US motives in Iraq’s invasion

WHAT were the motives behind the American invasion of Iraq in 2003? Was there a grand game plan of re-modelling and reforming the entire Middle East to suit Washington’s imperial design? Was it a preventive war spurred by defensive motives? Was it about oil and the security of Israel? Was it a show of force for its own sake? Did ideology and broader historical forces have a role?

It is too early to answer these questions as many necessary documents are still not accessible. There is another difficulty. Motives are perhaps one of the most illusive of human phenomena. This is also true in the case of actions of the states, though to a lesser degree. However, there is an alternative approach to understanding state policy in terms of individual capabilities and the configuration of the international system.

The preponderance of American power, the absence of balancing forces in the international system, Washington’s economic interests in the region and the fragility of the Saddam regime made the invasion of Iraq an attractive option. With an economy of $11 trillion, a huge resource base and a defence budget exceeding the combined total of the next 25 powers, the US enjoys a pre-eminence, as Henry Kissinger put it, “unrivalled by even the greatest of empires of the past.”

Since the end of the cold war, the US had been in search of a new definition of strategy, commensurate with its overwhelming power. “Neo-conservatism” evolved against this backdrop, the 9/11 incident proving the catalyst in the crystallization of this outlook. It urged the US to face up to its responsibilities as the undisputed leader of the world and not shy away from using military force unilaterally if vital interests were perceived to be at stake. In the context of the Middle East, there is a growing body of evidence that most of the current Bush aides were in favour of the invasion of Iraq even before they came to power.

As far back as 1998, they had written an open letter to President Clinton, where they urged him to attack Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein by force. In September 2000, a think tank, Project for the New American Century, published a report, which recommended policies for preserving and expanding US dominance in world affairs, including an aggressive policy for deposing Saddam Hussein. Many of the aides of President Bush were members of this think tank that recommended the presence of substantial American forces in the Gulf.

Finally, we have the testimony of George Bush’s former treasury secretary Paul O’ Neil who revealed that “President Bush took office in January 2001 fully intending to invade Iraq and desperate to find an excuse for it.”

The failure of the policy of containment and sanctions gave further credence to the idea that the use of force was the best option vis-a-vis Iraq. After the end of the Gulf war, America had not extended military support to the indigenous uprising of the Iraqi Shia majority against the Saddam regime. It hoped that the regime would collapse under the combined weight of defeat, sanctions and pressure applied through the enforcement of no-fly zones.

This did not happen and Saddam Hussein survived. But the sanctions had taken their toll on the Iraqi army, which by now was poorly equipped and ill-paid. Iraq’s military hardware suffered from a shortage of spare parts. Its navy was non-existent and its air force just a fraction of what it was before the Gulf war.

Saddam Hussein did not help his cause by adopting a defiant posture from a position of weakness. In a bid to win popular approval in the Arab world he gave financial support to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Such an ambitious policy from an isolated position was a recipe for disaster. The question was not of “if” but “when” the inevitable American invasion would take place. US policymakers only needed an alibi and 9/11 provided that.

The Bush doctrine of pre-emptive action against so-called “rogue states” was unveiled by George Bush in June 2002. He declared, “Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and our lives.”

Earlier in his state of the union address in January 2002, Bush had identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the “axis of evil.” The US used the argument of pre-emptive war because both international law and the just war theory allowed it. The US and the UK argued that since Saddam Hussein had been pursuing a clandestine WMD programme; it was better to attack him right away than wait for the day when he actually acquired the weapons.

Pre-emptive strikes are not new to the international system nor is the use of force to overthrow a hostile or unpopular regime. However, the Iraqi invasion was different in two respects. The US had intervened covertly to overthrow objectionable governments several times in the past, the Mossaddeq government of Iran being one example. What was new in the case of Iraq was the scale of intervention. It was a full-scale invasion to overthrow an antagonist.

Most of the countries opposed the invasion on the grounds that the US would be setting a dangerous precedent. According to Kissinger, such an approach challenged the international system established by the 1648 treaty of Westphalia, based on the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.

In the absence of tangible evidence that Iraq possessed WMDs, most countries did not agree with the US that Saddam was a mortal threat. They contended that pre-emptive action was justified in the international system against imminent and actual threats, but not against potential long-term dangers. That is why the US faced stiff resistance in the Security Council. The debates in the Security Council during the run-up to the war showed the differences between the US and its ally Britain and the other members.

