Few experiences in my life have been more thrilling or terrifying than visiting the headquarters of the Soviet secret police - KGB - at Moscow's notorious Lubyanka Prison in 1991, a place so dreaded that even Russians were afraid to even utter its name. KGB told me I was the first western journalist to enter its HQ as a guest.
I was shown the cells where the 'enemies of the Soviet state' waited to be shot, walked the Lubyanka's musty, dimly-lit corridors, inspected the fascinating secret museum of Soviet espionage, and interviewed two senior KGB generals.
I sat at the desk on which the mass murderers of the Soviet secret police - Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria - wrote orders sending over 20 million to their deaths. The same desk used by their post-Stalinist successors, like Andropov and Chebrikov.
The KGB generals and colonels that I met and socialized with during my extended visits to Moscow from 1989-1992 made me understand a profound revolution was under way at KGB HQ, better known as Moscow Centre.
A younger generation of KGB, mostly from the elite 1st Chief Directorate that conducted foreign intelligence operations, had become totally disgusted by the corruption, cronyism and incompetence of the Communist Party. Unlike party bigwigs, the intelligence people knew Russia was heading for economic collapse.
The famed dissident, Dr Andrei Sakharov and a group of his scientific colleagues had warned in 1981 that unless drastic steps were taken to cut military spending and renew the USSR's run-down industrial and agricultural base, the Soviet Union would collapse within ten years. The USSR crumbled in 1991.
That year, I reported from Moscow that the younger generation KGB, who were the USSR's best educated and brightest youth, with extensive experience abroad and contempt for communist ideology, were going to ditch the moribund Communist Party and attempt to seize power themselves.
Intriguingly, KGB's Young Turks repeatedly told me their role models for the 'new' Russia were two rightwing military strongmen, South Korea's Gen. Park Chung-hee, and Chile's Gen. Augusto Pinochet. 'We will make lazy Russians work at bayonet point,' were the words of an exasperated KGB colonel.
A decade later, KGB alumni have assumed total power under former KGB colonel, Vladimir Putin. After ten years battling corrupt bureaucrats of the Yeltsin years, ruthless gangsters, robber barons and rebellious regional governors, Russia's security establishment - known collectively as 'siloviki' - have consolidate their grip on power.
The recent barely contested elections in Russia confirmed Moscow's hard men are now completely in charge of a one-party state. President Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly scattered Russia's feeble democratic forces, brought the media totally under his control, broken the robber barons, and crushed regionalism. He is now an absolute ruler.
During the wildly corrupt Yeltsin era, less than 5% of senior government positions were held by 'siloviki.' In 1998, the security apparatus ousted the drunken Yeltsin and brought to power a former KGB colonel, Vladimir Putin. This was a first: a coup by intelligence services rather than the military.
Now, six years later, ex-intelligence and security officers control 60 per cent of all senior government positions. As the USSR was collapsing, KGB hard men quickly moved into business: security, information, banking and finance, oil, metals, trucking and foreign trade. Switzerland became the unofficial headquarters and banking centre for the KGB Inc.
After a decade of bitter infighting, often against local mafias, former KGB men now control much of Russia's major industries and services. The 'siloviki' dominate the military, and are pressing Russia's exceptionally brutal repression of Chechen independence seekers in the Caucasus. In fact, Putin came to power after KGB agents blew up a number of apartment buildings in Russia, killing 300 people, and blamed Chechen 'Islamic terrorists' for the crime.
Most Russians are content to see Putin and fellow hardliners in charge. During the degenerate Yeltsin era, foreigners - notably the US - exerted unconscionable influence over Russia's political and economic affairs, deeply humiliating nationalistic Russians. Gangsters waged wars in the streets. Putin ended foreign domination and semi-chaos, restoring Soviet-style order in Russia.
Some Russians are dismayed by Putin's crushing democracy and return to autocracy, particularly Moscow and St Petersburg's western-oriented elite. But most Russians (polls say 80 per cent) say they crave economic and political stability far more than the luxury of democracy.
High oil prices have injected sufficient money into the economy to compensate for the loss of political and press freedoms which, after all, were uncertain novelties to most Russians.
Putin has turned out to be a level-headed, pragmatic leader who commands great respect from his people and manages to avoid censure for incessant national disasters. He has so far balanced ruthlessness with remarkable caution, using his mailed fist only rarely, but to great effect. Trite as it is to say, Russians do crave strong leadership - and Putin is probably the most popular leader since Stalin. -Copyright Eric S. Margolis
Wana operation in perspective
By Iffat Idris
So Kaloosha II is to be wound up. Forty-six Pakistan army soldiers killed (eight of them in cold blood) in the space of two weeks; 60 odd militants and 163 "miscreants" captured. Hardly a cause for a sense of achievement.
Apparently, the army has yet to achieve its objective. After going in with threats spewing and guns blazing, it suffered some losses and, of course, an unexpected hostage situation led to a rapid change of strategy. Instead of force the army opted for negotiations. In return for agreeing to lift its cordon and pull out of the area, eleven army hostages were released.
