THE policies of the military government would continue, the economic reforms in particular, said Mir Zafarullah Jamali immediately after his election as the prime minister of the country with a wafer thin majority.

As a practical proof of that he has appointed former finance minister Shaukat Aziz as his adviser on finance and economic affairs without nominating a separate finance minister. As author of the reforms or co-architect with the IMF, Aziz would do more of the same. With the combined efforts of President Musharraf, Shaukat Aziz and the State Bank governor Dr Ishrat Husain, the reforms have brought macro-economic stability to Pakistan and built the base for meeting other targets such as poverty reduction, social sector development and accelerated economic growth.

The US treasury secretary Paul O’Neill, after a week’s visit to the region, has given economic growth top priority. Simultaneously he has said in India: “We have got to do 50 things, or a thousand things, and the idea that emphasis on one excluded emphasis on the other is just dead wrong.” That shows the enormity of the problem that the rulers in developing countries face, more so the region in which “one-third of the people of the world live.” Of this, one-third of the people of Pakistan, India and Afghanistan which he visited are “in rags and jobless.” He wanted the western states to help these countries in a big way, while they stay on track in respect of the reforms.

There are several ways of judging the worth of the economic reforms. Their intrinsic merit, their outcome after three years under a military umbrella, the good they are able to do to the people after the hardships imposed on them initially and the possible gains from continuing them, are some of the criteria. The outcome of such reforms in other countries also matters. Also relevant are the relative gains of the rich, the poor and the middle class from such reforms, and whether they have only increased the disparities in income and wealth common in countries like Pakistan.

The IMF reforms are usually based on the assumption: pain today for gain tomorrow. That has taken the place of the discredited trickle-down theory under which the poor were ultimately to gain by the good effect of the structural reforms. But it proved to be a case of too little too late, or never, and the poor getting poorer, as has happened in Pakistan. Hence the IMF, World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are giving a great deal of importance to poverty reduction, and are focusing on that somewhat directly instead of leaving it to the poor to gain by the reforms eventually.

There are several parties to the reforms on the other side, directly or indirectly. They include the IMF, the World Bank, and other international aid agencies, donor countries, foreign investors looking for future investment and the existing investors in Pakistan proposing to expand their enterprises. And they broadly tend to act together. Pakistan is not a top priority country for foreign direct investment.

Nor is India now. Paul O’Neill asked Indian industrialists why did the foreigners invest 45 billion dollars in China last year while they invested only 4.4b billion dollars in India? Then he answered the question himself saying, it was so because China honours contracts and abides by agreements while India has a one-way approach to the problem.

As the deals with the IMF are not popular, and it imposes harsh conditionalities on Pakistan, Pakistan has decided to do away with signing future agreements with the IMF from the middle of 2004 after the current 1.3 billion dollar Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programme expires. There is unanimity on the issues. The decision was taken even before the foreign exchange reserves had touched the current 8.7 billion dollar level.

Now if we do away with borrowing from the IMF and be free of its binding conditionalities, shall we be free of the IMF in true sense after over 30 years? The IMF will still evaluate the merit and strength of our economy and its future prospects for the benefit of others, like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, donor states and international banks. Hence Pakistan cannot cut across the IMF norms in a big way and be free of IMF altogether when the world is scared of the contagion of failing economies.

Right at the moment Pakistan stands to gain by staying on the reform course, certainly until 2004 when the PRGF comes to an end. The US is to write off a billion dollars of debt. And after getting 12.5 billion dollars of the official debt re-scheduled we are now trying to get that debt converted into aid for social sector development. The US after giving 600 million dollars as budgetary support last year,is also paying for the various facilities offered for it in Pakistan. And Pakistan has obtained better market access for its exports to the European Community, and is seeking the same kind of facilities in the US.

Paul O’Neill says Pakistan has taken on additional responsibilities far beyond it national needs and so it should be given additional assistance. Of course, much of that and other benefits like the tripling of the home remittances of Pakistanis abroad and slowing down of the outflow of capital from Pakistan, are the outcome of September 11 but we have to make the best of that discreetly when we have hardly any other viable option and even Saudi Arabia is coming under increasing pressure from the US.

