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20 April 2005 Wednesday 10 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1426

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Opinion


Limits of beetle mania
Determinants of future
Flatter and prosper
Menace of fake degrees
Charlie’s chance



Limits of beetle mania


WHEN Quentin Wheeler and Kelly Miller, a pair of Americans who describe themselves as “two of the only politically conservative scientists around”, were naming some of the 65 newly discovered species of mould-eating beetles, they decided it was a good opportunity to honour some of their heroes. As a result, three of the insects now bear the exalted names Agathidium bushi, Agathidium cheneyi and Agathidium rumsfeldi.

Did the scientists stop to think whether the US president, vice-president and defence secretary might be less than flattered by their nomenclatural association with creatures of questionable value that are liable to be trampled and susceptible to insecticide? The White House, as far as I can ascertain, has offered no comment. And should Wheeler and Miller be accused of hurling an ill-disguised insult at the men they profess to admire for “having the courage of their convictions”, they could always respond that at least the beetles in question weren’t of the dung-eating variety.

One can’t help wondering, though, why they stopped with this exemplary threesome. Surely it would have done no harm to carry on in the same vein, gifting other species of Agathidia with equally memorable names such as wolfiei, condii and blairi?

The relevant BBC report contains no clues to why this should be the case. It does point out, though, that whereas the bushi can be found in North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia, the cheneyi and rumsfeldi hail from Mexico. Doesn’t that make them undesirable aliens or illegal immigrants?

I am less than convinced, however, about the veracity of this part of the report. Surely, the bushi occurs mostly in Texas and the District of Columbia, while the cheneyi is harder to track down, because it tends to burrow underground at the first sign of danger. As for the rumsfeldi, well, it’s all over the place, isn’t it?

Over the past couple of years, a favourite clip of documentary-makers has been the one in which the US defence secretary pinpoints the location of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In a scene reminiscent of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove, Donald Rumsfeld announces: We know exactly where the WMDs are — they are in Tikrit, and to the north and south and east and west...

That priceless performance alone should have sufficed for him to be shunted off to some sort of sinecure at the end of George W. Bush’s first term. But no, possibly on Dick Cheney’s insistence, he ain’t going nowhere. He popped up in Baghdad recently on his ninth visit (not counting the occasion, two decades ago, when he dropped by in his capacity as Ronald Reagan’s special envoy to butter up Saddam), before cutting a swath through the “stans”.

The Iraq trip was evidently in honour of the latest instance of regime change. This advanced phase of the puppet show is predictably being projected as the great exemplar the region has been waiting for. But did Rumsfeld pause even momentarily during his sojourn in Baghdad to ponder why, from the Nile to the Gulf of Oman, Arabs can’t be heard yelling: “O Uncle Sam, why hast thou forsaken us? You can’t reserve all your blessings for our Iraqi brothers and sisters! We, too, yearn for the great civilizing influence of your daisy-cutters and napalm, of Halliburton and Abu Ghraib. Our hereditary satraps are wallowing in sleaze, so could we have some brand new, elected ones, please? We can’t wait a moment longer — come and kill, kill, kill us for democracy, private enterprise and peace!”

It doesn’t help, of course, that Bush himself has pointed out, albeit perhaps unwittingly, what’s wrong with Iraqi democracy. When commanding Syria earlier this year to remove all its troops from Lebanese soil, he opined that truly democratic elections were unthinkable in a Lebanon under occupation. It isn’t hard to imagine why many Lebanese would find the presence of a 15,000-strong Syrian contingent unpalatable. But those troops are now gone. There are 10 times as many American military personnel in Iraq. Are we expected to imagine that occupation did not adversely affect the January 30 electoral exercise?

Interestingly enough, the emerging political pattern in Iraq is remarkably reminiscent of the constraints in Lebanon whereby the president must always be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni and the parliamentary speaker a Shia. Iraq now has a Kurdish president (Jalal Talabani), a Shia prime minister (Ibrahim Al Jaafari) and a Sunni speaker (Hajem Al Hassani), plus a Shia and a Sunni each serving as vice-presidents.

