Monitoring 2002 election

THE monitoring of the October 2002 general election is going to be on a wider scale than ever. Five multinational foreign observer groups have planned intensive monitoring and a large contingent of domestic observers will also be in the field.

The foreign observers’ groups have been organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the United States, the European Union (which has been obliged to reduce the number of its observers in circumstances that can only be described as unfortunate), the Commonwealth, South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR), and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).

Some of the teams and observers are veterans of the game. NDI started observing Pakistan elections in 1988. The European Union and the Commonwealth have also monitored Pakistan elections in the past. SAHR, a new regional organization of human rights activists in South Asian countries, has taken over from the SAARC group of non-official observers, which monitored all elections in Pakistan since 1988 and has also organized similar mission in other South Asian countries. ANFREL, a coalition of South and South-eastern organizations and supported by Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), has come to Pakistan for the first time after monitoring elections in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and Cambodia.

The reason for increased interest in the forthcoming general election is obvious. The October poll is not viewed as a routine exercise in which free and fair balloting is usually the main issue. It is expected to mark the revival of democratic institutions and an end to the period of constitutional deviation, to use the euphemism favoured by the Supreme Court. The matter is of interest to many foreign powers, especially those that maintain that their friendship with, and aid for, a country depends on its respect for democratic norms.

While the US interest in democracy in Pakistan (or elsewhere) has apparently suffered one of its periodic eclipses (to the chagrin of democrats the world over), the European Union still seems committed to making democratic rule in Pakistan the cornerstone of its relations with it, and for the Commonwealth the issue is quite crucial: on restoration of democracy depends the end of Pakistan’s suspension (or its exclusion) from the Commonwealth membership.

Thus, the central issue in the monitoring of the coming general election is whether as a result of this exercise democratic rule, as understood by the world community and not in terms coined by power-driven innovators here and there, will be established in Pakistan. While many believe that an answer to this question is already available, a general view is that a final verdict should be withheld until the entire electoral process is over.

Many people in Pakistan are quite sceptical about election monitoring by foreign observers because there have been occasions when their certificates of fair elections have been found at variance with the experience of the Pakistani people. The situation is complicated when foreign observers, for one reason or another, do not wish to be on the wrong side of their own governments or of the government of Pakistan.

But the grant of a clean chit to Islamabad or making suggestions between the lines, though important, is not all that one gets out of foreign election observers. Observers from outside the region, from within the region and domestic observers share many concerns and they also have their somewhat different perspectives. It is perhaps necessary to understand each group’s role.

All categories of observers have learnt to view the electoral process in a broad context. They began by identifying the characters involved in the exercise, looked at the arrangements made by the Election Commission and concentrated on polling — whether it was orderly and appeared to be fair and according to the rules. Subsequently, a determination of the democratic content in elections entered their task and they started examining the legal framework, the circumstances in which elections were held and the grant of fair opportunities to the various interests. In this way, election monitoring acquired greater importance as a process for assessing Pakistan’s progress or otherwise along the path to democratization. Some observer missions have also started contributing to studies in voters’ behaviour and to their education.

As regards observers from outside the region, there is need to appreciate the fact that a considerable number of experts in a variety of fields have possibilities of looking at Pakistan, its administration, its public life, and its intellectual, social and cultural paradigms. This exposure does not necessarily result in negative conclusions. Pakistani people may have reason to lament some aspects of their life but they have equally good reason to take pride in many good things they do despite heavy odds. Thus, the foreign observers’ visits may enable them to correct the image of Pakistan and the Pakistani people they may have received from any source.

The observers from outside the region have another important role. They meet high state functionaries and political leaders whose comprehension of democratic norms and the rights of ordinary citizens often leaves much to be desired. Perhaps it is only during elections that these members of the national elite are sensitized to contemporary democratic values. Finally, these observers are useful sources for influencing the opinion of their respective establishments and one should not be afraid of assessments based on realism and integrity.

The mission of observers coming from within the region has a wider significance. Islamabad has a tendency to put on their praise or criticism a lower value than it attaches to the reports of delegates from big powers and the reasons are too obvious to be recorded. This saves the regional observers from labouring to find appropriate diplomatic camouflage for their findings. These observers can more easily understand Pakistan’s laws, practices and political habits. Nearly all of them come from countries where democratization of state institutions and society forms a prominent part of the national agenda. Comparative studies of election procedures and practices within Asia are useful to their own work related to promotion of democratic values. Their joint deliberations facilitate their understanding of the common areas of strength and weakness. There can be very productive cross-fertilization of ideas and strengthening of bonds at South Asian or Asian level.

The role of domestic election observers is more crucial and potentially more rewarding than that of any other group. Such observers start with a strong advantage — they are familiar with constituencies, the candidates and the electorate. They understand the local languages and can pick up during the election campaign and the polling process bits and pieces of evidence that are useful in determining the fairness or otherwise of the exercise and which foreigners may have difficulties in noticing.

Above all, the domestic monitors who take their task seriously and observe the whole electoral process, from enrolment of voters to the final announcement of results, become promoters of a political discourse which, unfortunately, takes place only around the election time. They, too, help the people in determining whether an election has been held freely and fairly, but a far more important part of their task in engaging the people, political parties and candidates in discussion on democratic proprieties and the secrets of governance and representative rule, and in promoting a democratic culture whose absence even autocrats continuously moan.

The question of credibility is certainly important. All observer groups, domestic as well as foreign, have been making increasingly more serious efforts to familiarize themselves with the requirements of their task. They also realize that the ultimate test of their credibility is the electorate’s concurrence with their findings, even if the authorities cannot break away from the habit of treating everybody outside their fold unreliable. Subjective factors sometimes do land election observers into errors of judgment and the only safeguard is mobilization of large groups of monitors. The role of monitors will decline as the electorate learns to guarantee the democratic essence of the electoral process and the powers that be have no option but to respect its wishes.

October polls: fair or rigged?

FAIR elections are a critical variable in institutionalizing democracy in a country. The countries that fail to hold fair elections also fail to establish a stable democratic system and often face repeated political breakdowns.

Fairness of the present elections can be determined in the light of universal conditions associated with fair elections and the specific conditions that produced two fair elections of 1970 and 1993 — out of nine general elections held so far in Pakistan. Objective analysis shows they are more or less the same. Fair elections result when they are held within the framework of an operational democratic constitution by a neutral caretaker government and when there are no undue or discriminatory restrictions on the participation of citizens and political parties.

Fair elections in Pakistan are exceptions rather than the rule. Except the 1993 and 1970 elections, the remaining seven national elections were unfair to varying degrees. The significant factors that made them unfair, singly or in combination, were the intervention of the military in politics and the partisan conduct of caretakers, whether presidents or prime ministers. Yahya’s intervention did not affect the fairness of the 1970 election for reasons discussed later.

The present elections are being conducted in conditions similar to those of 1962 and 1985 elections that made them unfair. They are the outcome of a coup and are being held when the Constitution is suspended and the higher judiciary has taken oath under the PCO of 2000 forsaking its oath under the 1973 Constitution — a repetition of what happened under the PCO of 1981 after Zia’s coup. Following the earlier three coup leaders, Gen. Musharraf has concentrated in his hands the power of the president, and most significantly, of the COAS — the office that helped them stage the coups and sustain them in power.

His chairmanship of the National Security Council and his role in US-sponsored international coalition have further fortified his power, making him the most powerful person in the country who can do and undo any law at will. Following in the footsteps of his two predecessors in political power, Ayub and Zia, Gen. Musharraf is acting as a partisan caretaker. Like three earlier coup leaders, he perceives the elections as another means of strengthening and retaining his power and not for transferring it to elected civilians unless they are his supporters.

Though he has not followed Ayub in banning the political parties, like Zia he has selectively targeted some of them, particularly the PPP and the Muslim League (N) and has virtually immobilized them by placing many restrictions on their activities that he lifted only 40 days before the elections.

The military-led government has attempted to split the defiant and popular parties into several factions and has thrown many politicians out of politics by using highly flawed laws of accountability. The National Accountability Bureau has convicted a much larger number of politicians belonging to parties opposing the government than of those that are supporting it.

If Gen Musharraf wanted to hold truly fair elections, the model of 1970 and 1993 elections whose fairness was accepted by all political parties, was available to him. These elections became fair then because the caretaker governments of President Yahya and Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi were neutral umpires and their cabinets did not include any person associated with a political party.

Both the caretakers did not choose a King’s Party to support. Both did not have a package of political reforms of their own. Yahya accepted the demand for restoration of the parliamentary system and adult franchise, which the Democratic Action Committee was pressing for. Moeen Qureshi restricted himself only to economic reforms avoiding political reforms. Both of them allowed considerable freedom to political parties, including easy access to public media.

Instead of choosing the model of two fair elections, Gen Musharraf is acting as a highly partisan caretaker. Since the announcement of election schedule he has taken several steps that have made his neutrality further suspect. By an order on June 23, the government barred non-graduates from contesting elections. This violated the right of the citizens to elect a candidate of their choice. The order also contravened Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of which Pakistan is a signatory and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil Rights.

On August 22, just 50 days before the elections, the government issued another order that barred a court absconder from contesting elections. The allegation that it was Benazir-specific proved right when her nomination papers were rejected under this order, depriving PPP of the vote-catching presence of its leader.

The absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from election campaign is benefiting the King’s party, the Muslim League (Q), and has minimised some potential threats to the military rulers now in control. These steps have also deprived the voters of choosing the leaders that they prefer.

On July 6 the government issued still another order that barred twice elected prime ministers and chief ministers from a third term — an unusual provision in a parliamentary system. Apparently, the order was passed to prevent both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from becoming PMs in case they got elected to the National Assembly against all odds.

Certain government agencies have successfully pressured some vulnerable candidates of PPP and Muslim League (N) to join the Muslim League (Q), the King’s party, or become independent candidates. The opposition parties allege that a number of senior civil servants are openly helping the PML(Q) and that the police in Punjab have been instructed to support it. There are also reports that the provincial governments have doled out 1.5 billion rupees to Nazimeen who support the government’s reforms, which will help the PML (Q) in the election.

Contravening established rule, Sindh and possibly Punjab governments have transferred government officials for the same purpose. There is evidence that the state-controlled PTV is discriminating against opposition parties in allocation of time for projection. Though Election Commission seems to be addressing these complaints, its effectiveness to redress them is yet to be seen.

While claiming that it welcomes teams of international election observers, the government seems to have adopted an unhelpful attitude towards these teams. It has termed the pre-poll study of the European Union an intervention in the internal affairs of the country and has asked the team to refrain from an intrusive role in the election and reduce the number of its observers — which it has done.

The government has also criticized the report of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the US for its concern that elections might lead to only limited transfer of power to civilians. A careful analysis of the LFO 2002 and the fractions atmosphere in which the elections are to be held confirms NDI judgment.

The factor of incumbency, reinforced by the revival of the Article 58(2) (b) unanimously repealed by all political parties in 1997, has given another lever to the government to influence the outcome of present as well as of future elections that would be held during his five-year tenure of President Musharraf. Incumbency factor has already helped it to sway the loyalty of candidates not fully committed to their parties to join the PML(Q).

Such candidates were vulnerable to manipulation, knowing that joining the Muslim League (Q) would enhance the prospects of their success in the coming elections.

By holding a rigged referendum and by acting as a partisan caretaker determined to keep the two major political parties out of power, President Musharraf has missed the opportunity of adding a third chapter of fair elections to Pakistan’s history. Such an opportunity may not come again in Pakistan in the near future, leaving the country in a whirlpool of repeated unfair and manipulated elections.

The writer is a social scientist based in Islamabad. He can be reached at: inayat@apollo.net.pk

Fight against terrorism

PAKISTAN’s forthright and unqualified adherence to the international coalition against terrorism came as an unpleasant surprise to some quarters. They had hoped that Pakistan would hesitate to commit itself to the campaign against terrorism thus giving them the opportunity to malign and isolate it.

However, being itself a victim of terrorism for more than two decades, Pakistan fully shared the international community’s concern over terrorism and, as a responsible member of the United Nations, voluntarily undertook to implement the UN Security Council’s resolutions adopted on September 12 and subsequently, in the wake of the heinous acts of terrorism in the United States on September 11 last year. These resolutions require the member states to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the September 11 carnage and to prevent and combat all forms of terrorism.

The United States held Osama bin Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda, responsible for the September 11 events. Both of them were, therefore, its first target. Its second target were the Taliban because they had given refuge to Osama in Afghanistan, allowed Al Qaeda to operate from there and refused to surrender Osama to the United States.

