| 19 April 2004 | Monday | 28 Safar 1425 |
More blunders in Iraq
The poor image abroad
What marks this century one of unprecedented upheaval is not primarily the emergence of new centres of power like China or India; that has happened before, though not on this global scale.
Nor is it the fact that significant states are losing control over all or part of their territory. The unique aspect is that when state power weakens, non-state terrorist groups fill the vacuum for the purpose of threatening the state system itself.
The challenge is not simply to reestablish the international system but to prevent vacuums that, like black holes, suck into themselves the nihilistic elements trying to destroy order altogether.
At least since Woodrow Wilson, the United States has had its own definition of international order: the idea that wars are caused less by clashing interests than by unrepresentative domestic institutions. In the Wilsonian view, foreign policy based on national interest and state power prevails when democratic institutions have failed.
Since democracies settle their disputes by reason, not by war, the spreading of democracy is, to this school of thought, America's ultimate mission and regime change its ultimate sanction.
The belief that compatible domestic structures are the ultimate foundations of international peace is not new. It was the basis of the Holy Alliance after the Napoleonic wars. The opposite of democratic, it asserted that monarchical systems were the best guarantee of international stability because they were impervious to the fickleness of a changeable public opinion. And dynastic leaders were said to be more peaceful because they did not require conquests to remain in office.
Though these propositions would not have been sustained by an objective examination of the record of 18th century diplomacy, they led to interventions to produce regime change in Naples in 1821 and in Spain in 1823.
The effort to universalize autocratic governance ultimately failed because the national interests of two members of the Holy Alliance - Austria and Russia - clashed in the Balkans and because Great Britain rejected the claimed right of universal intervention.
The current doctrine of global democratic interventionism faces comparable obstacles - if from better conceptual foundations. It postulates without much evidence - because there have never been enough democracies to test it - the essential harmony of democracies. (Europe's current pacifism is in part the result of exhaustion from wars of the 20th century.) It deals with how to achieve order between states but not with the prevention of challenges born of chaos.
Yet for America, the belief in the moral significance of democracy has been a fundamental theme of a society settled by immigrants. America must stand for democratic values if its foreign policy is to have any long-term support among its people. The issue is how to apply them.
Nor would a policy based on national interest defined largely in security terms prove practical. Power is an amalgam of capability and will, making it perhaps the most elusive component of international relations to assess precisely. A policy based on interest alone requires perfect flexibility and an instant readiness to adjust to changed circumstance.
This was difficult at all times and is increasingly so in the face of the combination of bureaucratic complexities, contradictory public pressures, and the growing role of non-state actors, both benign and hostile.
This is why the paragon of 19th century real politik, Otto von Bismarck, found himself reflecting - when government was still far less complex - that the best a statesman could do is to listen to the footsteps of God and walk with Him a few steps of the way.
Still in practice, Bismarck's realpolitik proved too complex. Requiring a genius in every generation, his successors produced not perpetual peace but rigid alliances and contributed to a world war.
But having said this, what does support for democracy mean for the practical conduct of foreign policy? How does the United States promote such a diplomacy in the face of widespread international criticism that charges us at the same time with hegemonic power and missionary crusading spirit?
America is engaged in a wide range of activities in the name of democracy and human rights. It publishes annual reports on the human rights record of every country in the world; it expresses public opinions on the democratic and human rights shortcomings of even permanent UN Security Council members; it applies congressionally mandated sanctions; it has gone to war in Bosnia and Kosovo over essentially human rights issues; it invaded Iraq in part to bring about regime change.
No other country has treated human rights and the support of democracy as so central or has permitted so direct a role to so many elements of its public opinion in the implementation of a specific aspect of its foreign policy. All these initiatives promote the checks and balances system of the American constitutional experience without modification on the basis of history or circumstance.
Does the United States have the capacity to achieve its lofty goals and, if so, how quickly? Democracy in the western world evolved over centuries. The Catholic Church, though hardly democratic in its internal practices, contributed to the eventual emergence of democracy by insisting on the separation of authority between God and Caesar.