With the Kurds over-represented in parliament and the Sunnis underrepresented, this artificial ethnic “balance” isn’t by any means the most dire of Iraq’s problems. During his visit, Rumsfeld warned the new leadership against purging Baathists and the like from the military and security forces as well as the administrative corps, as that would weaken the state (without admitting, of course, that the occupation authorities did precisely that two years ago).

This condescending advice, coupled with a warning against corruption (and one can be certain that neither Talabani nor Jaafari could have plucked up the courage to whisper “Halliburton” as a retort), was at least partially self-serving. The Americans want Iraqis to bear the brunt of the insurgency and that has been happening to an increasing extent in recent months. But there’s no escaping the fact that the resistance, often reciprocally brutal, is a consequence of the occupation, and the effect will be hard to remove for as long as the cause remains.

Talabani told the BBC this week that were the Kurdish peshmerga and Shia militias to be thrown into the fight, the insurgency could be ended. He appears not to have been asked whether, in his opinion, such a move might lead to a full-fledged civil war.

On a slightly less gung-ho note, Talabani also noted that he would not personally sign Saddam’s death warrant. Even though there is no sign yet of a trial for Talabani’s predecessor, the president says his colleagues, almost to a man, favour a quick execution. Some of them may be, in their own way, as bloodthirsty as Saddam, while others appear to believe his elimination would rob a substantial part of the resistance forces of their raison d’etre. However, a very similar theory, propounded by the Americans through much of 2003, turned out to have been based on deluded conjecture when violent resistance to the occupation actually picked up momentum after the former dictator was captured towards the end of that year.

One wouldn’t seriously argue with the perception that Jaafari and Talabani are a less odious duo than Saddam and Uday. But the real test of their leadership will come only when Iraq truly regains its sovereignty. And liberation isn’t only a Sunni preoccupation, as was borne out by a predominantly Shia protest in Baghdad on the second anniversary of the city’s fall.

The demonstrators dragged down effigies of Bush and Tony Blair alongside those of Saddam — an image that, if broadcast by any of the loyal networks, may have confused some Americans. In fact, they may also be scratching their heads over Saddam’s successor: “Who’s this Talabani fella? Are we now again friends with the Taliban....?”

Not coincidentally, Rumsfeld’s next stop after Baghdad was the land where the Taliban are still sporadically active, and where he was reduced to muttering sweet nothings in the face of a public plea from Hamid Karzai for a deep and enduring “security relationship to enable Afghanistan to defend itself, to continue to prosper, and to stop the possibility of interferences.”

Who would have guessed that Afghanistan was prospering? But then, perhaps the president’s observation was based exclusively on his experience of Kabul. And if he’s unable to sleep at night for fear that his sponsors will suddenly get up and go, perhaps he should be consulting a psychotherapist rather than outgoing US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

For the time being, at least, the Afghan-American “security relationship” runs deeper than either Karzai or Rumsfeld would be willing to acknowledge, with Afghanistan reportedly serving as the hub of global prison system, whereby “terrorism suspects” are flown in from various parts of the world, and then transferred to countries — Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have been mentioned — where they can be squeezed for information they may or may not have through methods that violate every known international covenant, convention and protocol against torture.

Elements of this system have been in place since late 2001, but it entered a new phase of development after the US Supreme Court ruled last July that detainees at Guantanamo Bay weren’t necessarily off-limits to the American system of justice. The international prison network includes facilities where US interrogators themselves handle some dirty work. That is evidently the case at a pair of jails in Haripur and Kohat, in northern Pakistan, where the prison population reportedly approaches that of Guantanamo, and former inmates claim to have been subjected to Abu Ghraib-like techniques. Worse tales have emerged from interrogation centres in Jordan and Egypt.

It is likely that only a fraction of the ghost detainees have anything to do with terrorism, given that the system operates on the old McCarthyite principle, whereby names revealed under torture provide more targets for arbitrary arrest or kidnapping.

