ONE would have thought it impossible for a man who came to power promising security and delivered nothing but, to be re-nominated a prime ministerial candidate by his party and be on course for victory in forthcoming national elections. Such are the paradoxes of Israeli politics that that is precisely what is happening.

On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon launched his election campaign with a highly provocative visit to the Temple Mount. That violation of Al-Haram Sharif sparked the second Palestinian intifada and put an end to hopes of a peace settlement between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat. Having stirred the Palestinians to violence, Sharon then secured power by promising to stamp it out.

In eighteen months as prime minister, though, Ariel Sharon not only failed to deliver on his promise of security but pursued a course that increased rather than diminished threats to the Israeli people. The recent bomb blast in Mombasa shattered any illusions they might have harboured about safety in distance: thanks to Sharon’s unrelenting hardline policies, Israelis today are vulnerable at home and abroad.

Ariel Sharon’s government has also failed to deliver economically. The deteriorating security situation under his watch has led to a decline in tourism and trade. Add to this the burden of maintaining the occupation and protecting Zionism’s frontline troops — the settlers — and the end result is economic collapse. Nearly 1.2 million Israelis now live below the poverty line; unemployment is running above 10 per cent. The prime minister’s standard response to accusations of economic mismanagement is ‘security’ — only with security will there be economic growth: security comes at a price.

Sharon has delivered neither security nor economic growth. Yet two years and three months on, as he prepares for a second election campaign, he is making the same promise of security. The irony is it is winning him votes.

Last Thursday he inflicted a crushing defeat on his rival for the ‘hard-line’ crown, Benjamin Netanyahu. The one-time darling of the Israeli right was able to secure only 41 per cent of the vote in Likud internal elections, well short of Sharon’s 56 per cent. Even the Mombasa bombing and an attack on Likud voters on the same day as the polls — vivid proof of Sharon’s failure to provide security — did not deter voters from choosing him again. Analysts are predicting that the prime minister will win January’s national elections by an even bigger margin. How to account for such popularity in the face of such abject failure? How does a man who has proved so disastrous for his own people — even more so for others — retain his position at the helm of national affairs? One reason is lack of alternatives. Benjamin Netanyahu might have been a sure bet for the Likud leadership two years ago, but in last week’s polls he appeared immature and petty-minded alongside the national icon that Ariel Sharon has become.

Netanyahu’s problem is that many of the extreme views he holds (ousting the Palestinian leadership, building more settlements, using force to crush the intifada) are already held by Sharon. The only way for him to differentiate himself is by holding even more extreme views — hence his insistence on ruling out any possibility of a Palestinian state. That is a position that is long passed its salability. Most Israelis (including 50 per cent of Likud voters) concede the inevitability of a Palestinian state. To deny that reality is to live in cuckoo land.

Ariel Sharon has recognized that reality. He has grudgingly come round to accepting that there will eventually have to be dialogue with the Palestinians about their own state. Hardly a ringing endorsement of Palestinian statehood but, coming from the ‘Butcher of Sabra and Shatila,’ a significant shift, and one that takes him from the extremist fringe into the mainstream. Netanyahu’s other mistake was to attack Sharon on the economy. Most Israelis buy Sharon’s excuses of ‘security before economic growth’. To argue about taxes and jobs in the face of bomb blasts and shootings came across as petty-minded. It went against the mood of national unity fostered by the intifada.

The coup de grace was Ariel Sharon offering Netanyahu the position of foreign minister in his cabinet after Labour pulled out of the coalition. Again, given the mood of national unity, Netanyahu could not refuse the offer. But once in the cabinet, it was virtually impossible for him to attack the Sharon. In short, Netanyahu was out-flanked on all fronts by the wilier Sharon. His time may come — he has plenty of political years left — but for now Ariel Sharon is undisputed party leader.

What of Labour? It too held internal elections recently that produced a new leader, Amram Mitzna. Mitzna defeated the incumbent leader and outgoing defence minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, by an even bigger margin (17 per cent) than Sharon against Netanyahu. Mitzna’s victory is good for Labour as a party but bad for its electoral prospects. It is good because it returns Labour to the ideological opposition. Following Ehud Barak’s crushing defeat at the hands of Sharon in the February 2001 elections, Shimon Peres made the calamitous decision to take Labour into coalition with Likud. The argument supporting this move — that Labour could exert a restraining influence on Likud — proved erroneous: Sharon still went hammer and tong against the Palestinians and reoccupied their land. The argument against it — that Labour would betray its liberal roots — proved prophetic. Inside the Sharon government Labour was too right-wing to represent liberal peace-loving Israelis, but not right-wing enough to attract the Zionist vote. The end result: it ended up nowhere.

Mitzna has taken the party firmly back into the liberal camp. The former army general and mayor of Haifa advocates Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, dismantling of settlements, and unconditional dialogue with the Palestinian leadership. He even calls for Jerusalem to be divided into two parts — one Israeli, the other Palestinian. A radical departure indeed for an Israeli political leader.

Mitzna’s solution is the only way out of the crisis created by Sharon. The key to Israeli security is recognition of the Palestinian right to a viable state. That in turn will only come about once there is an end to violence, (an end to Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and oppression of Palestinian people) and dialogue.

The tragedy is that very few Israelis recognize this reality (even as they accept that a permanent settlement with the Palestinians will entail a Palestinian state). Too many accept Sharon’s argument that there can be no dialogue while violence continues, and that only force will crush the intifada. Occupation of Palestinian land, demolition of their homes, violation of their rights, assassination of their leaders and children will only drive them to greater violence.

Security for Israelis will never come about through the route that Ariel Sharon is pursuing. If they want peace, they have to replace the rigidity of Sharon with the flexibility of Amram Mitzna. Sadly, there appears little chance of them doing so soon.

AFTER weeks of negotiations between the major parties a government at the national level was finally put together. Who was negotiating with whom and for what? The PML-Q, PPP (People’s Party Parliamentarians) and MMA, being the larger groups in the assembly, were the principals, while the MQM went around showing its wares and price tag to prospective takers. The PML-Q, being the largest, expected to form and lead a coalition government. General Musharraf, whose instrument it was, wanted the same thing. A coalition with either the PPP or the MMA would have produced majority support in the assembly and a stable government.

As I have submitted once before, the PML-Q and the PPP would have been natural allies. Neither of them is encumbered by an ideology, or even principles, that won’t bend. Their positions on foreign policy, including that concerning the United States and India, are identical, their approaches to issues of domestic policy (economic development, privatization, centralization versus deconcentration of authority, maintenance of law and order) are similar, and both have been willing to show due deference to the generals when that appeared to be necessary.

They were expected to make contact and they did. ‘Come into my parlour,’ said Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain to Makhdoom Amin Fahim; ‘it is cool and comfortable here, and you have been out in the scorching sun much too long.’ The Makdoom might have said to the Chaudhry: ‘How nice of you to ask; the sun doesn’t bother us any more, but we would love to join you to preserve and advance the public interest.’ Such were not, however, the words that passed between them. A problem arose that proved to be insurmountable.

Each of these gentlemen was the spokesman of a superior — one of them lodged in the Army House in Rawalpindi, and the other calling the tune from Dubai, London, or some place in America. The principals in the ensuing negotiations were really General Pervez Musharraf and Ms Benazir Bhutto. In the latter’s reckoning, her own political career, and the well-being of her husband, formed an essential part of the national interest. Some reports have it that she demanded, as a condition of cooperation with the PML-Q, the withdrawal of all criminal charges against Mr Zardari, dismissal of the cases pending against her in the courts and presumably the setting aside of her conviction in some.

These demands were not well received at the Army House. They would cause serious legal and political problems. Consider also that the generals had been distrustful of the PPP almost since the spring of 1972, when the late Mr. Bhutto dismissed some of them and humiliated others in a mismanaged campaign of placing the armed forces under civilian control. It was enough that they would now see the party as a possible partner in the government to be formed. So far as Ms Bhutto was concerned, no dispensation outside of law would be offered. This response did not satisfy her, and the project of the PPP coalescing with the PML-Q fell through.

One may argue that Ms Bhutto ended up as a loser by equating her personal interest with that of the country (even if there might be some controversial degree of correspondence between them). With some of her lieutenants occupying ministerial offices in the national government, she would surely have been more influential in the conduct of our affairs than she is now. Moreover, given time, her men might have been able to turn the general’s mind, and the wheel of fortune, in her favour. But she wanted her plums here and now.

