WHAT is Pakistan coming to have now is the largest ever external assistance package. The 9.5 billion dollars it is to receive from various sources over a three-year period is to be composite package for composite purposes. If it is truly well utilized it should place Pakistan on the path to a far higher economic growth and reduce the pervasive poverty.

In the 1980s when Pakistan was helping in the fight against the Russians in Afghanistan the largest aid giver was the U.S. and the three year package then was less than a third of the total package being offered now by the international coalition fighting terrorism.

It is true the IMF is offering only 1.3 billion dollars over a three-year period which is about a half of what was expected by Pakistan earlier. But the total package is to be contributed by the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank among the international financial institutions, through bilateral assistance in the form largely of grants and through rescheduling a large part of the bilateral debt of 12.5 billion dollars by the Paris Club of donors. In addition, there is to be a swap of a considerable part of the bilateral debt by same countries led by Canada which have agreed to convert much of their loans into financial assistance for social sector development to which they attach a great deal of importance.

The significance of the IMF commitment of 1.3 billion dollars or quarterly tranche of 109.6 million dollars lies in not only the volume of money available, but also in the manner it has opened the doors for rescheduling the 12.5 billion dollars bilateral loans by the Paris Club. The IMF has become a kind of regulator of the international assistance programme. But for the deal with the IMF the rescheduling would not have been possible.

No less significant is the assurance that if all the targets listed in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility are met and the promised reforms are implemented earnestly the international financial institutions would be ready to come up with additional assistance. And if Pakistan spends more money than committed now on social sector development, like the Khushhal Pakistan programme, the IMF would permit the limit of the budgetary deficit to be raised from 5.4 per cent to 5.7 per cent.

The Pakistan initiated and IMF approved PRGF seeks sustained economic growth, reduction in poverty, social sector development, consolidation of micro, economic stability, along with distinct improvement in external balances, and larger revenues through extensive taxation reforms and reduced public spending in the non-development sector.

With the current IMF emphasis on recipients of aid owning up their programmes it had suggested to Pakistan to come up with its own PRGF programme. And Pakistan is well aware of the IMF expectations in various sectors of the economy to qualify for any kind of assistance. So it came up with its Interim Poverty Reduction strategy paper. And the targets, as accepted by the IMF, are realistic and not over-ambitious, and are the need of the hour for Pakistan. The targets are rather inter-related and failure in one sector can cause setbacks in other sectors and hold up the process.

Much of the aid package is not based on the aftermath of the September 11, terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the Afghan war. The scheduled assistance from the international financial institutions in particular is based on the success of the stand. By agreement with the IMF which saw all the targets being fulfilled except one. and that was regarded as a good achievement for a country which had until now the reputation of a “first tranche country”. The IMF, World Bank and Asian Development are now all praise for the economic reforms carried out by the military regime. The World bank describes that as a “solid strategy” which qualifies for larger assistance.

But the first year of the three year programme is also the election year in Pakistan or the year in which the country is to return to democracy after three years. It is the year of making a new constitution or radically revamping the submerged constitution, of presidential elections and national, provincial and Senate elections with all their uncertainties. The government may find it tough to come up with the economic reforms promised, particularly increasing the revenue collection or levying sales tax on the varied agricultural inputs, as has been agreed with the IMF now.

Hence while accepting Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Paper the IMF has identified four risks faced by the programme. They are political opposition to the reforms, lack of continuity in implementation of the programme, insufficient institutional capacity and exogenous shocks, like the Afghan war which intervened this year.

The IMF assessment of the programme has also noted the absence of a number of vital details and lack of real emphasis on actual policy objectives. All that has led to the perception in some quarters in the country that Western governments may not push Gen. Musharraf to return to democracy this year or may not be too critical of the kind of democracy that he seeks. As far as the international financial institutions are concerned the economic reforms are far more important than the elections. And many Western governments are inclined to think that fighting terrorism, including within the country, is far more important than a return to a perfect political polity.

And the World Bank regards the Interim Povery Reduction Strategy Paper of Pakistan as a precursor to a “full poverty reduction strategy” which means aiming at an economic growth rate of 7 to 8 per cent for a period of ten years at least.

There is hardly an area of economic activity which is not covered by the PRGF. The targets are specific for each of the three years, and the IMF acknowledges the first year of the programme is very difficult because of the fallout of the September 11 tragedy and the expanding global recession. In fact the war in Afghanistan may not be doing as much damage to Pakistan’s economy as the global recession may do.

So the IMF has stressed that for the success of the programme “solid support from the domestic stakeholders is imperative and there should be clear allocation of responsibilities, a detailed devolution plan and accountability at all levels of the administration”.

