HOW come a state that was created by the freely expressed will of the people, through various forms of participatory elections, has had to endure decades of unelected, authoritarian rule, from those who have shown scant regard for even the pretence of democracy? And, how come this same state, whose birth was bitterly and vociferously opposed by the religious parties, has now come to accept a primary role for these fundamentalist religious groups?

Finally, why and how did the United States, while proclaiming and preaching its strong attachment to democracy and the rule of law, nevertheless prefer to sustain and nurture authoritarian, fundamentalist regimes in this country?

These are questions over which many a Pakistani has agonized for years, wondering when and how things went wrong in their homeland for which millions sacrificed all they possessed. We now have as good an answer as any we are likely to get. Husain Haqqani, a well-known Pakistani journalist, who had the unusual distinction of gaining the confidence of two of the country’s most bitter political rivals (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif), has obviously spent his years in Washington DC to good purpose, as evident from his book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military released recently by the Carnegie Endowment.

The book should be welcomed for both its content as well as its timing, by political analysts and common citizens of this tormented land. Simultaneously, it should merit consideration by the establishments in both Pakistan and the United States, given the fact that not only is Pakistan the recipient of massive amounts of assistance from the US, but that Washington has declared Pakistan, and more importantly its military ruler, General Musharraf, as a lynchpin in American plans for combating global terrorism.

Mr Haqqani paints a wide canvas, in which he not only deals extensively with the role of the Islamic parties and the armed forces in the evolution and development of the country’s politics, society and the economy, but goes back to the very origins of the country’s quest for security and an identify. In pursuit of this ambitious objective, he seeks to examine all those postulates which became sacred over time, not because they emanated from the people, but because it was to the advantage of the ruling circles, to perpetuate these myths and turn them into shibboleths.

A stage was reached where Mr Jinnah’s important policy pronouncement was altered to suit the whims of the rulers. Therefore, it is imperative to know the tragic events that led to the evolution and development of a polity that became religiously extremist and socially bigoted, that in turn transformed the country into a fundamentalist state, where the military claims for itself the unquestioned right to rule. And in this most bizarre mix, the United States became not only a key player, but one whose influence continued to grow, even at times when the two appeared to be drifting apart. No wonder then, that though Pakistan has been one of the major recipients of American largesse, the country’s vast majority has a hostile view of the US.

Of course, many of the things that Haqqani writes about have been known or suspected for years. To see the confirmation of these misgivings, by reference to source material, is deeply disturbing. Should we then be surprised to learn that the army chief decided way back in September 1953 to visit the United States “at his own volition”, so he could offer Pakistan’s “services to serve US interests as the West’s eastern anchor in an Asian alliance”.

Or, that Gen Ayub had discussed with the British envoy his plans to topple the civilian government “because the time had come for him to act”, and presumably was encouraged to do so. And, notwithstanding his own aversion to religious rituals, Ayub recognized early on the usefulness of injecting Islam into the body politic of the country. Therefore, while abroad, he presented himself as an Ataturk, while at home, he “moved Pakistan further along the road of a state-sponsored ideology”.

It was however under Pakistan’s second military spell that the regime not only co-opted the Islamists into the state machinery but made them and the military, the guardians of state ideology. That this should have been done by Gen Yahya, who in his personal life showed scant respect for the precepts of Islam, made it even more cynical.

Bhutto did succeed in “creating a new Pakistani order in which secular civilians attained ascendancy”, but he failed to protect it against “the onslaught of the mosque-military combine..... because of his compromises with the forces of obscurantism and his desire for a large military beholden to him”. Thereafter, Zia ul Haq not only “attained power as a result of the mosque-military alliance, he also worked assiduously to strengthen it over the next 11 years”.

On Afghanistan, the book tells us that much before the Soviets had installed Babrak Karmal in Kabul, both Pakistani and American intelligence were already funnelling in men, money and material into that country.

However, it was Gen Zia, who having seen his two military predecessors stumble into war with India, and thereafter lose American support and finally their power, who realized the folly of repeating the same mistake. He was fortunate in having the brilliant strategic thinker, Yaqub Khan as his close confidant and counselor. The latter had the foresight to point out the dangers of a conflict with India, especially at a time when we were already engaged in a war-like situation with Afghanistan.

