THAT the President of Pakistan had to travel to Kathmandu via China to attend the Eleventh SAARC Summit, owing to the restrictions imposed on Pakistani overflights across India’s air space, illustrates the problems this regional organization faces owing to India’s approach.

It may be recalled that the summit, which was to have been held in November 1999, had already been delayed by more than two years owing to India’s policy of isolating Pakistan since the Kargil crisis in Kashmir. Having caused deep resentment among the other members by paralyzing the organization for such a long period, India could not afford to delay the summit any further. Instead, it chose to use it to highlight the issue of terrorism.

The summit, held between January 4 and 7, 2002, became the focus of international attention, as it took place in an atmosphere of crisis, with the bulk of India’s armed forces concentrated on Pakistan’s borders in a threatening posture. The terrorist attack on India’s parliament on December 13, 2001 had been blamed on Pakistani organizations, and India was demanding the handing over of 20 named terrorists under the ominous threat of war.

President Musharraf had condemned the attack, and had also moved against the jihadi groups, something he had been doing even before the outrage of September 11 as a part of his policy of reining in religious extremists. However, the BJP led government in New Delhi was obviously keen to capitalize on the post-September 11 scenario by the use or threat of force to achieve its goal of crushing the indigenous freedom movement in Kashmir.

SAARC has been held hostage to India’s aims and policies right from the beginning. At India’s insistence, two conditionalities were incorporated into its charter. One was that all its decisions would be taken by consensus, thereby giving all members a veto. The other was that contentious political issues would be excluded from its competence. This condition was insisted upon as India has had disputes and problems with nearly all its neighbours, and did not want them to be raised or discussed in SAARC meetings.

The continuation of such disputes has prevented the organization from achieving its potential, since economic cooperation and integration is best achieved if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between all members. Successful regional groupings, such as the European Union and ASEAN use the mechanism of consultation and coordination provided by the regional organization for discussions that promote conciliation and strengthen peace.

The history of SAARC is really a history of India’s attitude towards it, since India is three time the size of the other members put together, and has never left them in any doubt about its ambition to exercise hegemony. The fifth Summit, for instance, could not be held in Colombo, as Sri Lanka refused to host it till India withdrew its forces, deployed to fight the Tamil insurgency, which had overstayed their welcome. Therefore the summit was held a year later in Male. After Sri Lanka agreed to host the next summit in Colombo, India tried to prevent it, by persuading Bhutan to plead domestic reasons.

However, the other members stood by Sri Lanka so that the summit was duly held. It was abbreviated to one day at India’s insistence. The summits thereafter were affected by the tension between India and Pakistan over the indigenous movement in Kashmir, which India blamed on Pakistan’s support and encouragement.

Despite India’s opposition to formal discussion of political differences at SAARC summits; the forum provided valuable opportunities for informal contacts. For instance, the Male Summit of 1997 enabled the prime ministers of India and Pakistan to meet and agree to the resumption of political dialogue between the two countries. Indeed, the members of SAARC, other than India, were becoming convinced that the exclusion of political issues was harming the prospects for a greater role by the organization in the region. At the tenth summit, the then Pakistan prime minister had circulated a proposal to expand the terms of reference of the organization along the lines of ASEAN.

The Eleventh Summit was scheduled to be held in Kathmandu in November 1999. India, which had been following a policy of isolating Pakistan, in the wake of the Kargil conflict in Kashmir during the summer, sought its postponement after there was a change of government in Pakistan in October. The reason given was that it did not wish to rub shoulders with General Pervez Musharraf as he had taken over power from an elected government. This amounted to interfering into the internal affairs of Pakistan. Two year later, after having held a summit with General Musharraf at Agra, India’s opposition on this score ended.

There was a total transformation of the international and regional situation on account of two developments after the Agra Summit. One was the terrorist attack on the US on September 11 that led the US to declare war on terrorism, with Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, the first target in their sanctuary in Afghanistan. India saw this change as entirely to its advantage, as it had achieved a certain success in relating the movement in Kashmir to terrorism.

When Pakistan joined the Coalition against Terrorism, and became a frontline state in the operations against Afghanistan, India felt frustrated, notably as President Musharraf appeared to have secured understanding of the difference between terrorist movements elsewhere and the freedom struggle in Kashmir. However, India kept insisting that Pakistan had to prove its anti-terrorist credentials by ceasing support to “cross-border terrorism” in Kashmir.