The IMF also says Pakistan’s economic outlook is now clouded by considerable uncertainties in view of the September 11 events and the on-going slowdown in world demand which adversely affects prospects for exports and capital inflows. The IMF also talks of the possible shortfall in resources for financing the PRGF programme, including external resources despite the larger external assistance projected now.

The PRGF projects an economic growth of 3.7 per cent this year, 5 per cent next year and 5.2 per cent in the third year which is well below the 6 per cent growth of the 1980s. As a result the per capita income growth will remain 1.6 per cent this year, 2.7 per cent next year and 2.9 per cent in the third year. These are not reassuring figures for poverty reduction in a country in which over 40 per cent of the people are living below the poverty line of a dollar a day. But unless real economic growth picks up and crosses the six per cent margin, per capita income cannot increase substantially and poverty go down.

The IMF wants budgetary revenues (excluding grants) to remain at 16.5 per cent this year, rise 17.5 per cent next year and touch 17.6 per cent in the third year. And it wants the budgetary expenditure to fall from 21.9 per cent this year to 31.4 per cent next year and to 20.8 per cent in the third year. And that can result in the budgetary deficit coming down from 5.3 per cent this year to 4.1 per cent next year and 3.2 per cent in the third year.

The big question, as the IMF has posed, is: will the government be able to collect far more revenues, reduce its expenditure substantially and lower the deficit which it has not been able to do in recent years? The performance of the government will be scrutinised by the IMF not on an annual basis but on a quarterly basis, well before the tranche of 109.6 million dollars is released each quarter. And dissatisfaction on the part of the IMF will result in negative reaction from the World Bank and the Asian Development as well. And excellent performance can bring forth larger assistance from them, as they have promised.

The IMF wants the net public debt this year to remain at 92.4 per cent of the GDP after crossing the 100 per cent ceiling drop to 87.9 per cent next year and to 84.6 per cent in the third year. And that means that even if some of the external loans are re-scheduled for payment over a long period, the total debt burden remains the same. Hence the only way the net debt can be brought down is not to borrow far more while reducing some of the loans as from the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank to whom we owe 15.4 billion dollars.

THE foreign donors, the US and other members of the international community seem keen to provide Pakistan with funding to keep a watch on madressahs. There are about ten thousand madressahs spread all over Pakistan, many of them allegedly fanning religious extremism and sectarian sentiments among the students.

These seemingly centres of learning are also known to be used by a number of religious parties for recruiting the youth for jihad in Afghanistan and other countries. What must be realized is that the problem may not be solved by initiating specific programmes operated by the bureaucratic machinery sitting in Islamabad or the provincial headquarters. After all, the present madressah system itself is a product of bureaucratic manoeuvring of years.

Moreover, the erroneous educational policies created an environment of discontent, a vacuum that the informal religious schools seemed to fill. Needless to say that it is vital for the funding organizations to have a clear idea of how the present madressah system expanded to such an extent that it became a threat to national and international security.

Contrary to the views that the madressahs represent an age-old indigenous educational culture, the present madressah system is indirectly a bureaucratic formulation, a system that evolved as a result of the policies of General Zia-ul-Haq. It was under his eleven years of dictatorship which encouraged it. Islam was institutionalized through establishing a system of Nazim-e-Salat. Even during the 1980s Islamabad had sufficient evidence that many madressahs were engaged in fanning sectarian hatred.

This information was provided by various confidential reports prepared in the districts of Punjab. For instance, the report prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Bahawalpur indicated that about forty per cent of the 401 religious schools were supporting one or the other sectarian group. Nonetheless, the government chose not to take any action against them.

Perhaps General Zia’s ambition was to create a new set of stakeholders that would support his continued rule in the country, or help him counter the other political forces considered antagonistic to him. The creation of alternative political forces is a pet strategy adopted by authoritarian regimes. The use of religion as a tool was considered essential to secure the support of the traders from the lower-middle and middle classes of society.

Additionally, inculcating a religious zeal was considered necessary to further the country’s foreign policy objectives. The war in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir, required a partnership between the military and the religious parties. Qazi Hussain Ahmed claims that it was his party that had drawn Pakistan army’s attention towards Afghanistan. The Jamaat’s help was vital in energizing the fighters in Afghanistan and preparing a force of religious warriors within Pakistan.

The madressahs system played a crucial role in incorporating religious fervour in a particular class of youth. The madressahs, thus, had a specific role to play. Furthermore, since the 1980s this system was used by various religious schools of thought to propagate their ideals often at variance with each other.