General Musharraf, too, having engaged in the Kargil encounter and seen its fall-out, realized early on that “the semblance of good relations with India had become a prerequisite for Pakistan’s security relationship with the US”. He, therefore, made normalization with India his major goal. This has not only earned him kudos in Washington, but made it possible for the resumption of American arms supply to Pakistan.

Significantly but tragically, the two civilian political leaders who were the most enthusiastic supporters of a strong military and went out of their way to prevent its humiliation met inglorious ends. True, both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif made many mistakes, including ‘their refusal to compromise and work with each other”, but it is equally true that the “civilian leaders might not have blundered into many of their bad decisions if they had not had the mullahs and the military narrowing their options”.

That the Americans have always had a preference for military rulers in Pakistan is well-documented. Nevertheless, to see fresh corroboration of this is an eye-opener, to any who suffers from the illusion that the US is committed to democracy and the rule of law.

Our military rulers, aware that American policymakers focus much more on the failings of politicians than on their shortcomings, make it a special point to cultivate the Pentagon. In this context, the roles played by Generals Zinni and Frank to facilitate General Musharraf’s acceptance in Washington is fresh confirmation of this perception. Relevant here is also the observation of the American historian Dennis Kux, who in the context of the 1990 aid suspension has written that “the Pentagon was especially sorry about the rupture in cooperative security ties”.

Even more revealing are the aid statistics. Between 1954 and 2002, the US provided a total of $12.6 billion to Pakistan. Of this $9.19 billion was given during 24 years of military rule, while only $3.4 billion was provided to civilian governments covering 19 years.

Admittedly, American support for Pakistan’s military regimes has not made the task any easier for Pakistan’s weak, secular civil society “to assert itself and wean Pakistan away from the rhetoric of Islamic ideology toward issues of real concern for the citizens”. But is there any lesson in all this for the present leadership, should it ever wish to disengage itself from its involvement in national politics? Ironically, it may be the counsel of a senior general, who was one of the foremost proponents of the army’s rule, that it may wish to recall.

In 1969, Major General Sher Ali Khan had advised Gen Yahya that the army’s ability to rule lay in its being perceived by the people as “a mythical entity, a magical force, that would succour them in times of need when all else failed”. It is for the current rulers to determine if any of that myth or magic remains. But they are patriots. They have to recognize that continued denial to the people of their inherent right to be governed by a freely and fairly elected government, that is accountable and answerable to them, amounts to preventing the inevitable march of history.

They must also realize that the alliance between the military and the Islamists “has the potential to frustrate anti-terrorist operations, radicalize key segments of the Islamic world, and bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war”. There are other dangers as well, arising primarily from the regime’s willingness to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of US global concerns. Do we not realize that we are receiving military and economic aid from the Americans only because we have made Pakistan, “a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location”.

The US, too, must abandon its preference for quick, short-term, transient advantages for long-term, permanent benefits. It must recognize its past mistakes, and then embrace strategic choices, such as strengthening civil society, encouraging secular political parties, nurturing forces of peace and moderation and insisting on democratic values and the rule of law everywhere, but certainly so in countries that seek American support and assistance. It is only then that the Americans will be perceived as “friends and not masters”.

THERE are clearly some paradoxes that have recently emerged in Indo-Pakistan relations, which have baffled both political analysts and the people at large. A few of these paradoxes are listed below.

There are accusations that Pakistan has abandoned its traditional stance on Kashmir — that is, self-determination of the basis of the UN resolutions. Some accuse the Musharraf government of “appeasement” or “sell-out” and even a “meltdown” on Kashmir. If this is true, how is it that the majority of Hurriyet leaders, who are the most representative among the Kashmiri leadership, have fully supported Gen Musharraf’s ideas on Kashmir? Surely, they do not see any “sell-out”, nor are they under any obligation to support a “meltdown” on Kashmir.

Of course, it is also paradoxical that Maulana Gilani of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the most pro-Pakistan among the Kashmiri leaders in Indian-occupied territory, declined to join the recent bus journey of Hurriyet leaders to Pakistan and did not avail himself of a rare opportunity to interact with Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri leaders.

