THE entry of retired NATO Commander, General Wesley Clark, as the tenth Democratic candidate for the 2004 presidential election is a signal that President Bush is seen as vulnerable in the sphere of security where he was unassailable hitherto following the 9/11 events. General Clark’s initial criticism of the Bush administration focused on the floundering economy, and the diminished standing of the US in the world. However, the neo-cons around the president realize that the general will enjoy greater credibility when he takes up US policy in Iraq that is beginning to affect his popularity ratings.

In Britain, the Hutton Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the suicide of weapons specialist Dr. David Kelly, has highlighted the fact that the British government had “sexed up” the facts to justify an attack on Iraq. Dr Kelly, a man of conscience, felt so uncomfortable with the official version about Iraq’s ability to launch aggression at 45 minutes notice that he talked about it to a BBC reporter. Recent disclosures by Dr Hans Blix, former chief UN weapons inspector have revealed that Iraq had destroyed its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 1991, and had not developed new ones, since none have been found despite an intensive search by the coalition forces.

If the conclusions being drawn up are that Iraq had neither the capability, nor the intention of launching aggression against the West, and President Bush has conceded that Saddam Hussein had no link with the 9/11 events, then no justification exists for the pre-emptive attack against Iraq in March. Public opinion in most countries other than the US had been strongly against the attack, with around 80 per cent of the Europeans disapproving of it, including in Britain, whose government joined the US in the venture. Now, the US electorate is also reacting to the human and financial toll of the war.

Had the pre-emption brought military glory, political advantages or economic benefits, even its critics would have greeted it with applause, as nothing succeeds like success. As events have unfolded, the victory claimed by President Bush at the start of May has proved to be a hollow one, as more American soldiers have been killed since then than during the lopsided conflict. The US forces are already experiencing the strains of “overstretch”, as the National Guard has had to be called up, and there are serious problems about maintaining current force levels in Iraq. The US servicemen find themselves to be sitting ducks, with a rising number being killed and wounded with each passing day. They have not endeared themselves to the local population by their trigger-happy attitude, as was evident from their attack on Iraqi police who were chasing criminals north of Baghdad. President Bush, who had showed a contemptuous disdain for the lack of UN support for his pre-emption, is now calling for troops from other countries to take up peacekeeping duties in Iraq.

There was a remarkable contrast between his address to the UN General Assembly, last year, and the one to the current session. Last year, having just announced the doctrine of pre-emption through the national security strategy paper, he linked the relevance of the world body to its readiness to endorse such pre-emption in Iraq. This year, with US forces bogged down, and taking mounting casualties, while costs of occupation and of reconstruction have mounted, he sought the UN support in Iraq, and affirmed US commitment to its goals.

What President Bush is trying to achieve is to secure legitimacy for the Iraq venture that was launched in the teeth of opposition within the Security Council, and indeed of world opinion. He would like to have other countries provide soldiers, to reduce the pressure on the US and its few allies, as well as resources for reconstruction, with some kind of UN cover that concedes the operational control and overall authority to the US.

The draft resolution proposed by the US is already running into objections within the Security Council, notably from France, Germany and Russia that are pressing for the traditional overarching role for the UN in peacekeeping operations. There is also a feeling that while humanitarian aid deserves international support, the reconstruction of damage inflicted by the US-led invasion is logically the responsibility of the coalition whose military action caused it.

President Bush and his neocon backers are inclined to persist in claiming the dominant role in managing the transition in Iraq, on the basis of the right of conquest, that has conferred the blessings of democracy and freedom on the people of Iraq after years of Saddam’s ruthless dictatorship. However, even after five months of US control, life is difficult, amenities such as clean water and electricity are lacking, and there is widespread unemployment. The nationalistic sentiment and the resentment the US has generated among Arabs and Muslims by its total partiality to Israel stand in the way of any pro-US sentiment.

It was revealing that even Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, current chairman of the US-chosen governing council in Iraq, who is attending the UN General Assembly, voiced preference for an early transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people favoured by France and other Europeans. The US and its allies foresee a much longer transition, starting with pacification, followed by the adoption of a constitution, and holding of elections under it, a process that would extend over two to three years.

The Bush administration has yet to realize fully that despite its military superiority and unchallengeable power, the US has lost moral high ground by its pre-emption in Iraq. The justifications given, including alleged possession of the WMDs by Iraq, and its links to terrorism, have not been proved. Though President Bush is not facing the public outrage to which Prime Minister Blair has been exposed in Britain, American public opinion is becoming increasingly agitated over the mounting casualties the US is suffering in Iraq, and the escalating costs of occupation.