The October 1 terrorist attack on the State Assembly in Srinagar, and the December 13 incident in the Indian parliament were invoked by the BJP hawks to build up war hysteria against Pakistan, notably after the second incident which was presented as a plan to eliminate India’s entire political leadership. President Musharraf condemned both the incidents, and signified readiness to move against any Pakistani citizens involved on the basis of a joint inquiry. However, India moved the bulk of its armed forces to the border with Pakistan, and its government made a series of demands for action against terrorist groups, and for the extradition of named terrorists. Poisonous propaganda, including questions regarding the very emergence of Pakistan, was unleashed as if to justify a war that could turn nuclear.

Pakistan has acted with great restraint, and taken action against militant groups, in line with a policy that had been initiated well ahead of the September 11 incident. Pakistan had also offered to enter into a dialogue with India, and called for de-escalation. The international community had welcomed Pakistan’s stance, and hope had been expressed that the SAARC Summit would afford an opportunity to the leaders of the two countries discuss the matter on the sidelines of the formal sessions. However, the Indian leadership did not encourage these expectations.

After reaching Kathmandu a day late for the summit by a Chinese plane, President Musharraf displayed his personal commitment to defusing the crisis precipitated by India’s belligerent stance in his own way. With the Indian prime minister and members of his delegation avoiding contact with the Pakistan delegation, he took the initiative. After making his policy statement, he walked to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s seat and offered his hand across the table, which the Indian prime minister had the grace to grasp in a handshake. This gesture drew spontaneous applause from the assembly, with the Nepalese hosts particularly pleased that the ice had been broken.

Over the next two days, the Pakistan president took every opportunity to interact informally with Mr. Vajpayee, including a ten-minute meeting arranged by the Sri Lankan president, Mrs. Kumaratunga. The foreign ministers also interacted informally, and even pieces of paper were seen being exchanged after consultations between Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. These contacts got much greater coverage than the formal proceedings of the summit, since the large press corps in the Nepalese capital was specially anxious to follow the moves of the leaders of the two nuclear armed neighbours confronting each other.

The Indian leadership sought to play down the significance of these contacts by describing them as an exchange of courtesies with no political relevance. President Musharraf presented a more positive picture, stating that there had been “informal interaction”, which he hoped would be followed by formal talks. The gesture by the Pakistani president had the effect of conferring greater meaning on the summit, and of underlining the usefulness of personal contact. The effort by India to play down the significance of these contacts highlighted its determination to maintain the political pressure on Pakistan resulting from the massing of its forces in an aggressive posture.

The international community naturally welcomed the Pakistani move to lessen tensions, and looked to further progress towards a peaceful resolution of problems. The Nepalese hosts were relieved that the summit they hosted had produced this positive interaction.

The formal business of the summit concluded with the signing of the Kathmandu Declaration. This document is notable for the heightened emphasis on fighting terrorism in the region, though it also looks to increased economic integration among the member states.

The fact that the progress achieved, howsoever marginally, in lowering tensions between the two largest members, attracted the most attention shows that SAARC has a role to play in the political sphere as well. Genuine integration and mutually beneficial cooperation is possible only in an environment of peace and stability. One should hope for progress towards this by the time of the next summit in Islamabad.

IT has happened before. Pakistan has retrieved the failed parleys at the eleventh hour. The last round of conference or the words said at the goodbye meeting have raised hopes. They have been followed up by efforts to pick up the broken pieces so as to rebuild the structure of relationship. The exercise has been of use in the past.

At Tashkent in 1966, the prospect of an agreement was dashed because Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan could not concur on the wording of the text. But suddenly everything changed drastically. Ayub wrote in his own hand, “not to resort to arms,” while seeking a solution to the problems between Pakistan and India. There was such a gush of sentiments after Shastri’s death that Ayub, pointing towards his body, said: Here lies the man who could have spanned the distance between the two countries.

The conference between Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Simla in 1972 was also a failure till nearly the end. The farewell call by Bhutto on Indira Gandhi saved the situation. He reportedly told her that his failure would bring back the army to power. She relented. He had to get back the official seal which he had sent along with his luggage to Kalka.

President Pervez Musharraf too tried the same thing at Agra and Kathmandu when he stretched the duration of his goodbye call on Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. But the reason why Musharraf did not succeed was the failure on his part to agree to the formulation on cross-border terrorism. Both Ayub and Bhutto had at least given the assurance that they would eschew violence. Musharraf did not. The laborious joint declaration remained unsigned at Agra and so did the hurriedly scribbled words at Kathmandu.