Negotiations with the MMA also ran into a stone wall and broke. Given the MMA’s antipathy towards the Musharraf regime’s active participation in the American crusade against Islamic militants (called terrorists), and its sympathy for the targets of American military campaign in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan itself (Taliban and Al Qaeda), and given the general’s disapproval of Islamic fundamentalism, his acceptance of the very idea of an MMA presence in a government with which he must work was, in his calculation, a large enough concession by itself. But the MMA’s rejection of his “reform” of our system of governance and his own place in it, and its insistence on undoing his work, made it ever more difficult for him to be more accommodative.

Some of the MMA’s demands could have been withdrawn without any real loss of face. It did not want a National Security Council. In a recent statement Maulana Fazlur Rahman has said, however, that his side would accept the NSC as an advisory body. But under the relevant law that is exactly what it is: a “forum of consultation.” The MMA repudiated the Legal Framework Order and wanted its repeal. This was an unreasonable demand, for it did not take account of the fact that the recent elections had been held and the assemblies called into being under the very same LFO, and the obvious certainty that its annulment would cause a huge chaos — or what our ulema call fitna.

The MMA wanted the general to seek election for the office of president through the procedure stipulated in the Constitution. In his recent statement, referred to above, Maulana Fazlur Rahman stated also that his group would support Musharraf’s candidacy. Leaving aside the technical difficulties that the demand involves, one may ask why not let him be if he is otherwise acceptable. True that procedural niceties should normally be observed, but this is not a normal situation. At stake here is the transfer of ruling authority from the military to a civilian government. This is a crucial shift even if the transfer is going to be a little less than total.

The next important demand is that the general must step down as the army chief if he is to remain president. This is eminently reasonable. But the general does not want to accept it. So, what is to be done? One answer may be that we should settle for the half loaf, if we can’t have the whole thing. The second approach may be, once again, to give time a chance to work its miracle. After the general has worked with politicians for a while, and if he has begun to feel comfortable with them, he may be more easily persuaded to give up his post in the army. In this connection, it may be useful to recall also that our Islamic parties did not agitate against Ziaul Haq’s continuance as the army chief even as he functioned as president after the 1985 elections and until his death.

The MMA should also have considered the advantage to the national interest its participation in government could have brought about. If one assumes that they are not open to graft, the presence of persons like Qazi Hussain Ahmad in the cabinet would have discouraged political corruption. Second, it might have helped introduce some measure of balance in our relations with the United States. Third, it would have become a valuable learning experience for the MMA leaders. They might have mellowed a bit and found that democratic politics are not a contest between absolutes but an exercise in developing feasible solutions to problems through a process of give-and-take and reasonable compromise.

In the negotiations they had, and in taking the positions they adopted, what was the trump card the parties thought they held? In effect the PPP and the MMA were, each, saying to General Musharraf that he might not have any government, to which he could hand over power, if he did not accept its terms. In other words, they had the ability to create a constitutional crisis, and they would use it to his embarrassment. Thus, they forced him and the PML-Q to go looking for assembly members who might be amenable to pressure or seduction, and they found ten such men in PPP. It is doubtful that this denting of the PPP’s wagon was any kind of a gain for the nation.

The Pakistan People’s Party, of which the PPP is the legislative arm, has been active on our political scene, both as a ruling party and as a force in the opposition, for nearly thirty-five years. It is reasonably well grounded in the affections of a lot of our people throughout the country, and it has a fairly stable core of political workers. Despite an element of personalization in its command structure and a certain amount of corruption and lawlessness among its notables when they were in power, the party is a national asset. It has survived all kinds of adversity and stood the test of time. This is how it should be regarded — as a national asset — by those who have sought to split it by encouraging the emergence of a “forward bloc” within its ranks. And, this is how Ms Benazir Bhutto should also regard it. It should not be treated merely as an instrument for the advancement of any individual’s personal ambitions. The same holds for some of our other political parties: they too are national assets and it is wrong to disrupt any of them by fomenting defections in its ranks.

Looking at the brighter side of the political landscape, it is gratifying to note the assurances of both the MMA and PPP leaders that they will not let the Jamali government fall as a result of the MQM’s impetuous, and almost frivolous, decision to desert it — only to reverse it a few days later. This is a wise move on their part and very much in accord with the public interest.

Lastly, in this discussion, one may remind our politicians that it is not without good reason that their profession is called the art of the possible. Democratic politics cannot go forward unless the players are willing to engage in a process of negotiation, bargaining and compromise. The fewer the issues that are made matters of principle the greater is the prospect that they will make life easier and more fulfilling for us.