Let us take another paradox. L.K. Advani, considered the most prominent hard-liner in the BJP, and previously described by President Musharraf as the “wrecker” of the Agra Summit, was received with great warmth when he visited Pakistan last month. Advani also visited the mausoleum of the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, laid a wreath there, had words of praise for Jinnah and described him as a secular leader, relying on the latter’s speech of August 11, 1947, on the eve of Pakistan’s independence. Advani also called the razing of the Babri Mosque in 1992 as the “saddest day” in the life.

Not surprisingly, Advani was bitterly attacked by the Hindu extremists in the BJP, who called him a traitor. Some years ago, Advani had led a nationwide agitation against the Babri Mosque and had long been the hero of the “saffron brigade” among the hard-core Hindu elements. They were outraged by Advani’s comments in Pakistan and their criticism forced him to resign as president of the BJP, though, soon thereafter, he withdrew his resignation. Still, the BJP alliance is in tatters and the latest casualty is ex-Foreign Minister Sinha, who had criticized Advani, and has now lost his position as BJP spokesman. How does one explain the apparent change, if not a U-turn, in Advani’s thinking towards the old enemy?

Finally, there is the paradox that President Musharraf keeps praising Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and has hinted at an early Kashmir solution, but on the ground there seems to be no indication of an Indian flexibility on Kashmir. Since Musharraf has ruled out the LoC as the solution of the Kashmir problem, which is the Indian preference, how does he see “light at the end of the tunnel”?

To disentangle the above-mentioned riddles, one has to take note of some ground realities. Firstly, war is no longer an option for either Pakistan or India. Both possess weapons of mass destruction and can annihilate each other. Going to war would be an act of suicide. Only the mad (unfortunately, there are still a few of them around on both sides) would advocate such a course.

Two, it follows from the above that peaceful negotiations remains the only viable option for the two countries. Both governments have already declared that the peace process is “irreversible.” Thirdly, to promote the peace process, a congenial atmosphere has to be built, which is already taking the form of the various confidence-building measures instituted by the two sides.

Pakistan is also committed to prevent any cross-LoC infiltration. Perhaps, not everyone in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan is convinced that the interventionist policy followed since 1989 and the jihadist approach has to be abandoned, if the peace process is to have any chance of success. However, the hard fact is that the jihadist approach has not worked. Instead, it brought India and Pakistan close to war in 1999 and 2002. If this approach is still pursued, the current peace process would be wrecked and Pakistan would come under intense international pressure to desist from such a course.

The jihadists should also realize that, during the last fifteen years of the militancy, the people of Indian-held Kashmir have suffered immeasurably, while the deadlock on Kashmir continues. It makes little sense to persist with a policy that carries deadly perils, involves immense sacrifices, but has little chance of success. Let the jihadists also remember that the great struggle to create Pakistan was conducted successfully through peaceful, political means and not with the gun or the terrorist’s bomb.

Then, there are those (including the Kashmir committee of our parliament) who want Pakistan never to abandon its old stance about UN Resolutions and a plebiscite. What they overlook is that these UN resolutions were passed over fifty years ago and have been described even by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as “obsolete”. There is little international support for implementation of these old resolutions. In any event, India is absolutely opposed to implementing them; and Pakistan simply cannot force India to change its stance on the issue. The two Indo-Pak wars and acrimony of the past 57 years are ample proof of this. Of course, we can maintain our stance about a UN-organized plebiscite in Kashmir for another fifty years, or more, but this looks like a cry in the wilderness without any prospect of success.

The price of confrontation has hurt Pakistan, the smaller country, much more than it has hurt India. Pakistan’s economic and social progress has been stymied because of this confrontation. Our scant national resources have been diverted to military spending, resulting in an oversized army and the country’s resultant political destabilization as a result of repeated military interventions. Against this background, is it wise to continue the policy of “no peace without Kashmir” which is working to the detriment of our national interests?