The first task assigned to the international coalition, which was formed to combat international terrorism, was to take punitive action against Osama and his outfit as well as the Taliban.

Since Pakistan had close relations with the Taliban regime, the decision to join in action against them was a wrenching one. But, as always, Pakistan did not permit any consideration to come in the way of principles.

President Pervez Musharraf displayed courage and sagacity in joining the coalition and assuring President George W. Bush of Pakistan’s unstinted support and cooperation in this fight. In fact, a contrary decision was inconceivable for Pakistan which has always adhered steadfastly to principles and implemented all the UN resolutions promptly.

Pakistan fully shares the concerns of the international community over the growing incidence of terrorism. It is against terrorist activities, irrespective of the motivation involved, and has been playing a pivotal role, since September 11, in combating it.

In August 2001, Pakistan suitably amended its 1997 Anti-Terrorist Act to provide a legal framework to deal with terrorism in all its aspects. It has banned extremist outfits in the country. It has also extended full co-operation to the international coalition against terrorism. This co-operation included information-sharing, use of Pakistan’s air space and provision of logistical facilities in Pakistan.

In order to cooperate with other countries in combating terrorism, Pakistan has concluded extradition treaties with twenty-seven countries and, pursuant to these treaties, is co-operating actively in tracking down and nabbing terrorists and other criminals. Pakistan has also acceded to the United Nations’s anti-terrorist conventions and is fulfilling its obligations under them.

Terrorism cannot, of course, be justified and ought to be condemned in all its forms and manifestations. However, at the same time, the legitimacy of the peoples’ right to struggle against colonialist and racist regimes, including armed struggle to liberate their territories under foreign occupation and for the attainment of their right to self-determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter, can neither be ignored nor treated with indifference.

Therefore, there is need to evolve a universally agreed definition of terrorism and make a distinction between terrorism and legitimate struggle for freedom and the right to self-determination the denial of which can breed terrorism. This definition should also take into account all forms of terrorism, including state-sponsored terrorism being perpetrated by some countries on innocent people.

On September 11 a large number of world leaders assembled in New York to remember those who became victims of the perfidious terrorist attacks on this very day last year and re-affirmed their commitment to fight against international terrorism. These leaders, however, ought to realize that unless they earnestly start a process for the eradication of the root causes which breed terrorism their fight against this menace would remain inconclusive. No system, which tolerates injustice or allows its continuation, can hope to be free of violence.

Unfortunately, despite the wholehearted support being given by the Muslim countries in the fight against terrorism, individually as well as collectively, under the umbrella of the United Nations, the OIC and the Arab League, a sinister campaign has been launched by some countries equating religion with terrorism.

These elements, however, tend to deliberately ignore the fact that, in many parts of the world, the Muslims are being denied their fundamental rights and have fallen victim to rage and violence at the hands of their non-Muslim tormentors for raising their voice for the restitution of their rights. Palestine and Kashmir are the two glaring examples of the deprivation of human rights to the Muslims.

President George W. Bush, being a pioneer of the coalition against terrorism, must take a serious note of the canard being spread by some myopic elements against the Muslims which, if not checked, may even threaten the very existence of the coalition and its mission.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.

To shred or not to shred

WHILE many of the major office equipment companies are having a terrible time, there is one business that’s booming.

The paper shredder industry is having its greatest year. Therefore I paid a visit to the Felony Paper Shredder Co., one of the largest in the world.

A vice president, Adam Google, showed me around.

“We’re working 24 hours a day. Every corporation in America needs them in their offices.”

“Is this because of the scandals hitting American business?”

“You could say that. Not only corporations, but lawyers and accountants are also buying them.”

Google took me down to the showroom. He pointed out the various models.

“One of the best sellers is the Arthur Andersen Mark VII. It can shred 100 lines a second. We’re working now to get an Andersen whistleblower to do our commercials. The beauty of the Mark VII is that it also has a laptop model so you can shred documents while you’re on an aeroplane.”

“How much is it?” I asked.

“The one with all the bells and whistles is $25,000, plus a five-year guarantee for parts and service, since all the investigated executives would rather buy a shredder than take the Fifth Amendment.”

I said, “What is that model over there?”

“That’s our Enron Personal Crusher. Everyone at Enron was issued one when they joined the company. Even though they are bankrupt, they are still buying Crushers because they have so much to shred and so little time.”