Pakistan has to make the best use of this opportunity, however hurting some of its features are to our national pride, and profit by that to make up for our lapses of the past. We may not be a failed state, but certainly ours is a failed system with flawed methods as there has been a large gap between action and lofty intentions between piety and practices.

Now what does the IMF want from us? It wants us not to have large budget deficits after they had in reality hit the peak of 10 per cent of the GDP which was not openly conceded. Now if the public sector units with their corrupt practices and gross inefficiency cost the government Rs. 100 billion each year, and efforts to check this sustained financial hammohraege have failed it has to press for privatization of such units.

Since we have been too slow to move in that direction for political or international reasons, it asks us to collect far more revenues. And since that has not been taking place in the normal manner it forced us to raise the general sales tax from 10 to 12 per cent and finally to 15 per cent with higher rates for some errant groups.

As a result retail prices in the market rose high, particularly when the GST net was spread too wide to cover the service sector as well and which hurt the low income groups hard. Consumption went down along with industrial production. Industrial investment slowed down further, while investment in the various eateries in the cities shot up.

As a result of the heavy borrowing to meet the budget deficit the national debt exceeded Rs 4.5 trillion. More and more of the tax revenues have to be spent on debt servicing which this year will be Rs 290 billion, including the interest on domestic debt of Rs 192 billion. Add to that the defence outlay of Rs 146 billion excluding the heavy military pensions.

As a result, too little is left for education and public health and we have come to be ranked as the 38th country in this regard, far behind many African countries as well. If all that crowds out the development outlay and that comes down to 3 per cent or less instead of the 7 to 8 per cent of the early 1990s, the infrastructure has to decay and unemployment increase. Hence a large and sustained budget deficit is acknowledged as the mother of many evils.

Although India is not under any IMF programme now its deputy managing director Anne Krueger has warned during her current visit to that country that India cannot just sustain a heavy combined deficit of 10 per cent of the GDP at the centre and in the provinces.

Now following the failure of the conventional IMF programmes to reduce poverty, it is also urging a more direct approach. Hence its three-year programme for Pakistan is called Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility as the two have to stay inter-linked.

The IMF wants more exports to improve the balance of payments, monetary stability, low inflation and less corruption.

None of these are exceptional or objectionable demands. But the problem with Pakistan has been that it agrees to all the demands when it finds it has no other option but reneges on them after receiving the first or second tranche.

Hence we had come to be known in IMF circles as the first tranche country. The fact is that if Pakistan has been disappointed with the IMF, the latter, too, has been disappointed with Pakistan, and had caught us even fudging the accounts to keep the IMF programme going.

The IMF’s analysis of our problems is sound. The initial remedies it suggests are also proper. When those initial or obvious remedies fail, it comes up with harsh remedies, which are extremely unpalatable or unacceptable to the people. In fact such remedies punish the people for the failure of the government or the success of excessive corruption and gross inefficiency in the system. The people are the victims of both.

When the loss and theft rate of KESC continues to be 40 per cent even after three years of military rule, the IMF and other donors suggest increasing the power tariff sharply to wipe out the deficit. What happens is the higher the power rates the larger the power theft, and while the honest consumers are forced to pay far more, the dishonest consumers and the KESC officials flourish. And there is lasting uproar against the IMF.

The new government’s plate is full and overflowing with problems and it has little of resources despite the increasing aid and rising debt relief to meet its needs. But what we have is a shaky coalition government with too many small parties or groups making large demands. If the government remains too politically preoccupied it cannot solve the tough economic problems, particularly when some of the ministers are not fit for their key portfolios.

Can such a government inspire the domestic and foreign investors to make large investments as that is the only way enough jobs can be created and the growing poverty reduced? Can the parliament press the government to do its duty by the people, more so the 40 per cent of the population living under the poverty line? It is easy to ask questions and receive stock answers or assurances but difficult to act on them and deliver, when the government’s feet are not on the ground politically.

MIR Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected leader of the house by 172 members of the National Assembly. Being the leader of the house, he is now the elected prime minister of Pakistan.

It is always an occasion of joy when the democratic process is restored after a spell of military rule. A transition from dictatorship to democracy, however flawed and truncated, is always a step forward.

