DURING the days of “bipolarity,” Soviet control in Eastern Europe was tight and harsh. But it was fairly light in other places. Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh were no vassals of the Kremlin even as they accepted its aid. China rebuffed Soviet assertions of supremacy and, soon after 1959, emerged as an adversary.

The United States handled its allies in Western Europe with “kid gloves.” It made no effort to intervene in their domestic politics, and it tolerated even their deviation from its own hard line towards the Soviet Union. Why? They were inheritors of the same civilization, religious tradition, political thought and institutions. Moreover, the West Europeans were the equals of Americans in educational attainment, technological competence, and political and diplomatic experience and skills. Theirs was not a patron-client relationship; it was an alliance of equals, despite differences in military capability.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union and its empire, the United States has been regarded as the one and only superpower. What does that mean? It is admittedly the mightiest military power, and the wealthiest country, in the world. But it does not follow that it has the capacity to rule the world; it cannot dictate domestic and foreign policies to all of the other nations. It cannot unleash instruments of coercion (invasion, sanctions) every time a foreign government turns down its advice.

It does have “clients,” notably in the Middle East (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirates) that will take its advice in the conduct of their foreign relations. But there are others in the same region — Iran, Syria, Libya, Iraq -that have endured American bombing raids and long years of stringent American-sponsored economic sanctions without giving up their self-assertion and independence.

Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world in whose affairs, both domestic and foreign, the United States has had a great deal of say. This had little to do with the fact that we needed external assistance to become economically viable. India under Nehru, Indonesia under Sukarno, and Egypt under Nasser were similarly situated. But each of them asserted its will and defied the United States when its own perception of its interests so required.

Anyone with even a modicum of diplomatic experience could have told Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan that a visit to Moscow would by no means close the door to the development of mutually advantageous relations with Washington. But unduly apprehensive that it might, he chose to insult Stalin by withdrawing his earlier acceptance of the latter’s invitation to visit, and instead travelled to meet Truman. A few years later the government of Pakistan, pretending that its political stability and territorial integrity were threatened by domestic and foreign communists, received American military hardware free of cost for ten years (1955-1965) and hopped on to the American-sponsored alliances in the Middle East and South-east Asia — regions to which it did not belong.

The foregoing should not be taken to mean that Pakistan did nothing of any importance in domestic or foreign affairs without American permission. Overriding moderate American opposition, it signed border and air travel agreements with China. It went to war with India in 1965 without the prior knowledge and consent of the Johnson administration. After the suspension of American military aid following this war, Pakistan became the recipient of Chinese military supplies. More recently, it sent “freedom fighters” into Indian-controlled Kashmir, and undertook the Kargil adventure, again, without American concurrence.

On the other hand, Pakistan followed the United States in opposing communist China’s presence in the United Nations for some twenty years. American economists dominated the Pakistan Planning Commission and made our development policy in the 1960s. American professors and all kinds of other “experts” advised our people in every other segment of our government. American advice became subdued during the late Mr Bhutto’s rule, partly because he had no use for planning and chose to be his own chief economist. Ziaul Haq served the United States in expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan, and it left him to his own devices in fashioning Pakistan’s domestic politics and system of governance.

Does America have a compelling voice in the choice of rulers and systems of rule in Pakistan? Our own notables assume that to be the case. A few weeks ago, Dr Aftab Ahmad recounted in this space some of the events relating to the coup of October 1958. He referred, among other things, to Ayub Khan’s visit to Washington, DC. and his meetings with the Dulles brothers (Allen, head of the CIA, and John Foster, the secretary of state) to convince them that elections would destabilize Pakistan, unleash anti-American forces, and that the country needed a period of dictatorship not only for its own good but also to better serve American interests.

