IT was in March 1989 that I put a fundamental question about the historical status of Iran’s Islamic Revolution to a small but distinguished group of Iranian intellectuals visiting the embassy residence in Tehran: how tenable and sustainable was its claim of transcendental universalism even in the Islamic world? A month earlier, Imam Khomeini reacted to Salman Rushdie’s book ‘Satanic Verses’ with a call for a ‘cultural revolution’ to restore the pristine passion and clarity of the Islamic revolution.

He had doubtless noticed the erosion of revolutionary fervour since Iran’s acceptance in July 1988 of a ceasefire with Iraq, a decision which the Imam had described as drinking out of a chalice of poison for which he felt ‘ashamed’ before history, before the nation and its supreme sacrifices.

After the great upheavals of the revolution, the ceaseless struggle against domestic and foreign-sponsored counter-revolutionary threats, and, above all, the heroic defence against Iraq, the people of Iran seemed to be more interested in repose, reconstruction and a peaceful civic life. Borrowing an analogy from the French Revolution, I had asked if the “Thermidor-Girondin” period had not already ended with the end of the war. The Iranian revolution had defeated the counter-revolution and driven the alien armies out but failed to establish the revolution’s ‘frontieres naturelles’ or ‘republiques soeurs’, an objective for which the war was prolonged.

Was it not, therefore, logical that the Iranian people wanted to step aside the millenarian dimensions of their revolution and become a traditional nation state? The diverse responses to this question added up to a paradigm, which has been valid to the latest presidential elections in Iran: outside observers should not expect a linear progression in Iran’s Revolution but an endless dialectical tussle between ideological exponents of perpetual revolution and the advocates of necessary compromises with history, geo-politics and global economy. The one man who could mediate this inherent tension in the body politic was Ali Akbar Rafsanjani.

Imam Khomeini, the symbol of the messianic aspect of the revolution, passed away soon after this conversation. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, the successor-designate once described by the Imam as ‘the fruit of my life’ had fallen out of favour because of his trenchant criticism of ‘totalitarian trends’ in and denial of individual freedoms by the Islamic republic.

The mantle of Supreme Leader (“Rehbar”) passed on to Ayatollah Khamenei, who has fully vindicated the Imam’s faith in him as the future custodian of the intricate political and constitutional structures designed to preserve the hard core of the revolution. A two-term president, Hojatolislam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the leading alumni of Qom and a co-founder of the Islamic Republican Party, emerged as the famous ‘pragmatist.’

A pillar of the overarching clerical architecture, he worked for a transition to a post-revolutionary managerial society without any inclination to seek fundamental changes in the established parameters. He assembled an impressive team which included American-educated economist Mohsen Nourbakhsh, foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Khatami, Dr. Mustafa Moin (the reformist candidate in the latest presidential election), and the oil minister, Gholamreza Aqazadeh.

Rafsanjani laid the foundations of Iran’s relations with Russia and India, developed better understanding with the Arab neighbours and stabilized Iran’s economy within the constraints of a state-controlled system and an unfriendly international environment. It was perhaps Rafsanjani’s distrust of bold innovation in the economic field that came to haunt him in the recent presidential election. The great surprise of the latest presidential election in Iran was not Ahmadinejad’s victory but the fact that Rafsanjani managed to win a mere 21 per cent of the vote in the first round and no more than 36 per cent of it in the run-off.

Iran has close to 47 million voters with a large component of young men and women whose allegiance to the Islamic Republic is accompanied by an equally strong desire to invest it with a capability for dynamic change and adaptation to the world at large. There have been persistent voices demanding a review of the rather static inter-relationships amongst the major decision-makers such as the Supreme Leader, who embodies the concept of Velayat-e-Faqih, the Guardian Council with its controversial veto on elections and legislation, the directly elected president and, above all, the Majlis.

The dissatisfaction with the status quo was eloquently expressed when the Iranian people elected Hojjatolislam Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 as their president with more than 20 million votes, incidentally more or less the same number that has now gone to Ahmadinejad.

The great promise of the rise to power of Khatami, the brilliant author of Dunyia-e-Shehr ta Shehr-e-Dunyia (From the World of the City to the City of he World), a critique of western political thought, was never entirely fulfilled much to the disappointment of Iranians, and Muslims elsewhere, who had hoped for path-breaking creative initiatives in designing a modernistic Muslim state. It is not that Iran did not move forward during the Khatami era. It is to recognize the shortfall in the implementation of the reformist agenda because of the backlash from the conservative power centres, which were apprehensive that rapid reforms could lead to a loss of control and the overturning of the revolution by its internal and external enemies.

