Acceding to the CTBT
By Ghayoor Ahmed
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his statement to the fourth conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), held in New York from September 21 to 23, inter alia, said that the conference was being held at a time of heightened global anxiety about weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and that a collective effort was required to promote and strengthen the various multilateral instruments to reduce the threat these weapons pose to humanity.
The secretary-general stressed the enforcement of the CTBT as soon as possible and called upon all states that have not signed or ratified the treaty to do so without delay, particularly those who have to ratify it to facilitate its enforcement force. Pending its entry into force, the Secretary General urged all states to maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty.
The fourth conference on the CTBT, which concluded its three-day meeting on September 23, also endorsed the secretary-general’s call for all member states to accede to the CTBT and urged them to sustain the momentum generated by the conference and remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. The conference also asked its special representative, ambassador Jaap Ramaker, to accelerate the ratification process of the CTBT and continue to assist Australia, nominated by the ratifying states, to obtain further signatures and ratifications in order to facilitate the treaty’s entry into force.
The conference also reiterated that the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, through constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced nuclear weapons, constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and would be a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve this goal.
The CTBT, which aims to ban all nuclear tests for all time, has so far been signed by 176 countries and ratified by 125. However, out of the 44 designated countries whose ratification is essential for its operation, 11 countries have still not done so. These countries include the United States, China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Indonesia, Iran, Vietnam and Colombia. As a matter of fact, India and Pakistan have not even signed the treaty. They have, however, voluntarily declared a moratorium on further nuclear tests after carrying out nuclear explosions in May 1998.
The special representative in his report to the New York Conference on the CTBT stated that the unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests, declared by Pakistan and India, cannot take the place of the treaty which, once it entered into force, would ban nuclear weapon tests for all times. It is believed that in the coming days both Pakistan and India will come under immense pressure to sign and ratify the CTBT. It is, therefore, necessary to make an objective analysis of whether or not acceding to the CTBT would be in Pakistan’s national interest.
There is a general consensus in Pakistan that adherence to the CTBT, that is designed to bring Pakistan into the process of nuclear non-proliferation without giving to its demand for nuclear status, will impinge upon its security interests. However, exponents of the CTBT hold altogether different views on this issue, which also need closer scrutiny, with a view to understanding the full implications involved in the accession to the CTBT by Pakistan. These views are summarized in the following paragraph with comments:
i. The proponents of the CTBT argue that since Pakistan has already achieved minimum nuclear deterrence there is no need for it to conduct further tests. Experienced nuclear scientists and engineers are, however, of the view that nuclear testing is essential for maintaining credible nuclear deterrence. Otherwise, they argue, that Pakistan’s existing weapons components could become brittle and corroded rendering them unreliable and ineffective.
ii. The proponents of the CTBT also argue that the treaty only bans nuclear tests and does not prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons by the states. It may, however, be mentioned that the CTBT is not an end in itself but a means to prevent nuclear proliferation, as enunciated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The preamble to the CTBT also confirms this assertion as it clearly states that an end to all nuclear explosions constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament, in all its aspects. In this connection it may also be pertinent to refer to the UN Security Council’s resolution 1172, adopted on June 6, 1998, which also reaffirms that the CTBT is the cornerstone of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
iii. The proponents also assert that unless all the 44 designated states have ratified the treaty, which, they think, is highly improbable, Pakistan may accede to the treaty as it would improve its profile on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation without causing any harm to its security interests. Apparently, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties has escaped the attention of these elements. This article clearly states that a country is obliged to refrain from acts, which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, even pending its entry into force, if it has signed it subject to ratification. It follows from this that in case Pakistan accedes to the CTBT it will be bound by its provisions even prior to its coming into force.
Since Pakistan had neither signed the NPT nor the CTBT, it carried out its nuclear explosions, in May 1998, to correct the strategic nuclear balance in the region without violating any international treaty obligations. Pakistan may possess and maintain nuclear weapons only as long as it remains outside the purview of the NPT and the CTBT. If Pakistan accedes to these treaties, without being recognized as a nuclear state, it would be asked to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in all its aspects, and to the process of nuclear disarmament as a non-nuclear state.
The United States and other permanent members of the UNSC, should, however, take a realistic view of the situation and recognize both Pakistan and India as de jure nuclear states to enable them to fulfil their obligations towards an effective nuclear disarmament.
It is noteworthy that the world summit, held in New York from September 14 to 16, could not agree on the way forward on disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Astonishingly, the outcome document of the summit did not even mention these vital issues, which was an indication of the serious impasse facing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
According to political observers, the failure of the world summit to reach an agreement on these important issues, following the failure of the review conference earlier this year, indicates that the five recognized nuclear states want to remain outside the realm of nuclear disarmament and want to retain their nuclear arsenal in perpetuity which is bound to frustrate all efforts aimed at achieving global nuclear disarmament.
There are pragmatic reasons for seeking nuclear disarmament. However, if the nuclear weapons states continue to insist on retaining their nuclear arsenal, for an indefinite period, it would not only run counter to their advocacy for global nuclear disarmament but the legitimacy of all the existing multilateral instruments to attain this goal would also be rendered infructuous.
The writer is a former ambassador.


