SECTARIAN discrimination is increasingly penetrating individuals’ attitudes and behaviours in Pakistan. That has been the outcome of sectarian tensions that have been nurtured at the level where they can be described as one of the structural problems that lead to the cessation of state functions.
Multiple factors have been described as the root causes of sectarianism and sectarian-motivated violence in society. But one factor, which usually has not received as much attention, is the administrative side of the problem, or how local administrations deal with issues involving different sectarian groups, such as disputes over mosques, routes for Ashura and Eid Milad-un-Nabi processions, allotments of plots for religious purposes, allocation of auqaf property, etc.
These issues are apparently not considered contributing factors in the worsening sectarian divide in the country. And yet at the district and sub-district level, these very issues are a major source of concern and occasionally lead to violence.
Usually state functionaries and even security experts do not consider such issues in a broader perspective. Sectarian sensitivities are not the reason behind the state’s refusal to tackle the administrative aspect. It is, in fact, a collective denial on its part that such challenges exist — which is a major stumbling block in evolving a comprehensive response to such issues. Many examples prove that religious and sectarian disputes were initially local in nature but their imprudent handling by administrations transformed them into national crises.
The Lal Masjid crisis was mainly the fallout of a three-month occupation of a children’s library near the mosque in response to the demolition of the Hamza mosque, which the Capital Development Authority (CDA) claimed had been built illegally on state land. CDA was planning to raze other illegally constructed mosques in the city, including parts of Jamia Hafsa, which was also managed by the Lal Masjid clerics.
The clerics, Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, and 300 pupils began a protest which grew into a movement for the implementation of Sharia. Security analysts believe that the motive behind the movement was to continue the occupation of state land as no one had dared to raise objections to such illegal occupation before.
An important factor noted during the initial stage of the Lal Masjid crisis was the lack of coordination among the law-enforcement and civic agencies in Islamabad. A vigilant and coordinated response from the local administration had the potential to resolve the dispute. Rather than evolving workable mechanisms, the lesson the local administration has learned is to ignore such rapidly growing constructions in the federal capital.
Sunni Tehreek (ST) in Karachi is a prime example of administrative mismanagement of local sectarian disputes. The ST first emerged in reaction to the occupation of Sunni mosques by rival sects. The initial demands of the ST included a non-discriminatory stance in making appointments to important religious posts in the city government. The law-enforcement agencies in Karachi failed to adopt a proactive approach to prevent such disputes, which further worsened the situation.
Most sectarian disputes in the city are vicinity-centric but contribute in a major way to sectarian strife across the country. Similar stories abound in Kohat, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan which are other flashpoints of sectarian violence.
In many cases, the resolution of sectarian disputes and tensions has not appeared to be the priority of local administrations. The latter have only responded when the situation was found to have markedly worsened.
Almost all district governments across the country have interfaith harmony committees comprising religious scholars from different faiths and sects, but these bodies are not functional or are used by law-enforcement agencies for nothing more than spying purposes.
The local administrations usually only call a meeting of these committees ahead of the Ashura procession, and other religious processions. No doubt such bodies can play an effective role in resolving sectarian disputes but the bureaucratic mindset is a major hurdle in the way and it has evolved only a fire-fighting approach.
Another dangerous tendency, which is becoming more evident in the bureaucracy, is sectarian biases that complicate efforts to resolve such disputes. These biases can be found in appointments to religious posts and allocations of plots for religious purposes. Usually, such proceedings are not reported in the mainstream media but religious publications are full of such stories. The real concern emerges when such stories focus on officials in law-enforcement agencies.
This reflects that sectarian outfits and their sympathisers have not only infiltrated government departments but have also influenced the mindset of officials who are expected to be above such biases.
A systematic probe is nowhere in sight to determine what motivates state functionaries to join the sectarian cause. Different countries have adopted various measures to shield their officials from such inclinations, but Pakistan is yet to establish a mechanism to screen security personnel for links with extremist and sectarian elements.
The vulnerability of the state institutions and mismanagement of sensitive issues is what escalates the sectarian divide. The communal divide already has touched unprecedented heights and it has become difficult to even raise one’s voice in support of religious freedom of certain communities in Pakistan; the sectarian divide is not far behind as another hate-filled fault-line.
The failure to address issues that can be resolved through a little vigilance and common sense reflect that the administration and bureaucracy also need ideological overhauling to refresh their vision.
The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies. mamirrana@yahoo.com
