Deeper into Afghan chaos?

OCCUPATION is said to be nine-tenths of law. The Northern Alliance is getting cockier by the day having seized Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul are now at the gates of Kunduz thanks to America’s war on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Had the tragedy of September 11 not occurred, this tiny remnant in the north of Afghanistan would probably be in Taliban hands by now.

America’s recent adversity is the Northern Alliance’s fortuitous fortune. General Fahim, the current leader of the Alliance, now strutting about in Kabul and Governor Ismail Khan of Herat wear the colours of victors. They consider the British paratroopers landing at Bagram airbase outside Kabul as a “big mistake.” However, the Alliance Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah thinks otherwise. The UN-proposed Loya Jirga under the chairmanship of the ex-king, Zahir Shah, meets with different shades of procrastination and conditional acceptance. In any case, the Alliance cannot speak on behalf of the various warlords and tribal chiefs of Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and the Shias of the Hazarajat.

Afghans as individuals are the most honourable of men, but internecine squabbles, blood feuds, ethnic rivalries and revenge taking between groups leave yesterday’s promises a dead letter. The understanding reached at Pakistan’s behest for the Alliance troops not to enter Kabul has been ignored as have other undertakings to the UN and the US before the principal cities fell.

Afghanistan is on the brink of a second spell of chaos in less than a decade. Let us digress for a moment to see the origins of the first one.

Utter chaos reigned in Afghanistan between the 1992 fall of the last Soviet installed ruler, Najeebullah, and the rise of the Islamic Taliban in 1996. In these four years Kabul was ruled by this self-same Northern Alliance and the rest of the country by warlords.

The two Peshawar agreements brokered by Pakistan in 1992 provided for a rotating presidency which collapsed when President Burhanuddin Rabbani refused to vacate the office after six months to Gulbadin Hikmatyar as required.

The then Tajik commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, the military man behind Rabbani, the fellow Tajik president, would not countenance Pakhtoon Hikmatyar to take over the presidency. Hikmatyar resorted to a prolonged bombardment of Kabul to assert his claims. The residents of Kabul have yet to forgive him for this. This was the start of chaos 1.

As the US arms conduit during the Soviet invasion Pakistan acquired a taste for meddling in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It played favourites among the Afghan Mujahideen groups all of whom were corrupt in varying degrees, including the ISI, our own intelligence agency. Our hobby horse during and after the Soviet invasion was Gulbadin Hikmatyar, by all accounts an unsavoury ally.

The ISI more myopic than intelligent — clearly favoured the southern Afghan Pakhtoon groups, who constitute about half of the total Afghan population.

Geography dictated this alignment. The same Pathan tribes straddle the border on either side. But, above all, Pakistan wanted it all quiet on the Western Front. All our cannons face East; India was perceived to be the mortal enemy. There was also a bit of nonsense conjured by the cabal running our Afghan policy in the 1990s; that a brotherly Afghanistan would provide “strategic depth” to us in war.

The zeal and devoutness of the Taliban — young, starry-eyed, refugee camp raised madrassah students — was welcomed by the populace as relief from the chaos in 1996. But their zeal soon turned into fanaticism which brought about its own nemesis. In the annals of modern fanaticism, Mullah Omar is ‘sui generis’. Hitler saw the devil in the Jews; Stalin in his class enemies, the Kulaks; Pol Pot in anyone not sharing his brand of communism; and Mullah Omar in women, minorities and the pre-history of his own country. Germany, Russia and Cambodia have since learnt that democracy is the best of worst governments. Now after two decades of revolution, civil war, drought and famine, it remains to be seen if Afghanistan’s warlords have learnt this lesson.

We see once again the forebodings of chaos. Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Talokan are in the hands of the Northern Alliance which must make every Pakhtoon in the north shiver. But the Alliance itself is a manage of wild cats tied by their tails with a single point agenda: to bring down the Taliban. The Uzbek, General Dostum — another warlord with an unsavoury past — is at odds with General Fahim, the Tajik successor to the recently assassinated Ahmad Shah Masood, the strongman of the Northern Alliance. Fahim would like to string up Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the weak Pakhtoon member of the Alliance, as being responsible for the murder of Masood.