One has to live in Iran to understand this dimension of a continuing state of siege. The historical memory comprises not only the western-backed invasion by Saddam Hussein but also CIA’s successful coup against Mohammad Mossadegh’s nationalist government and, indeed, the long history of unequal obligations and extra-territorial foreign jurisdictions imposed on Iran by the imperialist powers in the 19th century.

The lamentable failure of the United States to rise above the pain of the hostage crisis, liberate its own Iran policy from subordination to the interests of an expansionist Israel, and the unacceptable doctrine of regime change in states that do not become allies in its enterprise to exercise hegemony over the vast resources of West and Central Asia and the Arab Middle East has made the task of the reformists most unenviable.

Khatami was eminently qualified to make the opening to the West. Indeed, he achieved considerable success in developing better relations with the major states of the European Union. But despite cogent arguments by several veteran diplomatic and security experts, the neocon-dominated US administration only intensified its thinly veiled campaign for a regime change in Iran, using Tehran’s alleged nuclear weapons programme as the pretext.

The gradual hardening of the conservative opposition to Khatami’s reformist rule is primarily rooted in the moderate-orthodox dialectic within the Iranian political class. But deliberate leaks of the details of war games envisaging US and Israeli pre-emptive strikes against nuclear installations and centres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards as well as large-scale land invasions across the Iran-Iraq border and from Afghanistan, though clearly beyond the present capability of American forces, could only have fortified the grip of the so-called hard-line forces on the Iranian body politics.

Iran has never been afraid of free elections for the simple reason that the checks and balances incorporated into the national constitution greatly reduce the risks of any unexpected electoral outcome. But this has not prevented President Bush and Rumsfeld from unfairly criticizing the Iranian election even before the voters headed for the polling booths.

The Iranians reacted by voting heavily in the initial as well as in the run-off election. The ill-considered comments probably did much harm to the candidacy of Mostafa Moin, the widely respected specialist in paediatrics from Shiraz University, whose track record as a moderate reformist and a champion of individual freedoms was impeccable. A perpetually threatened Iran will inevitably circle the wagons around the hard rock of a defiant revolution.

Once Mostafa Moin had slipped to the third position, Rafsanjani made a belated claim to the reformist agenda in the hope that Moin’s voters would turn to him. The Iranian electorate is perhaps too sharp and well informed to respond to such tactics. Clearly, the constituencies that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tapped, namely the economically disadvantaged and the zealots linked to the revolutionary guards and the Baseej, were doubly motivated to come out and provide him with more than 60 per cent of the votes.

The Shah of Iran uprooted nearly 600,000 Iranians from their rural homes to mobilize the work force required for his “Great Civilization” projects. They, the new underclass in the slums of South Tehran, provided the valiant foot soldiers of the revolution and the vanguard against Iraqi invasion. Evidently, now they flocked to Ahmadinejad’s ticket, which promised a fairer distribution of national wealth, a robust response to the enemies of the country’s popular nuclear energy programme and the renewal of the legacy of Imam Khomeini.

The new president has clarified that he would build a strong, modern Iran with a more equitable income profile of the people. He will have to continue Khatami’s policies of at least a gradual liberalization of the economy and increased cooperation with friendly countries of the region and beyond. He will be no less engaged with the European Union than his illustrious predecessor and, rhetoric apart, the new president may not be averse to exploring avenues of better understanding with Washington though as yet there is no evidence that the United States is at all interested in normalizing relations with Iran.

The ideological and doctrinaire elements in the current American decision-making apparatus put greater reliance on coercion and the threat of the use of force, and as in Iraq’s case, may systematically frustrate proposals for equitable negotiations.

The Iranian electorate has spoken eloquently that the country is amenable to negotiations but not external pressures. On the domestic scene, the majoritarian verdict of back to basics may see some curtailment of lifestyle manifestations of a more liberal era. As the mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad conducted himself with great austerity. What may become more evident is a resolve on his part and that of the Rehbar, Ali Khamanei, to revert to a general mobilization of the nation to safeguard national sovereignty, independence and dignity. The newly elected president’s description of the elections as a new Islamic revolution is a pointer in that direction.

Greater the threat perception, brighter is the rekindling of the fires of the revolution. In the conservative-reformists dialectic, the balance has again tilted towards the children of the revolution and the United States has unwittingly made a contribution to the process.

The write is a former foreign secretary and ambassador to Iran.

THE variety of negative reactions to the statements he made during his visit to the US must have shocked Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He is an economist par excellence but, may be, not nearly as good a politician.

Dr Singh is the builder of modern India that is significantly different from what was bequeathed to the nation by Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Beginning with the reforms initiated by the 1991 budget presented by him, India has travelled a great distance and is now an economic power to be reckoned with. In spite of the BJP’s mismanagement of the economy, it remains on course, which is a tribute to the strong foundations laid by Dr. Singh.

