NEW YORK, Feb 28: The newly declassified documents on the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, which signalled a major shift in US policy towards that country, contradict the version given by Kissinger in his memoirs.

In a report the New York Times said that the documents also indicate that the Nixon administration was determined to withdraw from Vietnam, even unilaterally, and even if it led to the overthrow of the government of South Vietnam.

The documents, released on Wednesday by the National Security Archive, an independent research group, include the transcript of the meeting on July 9, 1971, in which Kissinger, then the national security adviser, pledged that the United States would not support independence for Taiwan, the Times said.

The two documents were among 41 recently declassified documents released by the private, non-profit organization relating to communications between the US and China that led to President Richard Nixon’s visit to China 30 years ago this month.

In the first volume of Kissinger’s memoirs, “The White House Years,” published in 1979, he gave the impression that the purpose of the crucial meeting was not to allay tension between the two countries on subjects like Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province. Rather, he wrote, it was “to discuss fundamentals.”

Kissinger wrote: “Precisely because there was little practical business to be done, the element of confidence had to emerge from conceptual discussions. Taiwan,” he said, “was only mentioned briefly”, during the crucial meeting.

The encounter was the first at a high level between the US and China in almost 20 years and established a relationship of trust that paved the way for President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972.

“The document proves that what Kissinger writes in his memoirs about Taiwan being barely discussed is breathtakingly not true,” James Mann, senior writer in residence at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the Times.

“In the history of US-China relations, it always flew in the face of logic that Taiwan was not discussed.”

The NYT said Kissinger, reached by phone in London, acknowledged that his memoirs could have been interpreted as misleading. “The way I expressed it was very unfortunate and I regret it,” he said. “But we were still recognizing the Taiwan government. We had to get some statements of principle within which we could get into other issues. That was the intention.”

The first third of the meeting was consumed by Taiwan, the documents show. Prime Minister Zhou clearly stated that in order for relations to be established between the US and China, the US must recognize that China “is the sole legitimate government in China” and that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of Chinese territory.”

Kissinger pledged that the US would withdraw two-thirds of its troops from Taiwan. “As for the political future of Taiwan,”Kissinger said, “we are not advocating a ‘two Chinas’ solution or a ‘one China, one Taiwan’ solution.”

Rather, he said that “the political evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai indicated.”

Another document released on Wednesday is the transcript of a conversation on April 27, 1971, between Kissinger and Nixon,

Kissinger made clear that neither George Bush, then the chief American envoy at the United Nations, nor Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York would be an ideal choice to travel secretly to China to meet Prime Minister Zhou, the Times said.

When Nixon raised the possibility of sending Rockefeller, Kissinger said of his former patron, “He wouldn’t be disciplined enough, although he is a possibility.”

Nixon agreed, describing Rockefeller as erratic.

To that, Secretary Kissinger replied, “I think for one operation I could keep him under control. To them a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.” When Nixon suggested Bush, the secretary said, “Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough.” At another point, he said that Bush “would be too weak.” Nixon replied, “I thought so too, but I was trying to think of somebody with a title.”

Ultimately, Nixon chose Kissinger for the task.

The exchange is revelatory on a number of levels. Nixon seemed to be going out of his way to propose almost anyone except Kissinger as his secret messenger with the Chinese, even though it seemed obvious at the time that as Nixon’s most trusted and subtle foreign policy adviser, Kissinger was the logical choice, the paper said.