In the meanwhile President Burhanuddin Rabbani, the not so legal head of the Kabul government in 1996, has claimed his fiefdom in Kabul for the Northern Alliance. Ninety-year-old Maulvi Yunus Khalis has taken over Jalalabad and appointed Haji Qadeer as his Wali, declaring themselves virtually independent. To the west, Ismail Khan has regained his Khanate of Herat by reoccupying the palace, originally gifted to him by the royal family, with the help of Iran, and to the south at the moment it is not clear if Hamid Karzai, the king’s loyal supporter, has been able to convince Mulla Najeebullah and Haji Basher (the opium king), Mulla Omar legatees, for the prize of Kandahar.

Some questions arise: Who will demilitarize the major Afghan cities and when? And why is the UN Security Council dragging its feet for providing cover for such a force? If the Loya Jirga fails to hold together, is the partition of Afghanistan inevitable? And finally how should Pakistan react to this threatening situation? The West is sure to lose its appetite for Afghanistan once bin Laden, Omar and al-Qaeda are history.

One of the main conditions of Pakistan joining the US-led coalition was that the Northern Alliance would not occupy Kabul. Pakistan therefore has a right to demand of the US and its allies that the agreement be met unconditionally. UN cover or not the US and its allies must immediately take over the task of demilitarization of major cities. This means that the Northern Alliance troops be cleared of Kabul.

Germany has promised 4,000 troops; German and Turkish troops would provide an ideal combination to take over the demilitarization of the Pakhtoon cities. French contingents can be deployed in Persian-speaking cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, white the Americans can provide logistic support and air cover and carry out search operations. The UN representatives known for dithering and pusillanimity must concretize without further delay the much talked about Loya Jirga.

The world has a right to know when and where this is being convened. Dubai might be the ideal place for it to be held.

Time is of the essence. Afghanistan today is on the razors’ edge. Most people are still in bewilderment after the ignominious exit of the Taliban. What Afghanistan desperately needs today is law and order, food, demilitarization, and a Loya Jirga, in roughly this order. Bringing Afghanistan to a semblance of normality also provides for our own safety and well-being.

The question is: Who dares predict the consequences of the current Afghan War? There is a dreadful case scenario for Pakistan, which is the break up of Afghanistan between its southern Pakhtoon and northern parts. In which case we will have a Pakhtoonistan at our door step. All our nightmares will have them come home to roost.

Wars are unruly ghosts often bringing about the most unforeseen consequences. Afghanistan is the belly of High Asia and sits atop the sub-continent. This war puts Pakistan on the line. We now have a western border to worry about. Our best bet in these muddy times is economic vibrancy, a fortress Pakistan, a low profile with a bite stronger than the bark; and, as the late Mr. Asquith oft remarked, “Let’s wait and see.”

The writer is a farmer member of the National Assembly.

Hall of Shame

IT seems a small thing to ask of our religious and political leaders that they refrain from expressing outright bigotry in these sensitive times.

Muslims in this country have been attacked. Passions are running high, and American troops are on the ground in a Muslim country.

President Bush has responded to the crisis by emphasizing consistently that this country’s battle is not with Islam but with terrorism.

By and large, this country’s leaders have followed suit. The exceptions, however, have been beauts — and they should not be forgotten.

“We’re not attacking Islam, but Islam has attacked us. The God of Islam is not the same God,” the Rev. Franklin Graham, who spoke at President Bush’s inauguration, said recently. “He’s not the son of God of the Christian or Judeo-Christian faith. It’s a different God, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion.”

Meanwhile, Rep. Saxby Chambliss — chairman of the House subcommittee on terrorism and homeland security, and a Senate candidate in his native Georgia — has a modest proposal for combating terrorism: “Just turn (the sheriff) loose and let him arrest every Muslim that crosses the state line.”

If people can’t restrain themselves for the right reason — that such expressions are wrong, irresponsible and dangerous — they might at least consider how they undermine Mr. Bush’s position. Comments that cast the current struggle as a battle between the West and Islam, or that cast Muslims as enemies, get noticed both here and abroad.

They make the White House’s laudable efforts at outreach look false. Mr. Chambliss, to his credit, had the decency to apologize, describing his remark, which he said was “taken out of context,” as an off-the-cuff joke. Mr. Graham, however, didn’t apologize. In fact, he made matters worse, issuing a statement saying that he had “concerns about the teachings of Islam regarding the treatment of women and the killing of non-Muslims or infidels.” The minister noted that he had expressed these concerns “in the past” but did “not intend to comment further.” Here’s hoping. —The Washngton Post

Kashmir: to cut the Gordian knot

KASHMIR again. Pervez Musharraf has to keep it on the front burner. The war in Afghanistan, increasingly unpopular in Pakistan, needs to be balanced by emotions — and outbursts. The anti-India rhetoric is a useful digression even in a highly volatile situation.

