Daily SectionMarker

Misc SectionMarker

Weekly SectionMarker

Weekly SectionMarker

Pakistan's Internet Magazine
Herald
Dawn GroupMarker

Archive, Search, Feedback & HelpMarker

Weather
Dawn Classified



FrontPage National International Local Business KSE Forex Sports Editorial Opinion Letters Features Today's Cartoon PTV Guide Cowasjee Ayaz Mazdak Review Dawn Magazine Young World Images Dawn Group Subscription To Advertise

DINA
DAWN - the Internet Edition



24 April 2005 Sunday 14 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1426

DAWN Classified
Please Visit our Sponsor (Ads open in separate window)

Opinion


Case for an early election
Israel’s plan for new settlements
Politics of sugar
Keeping politics out of Kashmir
Behind Bush’s slump



Case for an early election


By Anwar Syed

THOSE dissatisfied with our periodic experiment with democracy have often complained that elected legislatures have never been allowed to complete their appointed terms; they have been dissolved by presidential fiat midway through their tenures. General Musharraf is telling all concerned that this will happen no more, that the present assemblies, elected in October 2002, will stay in place and complete their terms, and that the next elections will be held on schedule in 2007.

In a recent statement, he has told the PML-Q legislators not to get scared and assured them that the PPP and PML-N leaders, currently in exile, will not be allowed to return to Pakistan until about two years from now (if then).

This is good news for the PML-Q, the MMA and the MQM. These are the parties in power at this time, and they have understandably no desire to take the risks involved in returning to the hustings for a renewal of the electorate’s mandate, until such a course of action becomes unavoidable.

Politicians who believe that the government’s manipulations during the elections in October 2002 deprived them of the victories that might otherwise have been theirs advocate new elections and they want them sooner than later. It is said also that the present government is unable to overcome the crises confronting the country because, having taken power by unfair means and therefore wanting in credibility, it does not represent, and therefore cannot influence, the real political forces in the country.

This is substantially the argument that General Aslam Beg made a few weeks ago (March 25). Deals with the regime’s present opponents (e.g., PPP and PML-N), he said, would not produce a viable government capable of doing the job that needs to be done. Fair elections, offering all participants a “level playing field,” alone could bring it about. In a statement on the same day Benazir Bhutto maintained that the present government had failed to “deliver,” and that the bloodshed in Balochistan and breakdown of order in Waziristan were evidence enough of its ineffectiveness. October of 2007, she says, is too far away for new elections. She wants them to be held within the next few months.

Spokesmen for the PML-N and the ANP have also been demanding early elections. So have numerous newspaper editors and columnists. They argue that the exclusion of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto from the last election, persecution visited upon their parties, and favours done to the defectors from their ranks distorted the electoral outcome and the regime resulting from it.

These grievances and the accompanying interpretations are valid, and the case for holding new elections would appear to be reasonable. But closer scrutiny will throw up further questions regarding the rationale, mechanics, and the expected outcome of such an exercise.

Granted that the present government’s legitimacy is open to question (which can also be said of most of our previous governments), we may still ask if its performance is unusually poor. Benazir Bhutto’s government was twice dismissed on charges of incompetence and corruption. The real reason for her dismissal may have been her failure to get along with the president and the military establishment. But it is true nevertheless that her government had become notorious on both counts during each of her two terms in office.

Mr Nawaz Sharif’s government may have been a trifle more enterprising: it built roads and bridges and initiated several new development projects. But its notoriety for corruption was widespread.

The present government is doing no worse than its predecessors in terms of competence and probity. True, it has not reduced poverty, unemployment, and the rate of inflation; it has not eradicated extremism and sectarian conflict. But these are deep-rooted, systemic failings that no government can remedy in a day. There can be no assurance that a government resulting from new elections will be able to set them right quickly, Ms Bhutto says the bloodshed in Balochistan and turbulence in Waziristan are reasons enough for the present government to resign and for new elections to be held.