This represented a first tentative, but essential, step towards a pluralistic perception of governance. Centuries later, the Reformation institutionalized religious, and hence eventually political, pluralism by emphasizing the importance of the individual conscience.
The Enlightenment took the next step in its insistence on analysis based on reason. The Age of Discovery stretched horizons. Capitalism made individual initiative the engine of successful economies. The concepts of representative institutions, separation of power, and checks and balances evolved over centuries from a rich tradition.
No other culture has produced a comparable evolution. Islamic societies have rarely separated church and state and never acknowledged pluralistic interpretations of justice. In most Confucian societies, neither religions nor non-governmental organizations have had the autonomy or the legitimacy to challenge governmental authority except by outright rebellion.
To say that democracy has cultural prerequisites does not deny it ultimate applicability to other societies, only that to compress the evolution of centuries into an inappropriate time frame risks vast unintended consequences.
Where societies are divided by faith or ethnicity, our practices run the risk of ratifying a permanent distribution of power based precisely on those ethnic divisions. Where the minority has no prospect of becoming a majority, elections may often result in civil war or chaos - the very breeding ground for militant terrorist organizations.
The debate between the relative role of interest and values in the nation's foreign policy is not an issue of theory but of application. And the emerging amalgam will be tested by practical necessities - that is to say, some concept of feasibility and national interests.
Since democracy must be rooted in domestic factors, it will thrive only where it reflects cultural, historical and institutional backgrounds. This is why the attempt to impose western institutions elsewhere rarely succeeds without protracted western tutelage.
In the Balkans, it has produced three protectorates - in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia - entirely dependent on outside forces which have shown little tendency towards self-sustaining political evolution; in Kosovo, a self-sustaining internal evolution would likely run counter to American values and interests in the region. And, in its essence, the reconstruction of Iraq involves an extended period of an American protectorate.
These operations were necessary; but they define their own limits. Regime change is a special case; it cannot be the primary exercise of American military power. Priorities must be established, at least with respect to the availability of military force for the process of democratization.
A foreign policy to promote democracy needs to be adapted to local or regional realities, or it will fail. In the pursuit of democracy, policy - as in other realms - is the art of the possible. Diplomacy on behalf of democracy needs to reflect a strategic design rather than a bow to bureaucratic or public constituencies.
This proposition is often strenuously resisted by those who want to treat democratization as an end in itself. But slogans do not create a foreign policy. When the United States plays a major role in the destruction of existing institutions, as in the transition in Iran in 1979 and in Indonesia in 1998 and, even more, when it goes to war to bring about regime change, it must do so in the name of some operational definition of democracy and its evolution.
It is important to remember that the most successful building of democracy in the last half-century occurred when non-democratic regimes in places like Korea, Taiwan and Turkey fostered an economic growth that produced middle classes, which in turn, and with some American help, insisted on representative institutions and checks and balances.
When democratization is pushed in a conceptual and political vacuum, the outcome is likely to be chaos or regimes inimical to our values and perhaps our security. Though it is often argued that, for example, the hostility of the Iranian Ayatollahs towards the United States was caused by America's previous support of non-democratic regimes, reality is far more complex. Critics who urge the United States to help bring them into power will not necessarily follow policies compatible with either our security or our values.
Iraq is turning into the test case. Regime change was impelled by geostrategic imperatives together with moral convictions. But the reconstruction of Iraq was in no way comparable to the occupations of Germany and Japan.
In those countries, the populations were supportive; there was no alternative to democratic reform - indeed, reform and cooperation with the occupation powers were the sole means of regaining legitimacy and control over the national destiny.
In Iraq, these conditions are nearly reversed. The ethnic and religious divisions are so deep that in its early stages, democratization threatens to become a form of communalism.