The induction of a democratic government after a lapse of three years should have added to a mood of exhilaration had it not been for the damper of floor-crossing. Mr Jamali’s election was secured through manipulation leading to defection by ten PPPP members of the assembly.

Article 63-A of the Constitution, as originally enacted in 1997, provided that if a member of a parliamentary party votes contrary to any direction issued by his parliamentary party, he may be called upon to show cause within seven days as to why a declaration of defection should not be made against him.

Thereafter, the head of the party may determine as to whether he has defected or not. His decision is not appealable. The decision is to be sent to the Chief Election Commissioner through the Speaker within two days. The Chief Election Commissioner will give effect to the decision within seven days and the defector shall cease to be a member of the assembly. The jurisdiction of all the courts is excluded.

Article 63-A has been extensively amended by General Musharraf through the Legal Framework Order 2002 (LFO). The amended Article provides that if the member of a parliamentary party votes contrary to any direction issued by his party, then the head of the parliamentary party shall provide him an opportunity to show cause as to why a declaration of his defection may not be made against him. If there is no satisfactory reply from the member concerned, the head of the parliamentary party may declare him to have defected from the party. He will then forward a copy of the declaration to the Speaker of the assembly.

Within two days the speaker is required to refer the declaration to the Chief Election Commissioner, who will then decide the matter within 30 days. If the Election Commission confirms the declaration, the member shall cease to be a member and his seat shall become vacant. Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Election Commission may appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days. The court will decide the appeal within three months.

Thus, under the original Article 63-A the affected member had no right of appeal and the issue was quickly and conclusively to be determined by the head of the party. The amended provision provides for final decision to be taken by the Election Commission instead of the head of the party.

The original Article 63-A was examined in depth by the Supreme Court in the case of Wukala Mahaz v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1998 SC 1263. The court restricted the applicability of the provision to proceedings in the parliament. Upholding the principle underlying the provision, the Supreme Court held that the object of the provision was in consonance with the tenets of Islam and the representative form of government. The court also observed that the provision would bring stability in the polity of the country as it would eliminate the practice of floor-crossing.

There can be little doubt that floor-crossing is contrary to all democratic norms. It is an affront to the electorate whose verdict is falsified by the defector. If any member genuinely disagrees with his party, nothing stops him from resigning from it and the assembly and take his case back to the electorate. This is an honourable way of dissent.

Whether the ten members of the so-called forward bloc of the PPPP have fallen foul of the anti-defection provision of the Constitution and consequently liable to lose their membership of the house is of utmost importance. Its importance is underlined by the fact that this may have immediate consequence for the survival of Mr Jamali as prime minister.

If at some stage Mr Jamali opts for and obtains a vote of confidence by including the votes of members against whom a declaration of defection has already been made by their party, this would cast an even graver shadow on the legitimacy of his government.

The supporters of General Musharraf, who are also the supporters of Mr Jamali, have argued that since Article 63-A, unlike many other provisions of the Constitution, is still in abeyance, the question of defection would not arise until the moment of revival of this particular provision. The Article has deliberately not been revived to ensure smooth defection of PPPP turncoats.

Whether Article 63-A is in abeyance needs to be examined. On October 14, 1999, General Musharraf issued the proclamation of emergency whereby the Constitution of Pakistan was held in abeyance. However, this was followed by the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) 1 of 1999. Article 2 of the PCO provided that notwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution, Pakistan shall, subject to this order and any other orders made by the Chief Executive, be governed, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Constitution.

In view of the above provision, it may be argued that although the entire Constitution was placed in abeyance by virtue of the proclamation of emergency, the country was still to be governed in accordance with the Constitution unless the provisions of the Constitution were in conflict with any specific order made by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive never issued any order which was in conflict or was even inconsistent with the substance of Article 63-A. Thus viewed, it may be argued that even though Article 63-A was not specifically revived, it continues to operate by virtue of Article 2 of the PCO 1 of 1999.

This view also finds support in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Zafar Ali Shah v Pervez Musharraf, PLD 2000 SC 869. The Supreme Court observed that the 1973 Constitution still remained the supreme law of the land subject to the condition that certain parts thereof had been held in abeyance on account of state necessity. There is no reason to believe that Article 63-A was one of those provisions held in abeyance on that account.

Admittedly, the amended Article 63-A has not come into force. However, on the basis of Article 2 of PCO 1 of 1999, the original Article 63-A continues to hold the field, and it shall remain so until it is replaced by the amended 63-A. If that is correct, the PPPP defectors shall cease to be members of the house if such a declaration is made by the head of their party in terms of the original Article 63-A.

Thus, the net result of the government’s omission to revive the amended Article 63-A may be that these members may cease to be members of the assembly within seven days of such declaration being made by their parliamentary leader and without any opportunity of appeal to the Supreme Court.

Whether the original Article 63-A remains in abeyance as contended by the government or is operational would ultimately have to be resolved by the Supreme Court provided a declaration of defection is made by the PPPP against these members. Whether the party would do so is still a mystery.

Irrespective of the legal implications, the fact remains that by indulging in blatant horse-trading for securing the election of the prime minister, the legitimacy of his government which includes some of the defectors is open to question. With the support of these turncoats Mr Jamali may have secured a victory but it is a pyrrhic victory secured at the expense of basic democratic norms. An edifice built on the shoulders of such men of straw as these defectors have proved themselves to be, is unlikely to withstand the winds of resistance.

“THESE girls will be wearing swimwear dripping with blood,” said British writer Muriel Gray as 92 shaken Miss World contestants arrived in London from Nigeria on November 24. The organisers had pulled the beauty pageant out of Nigeria after at least 215 people died in riots led by Islamic extremists — but who actually put the blood on the swimsuits?

Some blame attaches to organiser Julia Morley, whose late husband, impresario Eric Morley, founded the Miss World event 51 years ago. She should not have let it go to a country half of whose 120 million people are Muslims, especially since the contest was scheduled for the holy month of Ramadan and it was predictable that extremists would try to exploit it. On the other hand, most Nigerians welcomed the contest, which was being touted locally as the biggest international event to be held in Nigeria since independence in 1960, and the choice of venue was automatic anyway because last year’s Miss World, Agbani Darego, was Nigerian.

As greater sophistication and feminist criticism eroded the contest’s old audience in the West, the Miss World organisers have responded by concentrating on Third World countries that saw the event as an opportunity to raise their profile internationally. This was bound to lead to controversy and cultural clashes: the contrast between Miss World glitz and local poverty was embarrassing, and conservative local values were often offended. The clashes duly occurred (generating useful publicity) over recent contests in India and South Africa, but not until Nigeria did they lead to mass murder.

Even before the contestants arrived in Nigeria, the political temperature was rising fast. Scandalised Muslim clerics denounced the contest as a “parade of nudity”, and human rights campaigners seized the opportunity to highlight the plight of Amina Lawal, a Muslim woman sentenced to be stoned to death for adultery by one of the recently introduced Sharia (Islamic law) courts in northern Nigeria. A number of contestants refused to come, and in mid-November President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian who needs substantial Muslim support to win re-election in 2003, cancelled a scheduled meet-and-greet session with those who did.

What put the fat in the fire, however, was an article in ThisDay, Nigeria’s leading up-market newspaper, on 18 November. Defending the decision to hold the Miss World contest in Nigeria, staff journalist Isioma Daniel wrote in a manner that could be described blasphemous. It was a dynamite in a country where over 3,000 people were killed in Muslim-Christian riots only three years ago it was dynamite.

Usually this sort of gaffe would be caught in the editorial process, but it was Friday night for the Saturday paper and it slipped through. The young Muslim men in the northern city of Kaduna burned down ThisDay’s local office and began killing Christians and burning churches the following Tuesday. The Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs declared a “serious religious emergency” and local preachers spread the message in the mosques. ThisDay apologised four times during the week, but the riots spread to the capital, Abuja, and the Miss World organisers pulled out.

No sane person, Muslim or non-Muslim, would defend the murder of over 200 people, with 1,200 more injured and 12,000 homeless, as an appropriate response to the tasteless remark of a single ignorant journalist. But many non-Muslims will see it as just another instance of the growing phenomenon of violent Islamism. More knowledgeable observers of African affairs will see it as yet another example of trouble along the Muslim-Christian fracture line that runs through so many African countries from Ivory Coast (recently split in two along that frontier) to Sudan (mired in a north-south war for the past generation).