For Marxists and structuralists, imperialism and economic interests or oil wealth are prime reasons for this war. The role of economic interests, especially the oil factor, and the expected gains in defence and reconstruction deals cannot be denied, but should not be blown out of proportion. After all, America is not too dependent upon the supply of oil resources from the Gulf. It gets only 11 per cent of its oil supplies from the Middle East while the European Union and Japan are more dependent on the region.

Here too, the geo-political and strategic objective in terms of gaining leverage over rival economies, appears to be more significant than pure economic interests. This indicates that, in the aftermath of the cold war, transnationalists had magnified the role of economic factors while asserting that geo-economics had replaced geo-politics.

On the issue of the declining salience of war in international relations, again the liberal and transnational paradigm proved erroneous and realists could claim that force remained the ultimate arbiter in the international system.

How far was this war about prestige? It could be argued that the American reputation suffered gradually in the region since the Iranian revolution. The US hostage crisis in Iran, the drubbing of American and Israeli forces in Lebanon, the rise of Islamic extremist movements, the weakening of the American bond with the orthodox regimes of the region, a series of attacks on US forces stationed in the region and finally 9/11 all contributed to the decline of America’s esteem in the region.

The neo-conservatives were insisting that diplomacy without the threat or use of force was ineffective and they asserted that the removal of the Saddam regime was necessary for the restoration of American prestige.

The US claimed that it would also unleash a process of reform and democratization in the Middle East. Critics questioned the sincerity of these claims citing US double standards in supporting friendly monarchies and dictatorships in the Middle East and in Central Asia. Perhaps public opinion propped up these claims because the spread of democracy was viewed as a noble cause worth the sacrifice. Two opposing impulses in American foreign policy stood reconciled. President Bush echoed this when he declared in his second inaugural speech “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one.”

Finally, the question of ideology arises. Like his father, the junior Bush used a word that stirred up much controversy in the Muslim world. In the Gulf war, Bush Senior had coined the term “new international order.” He stopped using that phrase soon afterwards. Similarly, while declaring the war on terrorism, President George Bush used the world “crusade” The Bush administration repeatedly clarified later that it was not a war against the Muslims.

The attack on Iraq might not be inspired by ideology, but there is a widespread perception among the masses in the Islamic world that they were under assault from the United States and its allies. As one analyst observed “The Israelis and the Americans are interchangeable in the mind of many Muslims.”

On the other hand while denying that America was anti-Muslim policy-makers claim that one of their aims was to reform and democratize the “never changing Islamic countries” of the Middle East. The stereotypes that Muslims are essentially irrational, violent and unable to change on their own, have gained ground in the western world. A corollary of this view is that change must come from the outside world.

Advani’s charm offensive

AFTER the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh April meeting in New Delhi and their joint statement, the week-long visit to Pakistan of India’s opposition leader and president of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) L.K. Advani is unquestionably the second most important event of the past six months for the India-Pakistan peace process and bilateral relations.

By preferring to resign as BJP chief rather than take back what he said or did in Pakistan, Mr Advani has not only strengthened India-Pakistan relations but also promoted harmony and understanding between the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent. The BJP’s refusal to accept his resignation and his willingness to continue as BJP chief augurs well for conflict-resolution and durable peace between India and Pakistan.

Before we analyse the reasons for Mr Advani’s charm offensive and his earnest efforts to present BJP’s new face, it will be worthwhile to recapitulate some of his important remarks and views.

He said: “The emergence of India and Pakistan as two separate, sovereign and independent states is an unalterable reality of history”. So the goal of “Akhund Bharat”, so dear to the Sangh pariwar, was now redundant.

Mr Advani stressed the need for moving the dialogue process forward on all issues. He endorsed Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s assertion that progress on all issues including Jammu and Kashmir should move in tandem. It is a measure of the long distance Pakistan and India have travelled since 2001, that the leading hawk of the BJP, who was accused of having wrecked the Agra summit, does not hesitate to state publicly today that lasting peace between the two countries is contingent upon the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He also stressed that we can no longer say, ‘let us give peace an option’. The truth is that peace is the only option”.