The creation of a governing authority on July 1 is the first small step on a long road towards a stability from which a secular middle class can emerge strong enough to insist on full representative government. An extended period of American involvement is required and, ultimately, some degree of internationalization.
But whatever the process, its prerequisite is America's willingness to see it through. Success is the only exit strategy. And as in Iraq, we must navigate in the rest of the Middle East between the imperative of reform and the danger of generating more chaos.
As the United States enters its national debate and, hopefully, a period of reconciliation afterwards, no challenge is more important than to define a direction of foreign policy integrating our values and our interests.
We paralyze ourselves when we treat these categories as absolutes and opposites. The advocates of "interest" must recognize that support for democracy is a fundamental goal that must be built into American policy.
The proponents of a value-based foreign policy need to understand that their challenge is no longer to establish their principle but to implement it and that down their road beckons not only democracy but possibly chaos.
The advocates of the important role of a commitment to democracy in American foreign policy have won their intellectual battle. But institution-building requires not only doctrine but a vision recognizing cultural and historical circumstance. Such humility is not an abdication of American values; it is the only way to implement these values effectively. - Copyright Tribune Media Services International.
More blunders in Iraq
How the many intelligent people in the Bush administration can continue to make so many enormous blunders astound and dismay. Two examples: Australia is facing a tight electoral race between conservative John Howard, who eagerly sent troops to Iraq, and Labour Party challenger, Mark Latham, who, like Spain's new prime minister, vows to bring his nation's troops home from Iraq. A majority of Australians oppose the Iraq War.
US ambassador Tom Schieffer, a Texas pal of George Bush, warned Australians of "serious consequences" if they elect Latham. Now, Australians love America, but any worldly person knows, do not threaten Aussies. They will come out swinging. Schieffer should be fired.
Far worse, however, is the ham-handed US Iraq proconsul, Paul Bremer. A neo-conservative ideologue, Bremer was responsible for two of the Bush administration's most disastrous mistakes in Iraq: disbanding Iraq's army, and firing tens of thousands of government bureaucrats because they were Ba'ath party members.
Any junior imperialist knows the first thing you do when you conquer someone's country is to buy the loyalty of its existing armed forces, government and police. Otherwise you will have armies of angry, unemployed potential rebels roaming the streets - Iraq being Exhibit A.
Bremer's third horrible blunder came last week. The US proconsul, who is supposedly bringing the light of democracy to Iraq, shut down a tiny, 10,000 circulation Shia newspaper and arrested its editor for "spreading anti-American views" and calling Bremer rude names. The paper's publisher was firebrand Shia mullah Muqtada el-Sadr, who has been calling on Iraqis to resist US occupation.
Bremer turned Sadr, a little-respected junior cleric with a limited following, into an overnight hero to restive Shias, and a new American villain. Bremer's latest imbecility caused Iraq's Shia majority, which was simmering with anti-American passions, to explode into violence.
Washington and US forces were caught totally by surprise, though warnings were aplenty. This writer, for example, said on CNN's Paula Zahn show - exactly three days before the explosion of Shia rage - "the Shia and the US are on a collision course...their younger mullahs are calling for armed resistance...what we've seen so far (Sunni resistance) is only a foretaste of the violence to come."
For months, Iraq's Shia have heeded calls for patience from their spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. He tried to get Washington to agree to genuine democratic elections in January 2005.
But it's painfully clear the US will not allow Iraq's Shia majority (60 per cent) to gain real political power, and intends to keep troops based there indefinitely.
The Bush administration's definition of "democracy" in Iraq means a puppet regime that goes through the motions of democracy, "invites" US troops to stay on, permits US business to exploit Iraq's oil riches, and cooperates with Israel.
An interesting side note: Reza Pahlavi, pretender to Iran's throne, opined to me recently in Washington that Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani actually outranks all of Iran's clergy, including leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, and Iraq's holy city of Najaf outranks Iran's theological centre, Qum.