This was not the only setback for the government. The operation failed to capture a "high value target" - something the president had rashly hinted at in an interview with CNN. The one Al Qaeda scalp our fighters claimed - "chief spy Mr Abdullah" - no one had ever heard of before. To add insult to injury, the very much alive and kicking Ayman Al-Zawahiri sent a tape to Al-Jazeera in which he called on Pakistani citizens to overthrow their unIslamic rulers.
At least two previous military operations also displayed a marked lack of strategic thinking: the Kashmir war in 1965 and Kargil in 1999. Lack of strategic thinking means an inability to consider and factor in the wider, long-term implications of military action.
Where was the long-term vision when Kargil was seized? Did our military planners really believe that the Indians would just let them hold on to the peaks they had seized? Did they really expect the international community to allow territorial control to be determined by the use of force? Kargil is, thankfully, part of our history.
The government sent thousands of soldiers and paramilitaries into South Waziristan to cleanse the area of foreign "terrorists" responsible for acts of militancy both in the wider world and in Pakistan which included the attempts on the life of President Musharraf. As an ally in the US-led war on terror, Pakistan cannot possibly allow such "miscreants" to operate from its territory.
Then, there is the whole sordid reputation and history of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The question arises: should, in the twenty-first century, be there some parts of the country where the rule of law does not apply, the writ of the government does not extend, and the army cannot enter? Here, there is a community that does nothing but engage in crime: smuggling, kidnapping, theft and now harbour "terrorists". This is how the government looks at the problem.
The United States will be having presidential elections in less than eight months. The two leading candidates are incumbent George W. Bush and Democratic challenger John Kerry. Bush is hoping to win on his record in the war on terror.
The only problem is the war on terror has achieved little and lost much: no Osama bin Laden or Zawahiri, no end to global terrorism, massive haemorrhaging of US credibility and standing across the world, and a disastrous (in every possible sense) war in Iraq.
Add to this a growing wave of embarrassing and damaging revelations about the internal workings of the Bush administration - and the fact that he is facing a decorated war hero.
If he has any hope of winning re-election, George Bush desperately needs Osama bin Laden. Where does everyone believe Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders are hiding? In our tribal areas. The military operation in Wana started on the eve of US Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Pakistan.
So, many believe this operation is about wiping out "terrorists" and cleaning up the tribal areas and that the Musharraf government sent thousands of troops into Wana to try and capture Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri or any other Al- Qaeda leader they could get their hands on, to support George Bush's re-election campaign.
Aside from a tendency to say "yes" to Washington's "requests" almost before they are made, President Musharraf was under pressure because of the proliferation of nuclear technology by our leading nuclear scientists - of course, acting totally alone with no knowledge of the army or government.
To relieve short-term American pressure we sent our troops into Wana. Think strategically for a moment and the potential long-term consequences of this action - the long-term pressures we will come under - become apparent. The fact remains no Pakistani soldier ever set foot in the Fata before 9/11. The British ruled the subcontinent for two hundred years but gave up trying to control the tribal areas.
There is a history here, of a fiercely independent people, all too willing to fight, totally unable to forgive or forget. You do not try to win your way with such a people using guns. You learn - as the British did many decades ago - that force leads to a bloody nose. What happens next in Wana depends on our military plans.
The recent fighting in the tribal areas included an attack on a distant military check post in Kurram Agency, and mortar attacks on the Frontier Constabulary HQ, the Judicial Complex and the Civil Secretariat in Peshawar - the seat of provincial government.
If that is an indication of things to come, we could soon be dealing not with a small-scale clash in the far-off tribal areas, but a conflict that encompasses the whole of the NWFP.
One cannot rule out the impact of military action on our troops, and on the wider Pakistani public. Much as the president would like to present this as a straightforward battle between good and evil, us and them, it is far from black and white.
True, many of those firing back in Waziristan are lawless militants, and at least some are terrorists - but many of them are also Pakistani, and they are all Muslim. Muslims who - whatever the means they choose - are fighting against US aggression and injustice.
The majority of Pakistanis would wholeheartedly condemn their tactics, but equally a majority of Pakistanis would wholeheartedly share their anti-US sentiment.
The cost-benefit analysis of military operations in the tribal areas therefore reads as follows. Short-term gain: Washington is happy with us, we have joined the club of major non-Nato allies.
Short-term loss: dozens of dead Pakistani soldiers, a couple of dozen dead civilians. Possible long-term gain: nothing - the US will slap on sanctions as soon as we outlive our utility.
As for bringing law and order to the tribal areas - this can never be imposed by force. Such change comes slowly through investment of time, money and effort; social and economic development; political interaction.
In conclusion, had the Wana operation indeed been motivated by what the government claims, one could at best have lauded the intention. But its Bush-pleasing objective deprives it of anything laudable.