When General Musharraf seized power from Pakistan's former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, one of the seven points on his agenda was the restoration of inter-provincial harmony in the country. That is a pledge that, during the five years of his controversial rule, he has failed to honour.
On the contrary, brand new polarities appear to be in place today while, with the Punjab inevitably being cast as the villain of the piece, the federation seems to be more gravely fissiparous than ever before.
What we are dealing with is a particularly tortured political perspective, part global, part domestic. The advent of George Bush and the cataclysm of 9/11 would seem to have been key factors in this context, contributing to momentous geo-strategic developments in some of the most sensitive parts of the world. These have been responsible for radically altering our perception of the world.
Of course, the most significant newcomers, officially, on the global scene have been terror and its antidote, the so-called 'war on terror'. Afghanistan was the first country to experience the full brunt of the US president's crusading zeal.
Pakistan, agreed overnight to renege on past practice and follow the straight and narrow as prescribed by the US. This meant joining the counter-terrorist coalition spearheaded by the world's sole superpower and cleansing this country of extremist religious elements largely in what is known as the 'tribal belt'.
It may be in order to remind ourselves here that the victims were none other than those former governments had nurtured to propagate jihad with a view to promoting hegemonistic ends.
That they were readily available to us as scapegoats when occasion demanded only points to our overall national cynicism. Whether or not there is any truth to recent allegations about our military actively assisting American forces in bombing raids across the Pak-Afghan border, the operation against our militant tribals promises to continue.
Regardless of those Pakistanis who stand disaffected or brutalized as a result of this, and however this may augur for the health of the federation, these are the wages of being an amenable client state.
However, it is more particularly the situation in Balochistan today that must give us pause - at least until the concerned parliamentary sub-committee's recommendations with its emphasis on a 'Balochistan for the Baloch' have been implemented.
In this complex scenario, where we confront a diverse and uniquely layered society in transition, reductionism seems a little inappropriate. Still, we must acknowledge that what was earlier perceived by Islamabad as a mini-insurgency has patently proven a case of the country's chickens coming home to roost in the wake of decades of socio economic neglect of and gerrymandering in the region by various central governments.
In effect, last year's bomb blasts in Gwadar and the more recent rocket attacks in and around Balochistan were not so much acts of sabotage as symptoms of the somewhat turbulent coming of age of an oppressed and dispossessed people. They betokened, above all, the spontaneous, if amorphous, resistance of a race to further exploitation and expropriation in the name of 'development'.
The occupation of Sui by our military subsequent to the unrest following the appalling business of the rape of Dr. Shazia may be justified on grounds of state necessity.
Yet no such immunity can be sought for the construction of a military cantonment there. Military options are often short-lived. In the case of Balochistan, they are also likely to be counterproductive as in the time of Z. A. Bhutto. They will, if anything, only serve further to fuel nationalist sentiment there, something we like to underestimate and can ill-afford at this juncture in our history.
Today, whatever the role of its controversial sardars, Balochistan stands at a crossroads where its future hangs in the balance. It is up to us to try to tip this in our own favour. Given the province's enormous strategic importance, it is obviously open to a number of takers.
It is relevant that the second presidential term of George Bush seems to be offering us and other Third World countries scope for national reconciliation. The Bush doctrine of today is manifestly different from that of his first term. Its general thrust appears, as suggested by his state of the union address, to be in the direction of the need for greater freedom and democracy for the world at large.
Though his address was slightly extravagant, we have no reason to disbelieve him. Having, from his point of view, made the world a safer place, he presumably feels the time has also come for making it one that is more socially and politically equitable. This will, of course, be a trifle hard to swallow as far as authoritarian regimes in the Third World are concerned.
However, it is something with which even the most recalcitrant autocrats, must necessarily come to terms. Needless to say, it will, in the case of our country, call for a radical shift of policy on the part of our ruling junta if an atmosphere conducive to a more just dispensation is to come about.
Above all, they will have to jettison their policy of occupation, political, physical as well as financial interest based, since that is the greatest stumbling block.
Of equal importance for the country's long-term survival its democratization. And, regardless of what those under the general might contend, the issue of his uniform is pivotal in this context.
It is crucial for them to realize that, despite the faintly arbitrary endorsements by occasional spokespersons of the West, General. Musharraf's uniform is among the many pernicious insignia militating against the democratic idea itself.
In short, to ensure that the country remains intact, the 1973 Constitution must be restored and militarism in the shape of the general's uniform must go. Also, fresh elections under the supervision of an independent election commission ought to be held as soon as possible in the larger interest.
At the same time, our two national party leaders in exile, with whom the government is reportedly engaged in conciliation talks, would do well to bear in mind that, in the last few years, a quantum change of sorts has taken place in this country.
Pakistan is, socially and politically, a quite different place from what it was. Today, its people are, for the greater part, hardboiled, cynical and shamelessly on the make with little or no interest in any prospect of change.
Also if, on the one hand, the establishment has energetic touts in abundance, apathy reigns supreme where economic deprivation, infrastructural decay and anarchy are concerned.
Democracy based on mere voter turnout can no longer be taken as the panacea it may at one time have been in the eyes of the average Pakistani. And nobody, including the US, could be so ingenuous as to equate this country with either an Afghanistan or an Iraq where even the holding of elections had earlier been unthinkable.
If democracy is to be about more than merely adult franchise at its most basic here, then the people of this country have the right to know where precisely their two major political leaders stand in relation to them in 2005.
What, by way of practicable national agendas, is on offer from them? How, for instance, do they propose to address the issues of economic stagnation, unemployment and poverty? What is their take on religious militancy, domestic and external security or Kashmir? What is their educational plan for a nation sinking irretrievably into the mire of illiteracy and moral inertia? Have they a scheme for checking the criminalization of Pakistani society? Granted that the present government is trying to steal a march on them in this sphere, how do they view the question of provincial autonomy?
These are some of the questions they should surely be mulling over with a view to preparing comprehensive policy statements for the people of Pakistan before the next elections.
They owe us no less. They must remember that slogans and charisma alone will no longer suffice. As erstwhile leaders who, clearly, failed before, it is incumbent upon them to look for a new, articulate connected ness with the people of this country if they wish to convince them that they are really worth going back to the hustings for.
Effect and cause in state elections
By M.J. Akbar
One of the most familiar words in the English language is 'because', because events are generally ruled by the relationship between cause and effect. If there is a cause there must be an effect. This makes issues, trivial and important, understandable. Examples from mass culture will prove the point.
Why do music channels keep showing Adnan Sami songs endlessly? Because that is a reasonably popular way to spend seven minutes of television time without paying a rupee.
Why are new songs shifting to Punjabi-soul after years of only Bhangra-pop? They are herding into the Bulle Shah train driven by Rabbi Shergill. Why do murderers get trapped by brilliant detectives in crime thrillers? Because they have a motive.
Why does the bikini issue of the American magazine Sports Illustrated (it's heavily illustrated with a different kind of sport) get thicker each year (224 pages, according to the copy on my table)? Because, despite an inflated price, it sells out faster than bikinis.
Why should the editor of this page get tempted to use one of those pictures from the bikini issue as an illustration for this column? Because that damn picture would get an ogle even out of an Edit or Op-Ed page.
So why doesn't that illustration get used? Because there are strict orders on the limits to which an Edit-page culture can go. You get the idea of cause-and-effect. The effect may be obvious but it is the cause that is the real story.
In mass politics, strangely, the sequence so often gets reversed. It is not the cause, but the effect that is the real story. Effect often reshapes and fundamentally alters the starting point. Clearly, this proposition needs some explanation.
This column is being written on the eve of the declaration of results of the Bihar and Jharkhand assembly elections, hardly the best moment to pontificate on a dicey subject. Elections are also taking place in Haryana, but since the results in this state seem to be a foregone conclusion, we will leave them alone.
What is the situation in Bihar, where Laloo Prasad Yadav has been in power for 15 years? We can leave the scientific business of getting the results wrong to the opinion pollsters.
Let us stick to the indisputable. The fact is that every political force, barring a section of the Left, has done everything in its power to defeat Laloo. I say a section of the Left because the most important Leftist group in Bihar are the Naxalites, and they were as determined to end Laloo-Raj as anyone else.
The Janata Dal (United) and the BJP were natural opponents, so their mobilization was on expected lines. In all fairness, the cracks in the Delhi-centric UPA were not unexpected. The logic that keeps partners together in Delhi does not extend to Patna.
If Delhi is the head, and therefore heady, then Patna is the base, and therefore basic. Ram Vilas Paswan cannot sustain his party by telling his followers that the doors of expansion are shut.
Neither can the Congress. And in Laloo Yadav's scheme of things, both Ram Vilas and the Congress were marginal factors, necessary to ensure his victory, but unnecessary in the exercise of power. It was an ideal situation for him, and precisely for that reason could not be sustained. This was a primary cause for the scatter of the Delhi alliance in Bihar.
An equally important cause was that every political party overestimates its strength on the eve of an election. After all, elections are a human business. There cannot be precise markers.
It is a fluid sum game. It is only in retrospect that the mind clears up. The BJP is still wondering (privately of course) what the tallies might have been if it had given the AGP an extra seat in Assam, Shibu Soren an extra seat in Jharkhand, and stayed with Om Prakash Chautala in Haryana rather than spurning him.
If Laloo had felt that the arc of public opinion would steadily move away from him, he might have offered the fifteen extra seats that would have kept the Congress by his side.
There was no way in which he could have retained the support of Ram Vilas, since the bitterness between the two is personal. But, in broad terms, when it comes to an analysis of causes, everyone has a story to tell.
No one, including Laloo, knows what the results will be, but the body language of the Laloo camp is edgy. Laloo Yadav himself does not believe in body language. He believes in language. Whether in victory or defeat Laloo Yadav is irrepressible. He has been using a few epithets about senior Congress leaders (apart from Sonia Gandhi) that will never be quoted in their authorized biographies.
There is only one realistic measurement of effect: when topsy and turvy have finished their game, who is in power? No one is getting a majority from the people; power will go to those who can cobble one in the assembly.
Laloo's problem is that power has only one meaning for him: his wife becomes chief minister again. An ally as chief minister could be as problematic as an opponent in that chair, and a nominee from his own party perhaps the worst of all options. This is a peculiarity of all personality-driven parties. In Laloo's case there is an added dimension of vengeance. He cannot afford to be out of power.
If Rabri Devi remains chief minister Laloo Yadav will have a vested interest in the status quo. If the dice throws up different numbers, and Ram Vilas, with 25-odd MLAs, can persuade the JD(U) to join his government, rope in independents and get non-participatory support of the BJP then the cracks at the base will turn heads in Delhi.
One nuance has already been established. Alliance in Delhi is no guarantee for a similar equation in the states. In Jharkhand, the Congress and Shibu Soren's JMM first nudged the third partner, Laloo Yadav, out, and then set about poaching from each other.
The aim was not merely to defeat the BJP-JD(U) but also to become the dominant partner of the alliance. This is also an acknowledgement of the individual power of a chief minister. That single office outweighs the collective power of a bunch of ministers.
This is partly because of the nature of the office, and partly because a chief minister, unlike a prime minister, does not have heavyweights as colleagues. This was why the Congress demanded, and got, this chair in Maharashtra, although Sharad Pawar had the larger number of MLAs. The rules were changed because the Congress could use its Delhi muscle.
The Delhi muscle did not work in Chennai. DMK chief M. Karunanidhi took pre-emptive action when E.V.K.S. Elangovan, the Congress union minister, dared to dream of his party's return to partial power in Tamil Nadu. The DMK was ready to go as far as to withdraw its ministers from the central government.
It was only a minor coincidence that Karunanidhi called for a meeting of his party on this for Sunday the 27th. This is the Sunday on which the results of Bihar, Jharkhand and Haryana were to be announced.
The difference between Karunanidhi and Sharad Pawar is but this: the DMK's departure from the UPA rattles the coalition; Pawar's departure raises a sigh, but nothing more.
POINT OF ORDER: Guess who was beside Laloo Yadav in Central Hall, enjoying the wit in his customarily restrained fashion, while Laloo rewrote the profiles of senior Congress leaders? Sharad Pawar.
This by itself means nothing. Power has very little to do with friendship and absolutely nothing to do with banter. Self-interest is the primary motive; and a brother's interest is protected a long way later, if at all.
POINT TO NOTE: If Laloo Yadav defeats his opponents and his friends, not to mention pollsters, crosses the 100-seat mark, reduces the Congress to 15-odd seats, emerges as the largest single party/group and dictates the shape of the next government, then what? That too will have its consequences in Delhi, because he will demand a larger share of power in Delhi.
Could he extend his grasp to Ram Vilas Paswan's portfolio? Logic suggests that he could. There has been no reshuffle of the Manmohan Singh government since it was sworn in, and these results could set the scene for a fresh check on equations. When effect impacts on cause, there is but naturally an after-effect.
The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, New Delhi.