What is most important to note about the madressah system is that it was never a part of the educational system of the country. Given the acute dearth of resources and mismanagement of the funding available for the education sector, the apparently secular schools, particularly in the rural areas, had become more or less dysfunctional in producing positive results.

The ghost schools scam presented the tip of the iceberg of the ailing educational system. It is a fact that the quality of education is so poor that the majority of the people did not consider it useful to send their children to schools.

On the one hand, there was the elite system of education represented through the mushrooming of private school system in the urban areas, and on the other, there were the government schools in the rural areas not geared to produce stuff that could then qualify to enter colleges or universities.

It is a fact that the products of the private sector English medium schools are better poised to compete for the limited number of positions at the higher levels of learning, or in the job market. Even the quota system failed to fill the gap. The problem was most acute in Southern Punjab that indicates a growing trend of madressah education.

Sociologically, the madressah system was preferred to the formal school system because it did not generate unattainable ambitions in its pupils. The formal system gave the students an idea of upward mobility that later might not materialize. This could give rise to a bitter feeling of injustice and inequality. given the unstructured nature of madressah education it was not surprising it degenerated into militant ideals.

What must also be noted is that the current madressah system is a symbol of discontent rather than a path leading to brighter opportunities. The government never launched any programme to objectively assess the education system or to bridge the gap between the haves and the have-nots. The formal education system has failed to produce the kind of stuff that could be beneficial to society.

Even if the present regime was to stop all funding to the madressahs or ban such schools entirely, the local community would manage on its own to generate resources that could be used to sustain these institutions. The problem cannot be solved without proper evaluation of the issues and without framing relevant policy proposals.

What is the direction of the education policy? How does one reduce the gap between the elitist institutions and the government institutions? What kind of gap exists between the educational systems in the urban areas and the rural areas? What form of educational system needs to be implemented? How to sell formal education to the rural populace? These are some of the important questions that must be answered in framing a new and dynamic education policy.

It is clearly a fallacy that madressahs can be abolished through using a pilot project approach. Madressahs will continue to thrive unless the entire educational system is revamped. Of course, there is the issue of dearth of resources or the lack of political will to divert resources from defence to education and other socio-economic development programmes. Education gets an average of 2.5 per cent of the central government expenditure which is not sufficient to bring about necessary changes. However, it would be a misrepresentation of facts to blame to entirely on the lack of resources.

If the state has the will, it could even tap the existing resources to improve the education system. One formula is to share the burden with the private sector. The idea is to make the elitist educational institutions responsible for upgrading education and introducing vocational institutes in their immediate neighbourhoods. It is no secret that all private educational institutions charge their students heavily. These private colleges and universities are highly profit-oriented and give a false sense of excellence to their students.

The attitude thus imbibed only enhances the social gap and breeds discontent. These institutions should be given the responsibility of sharing profits with the society at large through providing subsidized education to the children of their low-paid employees and for running schools in their neighbourhood. Similarly, large business concerns or multinationals should be asked to directly invest in educational programmes.

It is high time that Pakistan’s leadership should start thinking of developing its human capital. The lesson that needs to be learnt from a number of South East Asian countries is that they invested in human resource development rather than infrastructure before they moved on the route to economic development.

Islamabad’s approach, on the other hand, continues to be based on the instinct to capture additional aid. The problem with the potential aid for replacement of the madressah system is that it would be misused again by the bureaucracy with a major chunk being invested in paying fat salaries to foreign or local consultants. What is essential before any aid is received is to evaluate the system, policies and environment that led to the creation of such madressahs.

WHAT has the US achieved after waging war for the past two months in Afghanistan?

Afghanistan’s de facto government, Taliban, with about 30,000 armed supporters, has been overthrown and scattered. After holding out for five weeks under massive US bombardments, its leader, Mulla Omar, ordered his men to retreat to the mountains. Omar, who may be shortly captured or killed, claimed he ordered the retreat to spare civilians in Taliban-ruled areas from US bombing. Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, was shattered by intensive US bombing.

To date, the US has dropped over 10,000 bombs on Afghanistan, killing sizable numbers of civilians - perhaps in the range of 2,000, according to Afghan sources. US bombing of cities, towns and villages has driven over 160,000 people into refugee camps.

On December 3, 2000 — one year ago — this writer warned that overthrowing Taliban would ‘pave the way for a second Russian occupation of Afghanistan.’ This has now happened. The Northern Alliance, armed and funded by Russia, directed by the Afghan Communist Party, and under the overall command of the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Marshall Viktor Kvashnin, deputy KGB director Viktor Komogorov, and a cadre of Russian advisers, seized Kabul and all of northern Afghanistan, likely with the aid of troops from Uzbekistan and/or Iran.

