| 04 October 2004 | Monday | 18 Shaban 1425 |
More than just semantics
A superpower vs the superpower
Policy of pre-emption will lead to chaos
Pakistan's road to democracy has been paved less with good intentions and more with hidden landmines, along with civilian roadblocks and military check-posts that have prevented its people from choosing their own destiny.
In recent months, particularly since the removal of Mr Jamali's government last June, an intense debate has been going on in the media on whether the military or the political parties are responsible for "destroying democracy" in Pakistan and whether democracy as practised in Pakistan in recent decades deserves being given another chance.
That there are a lot of people out there showing their discontent with democracy a la Benazir and Nawaz Sharif is hardly in doubt, but to construe this as an endorsement of the present military regime and its "facade of democracy" would be a considerable stretch of the imagination.
The debate is getting increasingly polarized as the promised date for the giving up of the military uniform by General Musharraf approaches and the speculation on whether the promise will be kept continues amid conflicting signals from the president and his overzealous supporters.
Until recently, there existed two distinct schools of thought on the subject. The first consisted of those who considered that democracy was unsuited for developing countries which needed a strong leader to set things right and steer the country on the road to development.
Though that view is still extant and probably shared by the bulk of those supporting President Musharraf, its influence is declining even among the less informed.
The other school has long held the view that democracy has never been given a fair chance in Pakistan and that repeated interventions by the military, lasting on an average a decade or so each time, were giving democracy an extended "holiday" from which it returns more emaciated having unlearnt all past lessons.
According to the second school of thought, to which the writer unabashedly subscribes, democracy needs a long and continuous period to take root, and its constant uprooting and replanting by gardeners who have no clue as to the principles of political botany, end up in yielding nothing but bitter fruits.
Most observers of the Indian political scene, especially of the recent elections, are impressed by the high returns that country has received as a result of patience and perseverance with its political process and meticulous exclusion of the military from political affairs.
More recently, however, a third view seems to be emerging which sees General Musharraf's regime as an alternative to the preceding two perceptions. It defends the current military regime and upholds it as the best chance of ensuring a stable democracy in Pakistan in the long run.
Articulating this view, among others, are some former members of the civil service of Pakistan, who have unfairly suffered at the hands of some civilian regimes after 1970.
The view also seems to be shared by some "progressive" or "liberal" intellectuals who see the general as a check on religious fundamentalism and as a harbinger of a secular and modern state, although they are a bit sceptical about the general's tall claim of being a "renaissance" man. They also believe that eventually democracy will be restored, without saying how.
The central thesis of this group is that the present military regime is wrongly blamed for destroying democracy in Pakistan and that the real culprits are "the elected prime ministers starting with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and ending with Nawaz Sharif in 1999".
The protagonists of this view portray the present regime as qualitatively different from previous military set-ups. However, this product differentiation is hard to sell and is confined, at best, to its pious intentions.
Objective analysis, however, shows that both political and military regimes are at least equally to blame for the tragic plight of democracy in Pakistan. Even in the period between Ziaul Haq and Musharraf, the military is known to have constantly interfered in the election process, both openly and covertly, and in ensuring that "right-minded" people get elected. That the results have not always been as scripted is a measure of the inherent strength of the democratic process.
One can agree with these new discontents of democracy and admirers of the present regime that many of those clamouring for its return harbour a romantic view of democracy and are not fully mindful of either its limitations or of its obligations.
The sad and incontrovertible fact, however, is that democracy has not been given a fair and uninterrupted chance to develop in this country. It is true that the civilian democratic regimes, especially in the post-Ziaul Haq period, have also not distinguished themselves either in the political or economic sphere, and have earned notoriety for corruption and mismanagement which has made them anathema to the general public.
But halting the democratic process is (to rephrase a proverb) like throwing the baby out with the bath water. If at all, the brief military interludes should have been used as short surgical operations to remove the impediments to democracy and to enable people to overthrow those who are corrupt or dishonest through an election.
