RESORT to work stoppage as a way of forcing an employer to meet his employees’ demands for higher wages has been made from time to time since before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The first recorded strike in the western world was that of bakers in New York City in 1741. In 1786 the printers in Philadelphia stopped work to press their demand for a minimum weekly wage of six dollars. Six years later, shoemakers in the same city struck.

A call for a strike may extend beyond a single establishment or even industry. It may be addressed to the nation’s entire workforce, encompassing all occupations, businesses, and industries. This has come to be known as a “general strike.” To the extent that it does materialize, economic activity ceases for the duration: workers stay home or come out on the streets; shops, banks, commercial houses, schools and colleges close; transporters stay off the roads.

The purposes of a general strike will likely transcend the parochial interests of workers in a particular plant or industry. They have to be general and vital enough to engage the entire community. More often than not, such purposes will turn out to be of a political nature.

Going beyond wages and working conditions, workers have also been concerned with their political and civil rights. English workers agitated for universal adult suffrage during the Chartist Movement in the 1830’s and 1840s. Over a hundred thousand Belgian workers in 1891, and more than twice as many in 1893, launched mass strikes to demand franchise for the lower classes. Closer to our own times, Gandhi and the Congress party in India sponsored general strikes to reinforce their demand for independence from British rule. Other political parties in post-independence India have often issued calls for a general strike to advance, or oppose, certain public policy options. It would be no exaggeration to say that strikes had become a part of the Indian political culture.

French labour leaders and student organizations in France joined hands in 1968 in launching strikes to bring down the government of Charles de Gaulle. More recently (September 2003), Maoist rebels forced a general strike on Nepal with the object of bringing about certain basic changes in that country’s governmental system (including abolition of the monarchy).

Strikes within segments of the economy, or professions, in support of specific political goals have become a common practice in Pakistan as well. Pakistani students stayed away from classes to play a central role in the movement that overthrew Ayub Khan in March 1969. Lawyers boycott the courts, perhaps much too often, to demonstrate their support for, or opposition to, certain political situations. Every now and then a political party will call for a general strike, asking working people and businesses across the board to suspend their normal operations on a given day.

The MMA issued the call for a general strike for April 2 to register protest against the present regime’s numerous wrongdoings and failings. Reports indicate that positive response to its call was impressive in NWFP (where it is the ruling party) and Balochistan (where it is a partner in the ruling coalition), but that it was moderate to low in Punjab and Sindh. It is said also that the police in the NWFP aided the MMA activists in blocking roads, and let them intimidate the transporters and shopkeepers to get them to stay closed. In a few places in Sindh the police pressured businesses to stay open.

The strike remained generally peaceful, but a few clashes between the police and the MMA activists, and a few acts of violence by the latter, were reported. They smashed the windows of three buses close to the university campus in Lahore, vandalized buses, and burned down one of them, in Faisalabad.

It is not necessarily improper for a political party to sponsor a general strike when the community at large entertains the grievance at issue. In such a situation folks may be willing to forego income (wages or proceeds from business) to ventilate their resentment. But this is very rarely the case.

It is a known fact that even one day of a general strike can cause the economy losses running into billions of rupees. If the participants decided of their own accord to take this loss, there is not much we can say. But we know from our observation of strikes in the past that the participants are not always willing actors. Tough guys in the sponsoring party’s ranks, or on its payroll, go out to scare shopkeepers into pulling down their shutters. They deprive workers of the means of buying food and drink for themselves and their families, keep the sick from visiting their physicians and hospitals, students from going to school, and cause the non-participants a whole lot of inconvenience by confining them to their homes.

Use of force to deny people their right to a day’s wage, their right to movement, and their right to go about the normal business of life is to deprive them of their fundamental rights. In plainer language, it is high-handedness or, if you will, gangsterism.

The MMA’s call for a general strike may be considered from another perspective. One may argue, as did the late Professor Harold Laski (an illustrious figure in British political science in the first half of the 20th century), that calling for a general strike — whether done by a labour union or a political party — is a fundamental right. It is a right to awaken the public, that great “sleeping giant,” to some great wrong that is being perpetrated. If the public is put to inconvenience in the process, so be it, for it will not awaken until it is inconvenienced. Sounds reasonable, but this reasoning ignores the likelihood that in exercising its right to call a strike the party concerned may be depriving the non-participants of several of their fundamental rights (referred to above).

Apart from considerations of legality and morality, one may ask what the MMA’s sponsorship of a general strike has accomplished. Little, or nothing, as far as I can see. For one thing, it was not focused on a sharply defined issue. A long list of wrongs allegedly committed by the present regime was targeted. The undertaking, having thus been diffused and diluted, lost much of its punch. It has passed without making any noteworthy impression on the Musharraf regime.