The point to be noted here is that American officials were not the ones who initiated this discussion. They heard two of Pakistan’s highest dignitaries — Iskander Mirza, the president, and Ayub Khan, the army chief — and went along with their reading of their country’s politics, needs and interests. The American establishment had disapproved of Z.A. Bhutto’s politics and foreign policy orientations, especially after his opposition to the peace accord Ayub Khan had reached with the Indian prime minister at Tashkent in January 1966. Mr Bhutto, on his part, remained a critic of American policies for a time, and devoted his rather hastily written book, ‘The Myth of Independence’, to an exposition and denunciation of Pakistan’s subservience to the United States. But when, following General Niazi’s surrender at Dhaka on December 16, 1971, the generals in Rawalpindi asked Bhutto to return home from the United Nations in New York and take charge of the government, he first called at the White House, presumably, to make amends and conciliate President Nixon.

Political instability and growing economic adversity have made Pakistan more dependent than ever on the United States and lending institutions open to its influence. If there was room for further increase, it has been filled since the events of September 11, 2001. We are now seeing signs and symbols of subservience to America on a scale that we had never seen before. Not only Pakistani officials but opposition politicians too seem to have adopted the view that nothing of any consequence can happen in this country without American approval.

There can be little doubt that General Musharraf has been trying to convince the Americans that his restructuring of our system of governance, and his election-related regulations, were all for the good of Pakistan and its relations with the United States. That was to be expected. But behold Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan leading his ARD delegations to resident American diplomats and visiting American, Commonwealth, European Union, and Asian inspectors to tell them that the general was no friend to democracy, that the election would be farcical, and that his continued hold on power would work to the detriment of all concerned. In addition to the ARD’s collective representations, leaders of various parties outside the government camp have individually made similar submissions to American and other foreign officials and organs.

Ms Benazir Bhutto, even while trying to negotiate a deal with the general, has been knocking on doors in the US state department, addressing college students, and stopping anybody and everybody who would listen, to tell them that Musharraf is not to be trusted as an ally in the war against terrorism or for anything else. She has been trying to convince them also that she alone is the real spokesperson for the Pakistani people and if enabled to govern them once again, she would meet the promises and undertakings made on their behalf. Her pleas have not had the desired result, but that does not discourage her from continuing to solicit American favour.

How does one explain this type of behaviour on the part of our leading politicians? They believe, as a ground reality, that American approval and support are essential for going forward in Pakistan. Once again, this need not be the case. But they believe it is; they cannot imagine that it could be otherwise. They are ready and willing to accept this denial of their nation’s dignity, this self-imposed disgrace. Why not repudiate this presumed “ground reality”?

One explanation, in the absence of others more plausible, may be that a very large part of our societal interaction is made up of patron-client relations. With exceptions here and there, we are not accustomed to being autonomous persons. We don’t feel secure unless we have a superior, and more powerful, individual’s protection in return for which we may give him loyalty and possibly also service. This is a part of our feudal culture. The feudal society is hierarchically organized all the way and relationships are those of superiority and subordination. Equals, when there are any and must interact, know only to fight; the idea of cooperating with one another for common goals is foreign to them. Even the great ones look for, and find, an overlord until they reach the king for whose favour they compete with one another.

It appears that our presidents and prime ministers, and now even the opposition leaders who aspire to these offices, look upon the United States as a “patron-in-chief,” somewhat like the head of an empire, and regard themselves as “sultans” in the outlying regions. They will follow their own counsel in matters in which the “emperor” is not interested, or when he is busy elsewhere. But they want his concurrence in settling affairs which, in their estimation, are likely to engage his interest.

America does not insist on having a veto on the choices our rulers may want to make. Nor does it have the capacity for playing the role of an emperor. It cannot invade a country every time its government declines its advice or demands. But our own governors, lacking the strength that comes from domestic stability and popular support, insist on being supplicants. They think American approval will counterbalance their domestic weakness. This is an illusion and, more than that, an awful shame and a great pity.

Writer’s E-mail: syed.anwar@attbi.com

UNLESS President Musharraf has something up his sleeve and can pull a rabbit out of the hat when the National Assembly meets today, Pakistan is going to have a rather unworkable parliament, with the three star performers maintaining a distinct, separate identity, and MNAs performing purely ceremonial functions.

Yet the people must perhaps take cheer even from this ceremonial event and from the fact that the king’s party, after a whole round of negotiations with “like-minded” politicians, now claims that it has finally cobbled together a majority. But it would not be prudent to give too much credence to any claim made by either the PML(Q) or the MMA, especially when both parties have changed their tune with regular frequency.