Musharraf may have a point: he did not want to indulge in the “cricket diplomacy” which General Zia-ul Haq followed or the “bus ride” which Nawaz Sharif proposed. But whatever their methods, the sky remained clear from the clouds of war. They were able to stave off conflict between Pakistan and India for nearly three decades. In comparison, Musharraf indulged in the adventure at Kargil within a few months of his becoming Pakistan’s chief of army staff. And now when his takeover of Pakistan is just two years old, he has the forces of both countries out on the front, standing eyeball to eyeball.

His tactics may have yielded some results in Pakistan. But he has managed to alienate even those Indians who have had no strong view on Kashmir. The rulers at Islamabad probably underestimate the anger in India. The attack on parliament was the last straw. The nation seems to be oblivious even to the devastation that a nuclear war can cause. Though a preponderant majority in India wants peace yet it does not protest against the war-like steps or statements. It does show a contradiction in attitude but what it really reflects is a sense of exasperation. Therefore, the mood is not to have any truck with the Musharraf government if it does not come clean on terrorism.

It is understandable that Musharraf wants substantial talks with India and there is no reason why they should not be held. But a shotgun dialogue is like a shotgun marriage which does not last long. He will have to prepare the ground for talks. New Delhi will agree to them only when cross border terrorism stops. Musharraf has to change his outlook on Kashmir as he did on the Taliban. This is difficult because Pakistan was not so worked up about Afghanistan as it is about Kashmir. But New Delhi’s undertaking on a “serious dialogue” on Kashmir may help Musharraf make up the leeway. He should be able to deal with the terrorists more sternly.

For instance, he will have to stop justifying the terrorists on the ground that they are jihadis. Such a plea has, in fact, given a bad name to the once indigenously motivated movement. After being a signatory to the declaration adopted by the SAARC at Kathmandu, Pakistan’s position has become still more untenable. The declaration rejects any justification of terrorism on “ideological, political, religious or any other ground.” President Bush’s statement that General Musharraf must do more than what he has already done makes it very clear that America and its allies are not fully satisfied with Pakistan’s steps against terrorism.

Musharraf should have realised by now that the September 11 carnage in New York and Washington has changed international opinion on terrorism. What is not good for the gander cannot be good for the goose. Violence has ceased to be a solution to any problem because violence has become much too terrible and destructive. It does not differentiate between one type of people and another. Those who indulge in violence have no compunction in using the gun for their own sectarian ends. In India and Pakistan there are so many fissiparous tendencies that we cannot take risks.

True, Musharraf has taken some small steps to curb terrorism. But what is needed now is a giant leap. Imposing restrictions on Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammad, confiscating their assets and arresting some of their workers are certainly measures to curb terrorism. But they hardly mean anything when papers like the Sunday Telegraph from London have reported that both organizations have only changed their leadership, moved their offices and stashed away their funds. Lashkar leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Jaish chief Masood Azhar are said to be living in comfortable government quarters.

Azhar is one of the people wanted by India. He was bartered for the Indian Airlines passengers hijacked to Kandahar. Islamabad’s plea that India must satisfy the Pakistan courts before the 20 people demanded by New Delhi could be handed over to it does not hold water. India did not bother about the court and legal procedures when its foreign minister took Azhar from the Jammu jail to Kandahar in a special plane. Pakistan should not raise such issues because it has already handed over to the US Mir Aimal Kansi and Ramzi Yousuf, the two suspects, without following any legal procedures.

From British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s trip to the subcontinent and his constant contact with President Bush, it is more than clear that both Islamabad and New Delhi are under pressure. China too is playing a role behind the scenes. Musharraf’s dash to Beijing on the eve of the SAARC summit, even at the expense of delaying it by one day, is significant.

The ball is now really in Musharraf’s court. He has to do more to curb terrorists operating from Pakistan. Maybe, five out of the list of 20 can be surrendered immediately so that the process can at least start. The scene in India is messy. The elections in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab have made it messier. The BJP-led government at the Centre has made it worse by heightening the hype. The situation has created widespread anti-Musharraf and anti-Pakistan feelings.

Musharraf’s goodbye call on Vajpayee would have made the difference if he had told the latter that he would stop supporting the terrorists operating in Kashmir as he did in the case of Afghanistan. But would he survive after doing that? Not only the religious groups, the military itself has a vested interest in Kashmir which, it believes, cannot be solved until there is pressure on India through the terrorists. It is a wrong reading. Such methods have not taken Pakistan anywhere. Why not try conciliation and cooperation for a change? It would do Pakistan no harm.

