A SUICIDE attack in Adezai village on the outskirts of Peshawar on Sunday killed a number of people, including the Adezai nazim Abdul Malik. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Taliban. The attack occurred at the weekly cattle market in Adezai.

The attack appears to be part of a larger plan by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in and around Darra Adamkhel and their allies in Khyber Agency to demoralise the leadership and disrupt the local organised resistance to the militants' onslaught on Peshawar from the south and south-west of the city.

The people of Thapa Momand (Badaber, Bazeedkhel, Surezai and other small villages) and Thapa Koh-i-Damaan (Mathani, Adezai, Pasani and other small villages) of the provincial constituency PF-10 have organised a local lashkar through a jirga in collaboration with the local police and provincial administration for the last two years.

The lashkar has effectively kept the militant organisations of Khyber Agency (Lashkar-i-Islam) and Darra Adamkhel (TTP) at bay over the last two years. Had Badaber, Adezai and Mathani fallen to the religious militant organisations, the latter would have easily besieged Peshawar from all sides long ago. Abdul Malik was one of the five staunch leaders of the local lashkar which has been fighting for the security of the provincial capital. The others are Khushdil Khan, MPA PF-10; Gulzar Hussain, ex-nazim Badaber; Faheem Khan, nazim Bazeedkhel; and Dilawar Khan of Adezai. All have been quite effective in keeping up popular support for the lashkar and forming a useful link between the local administration and the lashkar.

Keeping in view the ongoing operation in South Waziristan, it is not a far-fetched assumption that militant organisations are prepared to open a new front in the suburbs of Peshawar as they have effectively used the strategy of opening new fronts in the past to keep the government and security forces at bay.

While the military has focused its operation on South Waziristan, the TTP and other militant organisations are perceived to have moved mostly to North Waziristan and Orakzai Agency. The latter is just a few dozen kilometres to the south of Peshawar. Darra Adamkhel, where the presence of the TTP had been quite strong, is just on the border of Adezai.

The suicide bomber's success in gaining access to and killing Abdul Malik in a busy market raises several questions in the minds of the local people. How could the bomber reach Adezai if he had come from outside the village? Did he come from the south (Darra Adamkhel) or from the west (Khyber Agency)?

Both in Khyber Agency and Darra Adamkhel, the military and the Frontier Constabulary are deployed on the main routes through several check-posts. How could the suicide bomber cross all these check-posts? The other possibility is that the alleged suicide bomber was a local resident of Adezai village. This assumption may not have validity if we accept the claim of the success of the local lashkar against militant networks.

Either both the civilian and the military intelligence working in the area had no clue of the suicide bomber entering the village from the south or the west or one of them had some information but could not communicate it to the other.

In the former case, updating and ensuring the development of both civilian and military intelligence networks is essential if Pakistan is to succeed in the insurgency unleashed by the religious militant organisations with the help of Al Qaeda and militant networks in Punjab.

If this is not seen to on an urgent basis, the militant organisations will succeed in opening another front in the suburbs of Peshawar by target killing the remaining four leaders to dismantle the local lashkar. This may jeopardise the provincial government and give the militant organisations a golden opportunity to call the shots under the very nose of the provincial establishment.

The possibility of intelligence not being communicated by either network means that it is essential that the military in Peshawar establish professional linkages with the provincial police authorities in Peshawar under the auspices of the provincial government. The provincial and federal governments must immediately take measures to boost the morale of the local lashkar besides improving their intelligence networks and security apparatus.

Firstly, the bereaved family of Abdul Malik must be financially supported both by the provincial and the federal governments. Financial compensation must include both expenses the family will incur due to the demise of their elder and the expenditure Abdul Malik had already incurred in the organisation of the local lashkar.

It is also suggested that the services of Abdul Malik in organising the lashkar be post humously recognised by both the provincial and the federal government.

Secondly, the remaining four leaders of the local lashkar must be provided with more government support in organising and sustaining the local resistance to the militant organisations. This may keep Peshawar away from the danger of collapse as militant organisations continue to develop their strategy of opening a new battlefront in the suburbs of Peshawar.

It is a matter of grave concern to the people of the NWFP that the federal government and the military have yet to put forward a comprehensive strategy to defeat insurgency and terrorism. The people in the province, and nowadays especially in Peshawar, have been going through trauma and suffering as suicide bombings and bomb blasts leave scores dead and maimed.

Hundreds of innocent men, women and children have fallen victim to such barbaric incidents across the length and breadth of Pakistan's north-west. The people now want a comprehensive strategy to deal with the military, political, economic and socio-cultural aspects of the militants' onslaught on their lives, their culture, their society and their state.

The writer teaches at Bahria University Islamabad and coordinates the research activities of the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy.

khadim.2005@gmail.com