Perhaps the latter has had an attack of remorse from the sudden discovery that they are, after all, dealing with a party of turncoats, who, like a chameleon, might change their hue at the drop of a hat. The reluctance of the MMA to put its seal of acceptance on an unholy alliance is understandable, but their continuous intransigence is not.

There is also no evidence to suggest that these two parties, (which appear to be stage-managing the show, now that the PPP is walking the tightrope), have finally reached a consensus on the choice of prime minister. The latest name being tossed up by the Grand Alliance and the MMA, whose choice had so far alternated between two hirsute warriors, is Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, the Tamundar of the Leghari tribe. This worthy gentleman certainly has the right credentials for the job and the advantage of being bilingual.

But he has an unfortunate reputation of squandering the people’s money for the wrong reasons.

The news of his possible selection as prime minister was not too well received in parts of Sindh, where people still remember how, when he was president, vast sums of public money were spent every time he entertained some visiting oil-rich Arab potentate who, because he doled out handouts to this nation, felt it was his right to decimate the wildlife of the province. And people still remember the time he took a plane-load of sycophants to the United States to celebrate his son’s graduation.

But wastage and public ostentation are part of the national psyche which is based on the theory that bigger is better. Every president and prime minister from Ayub Khan down to Pervez Musharraf have found ways to squander the people’s money, including taking hundreds of functionaries, journalists, businessmen and other hangers-on when they traipsy from capital to capital on official trips.

They probably have not heard of Tansu Ciller, a former prime minister of Turkey, who paid for her own and her secretary’s ticket when she travelled to the United States for her son’s graduation? The Turkish press would have crucified her if she had indulged in the kind of wasteful expenditure that can be found in Pakistan.

These days newspapers are full of stories of how one party is getting closer to another and is about to strike a deal, while a third is licking its chops wondering what to do next. To substantiate their analyses they inflict on their readers the same mug shots over and over again. By now, readers would much rather catch a glimpse of Miss Venezuela.

Television is no better as the news channels continue to project the ring masters as larger than life, while the talk shows churn out the same old cliches and platitudes.

But one does not remember reading a single statement on a party’s ideology, manifesto or economic programme, or what these politicians intend to do once they get into power, other than silence their opponents. Do they intend to support President’s Musharraf’s reforms, or are they going to make an effort to scuttle them? Are they going to zero in on one or two vital issues, like adequate of potable drinking water in rural and urban areas, and the provision for protection to the lives and property of the poor, especially the women?

Or are they going to carry on as they did in the past, looking the other way as massive Balkan-style abuses of human rights , euphemistically referred to as ‘honour killings,’ continue to blot the image of the country abroad?

Not a single elected MNA has said that there is a need for a ministry of social justice with powers to award the severest punishment to gang rapists, recalcitrant policemen who side with the strong against the weak, and those who practise karo kari. So far, after listening to the new set of performers, who are thanking their lucky stars that they passed the graduation test, there has been no indication that the status quo is likely to change.

Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, crackling with energy, announced on November 12 that the row over the controversial 58(2)B had been finally settled, even though he did not give specific details.

Some of the politicians who share a moral vacuity ,breathed a sigh of relief, as they believed this would allow them to do exactly as they pleased to whomever they pleased. However, they were in for a surprise as the government is certainly not budging on Article 58(2)B.

For readers who have not yet found their way around the confusing geography of the discussions, the LFO is, in a nutshell, a collection of constitutional amendments made by President Musharraf through a number of decrees, the most significant of which are the president’s right to sack the elected prime minister and to dissolve parliament—-something that former Presidents Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari did with panache. The current row is over President Musharraf’s attempt to incorporate this clause into the Constitution.

The MMA, which of late has received a whole raft of accolades from the king’s party, and which has been in the forefront of negotiations with the government on removing the Sword of Damocles which is hovering over the politicians’ has, have claimed to have forced the latter to make a number of concessions.