On the other hand, military rule has been practised not only more frequently, but also, not surprisingly, with greater diligence and fewer impediments, because of the military's organized structure and considerable resources.
In addition, it has also enjoyed the unstinting support of the bureaucracy in general and the CSP in particular, which always collaborated (and has been more in sync) with the military regimes in Pakistan and contributed to the elitist ethos of Pakistani society.
Yet, past military regimes cannot be said to have had discernibly more favourable effects on the welfare of the people, especially the poor, as empirical evidence has amply shown.
The only credit that periods of military rule can justly claim is that there has been somewhat higher growth though accompanied by greater inequality and a greater tilt towards elitist development policies.
None of the four military regimes have succeeded in bringing such structural reforms as land redistribution and other social reforms, an independent administrative machinery to hold elections, electoral reforms ensuring inner-party democracy, the creation of an electoral fund to enable low-income individuals to take part in the electoral process and accountability commissions for major financial scandals involving both civil and military personnel.
Critics of democracy are also correct in pointing out the unfortunate chain of events which occurred during the formative years of Pakistan and that adversely affected the evolution of a democratic polity.
These events deprived a solid foundation for the development of democratic institutions and traditions, providing our eastern neighbour (with whom we continue to have a fluctuating love-hate relationship) an unbeatable edge in these matters.
Our historical legacy of a rather rushed process of political liberation and the lack of a plan to deal with the problems of post-partition state craft and development of our leaders were also to blame. The vacuum created by the early demise of the founding leaders allowed the civil service and the military to step into shoes that were several sizes too big for them.
That said, we cannot put all the blame of our present and the future on our past. Neither should democracy be made a forbidden fruit which would banish us from paradise.
The present debate on democratic versus military rule should try to abstract from, to the extent possible, the long and sometimes ambiguous history surrounding it.
After all, if we are prepared to make a new beginning on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan relations, on which the military has always dragged its feet, why shouldn't democracy be given a new chance?
It can even be argued that unless democracy is fully restored and the military goes back to the barracks, the Indian leadership will continue to distrust Pakistani intentions, notwithstanding the optimism exuding from New York's Roosevelt Hotel after the Musharraf-Manmohan Singh meeting.
The real question to be debated in the current context is the relative space the military and civilian administration should be allowed to occupy in the political and economic spheres.
In a democratic dispensation, it is axiomatic that the military should be subject to overall civilian authority. Although the Pakistani Constitution recognizes it, the axiom has been repeatedly violated with impunity.
The military is constantly enlarging the scope of its operations, redefining its role and broadening its spheres of influence. On the pretext of forestalling the future possibility of a coup, it has vied for a permanent niche for itself in the governance of the country, through the forced establishment of the National Security Council, which even admirers of the regime consider as being "highly undemocratic".
The new discontents of democracy admit that the long night of the present military rule is likely to continue in the foreseeable future (estimated at up to two decades) "in the shape of the National Security Council, with some sort of civilian facade."
The hope for institutional stability, however, seems to be based on the unwarranted and unrealistic assumption that General Musharraf's dual role as COAS and president will not be challenged either by the army or by the public over such a long period.
The general's initial ambitions of becoming a Kemal Ataturk have lately been replaced by those of emulating Charles de Gaulle. However, the greatness of those hallowed names was earned through their involvement in long national liberation struggles, not thrust on them by accidental circumstances or by external powers.
One cannot forget either that, notwithstanding the high personal esteem the general is held by his admirers, power corrupts and excessive power corrupts immeasurably.
There is also no guarantee that a military president will not become a victim of megalomaniac dysfunction as civilian prime ministers Z.A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif palpably did. Neither is General Musharraf completely his own man and must adjust to the compulsions of changes in US politics and the composition of the collegial body he represents.
The dissatisfaction with the Benazir-Nawaz era is genuine and widespread, and hardly anyone, including the two former prime ministers and their followers, would wish that ignominious era to return to the country.
The discontents of democracy as well as the present regime are tilting at nonexistent windmills. To pre-empt the possibility of the recurrence of that period, a series of checks and balances and safeguards, as well as structural reforms noted earlier would be needed to end this game of hide-and-seek between the military and civilian rule, played with decadal regularity, which has plagued our polity.