PRESIDENT George Bush’s crusade against terrorism is going splendidly — except for a few minor hiccups, such as that target Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida remain elusive, the Russians have reoccupied half of Afghanistan, thousands of Afghan civilians have been killed by US bombs, and India is now threatening a war against Pakistan.

The chain of events that led to the current crisis are now plainly visible. The US ‘war against terrorism’ and invasion of Afghanistan upset the delicate balance of enmity between the old foes — India and Pakistan. The Bush administration, seeking new allies for its crusade against Muslim opponents, rashly signed a military alliance with India to fight ‘terrorism.’ To India, ‘terrorism’ meant Kashmiri independence-seekers battling Indian rule in occupied Kashmir, and their patron, Pakistan. India had also recently signed a secret, anti-Islamic alliance with Israel, which has become a major supplier of arms and nuclear weapons technology to India.

The Bush administration, unaware or heedless of the dangers facing it, had inadvertently stumbled into the 55-year old Kashmir dispute. Still unidentified militants staged a series of outrageous attacks on Indian targets, including the parliament in New Delhi, designed to bring simmering tensions between the two old foes to a boil, and upset India’s new alliances with the US and with Israel. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda may have been involved. The attackers remain unidentified, though India claims they came from two Kashmiri militant groups harboured by Pakistan.

India threatened to attack Islamic militants based in Pakistani territory, as it has repeatedly done in the past. If the US could attack Afghanistan because the elusive Osama bin Laden was presumed hiding there, then India, according to President George Bush’s own self-proclaimed rules of international retribution, had just as much right to attack Pakistan. The Indians, of course, were absolutely correct according to Bush’s logic. But the US is now urging ‘restraint’ to India, a virtue it failed to show in Afghanistan.

Off on the sidelines, China, another player in this drama, is also urging restraint to all concerned. Yet, at the same time, China is growing increasingly alarmed by what now looks like a permanent presence of the US forces in Afghanistan, and the threat of an Indian attack against its most important ally, Pakistan.

China’s unease is being heightened by the accelerating strategic arms race with India, which in 1998 proclaimed China its ‘number one enemy.’ India recently introduced its new Agni-II nuclear-armed missile that can hit most of China’s major cities.

The US has aggravated Indian-Chinese tensions by sharply tilting towards India and winking at its secret nuclear programmes, while keeping Pakistan under a punishing sanctions regime. Washington clearly intends to use India in the game of Asian strategic chess as a potential counterforce against China. Russia is levering its revived strategic alliance with India to advance its geopolitical interests in South and Central Asia, and, most notably, in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, President Pervez Musharraf, finds himself squeezed between Indian threats and US pressure. He has been trying to appease New Delhi without appearing to do so. Last week, in an embarrassing new low for Pakistan’s battered image, Musharraf, who stoutly denied in the past that his nation gave anything more than ‘moral support’ to Kashmiri insurgents, announced his intelligence service would cut off arms and finance to ‘non-indigenous’ mujahideen in Kashmir — meaning non-Kashmiri volunteers. The Indians, who have long accused Pakistan of ‘cross-border terrorism’ and sending ‘mercenaries’ into their part of Kashmir, crowed with triumph.

As India continued to mass troops on Pakistan’s border, the US repeated threats, made in September, to ruin Pakistan by cutting off the foreign loans on which it subsists. Adding to these threats, the Indian Navy is poised to blockade Karachi, Pakistan’s main port and principal entry point for oil. The spare parts for Pakistan’s F-16 warplanes are critically short. Pakistan finds itself alone, facing the Russians to the north in Afghanistan, fire-breathing India to the east, and a hostile Iran to the west.

AT the beginning of every year I test my karma. Everything that happens to me the first week of the year is either good karma or badkarma. (Karma is bringing upon oneself inevitable results, either inthis life or in a reincarnation.) I had good karma last week in December.

I attended aRenaissance get-together in Charleston, S.C., where the great minds of America (read lawyers and doctors and anybody else who wanted to getaway for New Year’s) held panel discussions on such weighty subjectsas “Why They Hate Us,” “Power — The Ultimate Aphrodisiac,” and”Management — If It Ain’t Broke, Fix It.” Jan. 1 came around and my karma was fine. I slept late and went tothe old city market, where I bought a half dozen watches made inChina, which were featured at a Mao Tse-tung Birthday Sale (take 50per cent of the price tag). It was Jan. 2 when my destiny took a turn for the worse.

