On Day 5 of the war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair came to meet President Bush at Camp David with an ambitious agenda in hand. There was, of course, the war to discuss now that progress toward Saddam Hussein’s ouster appeared to be going less well than expected.

But Blair’s main concern in making the trip was to discuss what he delicately called the “diplomatic implications of recent events for the future.” The diplomacy prior to the war had been a mess, and Blair wanted to get an early start on repairing the damage done.

He was going to meet Bush, Blair said before flying off, to talk about three issues: “how we get America and Europe working again together as partners, and not as rivals; how we rebuild Iraq post-Saddam; and also of course our approach to the Middle East peace process.”

Unfortunately, none of these issues was on Bush’s agenda. This became clear at the news conference that followed their meeting.

Blair’s failure to gain Bush’s assurance that he will make a diplomatic investment after the war as large as his military investment in the war — that is, put his heart and soul into it — reflects in part the White House’s preoccupation with prosecuting a war that has turned out to be much less of a cakewalk than many officials had hoped, and not a few expected.

This is an administration that sets clear priorities, and winning the war is now Priority One. Figuring out how to win the peace — let alone getting relations with key allies back on track — is something that can wait.

But there are real differences between Bush and Blair concerning the three issues. Not only does this make their resolution less likely, but it profoundly complicates Blair’s position at home and as a major European player and threatens to isolate the United States even more than it is today.

Consider US-European relations.

There is little denying that they have been deeply — and negatively — affected by the Iraq debate. France and Germany remain adamantly opposed to the war — as do vast majorities of European publics (even in those countries whose governments are counted as part of the “coalition of the willing”).

Blair, who sees himself as the bridge between the United States and Europe, is being stretched to the breaking point.

He needs Bush, as well as the leaders of France and Germany, to rise above their differences.

But there is little indication that Bush is prepared to show the magnanimity that this requires or that French President Jacques Chirac or German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder are prepared to come to Washington to declare fealty to Bush’s mission in Iraq. So the trans-Atlantic gap will continue to grow, leaving Blair with very little to hold on to.

Responsibility for post-Saddam Iraq also is likely to create tension between Bush and Blair. Having failed to secure a UN resolution authorizing the war, Blair is committed to ensuring the United Nations is “centrally involved” in Iraq after the war.

“It is important that whatever administration takes over in Iraq, that has the authority of the UN behind it,” Blair declared.

But that’s easier said than done, given the deep divisions within the UN Security Council—Dawn/LAT-WP News Service. (c) The Baltimore Sun