What is depressing is that a democratically elected Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, is equally keen on playing to the gallery. That his party, the BJP, faces a crucial election in UP is understandable. After having been ousted from 24 out of 28 states to political parties in the opposition, losing the government in the most important state can shake the alliance at the centre. But the PM’s observation of ‘kara’ in response to Musharraf’s bravado that he was not wearing bangles did not enhance his dignity. He sounded as childish as the Pakistan president.

Almost every power on earth has asked for talks between India and Pakistan. Vajpayee has said so many times: how long can you avoid talking to a neighbour? Both he and Musharraf have been told by foreign powers during their recent visits abroad.

It is not that they have not met. The sitting at Agra was a marathon session. Still nothing came out of it. The reason is their diametrically opposed positions. It means that someone should help. But an outsider is ruled out because his role may become that of an arbiter or a mediator. The two countries have to settle the problem of Kashmir bilaterally.

Perhaps the way out is to entrust the job to non-officials. Both countries can choose one person of their confidence. They can meet and do the spadework. In fact, during the Nawaz Sharif time, the two such non-officials almost found a solution. In the words of Vajpayee, “we were almost there.”

Over the years I have seen that when it comes to Islamabad, New Delhi throws restraint to the wind. The bureaucrats on both sides do it all the time. Their hatred or one-upmanship against each other provides grist to the propaganda mills of difference and defiance. When their superiors begin to speak in the same vein, they raise only concern.

It is a familiar scenario — some kind of political deja vu. Even the sequence has not changed. First there are inflammatory statements from both sides. Then some firing at the border and ultimately there is a build-up which is provocative enough but does not indicate hostility. Every time America calls for restraint, every time the temperature comes down.

The show looks like the threat which a spoilt child gives to his mother that he was going to jump into a river but does not do so because of her imploring. Both countries are probably vying with each other to catch Washington’s eye. Once in a while, at America’s prodding, there is a summit meet between the two countries. Then the period of animated pause begins. And everything is back to square one. The same exercise starts all over again.

Pakistan understands it. But after the death of its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who favoured a secular nation, the country has been made a theocratic state where the liberals have little role or say. The war in Afghanistan is strengthening the hold of the jihadis and other fundamentalists. How can they reconcile themselves to the idea of a secular Jammu and Kashmir when they want to grab the Muslim majority valley of the state?

There is no dearth of agreements between India and Pakistan. Starting right from the Jawaharlal Nehru-Liaquat Ali pact after the partition to the Lahore or the nearly-signed Agra Declaration some time ago, the joint communiques have not been the problem. They have analyzed the situation correctly whenever the two countries have wanted to do so.

Take, for example, the Simla Agreement text. Both countries declared: “The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relationship and establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.”

Nobody can take exception to the sentiments expressed. The problem is not that New Delhi and Islamabad do not know what ails their relationship. The problem is the absence of a desire to implement the understanding they reach, either in letter or in spirit. Pakistan is largely to be blamed because it raises Kashmir even before the ink of signatures on any agreement dries up.

Musharraf is blunt enough to say that Kashmir comes first and other problems later. But this does not mean that he is right in his approach. He knows that the path he has taken cannot end up in a solution of Kashmir. The entire approach is too religious and violent. India can never agree to it because it will hurt its pluralistic policy. Even a party like the BJP has begun to argue that Pakistan is seeking to undo India’s secular society. It is significant that Vajpayee brought in the partition of India for the first time in his recent speeches and said that the country would not allow the partition to be repeated. One leader at Srinagar has said: the Afghanistan war has highlighted Kashmir and it will now be pursued by the Muslim world. Again, the approach is communal. No amount of religious colouring will resolve the Kashmir problem. It will only get tangled. The liberal approach of Kashmiriyat may help. But that is where the Kashmiri pandits come in, not the Muslim world.

A letter which I have received from Ghulam Rasool Kar, once the Congress president of Jammu and Kashmir, rightly points out that “Muslims and pandits are two inseparable components of Kashmir society.” The problem is how to bring back the community to the valley after 20 years and how to give them the confidence. Islamabad can never understand, much less appreciate, this aspect. Even New Delhi does not.

Bringing the Kashmiri Muslims and the pandits together is important to normalize the situation in the valley. But attending to the alienation of the Jammu population is equally important if the state is to stay together. Just as the valley has got communalized in the past few years, so has Jammu. The Hurriyat, which claims to represent the state, should make efforts to retrieve the situation in Jammu. But it faces the pressure of the Islamic lobby from within. Were New Delhi to start negotiations with the Hurriyat and other elements in the state, the focus must be political, not religious, as the case is today.