Last week’s much ballyhooed Afghan ‘unity’ conference in Germany produced a sham ‘coalition’ government run by the Northern Alliance. One of CIA’s Pakhtun ‘assets,’ Hamid Karzai, who represents no one but himself, was named prime minister. There was no other real Pakhtun representation, though they comprise half the population. Of thirty cabinet seats, two thirds went to Northern Alliance Tajiks, notably the power ministries: defence, interior, and foreign affairs. Two women were added to please the West.

The 87-year old deposed Afghan king, Zahir Shah, widely blamed for allowing the communists to infiltrate Afghanistan in the 1970s, was invited back as a figurehead monarch. In short, a communist-dominated regime, ruled by a king, whose strings are pulled by Moscow. Quite a bizarre creation.

The very next day, feuding broke among Alliance members. Old communist stalwart Rashid Dostam, who had just finished massacring hundreds of Taliban prisoners with American and British help, threatened war if his Uzbeks did not get more spoils. The Alliance’s figurehead president, Prof. Rabbani, a respected Islamic scholar, was shoved aside by young communists. The Bush Administration was apparently too preoccupied chasing Osama bin Laden to notice its new best friend, Russia, had broken its agreement to wait for formation of a pro-US, pro-Pakistani regime, and seized half of Afghanistan. Marshall Kvashnin rushed his men into Kabul, just as he outfoxed the Americans in 1999 in a similar coup de main in Kosovo.

The hunt for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda continues. A few senior figures have been killed, likely including Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad. The net is closing around Osama’s possible hiding places. Unless he has escaped Afghanistan, his capture or death appear imminent.

This will be welcome news for the Bush administration. If he somehow escapes, or his body never found, Bush will be accused of blowing apart Afghanistan, killing large numbers of civilians, and allowing the Russians to grab back the country, all for nothing.

The late Pakhtun leader Abdul Haq, whom I knew from my Peshawar days, warned the US before his death that bombing of Afghanistan was unnecessary and a grave mistake. Taliban control could be broken, where needed, by financing tribal uprisings — the standard form of Afghan warfare — without foreign intervention. Otherwise, he warned, the Northern Alliance would take over and bring in the Russians. He pleaded with Washington for restraint, but to no avail. Haq was captured by Taliban during a bungled CIA operation and hanged.

But Haq was right. US forces could have hunted Osama in southern Afghanistan with relative impunity, as they are now doing, without having to launch a total war against Taliban. US air power totally dominates barren Afghanistan. Taliban forces could not move or communicate. There were only a small number of Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan where Osama was hiding.

Bombing Afghan civilian centres was absolutely unnecessary. The only real military targets offered by Taliban were its entrenched troops facing the Alliance. It was remarkable that Taliban managed to withstand five weeks of carpet bombing by US B-52s.

The US could have hunted Osama without allowing the Russians to recapture half of Afghanistan, a severe geopolitical defeat for American ambitions to use that nation as a gateway to Central Asian oil and gas. And without blasting to rubble what little remained of demolished Afghanistan, and without driving 160,000 civilians into terrified flight.

So, after eight weeks of war, Taliban is out; the Communists are in power in Kabul. The south is in chaos. Pakistan is isolated and unloved by all. The war has cost Washington US$60 billion to date. Afghanistan is a bloody mess. And Vladimir Putin is smiling. —Copyright Eric Margolis 2001.

WHEN a war starts, can rumours be far behind? Rumors are essential to a free society and can make or break the Home Front.

If you are going to be a rumour-spreader, you have to play by the rules. First, you cannot circulate a rumour until it is confirmed by two sources. For example, suppose your brother-in-law says, “I hear the terrorists are going to strike when everyone is cutting their lawns.”

If his friend Arnold confirms it, you may pass it to a third person. Then it will appear on the talk shows, etc.

Let’s take another rumour. “The Carlsons are breaking up after 30 years of marriage.” It came from Sarah Beecham, who heard it from Jennifer Sloane. The rumour started in the hairdresser’s, where almost all good rumours are given birth. It’s passed on from hair blower to hair blower.

By the time it got to the manicure table, the rumour had Carlson dating a 35-year-old meter maid and Mrs. Carlson dating a much younger man.

When I heard this, I felt it my duty to tell Richfield because he invests his money with Carlson in Boeing Aircraft.

In order to be passed on, the rumour has to have legs. I heard this one from Jane Merriweather, who heard it from the secretary of the head of a movie studio, who heard it from a stunt man: “Don’t go to a shopping mall during any months with the letter ‘R’ in them.”

