Welcome quiet on the eastern front
By A.R. Siddiqi
IT REMAINS serenely quiet on our perpetually-troubled eastern front. It has been like this since May 2003 when an 18-month-long deployment by India against Pakistan following an attack on its parliament in December 2001 ended.
The eastern front has been the arena of any number of border confrontations like the so-called 1951 Flap and the two wars of 1965 and 1971. The 1951 crisis was initiated by then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and won a riposte in kind from prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan.
Nehru had overreacted against the infiltration of ‘jehadi’ forces into Kashmir. Liaquat brandished his famous ‘clenched fist’ — to end the border crisis without any apparent exertion by either side. The prevailing quiet along the eastern border is therefore a positive departure from our warring history.
President Pervez Musharraf’s famous handshake with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2003 at the Saarc conference in Kathmandu might have been the first step on what looked like a 1000-mile journey. The handshake paved the way for the end of the stand-off of 2001-2003, the longest and potentially the most ominous between the two neighbours. The year 2004 opened on an encouraging fraternal note, bringing the two countries in a close and what appears to be a lasting embrace through a process of a composite dialogue.
A key feature of the composite dialogue is the resolve on either side to keep it going and discuss everything under the sun without relegating the core issue to secondary status. The Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting in Islamabad in January 2004 followed by the Musharraf-Manmohan meetings in New Delhi and New York stamped the process with an honest and firm guarantee yet to be formally underwritten.
Now, the earthquake disaster of 2005, despite a less-than-full response from India, has underscored the endurance of the composite dialogue and the mutual resolve to keep it on course. A natural cataclysm holds the potential of acting as a catalyst for peace, if handled sympathetically and far-sightedly. Along with the rest of the world, India responded promptly to help Pakistan. However, its response has been somewhat niggardly. To Pakistan’s offer of throwing the LoC open to Kashmiris on both sides to allow those on the other side to help in relief and rehabilitation, India’s response initially was somewhat tentative, even evasive.
By the time these lines appear, it is hoped traffic will be through at a number of agreed crossing points of the LoC.
Reportedly, the issue was first discussed between the Indian authorities and visiting US under-secretary Nick Burns before India would agree to the partial re-opening of the LoC — a rather peculiar and not too dignified a way of involving a third country in a patently bilateral matter. President Musharraf’s plea to make the LoC ‘irrelevant’ appears to be tellingly close to its present reality and configuration. Where and in what shape the LoC exactly will be after the earthquake’s huge landslides and the collapse of the mountains around is difficult to ascertain.
The earthquake has been a great leveller of the physical landscape. After a catastrophe of such epic proportions, only lines and coordinates stay on operational maps. To General Musharraf’s offer of a free flow of the affected Kashmiris across the LoC, Indian defence minister Pranab Mukherjee’s response was testy. Like someone callously unaware of the scale of the disaster on both sides, he opposed the “unchecked” flow of people across the LoC.
He said: “The earthquake cannot alter the history of the last 50 years and I am putting it very candidly.” Mr Mukherjee might well be thinking in terms of the ‘enemy’ or the ‘adverse hypotheses’, a standard procedure and an essential part of war planning. The exercise examines all the foreseeable and possible options available to the ‘enemy’ in the case of an armed conflict or a state of high tension leading to one. It’s unfortunate that despite the longest and the most enduring composite dialogue under way, the ‘enemy’ image should still remain a part of our psyche, and of military and political thinking on both sides of the border.
Coming as it did from no less a person than the Indian defence minister, reference to the 50 years of rivalry can hardly be dismissed by the Pakistani general staff. As it is, the Pakistan Army is thinly stretched on the ground. Easily one-fourth of its total strength (about half a million men) are deployed — from the tribal areas of the NWFP to Balochistan up in Gilgit (in aid of civil authority) and along the LoC. The bulk of it is fully engaged in providing relief and succour to the earthquake victims.
In the pre-composite dialogue situation of high tension and war-like deployment, the Indian army could take advantage of the over-extended deployment of Pakistan army even by merely posing a threat without physically invoking it. Theoretically and in terms of the ‘enemy hypotheses’, such a contingency cannot be completely ruled out even now.
Now a word about the unfortunate helicopter controversy: While the sensitivities of both are evenly balanced on that score, India should have taken a larger view of the matter. Pakistan’s ‘no’ to have Indian pilots flying over some of the country’s most sensitive areas was understandable. However, it might have been better to have flatly declined the Indian offer at the very outset. To accept the military helicopters without their pilots made little sense.
No country, least of all India, will place its military equipment at the disposal of Pakistani military pilots. Most importantly, Pakistan would have shouldered the responsibility for the safety and security of the Indian hardware under the command of its own men. Any accident could have touched off a major crisis.
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