Such a process will also defeat the efforts of fundamentalists from across the border. They should have realized by this time that the Indian state is no pushover. By making Kashmir a religious state — as Osama bin Laden wants to — the extremists are complicating further an already complicated problem. Theocracy is an outdated ideology which could attract people in the Middle Ages, not in the 21st century.

And what about the elements in Pakistan who believe that the pressure on Kashmir will make India disintegrate one day? Even in a recent interview to The Nation, published from Lahore, former ISI chief Hamid Gul has said: “I believe India cannot live as a political entity as it is today. It has to be fragmented.”

But when one comes to know that Hamid Gul is the person who wove the web of fundamentalism in Afghanistan in which thousands of simple, gullible people were caught, one can only have pity for those who think likewise in Pakistan. They are sick. The Muslim society should be wary of them. Look at what they have done to Afghanistan.

Lesson from the fall of Kabul

TO begin with, let us pick up the data relevant to the subject. First, only two extreme options given by President Bush about being “with us or with them” present an absurd proposition. This categorical assertion demolishes objectivity with a self-righteous arrogance and is a naked coercion by a superpower.

There can be many positions in between. For instance, I will never like to live in a country, which is ruled by Taliban, or their likes, because I do not agree with their narrow interpretation of Islam. But at the same time I denounce the US bombing of innocent people in Afghanistan and its foreign policies of political, military and economic terrorism.

I am, therefore, neither with President Bush nor with the Taliban. There are many more like me in Pakistan, in the Muslim countries and in the developed world. President Bush refuses to recognize these, and other, gray shades. Hence an inherent flaw in his approach.

Second, there is no doubt that all the moderate and enlightened Muslims have always abhorred the rigid, intolerant and myopic mullah. This deep-seated denunciation, however, is now being tinged with an undercurrent of admiration for the mullah, who has emerged as a symbol of defiance of the oppressor (the US the UK, Israel and India) by the oppressed (mostly Muslim countries) against continued oppression and injustice. There is a rising sympathy and respect for the bearded Taliban and the militant Osama bin Laden even among the clean-shaven moderate Muslims. The West does not understand this visible swing of Muslim heart because the oppressor always remains oblivious of the views of the oppressed.

Third, this lack of understanding is bound to enhance the ruthless oppression of the West in days to come. Draconian laws at home, floating the names of more Muslim countries to be attacked in due course, persistent Israeli intransigence on Palestine, and the rising tone of Indian threats about Kashmir are some of the many indications.

In addition, there is a hypocritical definition of the term “terrorist” which conveniently excludes all non-Muslim terrorists (like the IRA in the UK, Basque separatists in Spain, Naga fighters in India, Maoists in Nepal and many more). The myth of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network is likely to be kept alive over many years and, like Saddam Hussein, they may not be deliberately eliminated. This will provide a convenient excuse to the oppressors to strike at any time at the targets of their choice. The puppet rulers of the Muslim countries will be additional instruments of oppression, whose servility may ironically intensify, or even activate, the dormant, but pervasive, alienation between the Muslim masses and their rulers.

Fourth, there is no match in this unequal clash of a heavier than heavyweight party and a lighter than featherweight party. One side has knowledge, technology, devastating arms, imperialistic hold on world resources, ruthless cunning and manipulative links in the other side through puppet regimes. The other side has nothing more than the hateful and defiant stare of the exploited victim, and the suicidal ingenuity of an injured soul. Their human resource is degradingly deficient owing to persistently deliberate denial of education, institutions and development by their own perfidious leaders.

In spite of a high emotional charge the Muslims are not equipped mentally or physically to wage a winning war. Their motives may be highly laudable to redeem their freedom, dignity and honour, but their means are either non-existent or controlled by others. The traditionally pathetic indolence of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in any crisis is a proof of the strategic inaptitude of the Muslim world.

Fifth, there are serious doubts if Osama bin Laden or al-Qaeda could have committed the September 11 raid on the Twin Towers. It appears to be beyond their capacity. They remain the prime suspects but the names of other suspects have never been disclosed by the US, in spite of the Red Brigade of Japan having taken responsibility in the US and Pakistani media.