My planefrom Charleston was one of the few flying that day in the South andleft only two hours late. I was seated next to a 250-pound man who hada bad cold.

This wouldn’t have bothered me except that I had aconnection in Charlotte, and I missed it by three minutes. It was thenthat I had the feeling I was having a bad hair day. The next plane I could get to Reagan Airport in Washington leftthree hours later but was sold out, so I had to fly into Dulles. When I got to Dulles I discovered they lost my luggage with all myclothes and Chinese watches.

The lady in charge of lost luggagesuggested I go to Reagan Airport on the chance it might be there.

Mytaxi charged me $50, but my baggage wasn’t there either. Theluggage-meister suggested I wait for the next plane from Charlotte,which was to arrive at 10 o’clock at night. Still no luggage. There was no doubt by now that my karma was working against me.They said as soon as they could find my bag they would deliver it tomy house, but it might take a while if, for no reason, it had beenshipped to Australia.

At midnight I was home and not looking forward to the new year. Four days later, at 1:30 in the morning, the doorbell rang and theairline’s lost luggage man delivered my bag. I cried. It was like seeing a dog I thought I had lost forever.

Now the reason I still have bad karma is I have tried to tellpeople my story since then but no one wants to hear it. Everyone has abad airline story of their own and thinks their karma is far worsethan mine. They say things like, “You think you have rotten karma —I was stuck in a plane for nine hours on the ground in Atlanta.” Maybe in my next reincarnation somebody will listen to my story.—Dawn/Tribune Media Services Inc.

WHILE the connection between economics and politics is now appreciated adequately by all, recent world events since September 11, 2001 should begin to amply demonstrate the connection between a country’s economic policy and its foreign policy.

The case in point includes “trade for peace” with the European Union providing greater market access to Pakistan’s exporters and still more the $12.5 billion debt re-profiling by the Paris Club. None of these would have come through had Pakistan’s importance in maintaining global stability not gained worldwide visibility. And, Pakistan’s contribution to global peace received recognition as it adjusted its Afghan policy according to the national and global requirements in the fall of 2001.

At that time, Pakistan’s foreign policy also started acquiring the flexibility it had been needing for a long time to better allocate its resources to the various heads of budgetary expenditure. While improvement in budgetary expenditure pattern is long overdue, it has been defence and debt-servicing that have remained the major claimants rigidly regardless of other pressing priorities. The upshot has been a neglect of development and social sectors. This is notwithstanding a favourable but incremental movement in the desired direction of defence expenditure reduction as a percentage of the GNP.

This ratio of defence-to-GNP has, nonetheless, been twice as high as that of India’s recently. Pakistan’s high defence expenditure would, therefore, have a greater impact on the country’s expenditure pattern than would be the case with India.

While the above linkage between guns and butter had almost become hackneyed to tout in Pakistan, it would be generally ignored by defence strategists on the grounds that it was the country’s military security that was of first and foremost importance.

The concept of economic security that has been doing its rounds for the last few years cut no ice with them either. For, the foreign policy paradigm was pretty much frozen in the Afghan and Kashmir policies that Pakistan had been pursuing relentlessly since the end of the cold war. Defence expenditure is, inter alia, driven by the foreign policy direction.

Economic ramifications of frozen foreign policies ought to have been clear enough to the visionary leadership at various levels in the country much before the September 11 episode. These were probably clear to some. The challenge, however, lies in unfreezing the paradigm and identifying opportune trigger points for change that may serve as invaluable catalysts in the process of change. This is where a level of vision is required that is higher than the level available ordinarily. Possessed by this higher sense of purpose and vision, nations can be led through a long-awaited transformational change that can change the course of their destiny. Such is the stuff that the Ataturks of the world are made of!

With the kind of opportunities that the world events have been presenting Pakistan with since September 11, it is time to make possible out of what has been believed to be impossible thus far. The “sacred cows” can now be hauled to the altar. The only prerequisite is an ability to see and seize the opportunity offered by the external environment. Our foreign policy cramp can then be unfrozen. This is where the test of leadership currently lies. The economics of the country might then begin to look up eventually.

The September 11, 2001 tragedy and the ensuing US pressure left us with little choice but to rethink the Afghan policy and Pakistan’s support for the Taliban government. As Pakistan followed the rational route of joining the world’s anti-terrorist coalition, its support for the Taliban stood withdrawn. Thereby, Pakistan was disengaged from Afghanistan as the anti-Taliban Afghan forces gained control of Afghanistan under the umbrella of the anti-terrorist coalition. It would be for the international relations’ experts to determine whether Pakistan’s Kashmir policy remained tenable in the aftermath of the transformational developments in Afghanistan. Or, whether it could have intensified as the jihadi forces fled Afghanistan.