‘Religious’ clashes around the world usually have their roots in political power struggles, and Nigeria’s certainly do. This round dates from 1999, when the northern-based military regimes that ruled the country for most of the time since independence gave way to civilian democracy and a Christian southerner was elected president.

The alliance between Muslim army officers from the north and the traditional northern aristocracy finally lost control — and immediately began plotting to get it back.

Suddenly, in 2000, one state government after another across the north began to bring in Sharia law, causing great unease among the non-Muslim minorities in their midst. It was a recipe for religious conflict, and it was no coincidence at all that the twelve states which have adopted Sharia are precisely the ones where many Muslim voters broke away from their traditional religious loyalties last election and gave their votes to Obasanjo, a Christian.

Sharia law and the conflicts it causes are part of an attempt to herd northern Muslim voters back into their old voting patterns, and Obasanjo has not dared to enforce the constitution which declares Nigeria a secular state for fear of losing next year’s election. Along come the Miss World contest, and of course the conspiracy to restore northern control exploits the event for all it’s worth. It’s ugly and it’s extremely dangerous, but it’s not really about Islam and Christianity. It’s about power. — Copyright

NAWABZADA Nasarullah Khan felt betrayed by some of the ARD components. He resigned and was persuaded to come back. He did well, because the first day of the National Assembly on November 21, preceded by the speech of General Musharraf a day earlier, revealed new data and raised new questions. These are likely to be handy tools to the Nawabzada in the coming days to enable him to fight with greater vigour.

The new data comprises: (a) an opposition more powerful and vocal than anticipated, (b) a government precariously perched on a one-vote majority secured by the establishment, (c) critical constitutional issues dominating the scene, and (d) an ominous silence of treasury benches on those issues, to the extent of evasion on the part of the parliamentary leader, Ch. Shujaat Hussain, and Sardar Farooq Leghari.

This data paints a picture which is somewhat different from that conjured up by the earth-shaking jugglery of General Tanvir Naqvi during the last three years. A sustained campaign “in the supreme national interests” resulted in many casualties like the eclipsed sovereignty, disfigured Constitution, tarnished judiciary, politicized district administration, mock referendum, manipulated elections, legalized defections and chained democracy with a president in uniform, among others.

The avowed aim of this aggressive campaign was to manufacture a dumb national assembly under the wings of the army. The patented product of this campaign was to be replicated in future also, presumably till eternity.

The first day of the National Assembly, however, revealed a deficient ingredient mix. The main frame of the elected body broadly corresponded with the prescribed specifications for a hung parliament (albeit more “hung” than planned) but it was not as mute as desired. On the other hand, loud and clear voices could be heard, resenting the shadows of the wings above. The product appeared too wobbly and unstable to promise future production.

This primary data showed instant secondary results. The opposition spoke on the strictly relevant and live issues of the day with rhetorical perfection displaying deep conviction, but the evasive silence of the treasury benches on those issues showed expediency without conviction. The former was raising its own voice, while the latter was silently waiting for instructions from somewhere. It became a significant debate between the voice of the self and the proxy for others. One side was fully present, while the other was apparently absent, though hiding behind the tactical curtain. This has set the pattern of this parliament, as well as the future replications (if any). Instead of the treasury and opposition benches, the legislative house of “sustainable and real democracy” will always consist of the two newly invented sides of the “present” and the “proxy.”

Another secondary outcome of this primary data is that the drawing room chatter against the military dictators and the political role of the army has travelled to the parliament. The inconsequential social gossip of the past has now been upgraded to targeted political attacks by authentic lips, trained oratory, loud voices and logical reasoning in constitutionally protected quarters under the full gaze of the entire nation. This is a new trend. It cannot be ignored because the other side will have great difficulty in finding an effective match for this sustained onslaught.

They lack not only the human resource and credibility, but are also devoid of the constitutional, legal and moral grounds. If these grounds are going to be sought in the courtyard of the judiciary (as was tactically done during the last three years), then another open, but currently quiet, front of the bar councils will be reactivated. This is another dimension of the new data.