Perhaps Karzai is right to be worried. This sort of security relationship, which stretches far beyond Afghanistan, cannot indefinitely endure. It is illegal, immoral, and in all likelihood incompatible with genuine democracy — which, one must hope, the client regimes will eventually make way for.

Email: mahirali1@gmail.com

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Determinants of future


By Iqbal Jafar

THE future, as it would unfold in a chosen timeframe, is a matter of perennial speculation and planning by individuals, organizations and nations. It is, perhaps, the most fascinating of human endeavours influenced no less by our hopes and fears as by the dynamics of the given circumstances.

But projecting the future can be a very complex exercise, to the point of being meaningless, if one were to take into account all the numerous factors, from the universal to the local, that could impinge on our future. The focus in this article is, therefore, limited; it is limited to those elements of our present situation that are peculiar to our socio-political life, as distinguished from the common elements (illiteracy, poverty, fast population growth) that we share with other developing countries.

The peculiar elements of our socio-political life that could be expected to play a crucial role as the determinants of our future are these: the tension between various ethnic nationalities; the tension between sectarian communities; the tension between the revivalists and the reformists; and the tension between the military and civil society. For the sake of brevity of reference let’s call them ‘the four tensions’. And to begin with, let’s acknowledge the fact that the future of the state of Pakistan would depend on our ability, or the lack of it, to understand and resolve these tensions that can, if allowed to fester, shatter our social fabric and, ultimately, the state itself.

Now, let’s look at each of these four tensions a little closely for better comprehension of the situation that we are in. We begin with the ethnic tension that manifests itself at two levels. First, within each of the four provinces — Saraiki-Punjabi, Sindhi-Mohajir, Pathan-Baloch or Pathan-Hazarawal dissensions.

Second, between two or more provinces which, in fact, is a conflict of interest between Punjab on one hand and the rest of the provinces on the other. It has grown out of the perception, not wholly unfounded, of deprivation of rights and usurpation of resources by the dominant ethnic nationality. In recent months the ethnic political parties have trained their guns (at times literally) at the federal authority on issues like Kalabagh dam, Thal canal, natural resources and provincial autonomy. The ethnic sentiments today are at their worst since after the break-up of the country in 1971.

Second, the sectarian tension that has led to killings all over the country, even at places of worship. In fact the sectarian sentiments today are so intense that the fanatics on either side of the main sectarian divide are willing to lay down their lives as suicide bombers seeking oblivion for themselves and their chosen victims.

How and why has this contagion spread? Could it be that religious violence introduced during the anti-Qadiani movement in 1954 and later has become part of the sectarian mindset, and the exclusionist approach fostered by that movement impels the sectarian fanatics to discover ever new non-Muslims lurking in the fold of Islam who need to be purged by the true believers? Thus, even Shias, Barelvis, Deobandis and Agha Khanis have been purged out of Islam through speeches and fatwas. We should not be surprised if this breeds violence.

Third, the tension between the revivalists and the reformists or, if you will, the orthodox and the liberal. This is a conflict that the Muslim countries all over the world have been involved in for the last about 300 years. It has now acquired global ramifications and has become associated with violence. If the revivalists carry the day through violence and by espousing popular causes (Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya), we can expect the emergence of a Pakistan located on the socio-political scale somewhere between Afghanistan as it was under the Taliban and Iran as it is under the ‘Guardians’.

Fourth, the tension between the military and civil society. This tension is not so obvious as the other three are, mainly because it is a more recent one. To understand the nature and causes of this tension we have to keep in mind three given facts: first, the military does not command that much of popularity as it did until 1965; second, the two military regimes, after the first one, have left deep scars on our collective memory; third, over the years the military has been sucked into competition with civil society in practically every field: banking, insurance, education, civilian jobs, transport, construction work, urban and rural real estate and, above all, governance.

Now, none of the fields where military is in competition with civil society is a traditional or commonly accepted field. The fear is that competition on such a scale could lead to conflict or a series of conflicts between the military and civil society. That would, surely, undermine national solidarity, if not the integrity.