Irrespective of the impact of the above post-September 11 developments, the December 13 attack on the Indian parliament posed a fresh challenge for Pakistan almost in the image of the attack on the World Trade Centre and the suicidal attacks on Israelis. And, just like the US counter-attack on Afghanistan and the Israeli onslaught on Palestine, India agitated to run all over Pakistan in a world climate where strong anti-terrorist winds have been blowing hotter since the fall of 2001.

While Pakistan’s military and diplomatic terrain is quite different from that of Afghanistan or Palestine, the writing on the walls of the world is, however, very clear. The world has reached a level of near-zero tolerance for terrorism or its symptoms as the latter grew out of proportion compared to the causes of terrorism.

As the US Republican government contemplated to address the source of terrorism in Israel and Palestine, there was a fresh round of suicidal attacks on Israel. The US president noted with concern that attempts at addressing the sources of terrorism are torpedoed by extremists present on all sides. It, therefore, appears that before the world chooses to roll out the peace process in its volatile parts, it will attempt to rein in the hardliners whose extreme approach tends to undermine all attempts at peace. So, there will probably be no significant moves made for peace anywhere until such time that all threats to peace are pre-empted by insulating the doves by either neutralizing the hawks or freezing them.

It is against the above prevalent world mood that Pakistan ought to be rethinking its approach towards Kashmir when it revisits its policy there. The dominant world mood is allowing no room for the hawks. Same goes for Kashmir as is evident from the advice of the US president and foreign secretary to Pakistan president after December 13 last. So, even though Pakistan might be reacting to an aggressive action from India, the source is viewed to be on our side of the border. Whether we like it or not, we are being told to rein the source in.

In this threat is a challenging window of opportunity that may have opened for our country. For, it, could be viewed as a major trigger point for a change in a paradigm in which we find the Kashmir policy frozen since end-1980s. While this paradigm showed little progress towards the desired result of liberation of Kashmir, it generated negative externalities for the socio-economic scenario of Pakistan as a whole.

As the law and order situation in Pakistan worsened, the interior ministry attributed part of it to the activities sponsored by RAW and the other part to the proliferating militant outfits sponsored for an armed struggle in Kashmir. The interior ministry remained ill at ease in dealing with the ever growing jihadi organizations. Despite their discomfort, however, they were able to impose a ban on two such organizations before September 11.

This policy shift is being hitched currently to intensified activity in this direction necessitated in the aftermath of the December 13 events. So, as the indigenous character of the uprising in Kashmir is ferried out by weeding out the non-Kashmiris, the Kashmir cause might just become more marketable in the world than it has been thus far owing to the involvement of other nationalities that could not be concealed. For all one might know, in the aftermath of the December 13 events; the Kashmir cause might be promoted better and more effectively as it would be viewed less sceptically than when it appeared to be sponsored externally. And, as the sources of tension are scaled down, the cause might appear more vividly on the surface. Space would thus have been created for the identification and resolution of the specific issue that was hitherto being displaced by militant activity against which loud alarm bells have been resonating for some time.

So, as the Kashmir cause might stand to gain by de-escalating the militant activity, there might be or ought to be gains on Pakistan’s economic front as well. De-escalation of militant activity should improve the law and order situation that has so far discouraged business and investment activity in the country. A definite shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy as above that would address the volatility in our relationship with India should create a climate more conducive for not only the existing businesses but also for fresh investment activity.

Are we then saying that Pakistan gives up its principled stand on Kashmir? De-escalation of militant activity does not amount to the same. In fact, the Kashmir cause might be helped as shown above. If a certain strategy does not show results for some time, it ought to undergo a change regardless of external pressures. Thus far, internal pressures had built up to the extent that these themselves posed to be a major hindrance to change. The December 13 events should thus be viewed as external trigger points for a policy change that the Pakistan government might have been desirous of itself even prior to the development of external pressure. So, the opportunity could be seized for the better!

This would mean a shifting of gears and track for Kashmir policy so as to not only make it more promotable but to also allow it to create space for Pakistan’s economic prospects which have, hitherto, been pushed into the background as foreign policy kept gaining primacy over the country’s economic policy. If Pakistan is to get anywhere economically, the economic policy should be placed on an even keel with the foreign policy.