E-mail: syed.anwar@attbi.com

OUT of President Musharraf’s three years of reform and accountability has emerged a troop of public representatives teeming with turncoats and obscurantists. Not that these two breeds are new to Pakistan’s politics but the wonder is that the rigours of prison and disqualification have only swelled their number.

Had Musharraf been content with imparting just a touch of discipline to politics as he did to economy, rather than invent it anew, the government would have settled down to business soon after the elections. This one has not, even after two months. His new system, or democracy tailored to the needs of the country as he chose to call it, failed to win popular recognition because it was devised by the general and lawyers and, secondly, the main driving force behind it was to keep the previous two prime ministers out of public life.

The constitutional changes, coupled with the accountability proceedings, diminished, or altogether demolished, the established political forces and leadership without the new ones taking hold. Resultantly, the parties on the fringes grew in strength and the regional or fractional leaders have entered the mainstream.

Fortuitously for the religious parties which had their traditional base in Balochistan and North-West Frontier, the American war on terror in the neighbouring Afghanistan brought a windfall support to them for the sufferers in that war were not just the co-religionists but also tribal kin.

Such were the actions of the military government and some happenings beyond its control, which to other have thrown the country at the mercy of factions in search of power without programmes or understanding of statecraft.

Alliances will be forged and may even work for a while but a two- or three-party system which is an anchor of stability and good governance in a parliamentary government, it seems, has been lost for quite a few elections to come.

With benefit of hindsight, it can be said that had Musharraf held elections soon after assuming control when the maladministration of the previous governments and the totalitarian tendencies of their leaders were still fresh in the minds of the people, the parliament coming into being as a result would have readily adopted some constitutional changes intended to ensure the rule of law through institutions against the whims of individuals. In that event a role for the armed forces might have then been conceded.

By the time the changes in the Constitution and the structure of government were announced by the National Reconstruction Bureau, the regime had lost its impartial credentials and the people in their economic hardship and physical insecurity recalled the persecuted image of the ousted political leaders more than their misdeeds. The split verdict of a low turn-out of voters in the October election is but a mirror of the apathy or hostility thus induced.

The motley crowds forming governments at the centre and in the provinces (Balochistan has 20 ministers where five would have sufficed) have nothing in common but the pursuit of power.

They can survive, as long as they do, only if they curb personal greed and serve the people at large and not their own kin and cronies alone. Sadly, the conduct of many among them does not give rise to much hope on this count.

Zafarullah Jamali, the prime minister, is in a position to knit together, as far as it can be done, his disparate ministers into a cabinet for he is not known for any enduring party affiliation nor was he involved in the past political or military cabals.

Belonging to the clan of Mir Jafar Khan Jamali, whom the Quaid-i-Azam trusted more than anyone else in Balochistan, is a factor that should also help him in running a political government with a measure of confidence without confronting the army brass.

The prime minister’s first pronouncement on a subject most vital to the safety and prosperity of Pakistan — Kashmir — however has been hasty and hackneyed. As reported in this paper on November 29, he said that Pakistan could not even think of compromising the people’s right of self-determination in Kashmir, much less bargain on it. The opportunity of resuming talks with India with the coming into office of a civilian government has thus been lost.

the mere assertion of the right of self-determination has not resolved the problem for more than half a century, nor would it now. The prime minister could have broken new ground to end the agony of Kashmir and its emotional and financial strain on Pakistan by talking to the prime minister of India and not by publicizing the exchange of sentiments with the prime minister of Azad Kashmir.

Disappointing too has been the debut of the new provincial leaderships. The NWFP and Balochistan governments have announced a ban on liquor and gambling, knowing fully well that liquor was banned a quarter of a century ago by Mr Bhutto and gambling was not allowed even under the British rule. the problem of the two provinces is not liquor but traffic in narcotics and other contrabands damaging the economy and morals of the people. More frivolous are the orders of the Frontier chief minister about music in buses and transport halts for prayers. He should work instead to provide more and better buses.

Five years, in any case, is a long time to survive on sentimental declarations and cheap gimmicks. The real, and perhaps the only, contribution the new governments can make in this age of free thought and enterprise is to create a peaceful and tolerant society conducive to investment and human endeavour in all fields.

That would generate employment for the people and bring revenue to the government for development. The community itself and its elders can take care of the morals of the people better than the government.

A hazard constantly lurking in the shadows for the governments put together by defections is that they tend to fall apart by desertions. When that looks imminent, fresh elections should be called instead of indulging in yet another round of horsetrading or, worse still, inviting military intervention once again.