Moreover, the BJP leader provided a peep into his new thinking in a speech to the Karachi Council of Foreign Relations, Economic Affairs and Law. Citing Mr Jinnah’s August 11, 1947, address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, he pointed out that the founder of Pakistan envisioned a state that guaranteed “equality of all citizens in the eyes of the state and freedom of faith for all citizens.” This, the BJP chief observed, “is what we in India call secular or non-theocratic state — where there is no place for bigotry, intolerance and discrimination in the name of religion and where there can certainly be no place, much less state protection, for religious extremism and terrorism.”

At a Lahore reception, he said, “Let there be no place for anti-Indianism in Pakistan and no place for anti-Pakistanism in India.”

He emphasized that states which wished to progress had to live in the present and move on from the past and called for developing a consensus between the ruling establishments and oppositions in both countries for arriving at a mutually acceptable solution. Importantly, he regretted the demolition of Babri Mosque and said it was “the saddest day” of his life. While recording his comments in the visitor’s book at the Mazar-i-Quaid-i-Azam, Mr Advani thus concluded his remarks: “My respectful homage to this great man”.

Mr Advani was not obliged to pay a visit to the Mazar-i-Quaid-i-Azam. (He is the first ranking Indian leader to do so. Even more important is the fact that he is the first Hindu nationalist leader to visit the mausoleum). Not only did he pay his respect to the founder of Pakistan but also paid glowing tributes to him. He termed his visit to the mazar as “a milestone” in improving Pakistan-India relations.

In a way, his memorable gesture is more significant than the former Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee’s historic visit in 1999 to the Minar-i-Pakistan which is considered a symbol of the idea of Pakistan. Both these visits sought to counter the widespread belief in Pakistan that India had not reconciled itself to the partition of the country in 1947. .

It may be added that Advani is neither a novice in politics nor given to sentimentality or histrionics. He is a seasoned politician who has spent more than five decades in active politics. According to the leading Indian columnist Kuldip Nayar, whatever he said or did in Pakistan had been thoroughly discussed and debated before he left New Delhi for Islamabad.

Mr Advani’s remarks about the demolition of the Babri Mosque and tributes to the founder of Pakistan led to a strong backlash from the Sangh parivar (the RSS and its associates) whose illustrious son Mr Advani had so far been. He was severely criticized by Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) for being apologetic about the demolition of the Babri Mosque, and that too on “enemy” territory. His tributes to Mr Jinnah, considered responsible for the partition of India, were termed “treacherous” by the Sangh parivar.

The reaction of the Hindu extremists to Advani’s remarks was predictable. But the willingness of the ruling Congress party to join the chorus of condemnation came as a surprise to secular forces in India. This was not the moment to settle political scores. Even in the BJP, only former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee came out openly and strongly in Advani’s support. The younger generation of leaders, most of whom were picked up and trained by Mr Advani, deserted him in his hour of need and did not support him publicly.

It is significant that the RSS has refused to close the Advani episode and has not only attacked him for withdrawing his resignation but also criticized the BJP for rejecting his decision to quit. “The BJP leadership should have accepted his resignation” observed the RSS. This means the BJP’s biggest ideological crisis to date has not ended amicably and the truce may prove to be tenuous.

Mr Advani’s refrain during Pakistan visit was that the BJP was not against Pakistan and all his utterances and remarks were meant to present a new face of the BJP.

He went further than anyone has gone so far in promoting the cause of Indo-Pakistan friendship and making a persuasive case for durable peace between the two countries. The new Advani is barely recognizable from the old one who trekked across India, in the early 1990s, atop a motorized chariot (Ram rath yatra) to galvanize an entire nation on Hindu nationalism, drawing millions to the BJP, ultimately bringing it to power at the centre.

Last October when he was elected BJP chief, his third stint in that capacity, he defended his party’s association with the RSS and urged party cadres not to be apologetic about their beliefs.

Therefore, the transformation of a Hindutva hawk into a liberal and moderate secularist is a development of far-reaching implications for India’s domestic politics, Hindu-Muslim relations in that country and the future of India-Pakistan relations.

There is a realpolitik angle to the charm offensive launched by Mr Advani. The defeat of the BJP in the general election last year, followed by the defeat of BJP-Shiv Sena alliance in Maharashtra, India’s wealthiest and second most populous state (100 million), were bound to have a national fallout, influencing the future course of the country’s domestic politics. The unexpected defeat in general elections, followed by a serious setback in Maharashtra, has shown to the BJP’s leadership, at least to the moderates, beyond any shadow of doubt that the political emphasis in India is shifting from religious-based politics to social and economic issues.