She does not seem to remember the ferocious conflict, and bloodletting, between the native Sindhis and Mohajirs, and a horrendous rise in the incidence of dacoities and kidnapping for ransom, in Sindh during her years in office. She might want to recall also that she had to call the army, and keep it deployed in Sindh for quite some time, to handle that situation.

Can it be said that Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and their respective associates have learned from their past mistakes, that they are now chastened and wiser, and that if either of them is returned to power a third time, she or he will offer the country reasonably honest and competent governance?

Perhaps yes, but that prospect is very uncertain indeed. Our rulers, generals and politicians alike, are known for their disinclination to learn from earlier experience, their own or that of others.

The case for early elections cannot be that the resulting government will be more honest and competent than the one we have now. The case must be that democracy is a public good of a high order, that it was grossly violated during and after the last elections, that we want early elections in the expectation that they will be free and fair, that they will bring forth a government that understands and represents the inclinations and aspirations of our people, and that it will more likely have popular support in removing the current threats to public tranquillity and the impediments to the nation’s social and economic advancement.

Let us then agree that it would be a good idea to have new elections towards the end of this year or in the spring of 2006. But we must then address certain tedious problems of procedure and mechanics. We have an executive and a legislature in place now and their term does not expire until October 2007. How can they be sent away? The president could dismiss them under Article 58-2 (b) of the Constitution. He is not likely to take that road, because they are his people and they do his bidding. But even if he were to take it, the courts might repudiate him as they did Ghulam Ishaq Khan when he dismissed Nawaz Sharif and the assemblies in 1993.

Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz might conceivably be persuaded to advise the president to dissolve the National Assembly. He would be under no obligation to justify that advice, the president would have to accept it, and the courts would have no say in the matter. But it is hard to figure out why Mr Shaukat Aziz would want to commit hara-kiri unless the president showed him a way to pastures that were even greener.

Given General Musharraf’s notions of his own indispensability, it is most improbable that he will do away with the present arrangements unless he can be assured that he will remain at the helm even if the desired election returns a new set of politicians to form the government. I doubt that any of our major parties can be in a position to give him the assurance he wants.

Let us now ask what the outcome of the next elections is likely to be regardless of whether they are held on schedule in 2007 or sooner. Many observers believe that in free and fair elections the PPP and PML-N will do considerably better than they did in 2002. In assessing their prospects it may be useful to consider their performance in the last several elections. I shall do some of it today and the rest next Sunday.

Of the 207 general seats in the National Assembly (excluding those reserved for women and minorities) 115 belong to Punjab. It is then a fair assumption that a party that does well in Punjab will have a correspondingly good standing in the National Assembly. Let us then see how the two mainstream parties, PPP and PML-N, have done nationwide and in Punjab in the preceding elections. We will skip the 1990 election because, by most accounts, it was rigged on a large scale to the PPP’s disadvantage. It won only 46 National Assembly seats, including no more than 14 from Punjab. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan had not dismissed Ms Bhutto in August of that year only to welcome her back in office three months later.

The party-based election of 1988 is particularly noteworthy in that it came after 11 long years of Ziaul Haq’s rule. The PPP had suffered intense persecution, and Benazir Bhutto herself had remained in prison, under house arrest, or in exile during much of this time. A great deal of sympathy and admiration for her had developed in Punjab, supplemented by the disconcerting awareness that it was a Punjabi general who had overthrown and then killed her father, a Punjabi judge who had convicted and sentenced him, and a Punjabi majority in the Supreme Court that had rejected his appeal and confirmed his death sentence. Ms Bhutto received a fantastic welcome upon her return from exile and arrival in Lahore in 1986.

Some of the affection shown her in 1986 did get translated into votes two years later, but not as much as one might have expected. Her party won 94 seats in the National Assembly, 52 of them from Punjab, amounting to slightly less than one half of the total in each case. PML-N, campaigning in alliance with Jamaat-i-Islami, won 58 seats, 49 of them from Punjab. In other words, even in this good year (1988), when her shortcomings as a ruler had not yet come to light, Ms Bhutto’s party won only three more seats in Punjab than did Nawaz Sharif’s PML.

