither optimal nor clean. A slow-down as money becomes scarce would play into the hands of the terrorists. Three, individual and corporate analysts of terrorism like the CIA agree that the “current war in Iraq will generate a ferocious blowback longer and more powerful than that from Afghanistan.” The Bush presidency will leave the world far more insecure than before its advent.

Fourth, notwithstanding the brave declarations to ‘stay the course’, the Iraq policy of President Bush is beginning to unravel. No less than 55 per cent of Americans think that the invasion was a mistake. Only 40 per cent regard the present handling of the war as satisfactory. More and more members of the strategic community now draw parallels with Vietnam and urge Bush to stop reinforcing failure. As the American death toll crossed the 2,000 mark, a new feeling of futility about the Iraq war became discernible.

The Iraqi parliament may come into existence in a new ethos that puts greater reliance on internal mediation, adjustment and compromise than on an alien occupation army. Election in December, even under military occupation, may still create a political forum that provides a basis for holding Iraq together. It may still enable the Iraqi nation to pull itself back from the precipice. Should the Iraqis make that choice, the neighbouring Arab states, Iran and Turkey should be at hand to assist them in all possible ways.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. E-mail: tanvir.a.khan.@gmail.com