Elections and parochialism
AT a recent workshop I asked the participants to identify two major social evils in the context of the forthcoming general elections. Along with corruption, they mentioned biradri-ism, or parochialism.
When I asked them why they thought biradri-ism was bad no one could give a plausible explanation. After intense brainstorming, we reached a tentative conclusion: it undermines merit and promotes corruption and prejudice.
Though most of the participants abhorred biradri-ism, many admitted they often benefited from it. However, nobody was comfortable with this inherent contradiction.
There are glimmers of hope hidden in both recognising and resolving this paradox. When they were asked to further discuss the negative effects of such parochialism on elections, they said most voters were mobilised on the basis of it. As a result, the electorate ignored party programmes. Voters in our country might despise their favourite candidates but they are chained to them. Why? The problem is that our electorate is bought.
But after the bargain is made why do they complain about poor governance? They perhaps forget the relationship between cause and effect. Remember, often the quality of governance is a true reflection of the quality of elections.
Are our people parochial by nature? If yes, to what extent and in what ways? Most would argue that our society is predominantly parochial, as our actions tend to be influenced by our tribe, caste, sect, religion and ethnicity.
There is nothing wrong with this. Moreover, any group that is being marginalised and excluded from decision-making processes and structures has the right to organise and express its concerns on the basis of identity.
But problems arise when the powerful elite exploit these bonds to further their interests. Why do the political elite adopt this method to set up their parties and to mobilise voters? Are they ignorant of the modern means of organising parties or do they lack the capacity?
The family is the primary unit of organisation and most biradris have a common ancestry. Hence, elders of biradris command much respect. The political elite fully exploit this respect. This is the foundation of parochial politics.
One conclusion is simple: anyone who misuses such identities must be rejected. This is obviously easier said than done as the political class has deepened and perfected the politics of exclusion. This is their modus operandi. Political society in Pakistan, in spite of its stated programmes/manifestos, in fact promotes parochialism during election time.
Let’s discuss the formation of political parties. Most political parties in our country are not formed on the basis of a political programme.
The timeline of the formation and growth of most parties reveals that instead of developing a political vision and programme and then launching a programme and membership campaign, leaders of parties first approach relatives, friends or political families.
Since a manifesto and party constitution are mandatory to get a party registered, this formality is fulfilled. Then the process is taken to the districts, where the leadership has connections or biradri links. The dependants i.e. employees, peasants, workers or the biradri of early joiners, willingly — or due to pressure — join their master’s party. When he switches parties, his dependants follow. And each new entrant repeats this sequence.
Therefore, each influential party member has his or her own small coterie of followers based on personal loyalty rather than identification with the party ideology.
Since the capacity of an individual influential party member is limited to managing an enlarged coterie, he has little interest in expanding the social base of his party in his area of influence. Because of this, leaders of political parties are least interested in membership campaigns. This limited support base of political parties creates a dynamic which reinforces narrow parochialism.
An examination of media coverage reveals that during election time, political parties hardly launch systematic publicity campaigns. Moreover, reaching out to voters remains limited to a few rallies and public meetings. Instead of the party it is the contesting candidates who bear the bulk of election campaign costs. Hence, the focus of the campaign is often the candidate or the party leader, not the party ideology.
Since party structures and offices do not exist in most districts, a majority of candidates rely on traditional networks for attracting voters. Settlements in the rural areas can be broadly divided into two categories: settled and developed villages and small jhoks/bastis or hamlets.
Most of these hamlets consist of residents of the same lineage, while most villages are divided between various factions. Where there are hamlets, the elders reign and in big villages, factional leaders play the same role.
In rural areas, contesting candidates hardly reach out to individual voters. Very often they negotiate with the biradri and factional leaders. The outcome of these negotiations is often a mix of personal gain for the local leader and the community’s collective interest.
In return, the local leader is supposed to deliver a number of votes to the candidate. If he succeeds, his position is strengthened in the eyes of the candidate. To keep his control over his faction/biradri, he tries his utmost to get some benefits for his people.
Sadly, in the last 30 years most political parties have encouraged this trend. Their masters are constituency oligarchs whose dynasties reign over traditional networks and voters. It appears this trend will witness a rise in the next general elections.
A democracy based on parochialism is a farce. The way forward is to institutionalise party chapters through party elections at all levels and to fix maximum tenures for each office-bearer.
The writer works with Pattan Development Organisation and is a social activist.