As prime minister, he now wants to consolidate India’s economy in accordance with his dreams that were left unfulfilled by the unceremonious exit of the Congress government in the mid-1990s. In this context, quite understandably, he worries about the expanding gap between India’s rising energy needs and the paucity of domestic resources to cope with these needs. He also worries about the fact that, along with China and the US, India is now labelled as one of the main polluters of the planet’s environment.

This explains his keenness to expand India’s energy generating capability. What, however, remains unexplained is the reason for seeking US help in this regard because US technology will certainly be expensive. India’s next door neighbour China would have been an ideal choice and if that appeared politically inadvisable, the ever dependable Russians could have been asked to lend a helping hand. Finally, why didn’t he consider tapping the least expensive wind and solar energies?

The initiative smacks of something more complicated than finding a solution to the energy problem. If it is the discovery that the US can be a better friend than Russia, Dr. Singh is mistaken. His choice is stupefying because he is relying on a country that is in disarray, both internally and externally. To make things worse, the US is now seen by the Muslim world (India’s potential export market), as dangerously aggressive. How will India’s alignment with the US be viewed by this bloc should not be difficult to imagine.

Even if the Muslim bloc is disregarded, what about the other developments? Has Dr. Singh not felt the winds of change? The destabilization of Central Asia by the US for its zeal to democratize the region has led to a rethink in the region. Both the US and the EU have discovered limits to their power to fight and the determination to unite. The era of the sole superpower era is nearing its end. China is now a regional superpower and Mr Putin is trying hard to revive Russia’s superpower status.

What casts a shadow over Mr Singh’s political sense is the way he went about making friends with the Americans — toeing the flawed line they love. His outburst about Pakistan being politically unstable and its nuclear facilities being vulnerable to takeover by Islamic militants was bad but the reward was seemingly worth it: a US promise to lift sanctions on nuclear technology transfer and to establish intimate military links.

It is the last part that casts doubts on Dr. Singh’s integrity in doubt in the eyes of India’s neighbours because it smacks of accepting the role of US proxy in the heart of an Asia that is becoming too strong for Washington’s liking. Mr Singh has not been a student of history. Had that not been the case he would have known the ultimate fate of world leaders who befriend the US. It would be unfortunate if history records Dr. Singh’s fate in the same fashion.

What Dr Singh received from the US, were promises. He claims that the inspection of India’s nuclear facilities and demands for complete segregation of nuclear weapon development and power generation regimes will start only after the lifting of US sanctions. The Indian Foreign Office may feel good about its present success but the sentiment will last only until reality begins to surface in the form of long and unpleasant bouts of arm twisting — a time-tested American tactic.

The unpleasant part right now, however, is that the much talked about CBMs that held promise of reducing tensions between Pakistan and India appear to be making little progress, are although both countries are putting up false pretences of moving forward. If President Musharraf tries to prevent a slide back, not many Pakistanis would stand by him after what Dr. Singh said about Pakistan. The recent disclosure by Sheikh Rashid that the good general and the Indian prime minister agreed to refrain from commenting on Dr. Singh’s outbursts in the US is a clear indication thereof.

It’s a pity how leaders begin to enjoy the company of sycophants disguised as tactical advisers. Apparently, one such adviser suggested to the Indian foreign office that, given its current predicament, the US would give anything that India may demand; that this was the time to grab the most. The hope is an overly optimistic one. George Bush may overrule the Senate in appointing state functionaries but not in withdrawing sanctions on the export of nuclear technology. Another adviser may have suggested that, to prove his patriotism, Dr. Singh should periodically hit Pakistan where it hurts most. This, too, is bad advice because going back on the CBMs would generate a powerful media backlash given the wide public support for the CBMs in India.

It is time Dr Singh talked to his foreign minister to find out what really goes on at the foreign office.

THE reign of King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz may have technically started when King Fahd breathed his last on August 1 but new king has exercised most of the executive authority in the kingdom since 1995, when he was named regent after King Fahd’s health deteriorated to a point where he could not carry the full load of his responsibilities.

Prince Abdullah became crown prince in 1982 immediately following the assumption of kingship by King Fahd, and in that capacity, he had been deputy prime minister. Now, the next in line, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz has become the crown prince.

King Abdullah had shown an independence of approach in the past 10 years, especially in supporting Arab and Muslim causes that had led the US to consider using its influence to get the succession changed in favour of Prince Sultan. The Saudi royal family has followed certain principles in the matter, which cannot be altered on the basis of whims changed lightly.

In any case, Prince Abdullah showed due recognition of the realities after the 9/11 attacks, in which most terrorists were of Saudi origin. He took all the measures necessary to control religious extremism, though he could not ignore the popular anti-US sentiment, that led to some massive attacks on American compounds, and forced the US to shift its military command in the region to Qatar.