This throws in doubt the declared intentions of the US in attacking Afghanistan and committing savagery in the name of civilization. If they have a hidden agenda it will unfold itself gradually. Similarly, if Osama and al-Qaeda have actually destroyed the Twin Towers, then they have the capacity to do more. It means that right now we do not know enough about both the protagonists of this gory drama. We have to wait and see, and therefore cannot take sides at present.

Sixth, at present we know only one fact. For very doubtful reasons and suspect motives, the mightiest superpower on earth is pouring hell from the skies on innocent men, women and children (whose number for exceeds the innocent deaths of September 11); and the apparently defeated government of the poorest country in the world is vowing to destroy the invader, in spite of its near zero military capability and nil arsenal. It is a monumental paradox from any angle, but an earth-shaking clash of irresistible arrogance and irrepressible hatred with far reaching implications.

In the backdrop of this data let us dispassionately evaluate the fall of Kabul. This may signify the fall of the Taliban, but is in fact the first scene of a gradually unfolding drama, which portrays the Muslims as villains and the “American interests” as the hero. With the rise of each curtain future scenes will show the villain being subjected to as much poetic justice as the moralistic jargon and the sadistic nature of the hero can inflict. The Muslim world should be mentally prepared for a long campaign of vilification and persecution on one pretext or the other. There is no escape from this slow defeat.

This is a soul-searching moment for the entire Islamic world. They need a complete stock taking of their position on the globe. They have to work bout how not to add to their miseries themselves. Their future should not be like the past when they were their own worst enemies — various conspiracy theories notwithstanding. This enmity against self-originated from the inaction, indifference, and apathy of the educated, moderate and enlightened Muslims, which allowed the initiative to be thrust on the mullah.

The total stock of mullah’s wisdom was derived from the centuries old Dars-i-Nizami which would not allow any revision, research or ijtihad regarding its precepts or prejudices. His vision was focused on the past glory of the early period of Islam, without an analytical understanding of the ingredients of that glory. This antique vision has no doubt given him a highly positive nationalistic-cum-Islamic patriotism, but the atrophied mind blocked the awareness of modern realities. He closed his eyes to the present and visualized a past-based romantic future with those closed eyes. This distortion pushed his positive asset towards the negative means of violence only. His positive self gave him a tremendous strength to take huge suicidal risks, but his negative approach stripped him of the ability to take “calculated risks” in a balanced manner.

In spite of his focus on the past he fails to see that in the early years of Islam the Holy Prophet faced the overwhelming opposition with extreme caution, patience, and a rational assessment of all odds. Migration to Madinah (hijrat) in 622 A.D. and Hudaibya Peace Agreement in 628 AD were part of the same calculated, rational and mature approach, which continued right up to the capture of Makkah in 630 AD when it was replaced with amnesty and magnanimity. Such a balance is missing from mullah’s fossilized thinking.

The inevitable outcome of this irrational combination of lopsided factors was the fall of Kabul and the defeat of the Taliban. The painful truth is that it is likely to be repeated again for lack of military strength and foresight. In spite of these shortcomings, however, the status, acceptability and popularity of the mullahs will increase in the days to come for the following reasons (a) He has displayed the rare courage to challenge the powerful oppressor almost empty handed — a case of Samson facing the lion without his hair. (b) In the new hostile environment the haunted Muslim will be desperately looking for sincere leadership, but the ruling elite in the Islamic world is universally devoid of that quantum and quality of sincerity to the masses and Islam as is indisputably found in the mullah. (c) The vast illiteracy of the Muslim masses keeps them closer to the wavelength of the mullah’s mind.

A very large majority among the Muslims may be reluctant to accept him as a leader of the Ummah but they cannot deny that, in the forthcoming clash of civilizations, the entire Muslim world will remain a hostage to mullah’s conduct for quite some time. The depth of his convictions, the rigidity of his views, the growth in his numbers and followers, and the new-won expanse of sympathy and respect among the masses cannot be reversed overnight. The “American interests” are hell bent to crush it, and all the Muslims, whether modern, moderate or fundamentalists, will have to face the unpleasant consequences.

Viewed from any angle, the fall of Kabul teaches us only one lesson. The Muslim world cannot leave its leadership, or initiative, with mullah and hope to survive in this clash of civilizations. The educated, moderate and enlightened Muslim has to move from the spectator’s gallery to the centre-stage. He cannot replace the mullah immediately but can certainly start a parallel, but different, jihad. This new jihad should be against the corrupt and incompetent regimes in the Muslim world, which are not sincere to the interests of their own masses and are servile to their foreign protectors.