It has also become obvious to Mr Advani and other hardliners that the BJP cannot hope to win the next election by adopting an anti-Pakistan or anti-Muslim posture as Muslims in India constitute 15 per cent of the electorate. The election results have also shown that the old slogans of communal hatred are losing their appeal in favour of livelihood issues like roads, water and electricity. The rout of Shiv Sena in its stronghold of Maharashtra is all the more significant because Shiv Sena and its chief Bal Thackeray have been known for their demagoguery and rabidly anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan venom.

The extremists and hardliners, led by the Sangh Pariwar, offer an entirely different explanation for the debacle. They attribute the defeat of the BJP to its failure to fully implement the Hindutva agenda and its uncertain stand on issues like Ram temple at Ayodhya. They oppose what they call the “Congressization” of the BJP.

In short, the hardliners and the Sangh pariwar argue that polarizing the electorate along communal lines will bring electoral gains to the party. As against this, Mr Advani now appears to agree with Mr Vajpayee’s views that it was neither “over-confidence nor complacency” that led to the party’s defeat. It was the “safronization” or the efforts to “Hinduize” the pluralistic way of living that was rejected by the people. Hindutva once paid dividends because it was the need of the moment. As that moment has passed, Hindutva will no longer work.

The ideological crisis, gripping the BJP, is not yet over. The truce, hammered out by the party’s resolution, rejecting Mr Advani’s resignation but also accommodating some of the parivar’s views, appears to be tenuous. The RSS has refused to close the Advani episode and criticized the BJP leadership for not accepting his resignation. The all-important question is whether the moderates in the BJP, led by Mr Advani and Mr Vajpayee, will be able to “de-safronize” or de-communalize the party agenda, initiating the politics of the future in India.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Some scars of the emergency

SOME scars do not go away. They remind a nation of the rough period it has gone through. One ugly mark on the face of India is the emergency. The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed it in June 30 years ago. She wanted to suppress the demand for her resignation after the Allahabad High Court unseated her on a poll offence.

Not only did she suspend fundamental rights but also put one hundred thousand people behind bars without trial. Press was gagged and effective dissent smothered. There was a general erosion of democratic values.

Because of Janata Party’s squabbles, its government fell to enable her return to power within three years. That probably explains why some of the scars have stayed on. She did little to revive the institutions she had destroyed. They still have not regained their health. Yet the worse is the tinge of authoritarianism which the governments since then have come to acquire. State chief ministers are particularly bad. They behave like Mrs Gandhi, aggressive and vindictive.

Had political parties tried to curb the ills which came to the fore during the emergency, some scars would have disappeared by now. But they have done little. Congress in the last three decades has not been interested to find out what went wrong because it would have meant finding fault with Mrs Gandhi. The rest of the governments were merely coalitions which had supporters of the emergency as their ally.

Justice J.C. Shah was the only person who examined the excesses committed during the emergency. But his recommendations were not even considered because soon after he submitted his three-volume report, Mrs Gandhi came back to power. Still those recommendations are worth a debate. He said: “The circumstances in which the emergency was declared and the ease with which it was accomplished should be a warning to the citizens of the country.” He specially drew the government’s attention to the manner in which the police were used and allowed themselves to be used for purposes which were questionable. He warned: “Employing the police to the advantage of any political party is a sure source of subverting the rule of law.” This is what has happened.

Some senior retired police officials, who met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh a few days ago to follow up the Shah’s concern, requested him to make the police accountable. The officials also wanted every victim of communal riots to be compensated. Manmohan Singh proposed yet another law to determine the responsibility of the police.

What the government does not realize is that the people’s confidence in the police and other wings of the administrative machinery has been shaken. What do they infer when they find in the Manmohan Singh’s cabinet the same old faces that were part and parcel of the extra-constitutional machinery under Sanjay Gandhi? Top Congress leadership is no different. And there is no evidence that it has changed.

Knowing well the barbarities committed during the emergency, the Congress spokesman had the temerity to say that those who vilified the party for the purchase of Bofors guns should apoligize. The case has failed on technical grounds. The government-controlled CBI has come to the Congress’s rescue. There is no doubt that Rajiv Gandhi had opened a “parallel channel” for the payoffs when the contract terms specifically had precluded middlemen or agents. In fact, an apology is due from the Congress which detained opponents and critics without trying them in courts. Some 20 months of their precious life got wasted in jail. Even college boys and girls were denied examination because they dared to protest. How would Congress make up for the loss which the victims and their families suffered?