An examination of the performance of the PPP and PML-N in the subsequent elections (1993, 1997, and 2002), and a prognosis of the character of any government that may emerge from the next election, will have to be deferred to next Sunday.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US
E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

Top



Israel’s plan for new settlements


By Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty

ARIEL Sharon’s quick visit to President Bush at his ranch in Texas earlier this month represented another effort to garner US support for Israel’s persistent efforts to have its own way in Palestine. The Israeli prime minister was looking for US backing to his plans to build more settlements in the West Bank, and to construct a wall that would effectively isolate Palestinians from East Jerusalem, home to the Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third holiest shrine.

Israel already has draconian measures in place to prevent Palestinians from gaining access to the mosque for worship, though it has also found it necessary to prevent Jewish extremists from entering the mosque.

President Bush, perhaps for the first time, disapproved of Israel’s plans for new settlements and other measures that would run counter to the roadmap for Palestine, proposed by the US and supported by the UN, the EU and Russia. In his second and final term, and with no political ambitions at stake, Bush was enunciating the desire of his administration to improve relations with the Islamic and Arab countries. However, Sharon left the US without heeding any advice, obviously seeking to dictate terms on the basis of Israel’s military strength, and counting on US support when the chips were down.

Though the election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of Palestine, following the demise of Yasser Arafat in late 2004, has brought to power an individual who has eschewed armed struggle, and sought a negotiated settlement, Israel continues with its arrogant stance. With Bush still guided by the neo-cons, Israel assumes that Washington will ultimately stand by it, even though its stance makes nonsense of the concept of a viable Palestinian state existing peacefully by the side of Israel.

Sharon has stood for the domination of Israel, and the virtual reduction of Palestinians to an inferior status, with Jewish settlers occupying the choicest land, while Palestinians resign themselves to becoming serfs and servants in a territory that belonged to them five decades ago. His disengagement plan makes a great deal of fuss about withdrawal from Gaza, and removing 7,000 Jewish settlers from there, while his plans to build more settlements in the West Bank, and deprive Palestinians of more land in the name of security shows little regard for the roadmap. Not surprisingly, the Palestinians see little prospect of a viable two-state solution. Mahmoud Abbas, the successor to Yasser Arafat has made efforts to mobilize support for a solution in conformity with the roadmap. The main militant groups, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, have been persuaded to hold back their struggle for a year, to give peace a chance. However, Israel continues to use extreme force even in Gaza, against suspected militants, even though it claims to be committed to withdrawing from the area. Inevitably, the killing of young Palestinians in a show of force results in violent protests, and Israel then accuses the Palestinian leadership of failing to rein in militants.

The opposition of Zionist extremists to his plans for evacuating settlers from Gaza forced Sharon to form a coalition with the Labour Party, led by Shimon Peres. Even Mr Perez has found it hard to openly support the tactics of Sharon, who shows little concern for winning the confidence of the Palestinians. Though he makes great show of his disengagement plan, notably the withdrawal from Gaza, his overall plans leave little doubt that he does not envisage a viable Palestinian state.

Though a ceasefire has been in force since February 8, the Israelis themselves have been violating it. On April 9, the Israeli army killed three Palestinian teenagers for trying to cross from Gaza into Egypt, on suspicion of seeking to smuggle arms. The Palestinian militants reacted by firing mortar shells on Israeli settlements in Gaza. Earlier, Prime Minister Sharon announced a plan on April 4, to build 3,500 additional houses in the largest settlement on the West Bank, Maale Adumim, that would effectively cut off the West Bank from East Jerusalem. It was announced on April 5 that Israel would go ahead with this plan despite US and Palestinian objections.