Perhaps they have succeeded in convincing the establishment to abandon the idea of a National Security Council which would sit in judgment over their every action and deliberation. But one does not think this has been the case. Excluding the NSC would seriously restrict the military’s involvement in civilian affairs . And so far as Article 58(2)B is concerned, the president is fiercely resisting its exclusion. It appears from the politicians’ statements that the president has made a gesture and is prepared to make certain cosmetic changes which will make the whole thing a little more palatable. To party supporters at least it would look like the party chiefs have won the first round.

While negotiations are still going on, the reaction to the various shenanigans of the politicians is quite interesting. The business classes and large chunks of the middle class are, on the whole, quite indifferent to the saga being unfolded in Islamabad, and could not care less if the content of Clause 58(2)B was inscribed in gold letters on the walls of the Attock Fort. Unless, of course, they are hangers-on waiting for crumbs from the table, or if they have what in local parlance is quaintly referred to as “a jack” with one of the mandarins.

Most of them would much rather like the military continued in power, for they believe that even if the lads in khaki have not delivered the goods, they have not deliberately caused anybody any harm either.

Anybody who doubts the truth of this statement should ask the Japanese why they did not put up a desalination plant in Karachi, or the chief executive of a Japanese car assembly plant who discovered the price of patronage from two separate Pakistani political governments.

In fact, the older captains of industry look back nostalgically to the days of Ayub Khan when the Pakistani flag fluttered loftily in the wind, and Pakistani travellers were not given the third degree at foreign airport immigration counter. And they remember with disbelief the roller-coaster ride of Nawaz Sharif in his last hurrah, which was crammed with what in retrospect are seen as astonishing fiscal absurdities.Will this experience be repeated?

MY article appearing in this space under the above caption on November 3 has prompted a substantial e-mail traffic, particularly from Indian Internet users. I thank all correspondents for eschewing the usual subcontinental rhetoric. There was no hate mail. Let us all agree with Samuel Johnson’s dictum that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.

Thanks to Internet, a dialogue of sorts is possible between readers and writers, with the world as jury.

The pithiest e-mail reads: “You don’t have democracy in Pakistan and preach it for Kashmir — pity.” This refrain is echoed by a number of other Indian correspondents.

Indian democracy (if not communal tolerance) is much admired in Pakistan. Many in the country even feel jealous of the democratic tradition next door and in particular controversy, free elections and a freer judiciary. Our lawyers quote Indian cases in our superior courts and our politicians — excepting the extreme right who don’t believe in democracy either in India or is Pakistan — would desire a political evolution similar to India’s.

We shall not go into the question whether there is more or less freedom, and in particular press freedom and corruption under military and civilian rule respectively. Suffice it to say that military rule has not always been dictatorial and civilian rule democratic.

However, the issue in Kashmir is not one of democracy but the sovereign right of a people to decide as to where they belong. Elections under the British were remarkably free and fair but participation in the British Indian elections did not mean acceptance of British rule by the Congress or the Muslim League. The same principle should extend to Kashmir, which has a disputed legacy in this respect. Unlike Kosovo or East Timor the right to ‘belong’ has been accepted by both disputants under the seal of the United Nations.

A learned correspondent e-mails as follows: “The definition of “occupation” is rather subjective and needs to be better defined, as should “terrorism” or for that matter “freedom struggle”. Many a time, even prosperous, fully democratic societies, if given the freedom to choose for independence from the country, may choose separation. I’ll give the example of Canada, where the Unionists won just by a whisker [against] the separatists. Would you then call the Canadian government an occupying force?...So if you allow every country to be disintegrated into smaller fragments by way of a “plebiscite” then the world will be that much more unpleasant a place to live in. Perhaps, if you carry out a plebiscite in your own country, Sindh or Balochistan or the NWFP might decide to become independent. So, does that make Pakistani state an occupying force?”

“As a last sentence to the above, might I say with respect that what is good for the Pakistani goose is also good for the Indian gander?

“Not by the wildest of imaginations can one consider the Canadian government to be an occupying force? Indeed it sets a salutary example for the 21st century by offering a choice to the people of Quebec to be independent or part of the Canadian federation. What greater example of freedom and democracy in action?