Though the attack on Iraq was projected as a part of the war against terrorism, the actual outcome has been quite contrary to this goal. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not provide a haven for terrorists, but the destruction of his regime has provided scope for heightened activity by Arab extremists, including possibly Al Qaeda elements. The neocons, and even senior military commanders are trying to put a positive spin on this by claiming that Iraq is acting as a “fly-paper” for terrorists, who are being sucked into Iraq to be eliminated by the coalition forces. Objective observers see this development as a costly lesson on the perils of pre-emption.

The BBC recently gave prominence to an interview with an NGO in Washington that looks after members of the armed forces in distress. Apparently, 6,000 American servicemen have been injured or otherwise incapacitated in Iraq, a figure that official agencies have kept under wraps. The war party in the US, consisting of neoconservatives, oil barons and the Christian right, would like to see Bush persist in its goals of total victory and economic and political domination. The additional request by Bush for $87 billion for enhanced activity in Iraq has been seen with approval by the hard-liners. They favour lesser reliance on Arab regimes such as that in Saudi Arabia, and further shoring up of Israel’s security in the region.

However, the neoconservatives cannot ignore the growing sentiment within the US, and the chorus of criticism all over the world over US unilateralism and sidelining of the UN. William Kristol, leading neoconservative ideologue wrote that “the world does not allow you to do everything with precision bombs”. However, he and others of his ilk do not believe that the remedy lies in involving the UN; they prefer a larger commitment of US forces and funds.

The request made by Mr. Bush for substantial additional funds has not exactly been applauded, particularly as his administration scores poorly in the management of the economy. He inherited a budget surplus of $230 billion from the Clinton administration, which has turned into a deficit of $450 billion in three years. The social sector within the US has been adversely affected, with states denied adequate funds for health and social security. Nearly 2.8 million jobs have been lost since the Bush administration took over. No wonder the polls on his chances of re-election look bleaker with each passing week. The latest poll gave an edge to General Wesley Clark over President Bush, if elections were held today.

Owing to the 9/11 events, and the skilful exploitation of fear of further terrorist attacks on the US, the Bush administration had commanded high approval ratings. The US electorate appeared to be insensitive to the worldwide concerns over the hubris that characterized America’s global policies. However, the way the situation has evolved in Iraq after the victory claimed by Bush at the start of May has led to a gradual rethinking about the dangers and costs of pre-emption. There is increasing realization that the UN, in whose establishment the US played a leading role, provides an ideal forum to address the many challenges facing the world.

Though manifestations of terrorism have attracted the spotlight for the present, the real problem resides in its underlying causes, namely political and economic injustice. The economic moot at Cancun that failed owing to a deadlock between the haves and the have-nots suggests that multilateral negotiations, within the purview of the UN system offer the most promising and practical way to resolve problems confronting this globe. Happily, the US electorate is recovering its sense of proportion and the sole superpower may eventually play its expected role as a force for moderation and stability.

A PERCEPTION has taken hold in Sindh that it has been given a short shrift by the federation both in inter-provincial dispensation and between the federation and the province.

The list of grievances is so large that it is difficult to list them in one piece. Absence of the NFC award is one, because in spite of Article 160 of the Constitution, ‘that the president shall constitute a finance commission’ the NFC has not been constituted, although provinces have conveyed the names of their nominees long time back. The nominee of Balochistan was not acceptable to the Federal government.

The other issue dominating the debate is the Greater Thal Canal. It has galvanized Sindh. Even the MQM has thrown in its lot with them. A project, feasibility of which has yet to come, has been started post-haste on the basis of wishful availability of floodwater, about a year back. In spite of two unanimous resolutions by Sindh Assembly, the work is proceeding apace with full speed.

A resolution by Punjab government, on the other hand, recommending the construction of Kalabagh dam elicited an immediate response of the prime minister who wrote to all the chief ministers urging them to examine the proposals with a view to taking immediate action. The president issued orders to construct the project while inaugurating the first unit of Ghazi Barotha Hydroelectric project. The treatment meted out to the two resolutions of Sindh Assembly and one of Punjab Assembly are causing greater pain to the Sindhis.

In a recent article, Abdul Khalique Junejo, chairman, Jeay Sindh Mahaz, has highlighted some of the real and some perceived grievances of the province. One of the interesting instances cited by him is the Sindh demand that water resources to be apportioned among the provinces must also include underground water.