Next he showed me a model that could make enough confetti to drop on Martha Stewart’s headquarters.

He said proudly, “This is known as the Waksal Insider. It shreds papers of all those with inside information. It will also make it impossible for the prosecutors to prove Waksal did no more than run the a red traffic light.”

Then he walked over to a shiny aluminium model called The WorldCom Cutting Edge.

Google said, “It is one of the most expensive. It eats up everything on a person’s desk. It also is radio-controlled, so it can shred your files when you’re not in the office. Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO, swears he couldn’t do without it. ‘I have a Cutting Edge in my office, one at home, one in the car and one in my barn,’ he told me. ‘I feed the cuttings to the pigs and they love it’.”

I asked Google if his customers ever make mistakes and shred something important they really meant to keep.

“Well, the Adelphia people got so nervous they shredded everything in the office, including ‘Who’s Who.’ Once you put paper in the shredders, it’s goodbye, Charlie.”

“What about that one over there? It says NOT FOR SALE.”

“That’s a Tyco Dynamo. It’s been recalled by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.”

“Why?” I asked.

“A Tyco executive was shredding so fast he lost his finger.”—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

Hudood & Qisas laws: a critical view

DURING the regime of General Ziaul Haq various Hudood Ordinances were promulgated to seek the support of those who believed in sectarianism and also practised it. These ordinances were enforced without taking into consideration the basic conditions necessary for their promulgation.

Every sensible person in Pakistan will be forced to think whether Ordinance No. VI of 1979 relating to the offences of theft and dacoity can be enforced in Pakistan when (i) the level of poverty has crossed all limits (ii) employees are being rendered jobless on different pretexts (iii) the opportunities of employment are almost extinct and (iv) the sources of earning are diminishing with every passing day.

Similar is the position about Ordinance No. VII of 1979 relating to adultery. The available literature on sex, sleazy films shown on electronic media, non-availability of suitable match for marriage, etc., are such common causes which provide incentive for sexual offences. Under such circumstances people should think as to whether the promulgation of the ordinance relating to adultery is in accordance with the true spirit of Islam. Everyone would agree that in the presence of various temptations, the ordinance relating to adultery with the punishment of stoning to death does not appear to be in accordance with the spirit of Islam.

Although in a civilized society every one is equal before law. In Islam this principle is strictly followed, particularly in Hudood cases. Had it not been so, the holy Prophet (PBUH), would not have said that if theft had been committed even by his daughter, he would have cut her hand. Similarly Article 25 of the Constitution refers to the said equality as a fundamental right of every citizen of Pakistan.

With due respect to the persons who drafted the Hudood laws, we must accept that these laws are not free from serious defects. These defects have not been removed till date. Same is the position of the judges who deal with these laws. They appear to be blind followers of the path chosen by their British masters’ judicial system with reference to the art of interpretation of any law instead of being the follower of the spirit of Islamic path.

This is the reason why the appeals of the people convicted by subordinate courts are generally dismissed by the Federal Shariat Court or by the Appellate Courts. This is so because none of theses courts ever take into account the necessary circumstances of the cases when any offence relating to Hadd is committed. It is because of this that Islam is being defamed by anti-Islamic forces.

Regarding the number of Hudood offences it is interesting to note the difference of opinion among the jurists. According to some of them the number of such offences is seventeen. Majority of the jurists include seven crimes to be treated as Hudood offences i.e. (i) theft (ii) dacoity (iii) adultery (iv) drinking wine (v) Qazf (vi) apostasy, and (vii) mutiny. Imran Ibn-i-Hajar Usqlan, in his book “Fateh-ul-Bari, (which is the commentary on Bukhari) has mentioned eleven crimes including the above-mentioned seven. The Hanafis treat the first five crimes mentioned above as Hudood offences.

Another most important aspect relating to ‘Hadd’ is that in several cases, an offence may be included in the category of Hudood on account of its similarity with the main crime but the punishment of ‘Hadd’ is not imposed in those cases. For example, the Ordinance VIII of 1979, which deals with the offence of Qazf has been defined U/S 3 of the said Ordinance: Qazf. Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs, or by visible representations makes or publishes an imputation of zina concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation, or hurt the feelings of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to commit Qazf.

The punishment for this offence, as mentioned is Section 7 of the said Ordinance VIII of 1979 is whipping numbering eighty lashes.

