As the internal situation in the 1971 Pakistan remained volatile, certain developments on the international scene took place.

India flared up the issue of infiltration by Pakistan Army from East Pakistan. The Soviet Union reflected that view. Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny ordered the collection of information about the future intentions of Pakistan government through its consulate general in Karachi.

On April 2, he sent a letter to Yahya expressing “concern over the use of armed forces against the people of Mr Mujibur Rahman and other political leaders”. Yahya gave the letter a cold shoulder and expressed the determination of not allowing any country to interfere in its internal affairs.

However international pressure kept mounting on the Yahya regime. The United States seemed concerned over the developments in East Pakistan as well. Extended collaboration between the Soviet Union and India was viewed by the US as serious and included concerns that if East Pakistan broke away it could add to the Soviet dominance in South Asia.

To offset this, the US took up an old plan of replacing its backing of Taiwan’s independence and extended recognition to China.

Earlier, when Yahya had visited the US on October 25, 1970, a meeting between him and Nixon drew extraordinary importanceas Nixon unfurled the plan. He thought Pakistan being a close friend of China can help build a bridge.

The “Ping Pong policy” was spread out. On November 14, Pakistan called on Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister, and discussed with him the US intentions. Obviously, the Chinese leadership was satisfied with the developments but there were still some formalities that were to be met.

On July 8, 1971, when Pakistan itself was in serious trouble, US Forign Secretary Henry Kissinger landed at Islamabad airport.

He was driven directly to Nathiagali where he stayed at the rest house till he was taken back to the airport. The security blanket kept the ordinary people away and the more inquisitive were told that Kissinger was ill, therefore, he was kept in Nathiagali for rest.

At three o’clock in the morning Kissinger left Islamabad for Beijing to meet with Zhou Enlai on July 9-10. The discussion revolved around the tilt approaching the US policy and the beginning of a new chapter in South Asia. On July 11 Kissinger returned to Islamabad.

The US effort to bring China to the world decision-making forum was to become a setback for the Soviet Union. Moscow felt the failure of its secret service and reshuffled it. It signed a number of agreements with India, and even a defence plan called ‘Asian Collective Security’ on the lines of the European Security Plan, was signed which envisaged that in case of aggression on one party efforts would be made to take effective measures.

When Pakistan and India were close to an armed conflict in November 1971, the Soviet Union delivered a huge supply of arms and equipment to India; the US refused Pakistan similar deliveries by saying that bilateral agreements between the two countries envisaged arms supply to “fight Communism” only.

Years later when State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series were released (June 29, 2005) it became known that while the human rights situation in East Pakistan was being criticised the world over, Washington kept silent, for, it did not want Pakistan to go against the US as Nixon and Kissinger were at that time working on a détente with China.

The papers reveal that “Yahya was providing a secret communication link for their quest for rapprochement with China. The close China-Pakistan relationship was central to Nixon’s wish to ‘tilt’ US policy towards Pakistan in part to show Beijing that Washington would support its allies”, but Washington did so only so far and no farther.

The United States waited till a clear picture emerged of what India aimed at achieving in South-Asia, though it was aware that India was intending to dismember Pakistan. The US did not like it and preferred a political solution to the crisis of East Pakistan.

On September 3, 1971 US pressured Yahya Khan to make a last attempt to bring such a political solution to East Pakistan. The US advised the Yahya regime to bring forth civilian cadres where the army had failed to rein in the insurgency. Yahya began with the replacement of General Tikka Khan, who had earned notoriety for his violent action during Operation Searchlight as Governor. Dr A M Malik was brought in his place. The next day a general amnesty, which US thought would help restore government’s confidence, was announced, which did not work.

On September 18, Yahya announced that a constitution would be promulgated, empowering the National Assembly to change or amend it within 90 days. His intention to hold by-elections in East Pakistan invoked Bhutto’s interest who also endorsed that view.

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