During his rushed visit to the US on April 11-12, Sharon sought financial and political support for his Gaza pullout plan. He also wanted to draw attention to the poor control exercised by Mahmoud Abbas over the Palestinian militants. While Bush appreciated the “courageous” decision on the pullout from Gaza, he disagreed with Sharon’s plan to expand settlements on the West Bank as that would “contravene the roadmap and “prejudice final status obligations”. However, he reiterated his support to major Israeli population centres being included in any final settlement.

This was the first time that President Bush disagreed with the Israeli side, though he did not spell out the consequences of such settlement expansion. Though Mahmoud Abbas is still engaged in building up his influence, and winning the support of the militants, among whom Hamas appears to have greater following than his Fatah faction, he needs greater US support if he is to deliver from the Palestinian side. The US lacks credibility as an honest broker, especially as the Palestinians are identified with terrorism, even though their struggle for their rights on the basis of UN resolutions has been seen in the past as a liberation movement.

Israel has got used to enjoying unstinted US support, which is a major grievance among the Arab and Islamic countries in general, and the Palestinians in particular. The polarization over the Palestinian cause has pitted the US against the world of Islam, and affected the moral standing of the sole superpower.

It is frequently suggested that all that it would take to overcome terrorism in the world would be a just settlement of the Palestine issue, on the basis of well-known principles that enjoy universal support. It is the belief in the justice of the Palestinian cause, and disapproval of the way Israel’s expansionist and unjust policies have affected the life of the Palestinians, that have led to the resort to terror, and its deadly consequences.

The thousands of young people in Arab and Islamic countries, who think nothing of sacrificing their lives in the struggle against injustice, and resort to suicide attacks, are a sign that only a just order can endure. By now, over 60 per cent of all Israelis, and more than 70 per cent of Palestinians stand for coexistence on the basis of a just and durable settlement. It is only a minority of Israelis who are willing to forget their own experience of injustice and inhumanity they endured at the hands of the Nazis, and to adopt a similarly dreadful and insanely brutal policy towards the Palestinians.

President Bush has the challenge of playing the role of a peacemaker in a region that gave birth to the world’s great religions. Enough blood has been spilt and far too many tears shed, owing to the aggression and state terrorism practised by Israel against the Palestinians. One hopes that the heirs of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln will uphold their ideals to ensure that tomorrow’s world is one of peace, justice and harmony. The plans and acts of the current Israeli leadership are not in harmony with such a world.

Top



Politics of sugar


LAST YEAR the Bush administration negotiated a free-trade agreement with the five Central American nations and the Dominican Republic. It has yet to submit the deal to Congress because trade politics has grown so poisonous.

Even though the Central America deal, known by its acronym, CAFTA, would help a struggling region on the doorstep of the United States, and even though it would modestly boost US prosperity, a coalition of special interests has seized Congress by the throat. The most aggressive and least deserving of these is the sugar lobby.

US sugar policy stands for all that’s bad about its political system. The government restricts imports through a series of quotas, pushing US sugar prices to between two and three times the global market rate. As a result, a handful of sugar producers, notably in Florida, a battleground electoral state, pocket $1 billion a year in excess profits. To protect this cozy arrangement, the sugar barons plough a chunk of their revenue back into the political system. During the 2004 election cycle, two Florida sugar companies gave a total of $925,000 to election coffers.

This corruption has victims. Producers’ enviable profits come straight out of consumers’ wallets, so that ordinary supermarket visitors are made to subsidize welfare for corporations. At the same time, efficient foreign sugar producers, many of them in poor countries, are denied a fair chance to export their way out of poverty.

Meanwhile there is an environmental cost: In Florida, sugar cane production has contributed to the degradation of the Everglades. Sugar-using industries are losers too. As Kimberly A. Elliott notes in a paper for the Centre for Global Development, some candymakers have closed US factories rather than pay crazy sugar prices.

The biggest cost of the sugar racket is to free trade itself, and therefore to all producers and consumers. .