Revelations of Washington's plans to colonize Iraq, and Israel's assassination of the Palestinian leader, Sheikh Yassin, intensified pent-up Shia fury. Americans can thank Bremer and his bosses in the White House for opening this two-front war in Iraq and driving the Shia and Sunnis together.
The savage punishment of the rebellious city of Fallujah - over 300 Iraqis killed - after the brutal killing of four US mercenaries there sharply recalls Israel's ravaging of the rebellious West Bank town of Jenin.
As this column predicted a year ago, "liberated" Iraq has become a copy of the strife-torn Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza - writ large. Israeli military and intelligence experts are now advising US operations in Iraq. All who oppose US occupation are branded "terrorists".
Iraq is not going to be "liberated" or taught democracy by means of US heavy tanks and helicopter gunships. Quite the contrary, what we have seen this week is the sowing by heavy-handed US occupation forces of a whole new crop of terrorist dragon's teeth in the bloodstained soil of Iraq.
The only bright note for the Bush White House: if it can't kill Osama bin Laden in time for November elections, then maybe pesky Mullah Muqtada will do. - Copyright Eric S. Margolis
The poor image abroad
Articles published abroad which tarnish Pakistan's image crop up with regular frequency, though of late the focus of the indictment appears to have shifted.
The narcotic smuggler, trapped by routine and ritual, who for the past thirty years was regarded as the worst kind of international offender, is no longer the fearsome enemy. He has been replaced by a much more formidable foe - the itinerant traveller under whose tunic there beats the heart of the terrorist, fired by missionary zeal and religious passion
But it isn't just the alleged smuggler or terrorist, or the creative swindler who is giving this country a bad name. Lots of countries have their share of such anti-social elements who trade in arms.
There are other more cogent reasons for the poor image this country has achieved among opinion moulders in the capitals of the industrialized world, and no amount of public relations exercises in the cultural and culinary fields, by embassies abroad or the ministry of culture at home, will deface the portrait foreigners have painted of this country.
If a serious attempt was made to get to the root of the problem, the analyst would have to distinguish between political issues and sociological issues. The political issues are very much there and no amount of rhetoric at international forums about attempts to come to grips with problems of education and the eradication of poverty will make the slightest difference.
Pakistan continues to fare badly in the quality newspapers in Europe, which still regard the political system being practised in the country as a sham democracy, and the latest move to set up a National Security Council has made matters worse.
The Pakistan foreign office knows quite well why the country is being black balled from full membership of the coveted Commonwealth Club, and so does the president. But then, the nation is being told that whatever is happening in the country is in the national interest.
In 56 years, Pakistan has not been able to evolve a functional political system like its neighbour that shares an eastern border, who, except for a brief period when Indira Gandhi introduced an Emergency, has continued the tradition of having regular national elections.
The rot set in early in 1953 when Ghulam Mohammed fired the first anti-democratic missile and dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin who commanded a majority in the National Assembly. Three years later, a Constitution acceptable to both wings of the country was adopted.
But this was apparently a brief interlude in the impending storm. In 1958 the country got its first taste of martial law which sounded the death knell of whatever nascent democratic forces might have existed at the time.
After that, it was one long journey downhill with civilian forces, some of whom belonged to a feudal background, playing a cat and mouse game with one another and members of the clergy, while the men in battle fatigues, always at the ready, waited in the wings for an opportunity to take over.
No political government could complete its term. No law has been enacted to improve the lot of the people, particularly the women who continue to live in a stone-age culture. And so, the only constant factor in the history of the country has been a permanent state of temporariness and uncertainty.
This is probably an over-simplification, but that's more or less, with a few embellishments here and there, the way the leader writers in the quality newspapers view affairs in this blighted republic.
The sociological issues are perhaps the more important, for the blue collar worker and his wife, who have a low boredom threshold and read the popular tabloids in Manchester, Marseilles and Munich, are not really pushed about politics in Asia or Africa. But they respond, predictably, to stories about honour killing and excessive domestic violence, especially when they occur in their neighbourhood.