The pursuit of peace through negotiations and mutually advantageous cooperation makes sense for both India and Pakistan. The development of economic ties will create vested interests in both countries in favour of peace. The overland gas pipeline project, to take one example, will have economic as well as political benefits. Cheaper pharmaceutical imports from India will benefit the needy millions in Pakistan. Moreover, public opinion in the two countries is gathering a momentum of its own in favour of peace. The two peoples want a relaxation of tension and the growth of cultural ties.

Realizing the foregoing, an astute politician like Advani has chosen to play the peace card. This will win greater political support for his party in the elections ahead, including more Muslim votes. Paying respect to Pakistan’s founder is in any event normal protocol, just like Musharraf did by going to the samadhi of Mahatma Gandhi when he visited India. These gestures are also part of the CBMs and show a willingness to let bygones be bygones.

Moreover, any historian would confirm that Jinnah was a secular leader who had spent his lifetime in promoting Hindu-Muslim unity. Unfortunately, the Hindu majority under the Congress refused to accept even the minimal Muslim demands. Only then, the Muslims under Jinnah’s leadership felt compelled to demand a separate homeland. The demand for Pakistan was made for political and national reasons and not in order to create a theocratic Islamic state. This is what the Quaid-i-Azam said in his speech of August 11, 1947. The subsequent growth of Islamic extremism in this country was not the Quaid’s vision of a progressive Pakistan.

For its part, India also sees a serious security threat from Islamic extremists. By praising this speech, Advani was clearly hoping that Pakistanis would honour the Quaid’s tradition and reject Islamic fundamentalism. This is probably the explanation he gave to silence his critics in the BJP. Thus, the paradox in Advani’s utterances in Pakistan had a clear rationale.

As for the last-mentioned paradox, Musharraf is probably right in saying that Manmohan Singh is sincere in wanting to establish friendly relations with Pakistan. For the reasons listed above, good relations make sense for both India and Pakistan. Poverty is the real problem before the two countries, and economic growth can best be achieved if there is peace between them and fruitful bilateral and regional cooperation.

An economist like Manmohan Singh must be fully aware of this reality. However, he is in no position to give up India’s traditional stance on Kashmir. In fact, no leader in India can do so. What he could perhaps do is to reduce the hardships of the Kashmiri people through easier travel between the two parts of Kashmir, greater autonomy and reduction of the Indian military presence there.

As the political temperatures cool down in the two countries, say, in twenty years or so, some durable solution of the Kashmir problem might be possible. Light can be seen at the end of the tunnel if this particular approach is followed. There is really no other option: the alternative is confrontation and bitterness, which has not solved the problem in the past fifty-seven years and is unlikely to solve it in the next fifty years either.

The writer is a former ambassador.

HOW best to support American troops in Iraq? By sacrificing more of them in a war that should never have been launched and has no end in sight, or by bringing them home?

The latter is the best course for the United States and Iraq. American military occupation fuels nationalist and religious insurgents and we should begin a phased withdrawal as soon as feasible, while increasing aid.

Although this position is shared by millions of Americans and many others globally, it has long been deemed beyond the pale by leading politicians of both parties. Now that appears finally to be changing, as an increasing number of Republicans are admitting that the emperor has no clothes — having lied his pants off about our motives for invading Iraq, and ever since about how great things are going there. Declining public support for the war and the latest outrageous claims by Vice-President Dick Cheney have given these moderates an opening to challenge their own party’s administration.

“Too often we’ve been told, and the American people have been told, that we’re at a turning point,” said Sen. John McCain, on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” as he disagreed with Cheney’s absurd claim last month that the Iraq insurgency is in its “last throes.” “What the American people should have been told and should be told (is that) it’s long, it’s hard, it’s tough.”

Sen. Chuck Hagel, a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, was even more blunt: “Things aren’t getting better; they’re getting worse,” he told US News and World Report, as the latest suicide bombings claimed the lives of dozens of Iraqis. “The White House is completely disconnected from reality. It’s like they’re just making it up as they go along. The reality is that we’re losing in Iraq.”

Even Rep. Walter B. Jones, a Republican, who brought us “freedom fries,” has found enough of his wits to admit publicly that he has lost confidence in the Iraq occupation and would sponsor legislation calling on the administration to more clearly define how, and when, it intends to bring the war to a close.