Punjab, which has the largest good quality underwater resources, has refused, because it claims them to be its exclusive property. When Sindh counters by claiming exclusive rights to underground coal, petrol, gas and other minerals, the same are declared to be the national wealth and therefore subject to the federal controls for sharing by the provinces.

Statements, like the one quoting Governor Punjab that it was the responsibility of the Sindh government to ensure smooth supply of water downstream of Kotri, compound the situation. A similar position was taken by Punjab Water Council when it said that the coastal areas are Sindh’s responsibility and Punjab had nothing to do with it. As for the ports located in Sindh, Punjab claims its right to use.

And to top it all are the political issues setting the people of Sindh apart from the federation. For more than half of our national existence we have been under overt or covert military rule. The hugely rigged elections of 2002 yielded a divided Sindh Assembly with Pakistan People’s Party still the single largest group, but contrary to the treatment of other political parties in other three provinces, every ruse was adopted to keep it out of the government.

An artificial coalition has been cobbled up to ‘run’ the Sindh government. The people of Sindh excluding the urban areas feel left out. The denial of political power presents a serious ache agitating the minds of the people.

People talk glibly of a Pakistani nation and complain of lack of patriotism. It is easy to bandy such concepts when one controls all the levers of power. But they forget that national spirit evolves over a period of time as a result of common stakes and joint ownership of the country based on social contract as embodied in a constitution.

With the imposition of military rule with regular frequency and the emergence of artificial political leaders, it is futile to wait for a national ethos to take shape. The military rule is associated with Punjabi domination. The data on provincial composition of the army is hard to come by because provincial quotas do not apply to armed forces. No wonder that 56 years after independence we do not have a single Sindhi major-general in the army.

This writer had an opportunity of raising the issue of Sindh representation, or the lack of it, with the then Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg, in the context of national cohesion. He came up with the stock unconsidered reply that Sindhis do not want to join the army. That obviously is not true, with employment opportunities vanishing by the day. He was reminded that the US faced a similar situation with respect to its Afro-Asian community.

But then that government did not give it up as a problem of the black community, but devised a workable solution. Now 25 per cent of the American army consists of blacks, although their share in the population is only 11 per cent. They have risen to the highest rank in the military.

Rangers are another source of Sindh grievance. Karachi’s civic bodies continue to be hampered by the daunting presence of the Pakistan Rangers. Monthly ‘Herald’ in its issue of August 2003’ carried a lead story on the power of the Rangers deployed in Sindh ‘to control law and order’. On July 17 this year, the government of Sindh asked Islamabad to grant one-year extension. The official request contends that owing to the growing threat posed by the militants, the presence of the rangers is essential, particularly in Karachi.

Ironically, it was the PPP government which had summoned the Rangers in the first place, because according to Senator Raza Rabbani, ‘there was an insurgency like situation in Karachi at the time and the Rangers were called in to assist the civilians in law enforcement. But they later overstepped their mandate.’ The Rangers now effectively control each one of Karachi’s eight water hydrants.

A large number of tankers fill up at the Water Pump hydrant in Federal ‘B’ Area and deliver to other parts of the city even when local residents have been without water for days, complains an area nazim. The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), which heads the capital city government, insists that the Rangers are doing little or nothing to address Karachi’s security concerns.

Initially the federal government bore the cost of requisitioning the Rangers. Since 1995, however, this financial burden has been shifted to the province. A staggering sum of Rs.405.33 million has been earmarked for the upkeep of the Rangers and Frontier Constabulary in 2003-04 provincial budget.

Acquiring land is another favourite hobby of the Rangers and Kehkashan Scheme is by no means the only outrage. They have occupied hospitals, sporting complexes colleges and universities across Karachi and have turned them into their private lairs. They occupied Jinnah Courts Building in 1993 to serve as their headquarters. This 500-plus-room building meant to house students has remained firmly under their control. The next order of business was to raise a massive multi-storied structure in breach of building control laws and the laws of antiquity.

Bus depots are also targets of their avarice for forceful occupation of civilian property. They have occupied almost all the depots. Each is located on prime land. For example, a 500-square-yard plot in Gulistan-i-Jauhar sells for anything between 2.5 and three million rupees. JI’s Karachi Amir asks, if they are here to enforce peace, what are they doing at the water hydrants? Why are they involved in contracting out bus depots in Karachi?”

They also control the fishing rights to the exclusion of all the others in two districts of Sindh — Badin and Thatta. They grant contracts to their favourites and deny the local population their right to fishing. The impoverished fishermen are trapped in a no-win situation. The Rangers are meanwhile raking in the bucks, for doing nothing whatsoever.

On and off they raid their houses under the pretext of border security concerns. Sometimes they randomly search people entering or leaving the villages. They have created an atmosphere of fear in the area. They reportedly treat them as virtual Indian agents. ‘When confronted by an immovable force, the only judicious option for the powerless is to calmly accept your fate’, a young boy was overhead advising a friend.

These soulful sorrows of Sindh can conveniently be brushed aside, but that would be at our national cost. It is facile to claim that geographical proximity to the ultimate source of power will yield an outcome different from that of 1971. It would be much saner to coolly consider all these issues dispassionately before we hurtle into vortex of another calamity. Fact ceases to be relevant when perceptions take hold in the psyche of a people.

e-mail: sshuain@hotmail.com

ON September 18, Prime Minister Jamali announced, with an unaffected precision, that five factions of the Pakistan Muslim League had merged. All the pre-fixes would disappear. There would only be one Pakistan Muslim League — except, of course, for the group led by Nawaz Sharif.

The tone was cautious and reserved but ended with an air of cheerful confidence. He said that the merger was a good omen as it would provide direction to the country. Perhaps he was trying to send some sort of message to the opposition People’s Party that has, after the initial betrayal by the Patriots, still managed to remain largely intact, and to the hardliners in the MMA, whose continued intransigence and resolve has surprised even their harshest critics

The president is supposed to have been consulted in the merger and is understood to have given his assent. The prime minister added that there was also a proposal to make Gen Musharraf head of the PML, but it was decided ‘not to involve him in politics.’ The black ball was apparently cast by Pir Pagara Syed Mardan Shah. What is truly astonishing, however, is that the issue was actually discussed, as it was in the days of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, which reinforces the belief that irrespective of what kind of political system operates in Pakistan, the army will always have a permanent role to play. Who says history doesn’t repeat itself?

The announcement of the merger was accompanied by a photograph that adorned the front pages of the national dailies, which showed five grim-faced leaders, a little ill-at-ease, who were probably wondering what effect this development would have on the nation.

There was Chaudry Shujaat of the Quaid-i-Azam branch of the Muslim League, the Pir Pagara of the Functional faction, who a couple of days later made the astounding announcement that now that the factions had merged fresh polls would soon be held. There was Hamid Nasir Chattha of the Junejo faction, Ijazul Haq of the splinter group named after his father, and Mian Manzoor Ahmad Watoo of the Jinnah faction. Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League is still out in the cold.

Naturally, there was a slew of reactions. Nobody seriously believes that the merger would have the slightest effect on the outcome of any future polls, especially after hearing the news that there had already been a couple of resignations from the ‘King’s Party’. The more introspective critic is asking the awkward question: have the various factions merged or united? There is an essential difference, for the latter would indicate that somebody has to lead this clutch of disparate groups.

The Pakistan Muslim League, since the death of Mr Jinnah, has passed through all kinds of vicissitudes and in the process lost its character. Its history is an account of a long spiral of sublimated conflicts, disagreements, splits, temporary alliances and attempts at fostering the cult of personality. The five factions that promised to work together in a rare display of camaraderie, represent some of the League survivors. There were a few others in the past, trapped by routine or ritual, who died or lost their way.

This is all the more unfortunate when one remembers that this is a party that once drew its inspiration from the All India Muslim League, founded in 1906, which brought a new country into existence.

Since partition, every tinpot dictator from Ayub Khan to Zia-ul-Haq, and every aspiring politician whose views are outside the progressive or the fundamentalist fold, has used the party for his own ends, larding the ideology with his own peculiar twists and preferences. While Ayub Khan was at least a secular and broadminded soldier, who protected the rights of women and the minorities.

Zia-ul-Haq, on the other hand, turned out to represent the quintessence of obscurantism. His supporters, tarred with the same repressive brush, implemented his ideas with vigour, scorched by the heat of their own worthiness, and made certain that the country was taken further and further away from the ideals of the founder of the nation.

How foreign Mr Jinnah’s famous Fourteen Points, presented in a meeting of the council of the All India Muslim League on March 28, 1929 must seem, in the context of what is happening today. Point Seven sticks out like a sore thumb, and no administrator would touch it with a barge pole. ‘Full religious liberty, i.e. liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, association and education, shall be guaranteed to all communities.’ Successive governments have done just the opposite. One took over the Christian missionary schools and the other is now invading the madrassahs.

The merger diverted some of the public attention away from the real problem in the land , which is the continuing impasse over the controversial LFO. There has never been such a crisis during the last 46 years in this country. For 10 months the opposition and the government have been deadlocked on an issue that could be solved overnight. All it really takes is for the president to make a small gesture. The rest would follow.

The controversy is sapping the energies of the nation. No laws are being passed. No fresh ideas are being pumped into the system. The conflict is inhibiting the development of democracy. And it is providing fodder for leader writers in foreign newspapers who find it rather droll when the president and the prime minister of Pakistan maintain, in all seriousness, that the parliament will complete its term, for never before in the history of the country have so many been paid so much for doing so little.

The more one considers the problem, the more one comes to the inevitable conclusion that it is the president who must break the ice, and it is the MMA that should be a little more conciliatory, if it wants the system to work, however, imperfectly. Currently the president holds all the trumps. But there is a real danger that the rules of the game might change if the engine of government continues to be derailed. The system which he is overseeing is neither a democracy nor a dictatorship. It cannot even be described as some sort of enlightened despotism.

The MMA, which has been a constant thorn in the side of the ‘King’s party’ and the president, has finally offered what, from the standpoint of the military, must be regarded as a reasonable deal. If the president quits the post of chief of army staff after a year, the clergy promised it won’t bother him again.

This must be regarded as a good deal, especially when the ARD represents a more extreme point of view. Their leaders are clamouring for the restoration of democracy, shorn of all military embellishments. They just don’t want to see Gen Musharraf in the president’s chair, in or out of uniform, and chalked up another protest last week when its leaders claimed that President Musharraf had no right to represent Pakistan in forums abroad. Surely, they argued, this is something that should have been accomplished by the prime minister. But then, a precedent was set by Zia-ul-Haq

e-mail: a-mooraj@cyber.net.pk

UNFORTUNATELY, the history of Pakistan’s politics is marred by a dominant role of the military unlike other South Asian states — India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives, where a stable functioning democracy exists. Throughout our history, the struggle between democratic and military governance has existed with the latter ruling the country directly for more than 29 years out of 56 years.

The role of the military in politics, though out of fashion now except in Burma, Pakistan and Guinea Bissau, has a long history. Some time back, Africa and Latin America were its favourite pastures like Pakistan but they have come out of the long shadows of military dominated politics and are now making a swift transition to democracy.

It was generally believed that new economic developments of globalization, expansion of modern commerce and industry, urbanization, spread of education, information and mass communication revolution, and emergence of new professional middle classes were shaping modern societies and that these developments were making the return of military dominated politics impossible. To the astonishment of many, Pakistan making an exception once again hurled back into the clutches of martial law on October 12, 1999.

That day I was on my way to deliver a lecture at the University of California, Berkley, on the future of democracy in Pakistan when I received the news of military coup in Pakistan. More interestingly, when I arrived in Los Angeles the next day, I learnt that the Pakistani consul-general was equally embarrassed as he had vehemently ruled out the prospects of military takeover in Pakistan before a group of international affairs students at a local university in response to a question by an Indian student saying that Pakistan was not a banana republic.

It is a pity that all chronic patients such as Nigeria, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey suffering from MIGS (military in government syndrome) have found some cure but we are still lurching on our way to finding a solution.

With no matching challenge, Pakistan‘s military leadership undoubtedly enjoys unfettered power and also support of the United States of America for its limited geostrategic imperatives. This gives it a strong leverage over the democratic forces. As such the future of politics depends much on the thinking of the military leadership about its future role. In his outstanding classical work “The Man on Horseback”, Finer argues that to intervene in politics, the military should have occasion/opportunity as well as disposition. He defines disposition as “a combination of conscious motives or a will or desire to act. For “disposition” he refers to “motives” disposing the military to intervene. He classifies three motives.

First is the motive of the manifest destiny of the military. In this motive the military regards itself as the sole saviour of the country. The second motive is of national interest, under which the military could oust a group of civilian elite, whose acts it regards contravening the constitution and the national interest. The third motive is sectional interest. This consists of class interest, corporate self-interest of the military, and individual self-interest. In Pakistan, all three motives are seen to be working.

Ultimately, military withdrawals from politics take place. They can be substantial and total or limited and partial depending on the influence the military may choose to have on the policy and decision-making. In many cases, military withdrawals occur involuntarily; they are forced to withdraw by a defeat or some accident like in Argentina after the Falkland war, in Indonesia after the East Asia crisis; in Pakistan after the East Pakistan debacle, or crash of General Zia. In some cases they are done voluntarily, where military leadership proactively disengages abruptly or gradually like in Brazil and Turkey.

With regard to military withdrawal Nordlinger argues that there are three factors behind military withdrawal from politics. Firstly, extensive civilian opposition to the military regime in the form of demonstrations, strikes, riots. This type of opposition has succeeded in forcing the military to surrender power to civilian government like in Sudan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Secondly, the overthrow of a military government by dissident officers followed by the handing over of power to civilian politicians like it happened in Argentina, Columbia and Venezuela. The main motives of the military in restoring civilian rule are to avoid counter-coups and to maintain the unity of the military command. Thirdly, voluntary disengagement brought about by unexpected difficulties which the military faces in its political role, a willingness to promote democracy, and/or the desire to maintain and promote military professionalism.

The most authoritative account on the cost of military governance is documented by Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, which held the military’s role in politics as the principal factor responsible for the break-up of Pakistan. Regarding the impact of martial law on military itself, it said in its chapter 26. “One of the major causes of our disgrace was the moral degeneration which had set in among senior army commanders as a result of their continued involvement in martial law duties right from 1958 onwards.

“Several respectable witnesses drawn from various sections of society, including highly placed and responsible service officers, have asserted before the Commission that [owing] to corruption arising out of the performance of martial law duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of war.

“Allied with the corrupting influence of martial law duties is the fact that in order to retain the loyalties and support of the armed forces, the CMLA was compelled to offer to serving and retired military officers a large number of jobs ordinarily filled by civilians. The chairmanship of most of the statutory and autonomous corporations was offered to military officers and some of them even became managing directors of highly specialized industries like Karachi Electric Supply Company, cement production, Sui Gas, etc. Retired generals even became advisers to banking institutions. This was a situation hardly conducive to maintaining the traditional ruggedness and toughness of the Pakistani officer.

“Another contributory factor was the mad rush for allotment of agricultural lands all over West Pakistan. The criticism, is, however, aimed at the act that a considerable amount of effort and money was expanded by the welfare directorate and Military Families Rehabilitation Organization of the Adjutant-General’s branch on developing these lands for the benefit of highly placed military officers, and in the process a large number of serving personnel were not only diverted to these extraneous duties, but a spirit of greed was generated among comparatively junior officers for acquisition of these lands”.

“The military officers have also been engaged in feverish house-building activity, as evidenced by the large number of houses constructed by them in the various cantonments of the country as well as in the Defence Housing Society. Allegations have been frequently made that many of these multiple projects were financed by certain banking institutions, which became the fortunate repository of large amounts of military funds under the directions of GHQ. The diversion of funds belonging to Fauji Foundation also falls under this category”.

Today reading reports about Okara farms, Cholistan lands, Korangi Creek City, Karachi, Defence Society Phases 4,5,6,7 in Lahore and Phase 1 and 2 in Islamabad, Fauji and Askari businesses from mineral water to cement and fertilizer, over 500 military persons running key civil institutions from gas, electricity to shipping, and in view of growing unrest in smaller provinces one wonders what lessons our military leadership has learnt from our tragic history.

In Pakistan, withdrawal of the military has not resulted in a democratization process but the so-called democratic set-ups created by the military can be described as models of political liberalization under which the military maintained its control over key policy areas. Today, as the winds of change emanating from the knowledge and information revolution blow across the world, democratization of societies holds the key to progress and development.

Our military leadership must learn from the Chinese wisdom, which holds political stability and social cohesion as keys to economic development. It is because of the political instability that despite $ 11 billion reserves the governor, State Bank of Pakistan, has to concede that there is no rise in investments. How long can we afford to play these petty power games? We do not need new schemes of political liberalization we need democratization. If the military leadership can talk to India to resolve the Kashmir issue why can’t it talk to its own leaders to find a viable and stable model of democracy.

Instead of promoting politics of horse-trading, why can’t it initiate a process of reconciliation and consensus. Ultimately, nations that do well are the ones that promote positive synergy through collaborative mechanisms and the ones that fail are those whose internal strife and mistrust destroy them. Active and permanent political role for the military is a recipe for disaster both for the country and for the military itself as pointed out in Hamood ur Rahman Report. But to learn from history is not easy.

The writer is an MNA and former deputy chairman, planning commission.