Encouraged by the partial “success” of their strike, MMA activists mounted a much more dramatic act of lawlessness the following day (April 3). Led by an MNA, Qazi Hamidullah, several hundred of them forcibly stopped a young women’s “mini marathon” in Gujranwala. They beat up both men and women participants in the race, set fire to 19 vehicles parked outside the Jinnah Stadium, broke its windows, and damaged adjacent stores and buildings.

The Punjab government declared that it would not be deterred by the MMA’s violence in Gujranwala, and that women’s marathons would continue to be held in various district towns as planned. Maulana Fazlur Rahman said he had directed the MMA workers across the country to stop these races, which are acts of “obscenity and vulgarity,” by force. The MMA, he said would not allow the government to impose western culture on the Pakistan people.

A couple of issues arising out of this affair may be mentioned. First there is the question whether women’s participation in sports, held in public view, violates Islamic ethic. Needless to say, this is open to debate, and the MMA cannot be said to have the last word on the subject.

The MMA and other ulema are surely entitled to preach their view in this regard in their Friday sermons and other forums. But even in a place like Saudi Arabia, where the law forbids women’s sports in public view, the clerics cannot take the law in their own hands. They will have to leave it to their government to send the women running a race back to their homes or, more likely, to jail.

But the political system of Pakistan is not the same as that of Saudi Arabia, and the great majority of its people have no desire to see their government going the Saudi way. Pakistan is governed under a Constitution, which allows its citizens, both male and female, certain fundamental rights. Granted that these rights are subject to restriction under the law, but to date no law has been made to forbid women to come out and play games (tennis, field hockey, or races). How do we then assess the MMA’s resolve to stop women from participating in public sports?

The MMA is the ruling party and runs the government in NWFP. It is within its rights to pass a law forbidding women’s participation in sports out in the open, and it is surely entitled to use its police power to enforce this law, assuming that the courts do not strike it down for being repugnant to the Constitution. But the MMA is not the ruling party and it does not control the government in Punjab. How does it then become entitled to use force to stop a women’s marathon in Gujranwala?

The clear and unequivocal answer is that it has no business doing any such thing. The people of Punjab rejected its bid for power. They elected others to govern them and make laws for their improvement and happiness. In taking the position that it will nevertheless dictate policy to the government in Punjab, and that it will use such street power as it can assemble to force the Punjab government to obey its dictates, the MMA chooses to act like an agent of lawless force, not unlike a mafia. The viciousness of its choice is not mitigated by the possibility that its goals may be righteous. That is, in any case, open to dispute. The MMA’s conduct reveals also that its professed commitment to democracy and rule of law is not credible.

NAWAZ Sharif’s Muslim League polled 8.1 million votes in the 1993 election and won 73 seats. In the 1997 election, his League polled 8.8 million votes but won 137 seats. Just 700,000 votes thus got him 64 more seats and an absolute majority in a house of 207. By contrast, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP polled 4.2 million votes (nearly half of Nawaz’s) but won only 18 seats.

It is this kind of anomaly in the first-past-the-post ballot which persuaded some countries to switch over to proportional representation or the system of single transferable vote. Under either of these two balloting systems the PPP would have won about three times as many seats as it actually did in 1997.

These systems may be a bit too complex for our illiterate voters to follow but if adopted the assemblies would more truly reflect the support a party commands among the masses. It is especially true of countries like Pakistan where parties are numerous and where many among them are regional or parochial. The elections held in 1990, for instance, were contested by 27 parties. The number now may be smaller but it would be worthwhile for parliament to debate whether the next general election should be held on the basis of proportional representation but without opening yet another door to rigging. The first-past-the-post rule suits only those countries where the contending parties are two or three, as in Britain.

Putting the balloting system aside, let it be said that the voters in 1997 sowed the seeds of that which the majority of the people who did not vote have come to me. Though the increase

in Nawaz Sharif’s popular vote was marginal, he was quick to lay claim to a heavy mandate and trumpet his belief.

In their exultation, Nawaz Sharif’s partrymen and cronies (all anxious to reap rewards) failed to realize that the election of their ‘heavy mandate’ was also the election of the lowest voter turnout in the country’s patchy electoral history.

It was particularly low in the three smaller provinces — in Balochistan only 23 per cent of the registered voters turned up to vote, in the NWFP 29 and in Sindh 31. His majority thus came from Punjab where the turnout was 41 per cent.

The rhetoric of ‘heavy mandate’ evolved into high-handed rule. Nawaz Sharif made all the decisions while the parliamentarians and ministers roared their approval. Some sulked but fell in line. The high-handedness showed itself when Nawaz Sharif named a retired judge, with no record of public service, as president of the country. Party hopefuls squirmed but remained silent.

According to Abida Hussain, then a minister, everybody was too stunned to speak. Stunned or scared?

This submissive attitude persisted when a raid was organized on the Supreme Court and again when the Shariat bill was rammed through the National Assembly.