All of this means we may finally get a long-overdue national debate on ending the US occupation. A “democracy can’t do certain things if, in fact, the citizens don’t support it,” the Pentagon’s Lt. Gen. James T. Conway admitted, citing the Vietnam War experience. “It’s extremely important to the soldier and the Marine, the airman and the sailor over there to know that their country’s behind them,” he said. A Gallup poll released last week found that about six in 10 Americans don’t approve of President Bush’s handling of the war and want a partial or full withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Funny that Conway should mention Vietnam. Its prime minister arrived a few days ago for a historic visit to the White House, in belated recognition of the renewed diplomatic relations and robust economic trade now enjoyed between the two countries. It is thus an especially good time to reflect on the pitfalls of false patriotism and blind loyalty to a lost cause.

The general was right that growing public opposition to the Vietnam War pushed President Nixon to pull the plug on that conflict. But he was wrong to imply that being guided by voters to set firm deadlines for withdrawing from a foreign quagmire was a bad thing for either side. An estimated three million Vietnamese and 58,000 American deaths later, Vietnam is run by the same Communist Party that was our enemy back then, but it now seems to matter not at all. We are perfectly happy to see them open their cheap labour markets to the West.

The sad irony is that Iraq — unlike Japan or Germany during World War II — also wasn’t a viable threat to the United States when we “pre-emptively” invaded it. Once again, we have been reminded that violent intrusions into other people’s history have unforeseen consequences, usually negative. First among these effects is the inciting of insurgencies, united only by common hatred of the occupying foreign soldiers.

Iraq, as Vietnam, will likely have serious problems after the American withdrawal. These problems, however, will be Iraq’s, destined for Iraqis to sort out. Simply put, the best thing we can do now to encourage stability in Iraq is to stop serving as a recruitment poster for the insurgency. —Dawn/Los Angeles Times Service

THE timing of the decision of the Supreme Court to take up the appeal of the victim of the notorious Meerwala gang-rape case, against the background of an increasingly hostile international press, was as sudden as it was propitious.

The move has been seen as a final wake up call for the establishment to extricate itself from the hot, prickly embarrassment it found itself in after the judgment of the Multan branch of the Lahore High Court. It has given President Musharraf a little breathing space and allowed him to sidestep some of the international fox terriers who have been, with considerable justification, snapping at his heels.

The move has also stolen the thunder of a number of writers in various sections of the press, who for some time have been focusing their attention on what an essentially feudal and tribal society has been doing to the poor woman These writers would no doubt have hurled another missile at the establishment had the Supreme Court not made its long awaited announcement and ordered the re-arrest of the rapists and their mentors.

Hats off to that plucky village woman Mukhtaran Mai who almost single-handedly has drawn attention to certain aspects of the country’s system of justice. All kinds of theories are floating on the ether about what suddenly goaded the establishment to take the action it did. There is the portrait that is now firmly insinuating itself on the western mind of lascivious old men who live in houses hissing with cruelty who follow their own legal system and treat the local police as their flunkeys.

There is the theory about the president, who is basically a good and upright man, suffering a sudden attack of remorse, because he has started to resent the image people are forming of him abroad as a person who is most reluctant to rock the boat and is basically part of the same iniquitous repressive right-wing culture in which women have no rights.

And then there is the one about Condoleezza Rice, the globe-trotting ambassador of the American way of life, picking up the green telephone and making that all important phone call to Islamabad. Ms Rice, who used to be on the Russia desk during the Reagan years and has been credited with being part of the think tank that helped to destroy the Soviet Union, comes across as a straight thinking, tough-speaking hawk who doesn’t mince her words.

She often treads on thin ice, like the time she admonished President Putin whom she suspected wanted to fiddle with the constitution of the Russian Federation so that he could rule for another term. She talks incessantly about introducing democracy all over the world, even if it results in the death of 100,000 civilians as happened in Iraq. One wonders why she doesn’t talk about introducing democracy in Pakistan.

It was such a pleasure to see a smiling Mukhtaran Mai in glorious colour on the front page of last Wednesday’s edition of this newspaper. What a contrast from the earlier pictures of this unfortunate woman, which depicted a dejected, defeated outcast, with downcast eyes, surrounded by a clutch of curious onlookers escorted by a shabby policeman with a fierce unblinking stare, who was probably wondering what all the fuss was about, when women don’t really have any rights in Pakistan.