Finally, a common aspect of these tensions: though disparate and even contradictory, these tensions do share a common attribute: they, together and separately, tend to weaken the loyalty to the homeland by interposing substitute loyalties that are ethnic, sectarian, ideological or professional, and are more intensely felt and fostered than the loyalty to the state. It is as if the loyalty to the homeland has been put on the rack and is being pulled and stretched in four different directions. How long could this last without some of the lifelines snapping?

So much for the causes and nature of the socio-political tensions that, if unchecked, would determine our future in ways that none of us would like. But such are the oddities of human life that things that none of us likes may yet happen entirely because of our own actions. We must, therefore, move towards a resolution of these tensions before it is too late. And here are a few thoughts, not all of them new, on the resolution of each of the four causes of conflict.

First, the ethnic conflict. Apart from taking the obvious steps, such as greater provincial autonomy and more equitable share in jobs and resources, the time has come to give serious thought to the creation of ethno-linguistic provinces. The Indian experience shows that creation of separate provinces for the ethnic communities is the only realistic response to the ethnic aspirations.

However, new provinces should not be imposed but created through referendum in the areas or districts that are proposed to be constituted into a separate province. This would resolve the ethnic tensions within the existing provinces, and also reduce the tension between the provinces by ensuring that no province is too big to dominate the other provinces.

Second, the sectarian tension. It is possible to root out this menace to social cohesion if the government, with the support of the ulema, takes, as a matter of course, legal action against those who preach hate and violence at places of worship and elsewhere. If the law needs to be made more stringent, the Penal Code should be amended to achieve this purpose.

But more important than the legal code is the support of the ulema who exercise immense moral authority over the activists of their respective sects. The only problem is that there are some ulema who are part of the problem, not of the solution: they must be identified and isolated. That again is the responsibility of the ulema who owe it to the people to take a firm stand on this issue and take practical steps to resolve this tension. The government should encourage and support the ulema who are willing to do what they must.

Third, the tension between the revivalists and the reformists, or the orthodox and the liberals. Unfortunately for the Muslim world this conflict that started as a theological debate a long time ago, has now got mixed up with the on-going conflicts in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Mindanao where the orthodox (as jihadis) have assumed the role of champions of the cause of the Muslim communities there, and the liberals are seen as the apologists for the West. Thus, the resolution of this conflict, or even the softening of the militancy of the orthodox is inextricably linked with the conflict in Palestine, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Such being the facts of life there is not much that we can do to resolve the orthodox-liberal conflict in its violent form except wait for the resolution of the political conflicts in the occupied lands, and do whatever we can to resolve those conflicts.

Fourth, the civil-military tension. Now, this is a tension that is rather insidious, and wholly indigenous compared with the other three tensions that are quite open and have some beyond-the-border connections or implications. Since it is insidious it has to be openly acknowledged and debated as an issue. Because it is wholly indigenous, it should be amenable to relatively quick solution. As it is a civil-military tension it has to be tackled at the highest level on both sides of the civil-military divide.

Perhaps, one such forum could be the National Security Council (NSC) where both the civil and the military sides are represented at the highest level. The civil side is fairly representative too as it includes the Leader of the Opposition and the chief ministers of the provinces. If the NSC could initiate a dialogue on this issue, it would have done a great service to the nation, and more than justified its creation.

The future, as said at the beginning, is a matter of perennial speculation and also planning by individuals and nations alike. Here in Pakistan, however, the future is not a matter of much planning. We have left the future to the twists and turns of circumstances to shape it, although some of the determinants of our future are fairly obvious, and those that are likely to exercise evil influence on our future can be checked and corrected. But we refuse to intervene. How would, then, the future look like? Well, one has not been blessed with the ability to ‘look into the seeds of time’ and just as well, I think.