Were the bill not to be stalled by the Senate, it would have superseded the Constitution, divested the parliament of legislative powers and vested all authority in the prime minister. At the end of the day, Shahbaz Sharif’s tough management in Punjab, perhaps, remained the only redeeming feature of Nawaz Sharif’s two stints in power.

All that and much more took place, but Mr Sharif carried his mandate, and luck a bit too far when he made a habit of dismissing army chiefs. He could take liberty with the Constitution, presidency, parliament, judiciary and bureaucracy but not with the military, it turned out.

Considering that he himself was a victim of high-handedness, the people expected General Musharraf to be fair. In fact, that would have been the only justification for his taking over the reins of power in the absence of a street revolt or breakdown of law and order.

Even-handed in politics he could not be for he had made his choice of factions and individuals who were to form the nucleus of his political cadre. President Musharraf’s politics continues to be driven by this cadre and the defectors later joining it. The political elements who have chosen to oppose him must suffer deprivation, as much as they also enjoy admiration. Such has been the fate of every opposition before them. After all, Musharraf leads an intensely political government, it is only buttressed by the military. Patronage and persecution have been an integral part of Pakistan’s politics, no matter who has led it.

Democratic credentials and political biases aside, the people at large are puzzled and aggrieved, not because Musharraf is high-handed but because he has embarked on far-reaching institutional reforms in an offhand manner, and with little study or awareness of the consequences.

Today, no one can tell who is responsible for law and order (which is our primary problem) and what is the line of demarcation between the functions of the federal, provincial and district administrations.

The pledge to repeal the oppressive and discriminatory laws and to modernize or ban the madressahs has all but been forgotten. Reminders irk Musharraf and get an evasive response from Shaukat Aziz.

The national debate now rages around frivolous or inconsequential issues like the inclusion of the religion columns in the passport and “mixed marathons”. The fact remains that a passport entry is no evidence or endorsement of the faith of its holder and that if boys and girls can sit together in classroom why can’t they run together. It is a cultural and not a religious issue. Here too, as in case of more vital issues, a retreat by the government is in sight.

Little has changed in the past five years nor will there be changes in the next two because the politicians supporting Musharraf are opposed to his ideas and wouldn’t let him what he wants to. In pursuing his policies on the economy and Kashmir he is succeeding.

A conscious effort by Musharraf to enlist the support of some liberal elements in politics has been defeated, or so it appears, by an impetuous Benazir to the glee of the reactionaries. Now, as Asif Zardari takes a deeper plunge, the last laugh may belong to Chaudhry Shujaat Husain who has long been saying that it is not necessary to hold elections, not even in 2007 when they are due.

ONE year after opening its doors to 10 new members, the 25-nation European Union is facing an array of challenges. Policymakers in Brussels are braced for an unprecedented institutional crisis if — as many fear — France votes against a new EU constitution in a public referendum set for May 29. Under EU rules, the new treaty must be approved by all countries before it can enter into application.

Europe’s economy, meanwhile, continues to falter and governments are bickering even more fiercely than anticipated on the bloc’s future financial spending plans.

The EU’s historical expansion on May 1 last year, however, has had some positive fallout. The bloc undoubtedly has more political clout and economic weight in world affairs. It has become an even stronger magnet for its poorer eastern and southern neighbours, with more and more countries lining up to join the club. The EU is also an inspiration for a host of Asian, African, Middle East and other nations striving to build their own regional cooperation networks.

But enlargement has also made EU decision-making even more difficult and, most significantly, revealed a remarkable continuing lack of clarity and consensus on the core identity of the Union — and its ambitions of becoming a global superpower.

The EU today represents a curious and confusing mix of religions, cultures and languages. It is also a place of contradictions. They may have hammered out a new constitution outlining their common European vision but EU governments regularly engage in acrimonious daily battles over money, power and prestige.

The 25 countries are split among those which favour giving market forces full play and those like France which are up in arms against the so-called “ultra-liberal” agenda which they fear is being forced on them by officials in Brussels. As the debate on textile imports from China, India and Pakistan illustrates, the EU is also divided into nations which are committed free traders and those led by southern countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and France as well as most newcomers from the east which are trying to resurrect good old-fashioned protectionism.

There is little unanimity on foreign and security policy, with the bloc’s governments still struggling to overcome differences over the Iraq war and, despite recent high-profile transatlantic fence-mending diplomacy, increasingly uneasy about relations with the United States.

Most of the soul-searching and problems are inevitable for a bloc which is growing both in size and its ambitions. Avoiding further conflict among European states was an overriding objective of the EU’s founding fathers as they set up the original six-nation club in 1957, with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as members.

Anchoring democracy and ensuring a successful and thriving market economy are also key achievements of the EU’s successive enlargements, including past moves to bring in Spain, Portugal and Greece, as well as last year’s big bang expansion to include eight former communist nations of central and eastern Europe.