“The world has much to learn from the Quebec crisis. It was resolved peacefully. Not a shot was fired. After the referendum autonomous Quebec is a firmer part of the Canadian federation than ever before. And if Quebec had parted from Canada, it would have parted as friends. The disaffection of a people cannot be resolved by guns; on the contrary it makes matters worse.”

The other main refrain that runs through many of the e-mails from India is the alleged support in Pakistan for ‘terrorism’ in Kashmir. The truth is that all states fish in troubled neighbourly ponds, particularly when relations are not the best.

CIA, MI5, RAW, ISI and Mossad and several other secret agencies have all contributed their fair share to such fishing. If the ISI meddled in the Sikh insurgency and in Kashmir, so has RAW in Sri Lanka, East Pakistan and Nepal, not to speak of their alleged activities in Pakistan.

Kashmir was not always a seriously troubled pond. It became one in the late eighties when rigged elections overthrew the social contract and dissidence was met by military force. Each force generates its own counter-force. The savagery of one is responded by the other. The only way to break this vicious cycle is to move in the direction of the newly installed PDP government in Srinagar. I may assure my Indian readers that even if the LoC were to be sealed like the ceasefire line between North and South Korea, it will not put an end to terrorism. Terrorism is hydra-headed: you cut one head, ten others grow. The only way to cut off the oxygen supply that feeds terrorism is to adhere to the norms of civil society.

Mainstream public opinion in Pakistan does not support terrorism in Kashmir. A Kashmir won by terrorism (a very remote possibility) will be yet another Afghanistan. This much is clear. The Indian government claims that terrorists enter into Kashmir with the support of Pakistan. Pakistan denies this. Over here Pakistan’s argument appears more convincing. Why can’t an Indian army of three quarters of a million men mainly deployed on the LoC control infiltration?

Instead of wagging a finger at Pakistan, the militaries of two countries should either reach mutual accommodation or get a neutral country such as Sweden, Switzerland or Norway to help as a facilitator or adjudicator to control infiltration. This task is made easier by the use of electronic and night vision movement devices. Electronic monitoring and night vision technology has been refined to a point that a single human or animal movement can be detected with precision of location without moonlight. Controlling infiltration is not the insuperable problem that we think it is.

Another correspondent strikes a more strident note: “Kashmir is important for us for its strategic location, it is clearly a matter of internal security of 100 crore Indians. We cannot give it to you or make them independent just because a few Muslim fanatics of the beautiful valley want that. We already made two mistakes — in 1947 and 1971 — cannot afford any more. So, wisdom lies in not discussing Kashmir any more...”

If by 1947 he means the partition of India, and in 1971 the failure of India to overrun West Pakistan, of the former I would offer the admonition of Lady Macbeth: “What’s done cannot be undone”, and of the latter, though Bangladesh should be beholden to India for its freedom, is it any closer to India today? Yet the correspondent makes a valid point when he refers to Kashmir’s “strategic location”.

In truth, both India and Pakistan hanker after the real estate of Kashmir. The ‘will’ of the people is secondary to both. According to a recent Nielson survey made in the valley, if the long-suffering Kashmiris were given a choice today, they would probably opt for independence with peace and defence treaties with both India and Pakistan.

Finally, a correspondent — an expatriate Indian — has the following “solution” to offer:- “The solution is very simple and the steps are as follows: Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism; life in Jammu and Kashmir is normalized; displaced people are allowed to return and lead a normal life; a timeframe of peaceful five years should be agreed upon; then, a referendum could be conducted to ascertain whether Kashmir wants to be independent, merge with Pakistan or remain with India.”

Who would cavil at the suggested solution but the extremists in both countries? The solution is eminently reasonable — a testimony to the power and potential of Internet to promote ideas and debates aimed at peaceful solutions of inter-state problems and conflicts in different parts of the world. The governments of India and Pakistan have miserably failed to resolve the problem of Kashmir. We must now depend on public opinion in both India and Pakistan to show the way to a just settlement. The Kashmir imbroglio is not as intractable as is generally believed.

The writer is a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan.