College of corps commanders?
By A.R. Siddiqi
WROTE Karl Von Clausewitz (1780-1931), Prussian soldier and scholar of military science and history: “I’d disclaim any intent of telling generals how to conduct campaigns. It was the business of the theorist to educate the mind of the commander, not to accompany him into battle.
“It was not even to provide him with ready-made principles of war. It was to teach him how to think, not to do his thinking for him...”
Seen in the current national perspective, the ‘conduct of campaigns’ would mean coping with the on-going stand-off between General Pervez Musharraf’s government and the political opposition. Since the Bangladesh war of 1971, the military has been overtly or coverly, directly or indirectly, engaged mainly in national (civil) affairs. Campaign in the present context thus has a civil connotation.
The only exception has been the Kargil episode which the army (military) commander launched in formal consultation with the civil authority of the day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but largely at his own initiative. While the army chief has claimed that “everyone was on board”, the strategy behind Kargil and its actual execution was generally accepted to be his brainchild. The civilian authority was brought into play only when the campaign would not go according to plan to force a pull-out from areas across the LoC earlier overrun by our forces.
It is to be noted that the military mind is generally sensitive, even inimical, to any advice or opinion gratuitously offered. This would be particularly so in the case of a retired individual like this writer who is least expected by the those in service to say or suggest anything contrary to the military high command’s own perception of high policy matters, civil or military. Such behaviour, even if called for and timely, is not expected from one of the ‘same feather’.
But the coverage of a recent meeting of the corps commanders (Dawn, August9) presided over by General Musharraf needs critical examination. It is an event with wide-ranging implications of a fundamental nature likely to have an impact on the conduct of national affairs if carried to the logical conclusion.
The two major issues reported to have come up for debate (and ultimate consensus) at the meeting pertained to the role and status of the army chief as head of state (and, in effect, of government) in a dual capacity, with his general’s uniform as an essential component. The unanimous opinion emerging from the meeting was that “no dictation should be accepted to shed the military uniform”.
The military commanders “expressed their confidence in the leadership” of the president and opined that no timeframe could be given for the removal of his military uniform.
The issue of the uniform, it was urged, should be left for Gen Musharraf to decide in accordance with the geo-strategic challenges and imperatives the country is so up against. There was “no question” about “compromising over the holding of dual offices by Gen. Musharraf...”
The federal cabinet was informed of ‘some’ of the decisions of the crucial commanders’ meeting. In the routine language of official files, whatever was conveyed to the cabinet meeting presided over by Prime Minister Jamali would have been ‘For Info (information) Only’. That would, in practical terms, preclude any further action at the cabinet level contrary to the military commanders’ decision.
Should that really be the case, all the talk about return to a parliamentary, democratic order under a civil government (cabinet) would be little more than an essentially PR exercise. It would, in effect, denote the emergence of a supra- constitutional, supra-parliamentary, all-powerful body (or institution?) in the shape of what may well be called the college of corps commanders (COCC). Regardless of the wishes, policies and perceptions of the elected government, the COCC, at a stroke, could nullify all that the supreme civilian authority might stand for at a given point in time.
Yet another major and potentially tricky implication of the COCC discussing and deciding through a consensual procedure matters concerning the army chief’s service is that it exposes it to the vagaries of what may, eventually, amount to an electoral process. This would be a major paradigm shift in the nature of civil- military relations, tilting it inevitably and heavily in favour of the military high command. One hopes matters will not come to such a pass.
As for the demands of the “prevailing international environment” to justify the continuation of the president in his dual capacity, it is hardly anything out of the ordinary. From day one of its emergence, Pakistan had been up against no end of national and international threats and challenges. The question for us to decide now is whether a duly elected democratic and stable government or an army chief, approved by his corps commanders to stay on, would be better suited to face up to a given contingency.
— The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