E-mail: tvo@isb.comsats.net.pk

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Flatter and prosper


I READ a rather clever news report in a national daily the other day. I call it clever for the reporter probably fooled his editor by making it sound authoritative while there was nothing of the sort in it. The headline said: “Government to take disciplinary action against flatterers.”

This was one of the funniest headlines I had ever come across in my life. My immediate reaction was to thank Gold I was no longer in service, otherwise any day an unfriendly boss could have accused me of flattery and got me into trouble.

A reading of the news story gave a rather different picture. It seems that only those officials are threatened with disciplinary action who use influence to obtain lucrative postings or to avoid non-lucrative ones called khudda-line in the vernacular. And that neither of the two categories could gain their ends without flattery. Government servants could carry on as usual and butter up their superiors to their heart’s content. They could even flatter their subordinates to make them do things they couldn’t do themselves.

I like the story about the wily official who once said to his boss, “Sir, what I admire about you is that you are absolutely impervious to flattery and are able to take objective decisions about your subordinates.” The officer was a man of principles and agreed with the assessment. But it is one thing to employ clout and family connections to get what you want in government service and quite another to try and gain the same ends through praise of the powers-that-be which the headline implied. Both require clever manipulation, and constant perusal of popular American best-sellers on how to succeed in life.

The newspaper report quoted Rule 29 of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules that “no government servant shall bring, or attempt to bring, political or other influence, directly or indirectly, to bear upon the government or any government servant in support of any claim arising in connection with his employment as such.” This rule has been there since 1973, but I don’t think there have been even half a dozen cases during the last 31 years in which the attempt of a government servant to either gain a favour or avoid disfavour has invited disciplinary action on that account.

The issuance of this fresh warning (through the newspaper’s reporter, for no circular to this effect has been referred to) is just like reminding hardened criminals that the punishment for robbery and dacoity under law is so many years in the jug, and the consequence of killing someone (if you are caught in the act) can be hanging by the neck till you are dead. They already know this. Reminders never achieved anything.

You can try it. If you want something from the government and have written to it about your demand, howsoever just it may be, you may send as many reminders as you like, but the government (or the government officer dealing with the matter) will not be moved. As for a simple acknowledgement, you can whistle for it all your life. But if you can somehow reach the man in person and praise him for his immunity to influence he might condescend to be actually helpful. There is much to be said for flattery and the use of clout, Rule 29 notwithstanding.

There is also the story of the officer who felt embarrassed when a sycophantic subordinate would not stop recounting his qualities of head and heart (as the cliche goes). Convinced that the man was overdoing it, the officer advised him to desist. The man replied, “Sir, I would desist if all that I say was incorrect. I must abide by your orders, but you shouldn’t stop me from speaking the truth.” This officer too was a man of principles and had to give way.

As for using one’s clout and connections with the upper echelons of the state hierarchy, the practice has come down to us from time immemorial and is likely to remain a dependable tactic for decades to come. The best thing about it is that those approached for favours wouldn’t dream of reporting against this resort to unfair means, the contents of Rule 29 (again) notwithstanding.

One must admire the resourcefulness of officers who, by the judicious and timely use of these connections, have managed to remain posted at, say, Lahore, Islamabad or Karachi for 20 years in some cases. A recent announcement revealed that more than a dozen officers from the CSS have completed ten to fifteen years in Peshawar, and are to be moved out now. Not that they were not transferred during this period. They were, and a number of times, but somehow every time the transfer orders could not be implemented. The ingenuity of such officers should be put to better use.

The news story with which I began this piece confined itself to postings and transfers, as if manipulation in this field was the biggest irregularity that an officer could commit. It didn’t talk of the numerous other perks and privileges that most favoured officers are able to enjoy by virtue of their official position or by being kinsmen of big shots. There are officers who got the best of everything because they came to be known as blue- eyed boys of either one president or another or of successive PMs like BB and Mian Sahib. Rule 29 and other restrictions did not exist for them.