After the Hudood Ordinances, a Chapter XVI (relating to offences affecting the human body) was also introduced. This chapter relates to ‘Qisas’ offences and their punishments. Certain jurists have treated the punishment in ‘Qisas’ cases as Hadd on account of being fixed punishment because one of the definition of ‘Hadd’ is mentioned as “fixed.” Although the basic principles relating to ‘Hudood’ are also the same as in ‘Qisas’ cases with reference to the fixed punishments, yet there is a difference between ‘Hadd’ and ‘Qisas’ with reference to the seriousness of the offences in respect of the rights of Allah and the right of persons respectively.

The offence of ‘Hadd’ is an offence against society and the punishment of Hadd is the right of Allah which could not be forgiven even by the holy Prophet while the offence of ‘Qisas’ is an offence against individuals who may forgive an accused on certain terms agreed upon by he concerned parties. The law-makers of Chapter XVI of PPC committed the same mistakes as were committed in the cases of Hudood Ordinances.

For example the word “Qisas” was defined in Section 299 9(k) of PPC as punishment by causing similar hurt instead of defining the said word in such manners which could attract the concept of both — the ‘Qisas’ offences as well as their punishments. Similarly the punishment of death as ‘Tazir’ U/S 302 (b) PPC is totally un-Islamic because according to the teachings of Islam the punishment in case of ‘Tazir’ must be less than the punishment of ‘Hadd’ and ‘Qisas.’ If the punishment of ‘Qisas’ has to be equal to ‘Tazir’ then in murder cases there will be no difference between ‘Qisas’ and ‘Tazir.’

It may not be out of place to mention that an approver is always treated as a witness to be unworthy of credit and therefore his evidence is not admissible in Hudood and Qisas cases. The reason is obvious. In Hudood and Qisas crimes, the nature of crimes is judged on the basis of principles laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and as were followed by the Prophet’s companions. The punishments in Hudood and Qisas cases are the rights of Allah and the rights of the aggrieved parties.

It appears mandatory, therefore, for the courts dealing with murder cases to decide, first of all, as to whether a murder case falls within the ambit of Hudood, Qisas or Tazir. It is only then that a correct decision can be made by a trial court as well as by the appellate courts. If all these principles are taken into consideration by the trial courts or by the appellate courts, death sentences in Qisas cases would become rare in Pakistan. But contrary to this aspect, death sentences are commonly awarded by the trial courts as well as by the appellate courts in all such cases. This is, undoubtedly the result of lack of knowledge about the principles applicable in the Hudood and the Qisas cases.

The writer is a former judge of Sindh High Court and Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan.

Poverty on the rise in the US

THE economic downturn is hurting many Americans but, as usual, the poor most of all. During the past year, for the first time in eight years, the number of Americans living below the poverty line increased, the Census Bureau reported last week.

Median household income declined in most regions of the country. Children and working-age adults continue to lose private health insurance. From 2001 through the first quarter of this year, according to preliminary data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the proportion of children covered by private insurance dropped from 67.1 percent to 63.8 percent.

Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Programme (SCHIP), which covers uninsured low-income children, took up some of the slack: An analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that 2 million children moved into those programmes between 2001 and March of this year. But those programmes are facing trouble themselves.

Cash-strapped states, required to balance their budgets and facing continued slumps in revenue, are looking to cut Medicaid costs. The SCHIP programme has suffered a billion-dollar drop in federal funding as the result of agreements contained in the 1997 balanced-budget act. Some funds remaining from earlier years, which could help cushion against shortfalls, are scheduled to revert to the Treasury on Tuesday. In both of these areas, Congress can help, and should before the session ends.

The Senate already has voted, with a strong bipartisan majority, to provide a $9 billion package of federal aid to states. It would temporarily increase federal Medicaid matching funds, helping states to meet Medicaid costs and providing an incentive to forgo the cuts that a number are considering.

This is aid much needed by states which, unlike Congress, can’t turn to deficit spending to get through economic hard times. The measure, which was attached to a bill promoting generic drug use, is languishing in the House. Senate backers are seeking another way to move forward, but a package under discussion last week included only a portion of the needed funds.

There is broad support for acting to keep unspent SCHIP funds from reverting to the Treasury, but lawmakers have to vote to make it happen. —The Washington Post