The military's overarching presence in public life is depriving oxygen to all segments of civil society, including the academia, lawyers, social activists, journalists and other independent-minded people.
It is surprising that while the debate on the merits and demerits of political democracy goes unabated, there is no debate in the country on the role of the military and how to restructure it to make it more relevant to changing societal needs and compatible with other major players in society.
Neither does the military seem to be conscious of or prepared for such changes. That the military is both a problem in, as well as a solution to, the issues of governance needs to be the focus of a national debate.
More than just semantics
The Bush campaign finally has a response to John Kerry's Iraq critique that doesn't involve the word "flip-flop." The new line, in the words of Bush spokesman Steve Schmidt, is that Kerry advocates "retreat and defeat." The president, by contrast, "will complete this mission."
As President Bush himself declared during the recent news conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, "We will stay the course and stand with these people so that they become free."
This sounds plausible enough. After all, Kerry says he hopes to withdraw all US troops in his first term, while Bush claims to reject any such timetable, saying that America will stay in Iraq "as long as necessary, and not one day more." But in fact Bush has a de facto timetable of his own. And it will probably set in motion an American "retreat" no matter who takes the oath of office next year.
Bush is adamant that Iraq not delay elections due to be held by January 31, regardless of conditions on the ground. That seems consistent with his promise to stay the course. But in fact, quick elections could produce an abrupt change of American course.
Opinion polls show that most Iraqis want US troops to leave their country sooner rather than later. A May survey by the Coalition Provisional Authority found that 41 per cent of Iraqis wanted coalition forces to leave immediately, while 45 per cent wanted them to leave once a permanent government is elected.
Only six per cent thought troops should stay as long as is "necessary for stability." Those numbers are particularly significant because while the January balloting will not actually choose a permanent government - but rather an interim national assembly that oversees the writing of a new constitution - polls suggest that most Iraqis think it will. And thus they think it should begin the process of American withdrawal.
Given these realities, the surest way for Iraqi politicians to win votes will be to run on a simple slogan: "US out of Iraq." Elections usually unleash nationalist, populist passions, especially in countries with weak democratic traditions. And in a country with an acute memory of colonial rule, appearing to support indefinite foreign rule will be the political kiss of death.
According to the New York Times Magazine's David Rieff, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most powerful Shia cleric, has said that any conversation between an American and an Iraqi should end with the question: "When are you leaving Iraq?" Sistani has warned that if elections are delayed, he will call for a boycott.
Even the spokesman for Iraq's foreign ministry - a spokesman in a government essentially handpicked by the United States - recently urged a timetable for American withdrawal.
The Bush administration seems to be listening. Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that elections would proceed on schedule even if they could be held in only "three-quarters or four-fifths of the country."
And according to The Post's Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks, the Pentagon is planning a post-November 2 offensive aimed at retaking recalcitrant Sunni cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra in a bid to make elections possible there as well.
But ironically, since Sunni Arabs are even more anti-American than Shias, the more the United States lures them to the polls, the more likely Iraqi voters are to demand that the United States leave. And for all President Bush's talk of completing the mission in Iraq, his administration has already signalled that it would comply. As early as May, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell announced that if a sovereign Iraqi government requested it, "we would leave." And this week, Rumsfeld stated, "Any implication that that place (Iraq) has to be peaceful and perfect before we can reduce coalition and US forces I think would obviously be unwise."
In other words, the United States would begin pulling out before Iraq had a permanent constitution or a permanent elected government and before its government had even secured the entire country. So much for Bush's pledge to Allawi that "America will stand with you until freedom and justice have prevailed."
To listen to the Bush campaign, John Kerry wants "retreat and defeat," while the president remains committed to vanquishing the terrorists and building a democratic Iraq. But the gap between Bush's rhetoric on the stump and his policies on the ground grows with each passing week. In reality, it is Bush, not Kerry, who is laying the groundwork for America's withdrawal from Iraq, a withdrawal that secures neither democracy nor security in the country that was meant to transform the Middle East.
Would such a withdrawal represent "defeat"? Luckily for the president, he won't have to answer that question until after November 2.-Dawn/The Washington Post
A superpower vs the superpower
One of the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations, following the First World War, was that neither the United States of America nor the USSR (both former allies) was a member. One of the reasons for the impotence of its successor - the present United Nations - is that both the US and the USSR were.
At the first General Assembly meeting of the United Nations, held in January 1946 in London's Central Hall, a decision was taken by 51 delegates to locate the UN headquarters in the United States, the USSR agreeing "as a friendly gesture to Washington".
That was probably the last such concession made by the USSR to the US. Over the decades thereafter, they sparred, argued, fought a cold war and smaller wars through proxy states, without actually dragging each other and the rest of humanity into another world war.
The United Nations proved to be an effective safety valve. As Henry Cabot Lodge once explained to its members: "This organization is created to prevent you from going to hell", adding: "It is not created to take you to heaven."
All of its 191 member countries today know all too well that the United Nations is not their stairway to heaven. Its headquarters is more like some modern Trump Tower of Babel, where a hundred languages are spoken but only those that matter heard.
Two speeches made before the 59th UN General Assembly that ended recently were heard with especial attention: those by US President George W. Bush who spoke his mind, and by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who has at last found his.
Having behaved throughout his tenure like the quintessential international civil servant forced to humour many masters, Kofi Annan finally gave vent to his truer feelings, declaring to the BBC on September 15 that the allied invasion of Iraq was "illegal".
There, a week later, mustering all the residual courage of a man on the scaffold of retirement, he lectured the UN General Assembly: "No one is above the law, and no one should be denied its protection.
Every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad; and every nation that insists on it abroad must enforce it at home." It was more than a barb aimed at President George W. Bush who followed him at the podium; it was a belated challenge, an empty gauntlet thrown at the world's mightiest superpower.
Kofi Annan had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001, jointly with the UN. He earned it in 2004. Part of the citation for that prize had read: "In an organization that can hardly become more than its members permit, he (Kofi Annan) has made clear that sovereignty cannot be a shield behind which member states conceal their violations."
It was precisely that shield of superpower sovereignty that Kofi Annan had hoped to penetrate with his remarks, and that it was that very shield that President G. Bush used to deflect Annan's criticism.
Unrepentant, Bush continued to justify the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Forceful, he reminded the delegates that many of them had been accessories before the fact.
Divisive, Bush made clear that in his view the world was not a global village, but a modern Kurukshetra in which sides had to be taken on either side of "the clearest of divides: between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos; between those who work for peaceful change, and those who adopt the methods of gangsters; between those who honour the rights of man, and those who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or shame." And to those who preferred to sit on the fence, he warned: "Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground." Stirring words. If only Bush's audience had been stirred by them.
Dag Hammarskjold, Kofi Annan's predecessor as UN's Secretary General, had once commented: "It is not the Soviets or indeed any of the big powers who need the United Nations for their protection.
It is all the others." The others heard Bush out, without listening to him. Many of the silent majority wondered which of them would need protection from the superpower.
Today, the United States is engaged in three war zones in its crusade against terrorism - in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Pakistan. Each of the three is being protected against the forces of terrorism, just as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were once buttressed against the spectre of communism.
If only the US could have found now, more than it did then, better symbols for its struggle. Iraq has a papier-mache effigy of a prime minister Allawi; Afghanistan has Hamid Karzai with his ethnic stage-props, and Pakistan has President General Pervez Musharraf.
All three are being encouraged, as if they were unsteady toddlers, to walk on their own two feet towards democracy. It cannot be lost on the US administration that not one of these three ostensibly popular leaders can move within his own country without a heavy guard to protect him from his compatriots.
To anyone who can remember beyond two decades, the warmth of the reception accorded by President Bush to President Musharraf will seem like a replay of the Nixon-Yahya Khan reunion in Washington in October 1970 after the UN General Assembly session, and the even warmer display of support shown by the Chinese government to President Yahya Khan when he visited Beijing a month later in November.
In their eyes, Yahya could do no wrong, until things did begin to go horribly wrong in East Pakistan, after which they averted their gaze from him. For the average Pakistani, proud as he or she may feel at the president's diplomatic successes abroad, the daily defeats at home matter more.
They sense a disconnect between the president's mellifluous words abroad and his actual deeds at home. For example, at the UN, President Musharraf spoke movingly of the need to hand over "the governance and authority to the Iraqi people, allowing them full control of their natural resources". Some Balochs might have preferred to have heard him speak about their demands for fuller control over their own natural resources.
Both President George W. Bush and President Musharraf share more than a friendship and a common stand against terrorism. They share a conviction that each has a mission to fulfil, and that only his personal continuity can ensure the consummation of that vision.
Such confidence needs to be tempered though by a sensitivity to ground realities. Perceptions are often not enough. Let us not forget what happened to the man who refused to acknowledge that his house was on fire because he still carried the keys to it in his pocket.
Policy of pre-emption will lead to chaos
It has been revealed in the US press that intelligence estimates prepared last July expressed pessimism on the future of Iraq, where insurgency has become more intense, and the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government seems to have made matters worse.
The very worsening of the situation is likely to help the chances of President George W. Bush for a second term, since the public in the US may not favour change of command while the battle with terrorism is joined.
However, the growing appetite of the neo-conservatives around Mr Bush, who are calling for regime change in Syria, Iran and even Sudan, suggests that the risk exists for further US interventions, before the chaos and anarchy created in Iraq and Afghanistan have been resolved.
To add to the concerns of the international community, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has claimed the right of pre-emption, anywhere in the world, in pursuit of the terrorists responsible for the massacre of over 300 persons, half of them children in Beslan, a town in North Ossetia, in the Caucaus.
Though the claim by the Chechen militant leader, Shamil Bassayev, that he was responsible for the incident, has kept the focus on terrorism within Russia, Mr Putin's response also includes the broadening of his own powers, at the expense of checks and balances in the Russian constitution.
For the time being, with the presidential election a few weeks away, both candidates acknowledge the threat to the US following the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the deeper implications of issues at stake are hardly being debated.
What has become obvious is that while military pre-emption represents the easier part, in which the undoubted superiority of the US prevails, no organized or carefully considered plans have been developed about how to establish peace and security, after the military pre-emption has cleared the way for regime change.
The future looks murky, and unpredictable, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, after the "successful" military intervention. Indeed, the situation on peace and stability has deteriorated after the pre-emption to a point that requires continuing military repression, in which US casualties have been mounting.
While there is a broad consensus in the world on the need to root out terrorism, which is seen to have pitted the Islamic world against the western powers, very little serious effort is being made to get to the roots of the problem.
The UN General Assembly is again going to hear eloquent speeches, accompanied by strong words on the resolve needed to eliminate this cancer from the body of the world. Mr Bush has used the opening of the general debate in a manner calculated to advance his cause in the elections only six weeks away.
The reiteration of the resolve of the US to "stay the course" in the war against terrorism will not halt the rising sense of unease on how this war will end. Elections, designed to promote democracy and self-rule, are planned in Afghanistan in October, and in Iraq early next year.
The US has announced its intention of sending 1,100 additional troops to Afghanistan to ensure the completion of the election process. However, most observers doubt if enough international forces are available in Afghanistan, where the insurgency has increased, specially in the largely Pushtun regions of south and east Afghanistan.
Mr Hamid Karzai is being opposed by a large number of candidates, and the task of subduing warlords is far from complete. Indeed, the Al Qaeda deputy chief, Dr Zawahiri claimed in an address on September 11, that the Taliban fighters were already in control of large areas of the country.
Ayad Alawi, the prime minister in the interim Iraqi government, announced the resolve of his government to hold the elections scheduled for next January, during a visit to London, where he sought western and UN support to achieve this goal.
Though Prime Minister Tony Blair backed him, describing the fight against terrorism as vital for ensuring democracy and rule of law in the world, he is himself under strong attack within his country for having tampered with the truth to justify Britain's joining in the pre-emption against Iraq by Bush.
Regardless of the bravado and resolve being displayed by the authors of pre-emption, there is no gainsaying the fact that neither Afghanistan nor Iraq show any signs of returning to normality.
Pre-emption has failed to achieve its purpose in both the cases. Remnants of both the regimes that have been changed have maintained their resistance, which appears to have taken on the aspect of national resistance against foreign occupation.
Whereas "terrorism" hardly existed in Iraq before the US-led invasion, it appears to have acquired acceptability because it is seen as part of the nationalist movement against the foreign occupiers, who are regarded as allies and backers of Israel.
It is against this background that the 59th General Assembly of the UN opened in New York on September 21. Senator Kerry, the Democratic contender is banking heavily on the discomfiture of the Bush administration over the war in Iraq.
The opening address by Secretary General Kofi Annan stressed the rule of law, both internally in member states, and between them. As he had earlier questioned the legality of the war in Iraq, in an interview with the BBC, since it lacked the endorsement of the Security Council, his remarks were construed as being critical of the pre-emption in Iraq.
President Bush avoided sounding a defensive note, and claimed that the US and its partners were seeking to promote democracy and the rule of law in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The main problem of the US and its coalition partners has been that while pre-emption has inflicted enormous damage, the victors have failed to do enough to make the occupation tolerable.
After three years in Afghanistan, the US has failed to carry out any significant reconstruction. Part of the reason is that the authority of the government set up in Kabul does not extend beyond the city.
The US has relied heavily on the Northern Alliance, which represents only a small part of an ethnic minority in northern Afghanistan. The US also patronizes local warlords like Dostum, while the Pushtuns, the largest ethnic group, have been alienated.
President Karzai and his supporters rely on the coalition's support, whose main concern has been to hunt down Osama bin Laden, and destroy the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Capturing Osama bin Laden is likely to help the Bush candidacy, whereas making life any easier for the people has a low priority.
The situation is no better in Iraq. Though $18.4 billion were allocated for reconstruction, less than $1 billion has been spent so far, whereas the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was asked to divert $3 billion for the building up of Iraqi security capability. Senator Biden, a ranking Democratic member of the Committee, declared that if the state of Iraq is the criterion, the "war on terror is in trouble."
With resort to pre-emption in Iraq now the major campaign issue, the chances of holding elections in Iraq or Afghanistan to promote democracy are not rated high. Indeed, Europe has already adopted a different road for fighting terrorism that consists of countering it at the source, while building up a security infrastructure against it within the continent.
With the UN General Assembly recently in session, and many world leaders present for it in New York, this would have been an opportunity to rethink how to manage the war on terrorism.
The use of overwhelming force in pre-emptive attacks does not tackle the roots, which are the failure of the US dominated international order to address the political and economic injustices in the world.
President Bush sought, in his address, to move beyond terrorism, and to call for greater efforts to fight poverty and disease. However, his occasional rhetoric in support of righteous causes is not followed by implementation. Though $15 billion were provided for fighting Aids, large parts of the African population still do not have access to the latest drugs.
President Bush gave an oratorical flourish to the ideals of democracy and human rights, but, in practice, the call on Israel to freeze settlements constitutes a rare reference to the "roadmap", while Washington continues to back Israel in trampling on Palestinian rights which is the major cause of resort to terror by the Arabs.
Growing poverty is another source of widespread dissatisfaction in the developing countries, and the Bush administration has not done enough on that front either.
It is time for the US to project its soft power, based on respect for democracy and human rights. The speech of President Bush did appear to invoke America's ideals, but the rhetoric and actions of his closest advisers reflect a continuing reliance on power rather than principle.
Only respect for law, within and between states will produce a just and peaceful world order. Resort to pre-emption, and reliance on extreme force produce only chaos and misery.