Take another example. Posting as Officer on Special Duty is supposed to be a sort of punishment. A relation of mine, a Grade 20 officer now retired, holds the Pakistan record for remaining OSD. He was for more than four years in Islamabad. Since there was no restriction on his movements, he started and successfully ran a construction company in Lahore (he was an engineer) and also received more than five lakhs as salary and allowances during this period. The rule that provides for posting as OSD became a boon for him. And the joke is that, on two occasions, he used his connections to actually avoid a posting so that his business should not suffer.

I don’t subscribe to ‘piri-mureedi’, but if anyone can single out an officer in the government who never used his connections to secure a “good” posting, and never succumbed to the blandishments of insidious boot-lickers, I shall at once acknowledge him as my pir and pay spiritual homage to him.

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Menace of fake degrees


By Zubeida Mustafa

LAST week’s judgment by the Sindh High Court on an MPA’s degree verification issue was not the first of its kind. Justice Mushir Alam dismissed the petition of Malik Imran Khan who had questioned the action of the Sindh anti-corruption department and the University of Karachi for holding an enquiry into the authenticity of his B.Com degree.

This gentleman who was elected on the PML-N ticket to the NWFP assembly in October 2002, later found his election challenged by his rivals on the ground that his degree was “bogus”.

The University of Karachi has confirmed that he had not cleared two papers in his bachelor’s examination in 1994 and therefore he did not qualify for a degree. What is at stake is not the degree but the assembly seat which depends on his having a valid degree.

A number of legislators — at least one MNA and two MPAs — have already been disqualified on grounds of having fake degrees. Other cases are believed to be before the courts. This is not a new problem for quite a few of our universities have been famous for being involved in the paper chase. True, the university may not be officially involved in the game of doling out degrees for the asking. But as is well known there are cells operating on their premises with the connivance of some corrupt members of their staff which issue counterfeit degrees on payment of a heavy sum.

This old problem has suddenly assumed a new and grave dimension because of the Musharraf government’s decision to make graduation one of the requisite conditions for contesting the October 2002 elections. That generated an extraordinary demand for ready-made degrees. Way back in December 2003, Dr Farooq Sattar, a Muttahida Qaumi Movement MNA, had declared at a public forum that the assemblies were full of people with fake degrees. He had called the members of parliament with dubious degrees “political quacks”.

Less than 15 months later one of his own party members, who is a minister of state for religious affairs and conducts a popular television programme to indoctrinate the ordinary folks, was accused of having obtained fraudulent master’s and PhD degrees. These allegations generated a lot of hot air and evoked a weak denial. But the concerned member’s seat was not challenged because his graduation was not in question. The only positive aspect of this bizarre phenomenon is that the political interest it has generated has created watchdogs and monitors — those who lost the election — who are willing to challenge and expose the false degrees of their rivals. That would explain why these cases are being unearthed under the glare of publicity.

But politicians are not the only ones who have been chasing fake degrees. Others in public life who need a degree to pursue their vocation or for promotions are allegedly seeking the easier way out. In fact a heated debate on the issue has been taking place after Qazi Isa Daudpota, an academic, wrote about the nature of the institutions and the doctorate degree conferred by them on high dignitaries of the academia. Although the chairman of the higher education commission, Dr Attaur Rahman, has declared the charges against the vice chancellor of the Quaid-i-Azam University as baseless, his explanation has been challenged and many questions still remain unanswered.

The fact is that given the high level of corruption that prevails in some of our universities, one knows that obtaining a fake degree from these supposedly sanctified institutions of higher learning is not an impossible task. The credibility of the universities has already sunk low. We now know that many universities abroad do not accept the degrees of Pakistani universities at their face value. They revert to local institutions for official verification of degrees when a candidate applies for admission, even though this is a time consuming process.

This corruption combined with the appalling standards — Dr Attaur Rahman himself conceded that many of these universities are at best glorified colleges — has undermined Pakistan’s higher education system. Even when the degrees are genuine, they carry little weight because the standards are so low that the students pass with the minimum of effort. Hence even in Pakistan, many institutions are not admitting students solely on the basis of their exam results but prefer to conduct their own admission tests. Even prospective employers hold written tests and put the applicant through a rigorous interview before making a job offer. Degrees now mean little. They are only used for screening out people and stemming the flood of applicants.