—The Washington Post

Top



Keeping politics out of Kashmir



By Kunwar Idris

QAZI HUSSAIN AHMAD’s long march halted, Asif Zardari’s failure to take Lahore by storm and ARD falling apart — all lead to one irresistible conclusion: President Musharraf is not giving up his army post nor the elections will be held sooner than 2007.

The only question, and it is indeed a troubling question, that remains to be answered is whether the elections, whenever held, will be fair and free.

And further, whether the legislature that emerges out of the 2007 elections would be inclined to repeal the holding of another post which enables the president also to remain the chief of the army staff, as also the law which has created the National Security Council.

The continuing agitation by both the MMA and the ARD and the ruling coalition’s panic reaction to it contain some lessons both for the opposition and for the government. The chief lesson for the parties in opposition is that the changes they desire could come about only through elections and legislation that follows and not by strikes and sloganeering. And the lesson for that government, call it establishment if you like, is that it can no longer run the country through diverse, often disagreeing, political elements aided by experts howsoever competent or detached. It requires a solid majority party or a cohesive alliance of like-minded parties. That can emerge only out of elections. The present chaos is the result of a back-door deal. Yet another similar deal might lead to anarchy.

The people did not join Qazi’s marches in millions, nor a million gathered to receive Asif Zardari in Lahore because neither offered a credible plan nor even a faint hope of a better life if Musharraf and Shaukat were to go and they were to come in. In fact, the MMA asks for nothing more but that Musharraf should instantly give up his army post. The people do not seem convinced that that would improve their lot even if he were to do it. The PPP wants elections a year or so ahead of 2007. That too is not a prospect luring enough for the people to take to the streets.

In a situation where the parties are divided or lack popular support, agitation is more likely to delay the general election rather than bring it forward. Likewise, a slighted president may try to keep the army command even after the elections rather than relinquish it now. In any case, the evolving domestic and international situation holds no hope at all for Gen Musharraf’s detractors to drive him out of power by force.

The parties opposed to Gen Musharraf and his constitutional amendments, his dual office and policies of his government, thus, would do well to think out their plans afresh and consolidate their vote bank for the elections.

Two years is not a period long enough for this task. And Chaudhry Shujaat, as everybody knows well by now, would be too pleased if it were to be even longer. The parties and hordes of ministers supporting the government, too, have to get down to serve the people rather than use the resources of the government only for propaganda ignoring the realities on the ground.

Amid his politicking and reformism all that Musharraf has to show to the people is an improving economy. That claim too is now being called into question by the rate of inflation doubling within months, widening trade and budgetary deficits, rising interest rates, violent fluctuations in stock prices and investment remaining shy. Above all, the benefits of a growing economy show no signs of reaching the common man.

It now appears that underneath the strong macro-economic indicators, the economy remains fragile. It is growing but the disparity between the rich and the poor and the divergence between the regions that are booming and those that are lagging behind is growing faster.

Whether the economy keeps growing and all people and regions partake of it now lies not in the hands of the economists and financial managers but in that of the political leaders and the “establishment”. Both also share the blame for mass discontent — in fact, it is more of a weariness, growing faster than the economy.

Everybody agrees, even the religious parties concede with some mental reservations, that for peace and progress militancy must go out of national life. But when it comes to their own interest, the government and its opponents both act to the contrary. Even President Musharraf, the arch exponent of moderation, is seen balking at every opportunity that comes his way to reverse the tide of extremism. The laws and practices of Ziaul Haq’s time, or of his making, remain all in place.

Militancy flows from extremism, and since our extremism is of a religious kind, it passes under the honorific of jihad. Murders at home and armed incursions abroad are justified in its name. The origin of jihad in Pakistan lies in Kashmir and in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion. The realities in both territories have now radically changed. Pakistan — its armed forces or armed militants — cannot expel the Indians from Kashmir, nor can bring the Taliban back to rule Afghanistan.