I was, in fact, touring Germany when a story was printed in an illustrated weekly about a young Sikh girl born and bred and living in London, who committed suicide because she was being sent home to Ludhiana to marry a man her parents had selected for her. The Germans, who have their hands full with problems initiated by Turkish immigrants, were quite horrified by the story, as indeed were the British.
The British, in fact, alarmed at the influx of immigrants from the subcontinent in the early seventies, who brought their exotic cuisine, costumes and customs, amid working class fears about swallowing up blue collar jobs, crafted a whole string of droll stories involving Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis which were conveniently lumped together as "Paki" jokes.
One of them which is quite amusing bears mention, for it indicates how Pakistanis and Indians living abroad eventually learned to laugh at themselves. A Pakistani factory worker informs his English neighbour that in spite of the fact that both live in the same kind of house, drive the same kind of car, earn the same amount of money, have the same number of children, and enjoy the same future prospects, he is really far better off than the Englishman. When queried as to how he arrived at such a conclusion, the factory worker says he doesn't have a 'Paki' as a neighbour.
Unfortunately, many of the people that the government sends abroad, ostensibly to spread goodwill and to lie for their country, do not perform well at all and contribute to the unfavourable image.
In fact, soon after Pakistani diplomatic missions were established abroad, Pakistani newspapers have been littered by tales of gross incompetence, lack of interest in the performance of one's duties, and occasional displays of malice, especially towards one's own countrymen.
My first experience with a member of the Pakistan embassy in Lowndes Square, came when I was a student and needed to consult the education officer. This worthy gentleman was just never available and had developed the marvellous technique of going out to tea without returning back from lunch.
My second experience was in 1982, when I took over as chief executive of an English language newspaper in Dubai. I telephoned the office of the Pakistan consul general and requested an appointment to pay a courtesy call. Two days later, I repeated my request and was informed that my message had been conveyed.
As at least 80 per cent of the employees in my newspaper carried Indian passports, and over 70 per cent of the advertising business we received was generated by companies headed by Indians, I thought I should also pay my respects to the Indian consul general. When I made contact, Mr Previn Goyal said that it was his duty and an honour for him to call on me, which he promptly did two hours later.
One of the most glaring examples of what could best be described as "imported inefficiency" is the one about the time when PIA's general manager in New York decided he needed to recruit a shorthand typist.
For some curious reason considerable importance was attached to this appointment, and the director administration in the head office in Karachi, who was a retired high-ranking military officer, decided he should personally conduct the interviews.
A recruitment agency was contacted, interviews took place and a girl was selected. After she sat down with an anticipatory shuffle, the director asked the candidate her religion. Back came the reply that she was Jewish. The girl was then promptly informed that it was the policy of the airline not to recruit people of that faith. The girl left and the next day PIA was lumped with a $20,000 dollar lawsuit.
In spite of 9/11 and fingerprinting and the usual stories one hears about harassment of Muslims, the Americans are very particular about religious discrimination. In fact, the Department of Justice announced as recently as March 30 of this year that it will seek to intervene in a lawsuit pending against the Muskogee, Oklahoma, Public School District to protect the right of a sixth-grade Muslim girl to wear a headscarf to school.
"No student should be forced to choose between following her faith and enjoying the benefits of a public education," said Assistant Attorney General R. Alexander Acosta. "We certainly respect local school systems' authority to set dress standards, and otherwise regulate their students, but such rules cannot come at the cost of constitutional liberties. Religious discrimination has no place in American schools."
Europeans who have never been further east than Bratislava, experience a culture shock when they disembark, for the first time, at an airport in the subcontinent. In a short while they realize, with a certain relish, that many of the stories they have heard back home about cruelty to women, children and animals, about garbage lying in the open, about rampant corruption, about short cuts to beat the system are actually true.
Prejudice usually has a foundation. But in the course of time they experience oriental hospitality, and friendship and discover that there are people in this country who are trying to make a difference. All they have to do is show a little patience and understanding.