IT is an ominous development. At a time when the frozen relations between India and Pakistan are beginning to thaw, the 43-year-old Indus Waters Treaty looks like becoming a point of controversy. Islamabad believes that the Baghlilhar Hydro Power project in Kashmir violates the treaty. It is reportedly seeking arbitration by a third party.

True, the treaty lays down the appointment of a neutral expert if either of the two countries feels that the provisions are being jeopardized. But this development is bound to affect the endeavour to normalize relations. The two countries must once again try to thrash the matter out between themselves. When the engineers from both sides held discussions on the project in the past, the armed forces were confronting each other. The atmosphere was that of enmity. Even a little adjustment was not possible. After Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s initiative the climate has changed. This calls for some fresh thinking.

The question is whether the 7,000 cusecs of water, sought to be diverted to produce 450 megawatts of power, lessens the quantum of water flowing to Pakistan. If it does not, the matter is reduced to mere technicalities. The problem will not be insurmountable.

In the light of the treaty, Pakistan is justified in feeling that the western rivers allotted to it — Indus, Jehlum and Chenab — are its property as the eastern rivers — Sutlej, Beas and Ravi — are India’s. New Delhi should not do anything which could raise even an iota of doubt in the minds of Pakistanis. The places from where Pakistan’s three rivers rise are located in India. The people of Pakistan live in fear: India can easily divert the waters of these rivers to harm them.

However unfounded the fear is, the Pakistanis attach more importance to it than Kashmir. New Delhi has to explain and convince Islamabad, with facts and figures, before taking up projects like Baghlilhar that the power generation will not in any way reduce the quantum of water for Pakistan.

The water dispute is, however, as old as partition itself. When the award by the Boundary Commission chairman Radcliffe split the composite irrigation network of Punjab between India and Pakistan, the irrigation canals went to Pakistan and the rivers feeding them to India. The controlling headworks were evenly divided. Radcliffe threw up the idea of India-Pakistan “joint control.” But India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru summarily rejected it as “a political recommendation.”

Since there was no “joint control,” the two countries started arguing endlessly over their respective rights. They still are. Pakistan said that the rivers were common to the subcontinent and hence India could not do anything unilaterally. New Delhi maintained that it was the sole owner of the waters and the headworks in its territory.

Rawalpindi had suggested that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice, but Nehru rejected the proposal on the ground that it would be a “confession of our continued dependence on others.”

In 1951, when Pakistan was on the point of bringing the dispute before the Security Council, an article by David E Lilienthal, former chairman of the US Tennessee Valley Authority, appeared in an American magazine, suggesting a comprehensive engineering plan under which India and Pakistan could develop the entire Indus basin jointly, “perhaps with the World Bank’s help.” Eugene R Black, the then World Bank chief, had been consulted before Lilienthal wrote the article, and America gave the proposal its blessings.

Since the proposal suggested a way out and was also laced with money, India and Pakistan accepted it. And in response to the formal proposal of the World Bank chief (November, 1951) a “working team” of engineers was appointed to tackle the problem outside the political arena. India gave a guarantee not to disturb supplies until the end of the negotiations — and it kept its word though Pakistan continued to make allegations to the contrary. For nine years the negotiations between India and Pakistan covered a long, tortuous route and even in the last stages, both Nehru and President Ayub had to intervene to put the talks back on track when the prejudice and cussedness of officials looked like derailing them.

Nehru had to face criticism for agreeing to continue supply till Pakistan built its alternative channels. Indian engineers had prepared a formidable case to prove that both Punjab and Rajasthan would be practically ruined if the supply did not reach the two states for the 10-year transitional period. Morarji Desai, then a member of the Nehru cabinet, organized political opinions to oppose the move. Even Govind Ballabh Pant, a central minister loyal to Nehru, expressed his unhappiness over India’s “heavy contribution” to the Indus Basin Development Fund. He wanted to get it adjusted against the value of property that Hindu refugees had left in Pakistan.

Nehru brushed aside all objections. He was anxious to build good relations with Pakistan, and settlement of the water disputes could serve as a foundation of Indo-Pakistan amity. Ayub’s problem was not politicians but bureaucrats on whom he leaned heavily. Some 30 or 40 engineers and administrators, who were fomenting trouble, accosted him at Lahore. He explained to them that in the absence of a settlement, India could decide to divert the water and starve Pakistan. “If we can get a solution which we can live with, we will be very foolish not to accept it.”

“Since the Indian army is three times the size of our army, the dice is heavily loaded against us,” he said. “It is not a good bargain but I had no choice under the circumstances and I accepted it.” Before the treaty was signed there was a hitch. Ayub was not happy over India’s insistence on using in Kashmir “some water” of the Chenab, a river allotted to Pakistan. “It looked as if the whole thing would break down,”

Rajeshwar Dayal, then India’s high commissioner in Islamabad, told me. New Delhi deputed him to talk to Ayub and after a great deal of persuasion he was able to get Ayub to agree to the proposal. In the same way, New Delhi should try its best to persuade Islamabad not to go for arbitration on the project in Kashmir. It will unnecessarily generate heat and spoil the chances of rapprochement.

There is another side to rapprochement: America’s role in pressuring Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. New Delhi feels let down and bemoans that America has double standards. It puts its trust in Washington again and again to be betrayed once more.

The world saw how Americans got a resolution against Iraq passed in the Security Council on the understanding that they would come back to it if it came to war. But President Bush ordered his forces to march in Iraq in the face of opposition by most of the Security Council members. Musharraf’s claim that there is no cross-border terrorism has no supporting evidence.

All these years Pakistan has been promising that it will not allow any infiltration but it has not arrested even a single person trying to violate the Line of Control. It is doubtful if jihadi organizations will be reined in completely. They are a law unto themselves even in Pakistan. All that India wants is some proof of Islamabad’s action. This is important because the talks are about to begin.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.