The trial of the gang rapists will be a real test case for the Supreme Court. From its inception it has been a media trial. Few other cases have received so much publicity or stirred up such passionate feelings among members of the public — possibly because of the circumstances under which the heinous crime was committed.

Whatever the ruling of the court, it will have far reaching consequences. One wishes, however, that the Multan police are seriously castigated by the judges. In a civilized country there would have been a whole string of resignations.

Unfortunately, no great scholar has been able to come up with a scientific explanation as to why Muslims go to such extraordinary lengths to misinterpret religion and act in total contravention to the norms of decency. We hadn’t yet fully recovered from the horror of the Meerwala rape when news trickled in from across the eastern border of another sordid assault in a lower middle class Muslim family. Perhaps the women of this country should take courage. They are not alone.

In a shocking event in Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh , a girl named Imrana was raped by her father-in-law. She was subsequently declared as ‘impure’ by the panchayat of Ansaris who forced her to separate from her husband as she had been physically violated. Her marriage therefore stood null and void.

Having already given birth to five children, Imrana, through some convoluted logic, was decreed the mother of her husband as well, and was forced to leave for her brother’s house in another village after the bizarre verdict. The police, meanwhile, arrested the offender Ali Mohammad, who, if the Shariat law against rapists were to be applied, would be subjected to 60 lashes apart from stoning. The offender is apparently quite an unsavoury fellow who also stands accused of raping two of Imrana’s sisters, substantially compounding his crime.

The question that Muslim women groups in India are asking is: why has the Ansari panchayat, which has so zealously upheld their version of the Shariat in the case of the victim, not demanded 180 lashes for the serial rapist to be followed by stoning to death? Like in Pakistan, community and caste panchayats in India have also become a law unto themselves, which need to be reined in by strong administrative and judicial pressure.

The courage shown by Imrana of Muzaffarnagar in defying the clerics who had decreed her marriage annulled, is worthy of emulation by other individuals who are wronged in a similar manner in Indian society. Imrana is, of course, fortunate that her husband, Noor Ilahi, stood by her. Together, they sent a powerful message to the Indian mullahs that the extra-judicial powers of such panchayats have to be dismissed with the contempt they deserve.

“I believe in no other law except Indian law and will faithfully follow the instructions of the courts and the police,” said the angry and rebellious husband after his wife refused to leave home.

These weird judgments are not peculiar to Muslim women in India. Late last year a caste panchayat in the Asanda village of Haryana, decreed that a three-month pregnant girl named Sonia who was married to a man called Rampal — would henceforth be regarded as Rampal’s sister and not his wife. The ‘khap’ of village elders, similar to the jirgas that operate on this side of the border, invoked age-old bone-headed principles of caste endogamy and ‘gotra’ exogamy to declare that the marriage between Sonia and Rampal was unacceptable.

Mercifully, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, responding to a PIL filed by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties, came to the aid of the hapless couple, and directed both the state government and the Asanda panchayat not to interfere with their lives. The dust had hardly settled on the Asanda case, when news came down the pike that another ‘khap’ of village elders of Jakhauli in Haryana had declared a couple as brother and sister. The practice seems to be catching on.

This unwarranted interference in the lives of the Indian Muslims reached its zenith in the famous case of Shah Bano Begum v. Mohammad Ahmad Khan that precipitated a storm of debate about the existence and future of personal laws in India.

In a nutshell, this 1985 ruling of the Indian Supreme Court found that Muslim men had to pay support to their divorced wives in spite of the fact that this was not traditionally required according to Muslim personal law as it had been interpreted in India.

The outcry of the Muslims against this ruling was overwhelming, forcing the government, which had originally supported the Supreme Court’s ruling, to overturn it with new legislation implementing the more conservative interpretation of the personal law.

Curiously, however, the Supreme Court had already decided that Muslim men must pay maintenance to their divorced wives in spite of their personal law in several cases prior to the Shah Bano case. Women in the subcontinent obviously have an uphill struggle before them.