The question has been frequently raised in pertinent quarters: whose responsibility is it to investigate the authenticity of the degrees issued by a university? Can any one challenge a degree? What should be the higher education commission’s role in cleaning up the prevailing mess?

It is important that the HEC and the universities create a mechanism for checking the authenticity of degrees. Obviously every university will have to create an independent cell for this purpose. In order to ensure that the investigations are impartial and fair, some outside observers should be associated with it. As for the HEC, it may not be equipped to actually carry out the probe, but it should be empowered to order a university to look into a case. When should a case be investigated? Whenever charges are brought against a person who holds a public position and his appointment/promotion is dependent on the degree he holds. There should be absolutely no question of the HEC refusing to look into a charge of a false degree.

This may have to be spelled out clearly so that the HEC is not hauled to the court every time it investigates the authenticity of a degree. Interestingly, in the afore-mentioned case before the Sindh High Court, the petitioner didn’t challenge the finding of the university but was upset by the fact that the anti-corruption department had decided to investigate his degree. It gives the impression that it is the right of a person to obtain a fake degree!

Another issue — with a slightly different nuance — that needs some elucidation and must be addressed immediately is the acquisition of degrees from dubious institutions — many of them on-line ones. Any one with a computer and Internet would be familiar with the spam e-mails one receives every day offering a degree on line. “No classes, no study, no exams” the offer reads. It could be quite tempting to those who are not interested in books and studies.

In this globalized world of ours all the names of the universities, which crop up from time to time, are not familiar to people here. Hence it should be mandatory for a person to get such degrees issued by unheard institutions authenticated. This will have to be the responsibility of the higher education commission.

This is not a matter to be taken lightly. One hopes that it will be addressed in earnest and without much delay.

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Charlie’s chance


THE Liberal Democrats are one reason why the outcome of Britain’s forthcoming election will be so interesting. Last time, they won 52 seats. It’s nearly 80 years since a Liberal party did any better.

In this parliament, they have won two byelections and performed well in two others. They are starting out on this election campaign at a higher point than at any time in the party’s brief history. This, as well as fatherhood, is why Charles Kennedy has a song in his heart. Lib Dems believe they are poised to free themselves from being defined by what they are not, and establish themselves as what they aspire to be: the party of freedom and fairness.

Hence the hyperbolic title of the manifesto the party launched yesterday. “The Real Alternative”, it proclaims. But to what? To voting Labour, for opponents of the war (in traditional Labour seats), or to voting Conservative, for those who can’t stomach Michael Howard’s views on immigration (among the prosperous younger voters of southern target seats like Surrey South West)? Kennedy spent his moment in the electoral sun yesterday wooing both, reminding voters of his party’s opposition to Iraq, the prevention of terrorism legislation and tuition fees. “We were the real opposition,” he reiterated across the airwaves.

The party’s paradox is that the only way it can triumph electorally is by attracting in greater numbers than ever before the discontented of both the other main parties. And that is hard to do without a little constructive obscurity. At the launch, Kennedy, perhaps disoriented by the sleep-deprivation familiar to all new parents, was uncomfortably caught by the contradictions of some of his policies.

It is far from certain that troubled Tories will vote for a party that wants to see government spending as a (slightly) higher proportion of GDP than either of the others, and is correspondingly committed to raising tax through its well-aired proposals for a new 50p top rate on incomes of over 100,000 pounds and the substitution of council tax by a local income tax.

Never before pinned down to numbers, it emerged — eventually — that a household with two incomes of 42,000 pounds or above would be among the 25 per cent worse-off. In vain, the party protested that nationally the median household income is 22,900 pounds. If a household consisting of a nurse and a police officer is worse off, the Lib Dems can be confident that they will be branded the high-tax party — the price they pay for a commitment to greater economic fairness.

—The Guardian, London

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