Sentiments hostile to Saudi Arabia grew in the US, notably after evidence was found of Saudi charities funding extremist Islamic groups, and even the name of the wife of the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was mentioned though she denied any conscious funding for extremists. There were some in the neocon establishment around President Bush, who considered the role of Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan to be central to Al Qaeda’s activities.

Prince Abdullah had been closely involved in Arab efforts to secure a just settlement of the Palestine issue. His plan for a two-state solution, based on Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, in exchange for recognition of Israel by Arab countries had received the endorsement of Arab and Muslim countries in 2002.

President Bush’s own roadmap for Palestine, that had the backing of the EU, the UN, and Russia, was less even-handed, and has been violated by Israel at will. Israel is due to withdraw from Gaza in mid-August, but does not appear to be inclined to make major withdrawals from the West Bank, or from East Jerusalem. How far Mr Bush will pressure Israel on this issue is likely to affect the Arab attitude. King Abdullah, in all his capacities as the custodian of Islam’s holiest places, host to the OIC, and ruler of Saudi Arabia whose plans for Palestine enjoy both Arab and Islamic support, may face a confrontation with the US.

Saudi Arabia’s position as the world’s largest exporter of oil, that can influence prices by increasing or lowering prices, also makes it a major player within the global energy crisis. The kingdom’s dollar reserves are so large that any precipitate withdrawal could cause a financial upheaval in the US. Mr Bush, therefore, is likely to maintain close links with the kingdom, which has a major role to play in the war against terror, the settlement of the Palestine issue, and the global energy crunch. Saudi Arabia’s cultural and religious influence within the world of Islam also makes its attitude critical in encouraging moderation and peaceful coexistence between the Islamic world and the West.

King Abdullah has a host of domestic challenges. The ruling family adheres to the austere Wahabi school of thought. King Fahd had taken his role as the custodian of the two holiest shrines of Islam at Makkah and Madina more seriously than his role as king. He devoted a lot of time and resources to wards improving facilities for Hajj, and printing the Holy Quran with translations in all languages, for free distribution all over the Muslim world.

It is likely that King Abdullah will maintain this role, which the Islamic world has come to expect from Saudi Arabia. Though the West has been uncomfortable with Saudi support to Muslim communities with such projects as building mosques and madressahs, catering to the religious needs of growing Muslim communities in the West has to be accepted, with proper safeguards so that such assistance is not misused in any way.

There was an impression at one time that as crown prince, he was rather close to the Wahabi scholars and teachers. However, since 9/11, the Saudi government has taken action to restrict the role of the Wahabi clerics, whose functions have been strictly limited. King Abdullah, who has travelled extensively within the Islamic world, as well as in other regions, is mindful of the fears aroused by militant schools of thought among the Muslims, a phenomenon caused by the denial of political and economic rights to Muslim communities in many parts of the world.

Though the outside world may worry about King Abdullah’s relationship with the conservative clergy, his real challenge will be to find gainful employment for the large number of youth who are lacking jobs. Saudi Arabia’s population has grown rapidly from around six million in 1950 to 27 million according to recent estimates. Nearly 50 per cent of the youth are unemployed, and King Abdullah’s primary challenge will be to invest the country’s large reserves in new enterprises, and to create millions of new jobs, failing which, the spread of political and religious radicalism will be unavoidable. There is already growing resentment over the lavish lifestyle of the thousands of members of the royal family, and the growing gap between them and the youth in the cities and villages.

The record of the Saudi monarchy in spreading modern education is quite impressive, but with the West taking quantum leaps in technology, the kingdom needs to invest much more, and to help bridge the gap between its youth and that in the developed countries. King Abdullah is known to accord a high priority to education, notably science and technology.

This brings us to his broader vision that extends to the entire Islamic world. Though the Organization of Islamic Conference is based in Saudi Arabia, which has been meeting its financial deficits year after year, the need to revitalize this organization has been realized after the attacks of 9/11 that have made the world of Islam the main target of the “war on terrorism”.

At the last OIC summit in Malaysia in 2004, an Eminent Persons’ Group was constituted to promote the reforms needed to make OIC more effective, both in promoting progress and in projecting an image of Islam that highlights its spirit of enlightened moderation.

The second meeting of the group was held in Islamabad recently, and a special summit of the OIC will consider its recommendations, to be held in Saudi Arabia before the end of the current year. Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have played a leading role in the Eminent Persons’ Group, whose recommendations, if adopted by the summit, to be chaired by King Abdullah, will make it a far more effective organization.

This will be an early challenge for King Abdullah, and given his record, and commitment to the revival of the ummah, he can be trusted to discharge his responsibilities with the utmost sincerity and dedication. The leaders of other major Islamic countries, among whom Pakistan holds pride of place as the only Muslim nuclear power, would extend their full support to King Abdullah, who remains custodian of Islam’s holiest sites.