Countries now standing patiently in the membership queue — Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey — also clearly see the Union as a force for peace and stability. Not surprisingly, one of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s first gestures after his election last December was to ask for EU membership. The EU has also promised membership to all Balkan states — but without setting any deadlines.

However, the mood of European governments and the European public is changing. While last year’s big bang expansion to 25 states was relatively seamless, with most people backing the move, Europeans today are much more wary of the bloc’s future plans.

Romania and Bulgaria have been told in no uncertain terms that their planned entry on January 1, 2007, is conditional on further reform moves and especially action against corruption. The scheduled opening of accession negotiations with Croatia on March 17 this year was delayed indefinitely in protest at Zagreb’s failure to show full cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

Significantly, Ukraine’s drive for entry has spurred EU policymakers to reflect on the geographical limits of “Europe,” with many arguing that if Kiev gets a foot in the door, so should Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The decision to start membership talks with Turkey in October this year has triggered an even more impassioned debate on the entry of a largely Muslim nation into what many have hitherto viewed as a Christian club.

Integration problems facing many of the 15 million Muslims already settled in Europe is one reason many Europeans are wary of Ankara’s bid to join the Union. These concerns have been compounded by concern at post 9-11 worries about the increasing radicalization of disaffected Muslim youth in Europe. Others emphasize that Turkey, with a history of authoritarian rule and a poor human rights record, will never be able to fit in completely with the European “way of life.” Seeking to ease such concerns, thoughtful EU policymakers often argue that the Union is about common “values,” not a specific religion or culture. All European countries which agree to abide by these standards — democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance — are entitled to join, they say.

To prove the point, the new EU constitution does not include any reference to Europe’s Christian heritage. Instead, the focus is on “universal values” which can be applied and implemented by all countries, regardless of religious affiliation.

In addition to the internal debates, expansion has also reinforced existing differences in the EU over relations with Washington — and whether Europe can and should aspire to become a counterweight to America. The new EU treaty underlines a common vision of a stronger and more independent Europe with more power on the global stage. The bloc will, for instance, have its first foreign minister and a diplomatic service to back him up.

But as revealed by differences over the Iraq war, the 25 EU nations are divided between those like France — and sometimes Germany — which believe EU foreign policy must not automatically reflect US strategic interests and the so-called “Atlanticists,” including Britain and most new EU members, which want stronger links with Washington.

The two groups sparred over the Iraq war last year. This time around, the dispute appears to centre around French and German calls to end the arms embargo on China, a move which the US firmly opposes.

While they ponder over transatlantic ties, EU policymakers face even more serious difficulties at home. The most serious challenge is ensuring public approval of a new EU constitution designed to streamline work and decision-making in the expanded Union.

Three opinion polls released recently indicate that French voters will reject the European constitution in a May 29 referendum, provoking an EU-wide crisis. A survey conducted for the daily Le Figaro and private radio Europe 1 showed that the ‘no’ camp was holding steady in France, with 53 per cent of respondents against the landmark treaty. Two other polls put the ‘no’ vote at 54 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively. Since mid-March, a string of opinion polls have all suggested that the ‘no’ camp, with between 51 and 55 per cent of likely voters, will win out.

The polls have prompted French President Jacques Chirac to intervene directly in the debate and created quasi-panic in Brussels where officials say that a rejection of the treaty by France — a founding EU state — will mean sure death for the new constitution. There is concern that a French ‘no’ will also lead to a similar negative ballot in the Netherlands which votes on the treaty on a few days later.

After a virtual silence for several weeks, the French president is now urging voters to support the constitution, saying it “opens the doors of the future for Europe”.

Opposition to the European constitution gained momentum in France in the second half of March, propelled by anti-government feeling and unease about the country’s future in the EU. Concern about Turkish membership, rapid economic liberalization and, more recently, concern about rising Chinese exports of textiles has become mixed up in the treaty debate.

Worryingly for Brussels, anti-EU sentiment in France over the constitutional treaty is fuelling growing Dutch scepticism in the run up to the Netherlands referendum on June 1. Officials say French opposition to the EU constitution, is having a ‘domino’ effect on Dutch voters, with around 70 per cent saying that they will abstain from voting.

With deep uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the French vote, Dutch politicians are warning that unless the government takes action to stem anti-EU sentiment, the country could end up rejecting the constitution. As in France, the no camp with strong socialist backing is seeking to turn the referendum into a vote against EU policies including the sensitive issue of immigration and Turkish EU entry.

However, the Dutch foreign minister Bernard Bot has vowed that the vote will take place regardless of the French outcome. “If France votes no, then other countries must continue the fight for a yes, the more countries supporting the constitution, the better the chances we have of finding a solution,” said Bot.