This brings us to the currently inaudible and mute question suggested by this primary data. Will the new vocal trend mentioned above travel from the houses of the parliament to the houses in the streets? This question should not be confused with immediate street agitation, or with the wishful dream that a messiah from heaven will suddenly switch on a revolution. It simply examines the evolutionary chances of an increase in the openly anti-military trend seen in the National Assembly on the first day.

After the first stage of travel mentioned above, is the second stage plausible, possible or inevitable? If so, how long is it likely to take? If not, why not?

There can be, and will be, many answers, depending on the individual perception. But the speech of General Pervez Musharraf on November 20 could point the direction.

The 70-minute narration of achievements released a flood of facts, figures, vows and pledges claiming a sterling innings of the past three years and promising a golden future for the country.

For the common man he spoke at length about the steps taken for poverty alleviation, including the creation of 3.5 million jobs through new development projects, half a million jobs through Khushhal Pakistan programme and distribution of five billion rupees to mustahqeen during the current fiscal year. Success was also claimed in the elimination of corruption at top levels, thereby checking the plundering of billions.

Such sweet pourings in the ears of the common man are not new. The contents sound very familiar and the sedative effect was well proven in the past. But the effect may be dwindling because the new environment created inside the assembly on the very first day will continue to be juxtaposed with the prevailing environment of poverty, deprivation, unemployment and suicides. The former will encourage the people to evaluate the latter more critically. The lullaby of the president’s speech is likely to be broken by unwanted noises of the new trends.

How long the docility of the common man can be taken for granted amidst these opposite pulls? He may silently listen to the speeches of General Musharraf for 70 odd minutes but has to persistently suffer the harsh realities of the galloping poverty, so boldly mentioned in the reports of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and now in the report of our own Planning Commission: Pakistan, Human Development Conditions 2002.

This report bemoans the continued neglect of the social sector by the successive governments and observes that “in 1998-99, 30.6 per cent of Pakistan’s population was experiencing absolute poverty on a daily basis.” Other reports place today’s percentage at a higher level of around 40 per cent.

Apart from the tangibles of poverty, the intangibles are also crushing the citizen. With the introduction of “plea bargaining”, corruption has been encouraged and sublimated into a safe business venture, in addition to banishing the basic concept of justice from this land. The state is proudly shedding its responsibilities toward the citizen and is abandoning him to the lust of unregulated profiteers through a thoughtless spree of privatization.

Health, education, employment and security through private agencies are getting out of the paying capacity of the common man. His lips may be silent but he has a bleeding heart and an empty pocket. How long can he take it and avoid joining the chorus of criticism likely to gain stridency on the floor of the National Assembly?

This view, however, can be pressed to a point only. After that baffling questions block it. Can the new trend noticed on the first day be sustained long enough to create a significant ripple effect? Is it the noise of empty vessels, or the smoke of red-hot fire below? Will it persist or subside? Only a long chain of tomorrows can tell, while we draw some satisfaction from today.

The first day of the National Assembly was no doubt a new dawn. It may continue to advance into bright sunshine or may become overcast with dark clouds. The course will be determined by the internal anatomy of the new voices heard on November 21. Will the visible conviction of those words be backed by an inner hard core of commitment, or be shaken by a weak spine of compromise? On the one hand, there is the opportunistic track record of power-hungry politician, ever ready to sell their souls for paltry benefits.

On the other hand, there is a benefit of doubt in favour of the issue-oriented trial run of new faces. On top of both is the unbending confidence refusing to retreat and bent on ruthlessly using all possible weapons in a free-style combat developed over the last three years.

Coming days may see either a slow solidification of mercurial resentment in the corridors of legislature, courtyards of the judiciary and houses along the streets, or the smooth sailing of a gunboat against the current amidst grumbling and curses of helpless onlookers from the river banks. General Musharraf is on record having threatened that if the politicians would not comply with the “defined” rules, “either he or they will go.”

A milder reminder was issued when the general advised the politicians “not to make the LFO controversial, as it will create new complications for the country.” The reminder is tagged onto an invisible appendix of the style of governance during the last three years. The National Assembly hall may yet see another spell of empty silence.

In any of the above scenarios Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan will be needed.

E-mail: mmufti@apollo.net.pk