I know what you’re asking. Suppose you’re not sure whether a rumour is true or not. You may pass it along as long as you heard it from a “reliable source,” such as a gas station attendant, who heard it from a customer, who had a shotgun in his car.

One of the latest rumours, which has spread like wildfire, has to do with the new government dress code. The rumour was believed to have started in the Four Leaf Bar, where the FBI goes for happy hour.

The rumour is that very soon, FBI agents will not be wearing ties. Thus, they will fade into the crowd and no one will know who they are.

I know it’s difficult, if not almost impossible, for the crime-busters to walk around without a tie on. But this is war, and you have to have a disguise. The rumour also says the FBI spokesman will appear on TV in grungy, unpressed suits so the enemy won’t know if he is a bad guy or a good guy.

To further the deception, the FBI can no longer wear the zip-up jackets with “FBI” written on the back. The only acceptable stencil to be worn on the backs of jackets is “Big Bird.”

The same rumour has it that FBI agents must wear tennis clothes and T-shirts so people won’t spot them going in and out of the White House.

This is just a rumour, but remember, you heard it here first.—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

IT’S going to be a season of sharp contrasts. There’s the advent of Christmas and the New Year, and the traditional X-mas tree has been lit at the Ellipse near the White House.

Many houses have been decorated with lights, and glimmer in the dark of the wintry evenings. There are decorations on apartment doors, and the beginnings of a holiday mood. The stores are full of potted poinsettia plants with their bright red leaf-like bracts, typifying the colour of Christmas.

But there is precious little cheer on the sitting-room television screen. The images are of bombs pounding targets in Afghanistan, guns firing, bedraggled Afghan fighters and prisoners caught in a harsh, barren landscape. The anti-Taliban soldiers look as pitiful as the Taliban and Al Qaeda men in their captivity. There is war talk at the Pentagon briefings, with repeated declarations that Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders will either be captured or killed. The Christmas message of Peace on Earth is heard only now and then.

With Kandahar now also lost to the Taliban, military analysts and commentators point out how remarkable it is that a group of less than 2,000 American soldiers has been able to bring about the collapse of an entire regime, naively ignoring the damage inflicted from the air by constant bombings of Taliban targets and the US military’s unlimited access to costly ordnance. The Taliban were hardly a government and even less a military machine: they did not have an air force or trained cavalry and armoured corps ready to defend Kabul. This was not a war between two militaries, but between a superpower and a band of fanatics. The US has spent perhaps more time fighting ideologies than states.

What is far more significant is the general uprising against the Taliban in Kabul and Kandahar and the sense of freedom reported from various cities following the end of the Taliban. If this collection of zealots had not so alienated their own people and other tribes, it would not have been so easy for the US special forces to stir up an anti-Taliban revolt. If a majority of Afghans had been with the Taliban, then it would have been a much longer haul.

And despite the rout, both Osama bin Laden and Mulla Mohammad Omar have yet to be caught or killed. A 15,000-lb “daisycutter” bomb was dropped the other day on the complex of caves where Osama is believed to be hiding. The result was unclear on Tuesday night, and US officials had only the vaguest of ideas to offer about the location of Osama bin Laden and Mulla Omar. What if weeks go by and the two are not found? Would there not be questioning within the United States about the success of the campaign against terrorism? American officials have been careful throughout to caution against focusing on personalities or a few individuals; they have said their campaign should be seen in the broader context of rooting out terrorism from Afghanistan and other countries where it is perceived to find sustenance.

But failure to get the two main targets will prove costly for the Bush administration, and it will have a hard time explaining its position to the American press and public. In many other countries, there will be a tendency to draw malicious pleasure from the administration’s plight. So, despite all the military successes in Afghanistan, the political stakes remain high for the US.

Already reporters’ questions at official briefings are starting to sound less patriotic and jingoistic and have become more sceptical. It’s another matter that the questions often do not get reflected in the news stories published the next day in the major newspapers. If briefing transcripts were as routinely printed as they are put up on official websites — in another example of the openness that marks many aspects of government functioning here — they would show that many of the issues that are bothering people all over the world are being raised by reporters here. The “with-us-or against-us” credo is losing some of its sanctity, and voices for peace are being heard more clearly.

However, the reality is overwhelming. The US has got away again with ousting a foreign regime from power, with unleashing a war that has drawn in many other countries, with continuing its bombing campaign on a Muslim country even during Ramazan, and with treating other nations very much as underlings to be ordered about. The tragedy that engulfed thousands of Americans on September 11 was very real; there will be sadness in many homes this Christmas. It is unfortunate that the tragedy should have been pushed into the background in just three months because of the exercise of what was once described in the Vietnam days as the power of power.