Recognizing this reality and to the satisfaction of the vast majority of the people, General Musharraf is supporting the new regime in Afghanistan and is seeking a solution to Kashmir by means other than a plebiscite or war. Among the possibilities (besides accession to Pakistan) he is believed to have discussed with a tiered and divided Kashmiri leadership and a “flexible” Manmohan Singh are independence or autonomy for the state and joint control with India.

For Pakistan, its Kashmir and Afghan policies are intertwined. India will lose no time or opportunity to establish its diplomatic and economic hegemony over Afghanistan if Pakistan once again chooses to extend armed support either to the militant wing of the Hurriyat or to the remnants of the Taliban.

In the historical context, we tend to forget that Afghanistan has been a thorn in the side of Pakistan and a drain on its resources while it became a propaganda ground and market for India. Now for once a friendly, or at least neutral, Afghanistan can provide Pakistan access to Central Asia rich in mineral resources but its markets starved of consumer goods.

If through confidence-building measures Musharraf finds a solution of Kashmir which by and large satisfies the people of the state, he would also find a place for himself in history. If he doesn’t, the UN resolutions surely will survive Delhi dialogue as they did more fateful Tashkent and Shimla treaties. But what next?

The central issue is not one of jingoism or pacifism in relations with India but putting an end to the sufferings of the people of Kashmir. After the UN resolutions, war, insurrection, infiltration and jihad the only course that remains to be tried is talks with the leaders of India and Kashmir.

Top



Behind Bush’s slump


By David Ignatius

IT was less than three months ago that President Bush launched his second term with a soaring inaugural address and bold promises about how he would spend his new political capital. Today much of that momentum seems to have been lost, and analysts are puzzling over why.

Polls show striking erosion in support for the president and in confidence about the nation’s course. An NBC/Wall Street Journal survey released a few days ago found that only 34 per cent of those polled felt the country was headed in the right direction, a decline of eight per centage points since the previous survey in February. The president’s job approval rating in the NBC/Journal poll had also fallen, to 48 per cent from 50 per cent in February.

Poll numbers bounce around from week to week, but the trend for Bush has clearly been down. A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll released three weeks ago pegged his approval rating at 45 per cent, which the pollsters said was the lowest of his presidency; that rating improved slightly, to 48 per cent, in a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll released later. But that poll found just 41 per cent approved of Bush’s handling of the economy, and a mere 35 per cent backed his handling of Social Security.

“President Bush seems to have slipped into a second-term slump,” wrote USA Today’s Susan Page. And looking at the numbers, it’s hard to argue with that conclusion. Who would have thought three months ago that Iraq news would be a relief from the president’s domestic troubles?

So what has happened to the president and his political capital since Inauguration Day? Many analysts cite two obvious factors: the president’s intervention in the Terri Schiavo case and his barnstorming for private Social Security accounts. Both stands seemed to have frightened voters, including many who had voted for Bush. An astonishing 82 per cent of Americans believed that Congress and the president shouldn’t have gotten involved in the Schiavo tragedy, according to a CBS poll released in late March. I can’t remember the last time 82 per cent of the nation agreed about anything.

The public is also unhappy about Bush’s handling of Social Security — an issue on which he has raised public anxiety without offering a coherent solution. The president’s road show for private accounts has actually increased public uneasiness about his handling of Social Security, with 57 per cent disapproval today compared with 48 per cent in February, according to USA Today/CNN/Gallup polling.

The president’s political advisers argue that he’s taking a hit because he’s willing to provide leadership on unpopular and divisive issues. I would argue that the opposite is more nearly true. The public badly wants leadership; it wants a president who will govern wisely and confidently in ways that unite the country. The public is uneasy with a president who seems to be playing for political advantage on Social Security with his promises about private accounts, rather than offering a plan for making the system solvent.

A passive Bush is still waiting for Congress to take the lead on the benefit cuts or tax increases that will be necessary. “If you’ve got a good idea, we expect you to be at the table. . . . We want to listen to good ideas,” the president said last week during a stop in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. That hardly sounds like bold leadership.

—Dawn/Washington Post Service

Top



Top of Page






© The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2005