Scars on the Indian face became indelible after Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri’s death. Until the end of the sixties, Jawaharlal Nehru’s liberalism animated the country. There was only one ugly mark — the communist government’s dismissal in Kerala — when Mrs Gandhi, as the Congress president, forced it on Nehru to his regret.

Then the culture was different. Certain things were not done. There was a Lakshman rekha. Mrs Gandhi was the first prime minister to cross it. Since then the governance has become devoid of values and principles. The alarming aspect is the weakening of public opinion. People are still afraid to speak out. They are afraid of repercussions. In fact, protest has vanished from the Indian scene. It reflects sheer helplessness, not acceptance.

The bureaucracy was India’s armour. It is now full of chinks. After having lost its “chastity of independent functioning” during the emergency, it has become a tool of tyranny in the hands of rulers. The ethical considerations inherent in public behaviour have become generally dim and, in many cases, beyond the mental grasp of public functionaries. No administrative reforms commission (Manmohan Singh’s proposal) can set things right until the government servants realize that they can be dismissed.

Institutions like the judiciary and the media also did not come up to people’s expectations during the emergency. The first threw the egg on its face when it upheld the emergency and said that fundamental rights could be suspended. It is still trying to live down that verdict and some of the subsequent judgments have retrieved its prestige to a large extent. However, its “interference” in the Jharkhand assembly proceedings has raised fresh doubts. Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterji is right in saying that the judiciary should not cross the Lakshman rekha drawn between it and the legislature.

The media men, to use L.K. Advani’s words, began to crawl when they were only asked to bend. Things have improved since in the sense that they can express their opinion freely. But now their efforts have got directed towards amusing readers, not informing them. Very few in the media have any social obligation. The top looks too comfortable to pose any challenge if it ever came to something like the emergency.

The worst wound that has been inflicted is the credibility that the erstwhile members of the Jan Sangh, the Hindutva elements, got because of their arrest during the emergency. They are out and out communal but they try to parade themselves as pluralistic. I thought the BJP had decided to be different when I read Advani’s remark that Jinnah was secular.

But I was proved wrong. Advani has turned out to be a false god. He has lost his credibility on the one hand and has put the party still more at the mercy of the RSS. He has no choice left. He will be driven out of the party if he ever pursues what flickered in his mind in Pakistan. Maybe, I was trying to indulge in wishful thinking.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Tobacco sellout

SINCE taking office, the Bush administration has spent more than $100 million suing the tobacco industry. Last week it scuttled its own case just as it was approaching judgment. The episode looks like politically inspired malfeasance, and it should be investigated.

Last month the government put on expert testimony that a comprehensive national smoking-cessation programme would cost $130 billion over 25 years. During closing arguments as the eight-month trial wound to an end, the Justice Department suddenly backed off this request — asking instead for only a $10 billion, five-year programme that could be extended. The government thereby reduced by 92 per cent the value of a key remedy for the industry’s misconduct that the government’s own evidence suggested was necessary.

We have not been fans of the federal tobacco litigation. Though it could bring about some useful curbs on industry conduct, it is a poor substitute for what’s really needed: a comprehensive federal regulatory structure for tobacco products. That could be accomplished only through legislation, but the Bush administration has refused to seek reasonable regulation for tobacco products, pursuing litigation instead.

The case took a first big hit this year when a federal appeals court threw out the government’s request for $280 billion in forfeiture of allegedly ill-gotten profits. After that decision the government pursued other remedies, including the giant smoking-cessation programme outlined by its expert witness, Michael C. Fiore. But then — having spent six years portraying the tobacco companies as racketeers — the Justice Department unilaterally relieved those companies of the responsibility to spend $120 billion that its own evidence suggests is necessary to help smokers quit.

The decision appears to be the result of political pressure, not a judgment of the legal merits of the case made by the career lawyers trying it. It was made at the political echelon of the Justice Department and imposed on the trial team — which strongly objected — by the office of Associate Attorney General Robert D. McCallum Jr. Moreover, the department appears to have pressed its own witnesses to weaken their testimony.

—The Washington Post