THE on-again, off-again process of talks with the Afghan Taliban appears to be making some tentative headway once again. Reports in the local and international media suggest that the Taliban may be on the verge of opening a political office in Doha, Qatar, and that several Afghan prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay may be released (though it is still not clear where they will be sent). In return, the Taliban may pledge to distance themselves from Al Qaeda and to negotiate with the Afghan government. While a political end to the war in Afghanistan is what the international community, the Afghan government and perhaps even the Taliban appear to desire, there is still a long way to go before it can become a reality.

At this point in time, there are more questions than answers. First of all, with all the talk of the need for talks, what signal does that send to the Taliban? If the Taliban conclude that they are in the driving seat in Afghanistan — a perception that may be at odds with the battlefield reality but nevertheless is the dominant narrative emerging from Afghanistan at the moment — will there be incentive enough to delink from Al Qaeda and renounce violence? And if the Taliban do engage in talks, even the most basic elements of a deal are far from clear. For example, will the Taliban seek recognition for their leader, Mullah Omar, as the amirul momineen? And would the Taliban really be willing to work within some kind of coalition framework with the Afghan government?

The outlines of what a relatively peaceful Afghanistan would look like in a situation where no group has total sway and all power centres continue to maintain some clout has been clear for some time: the warlords, the ethnic power brokers, the Taliban and the Haqqanis, etc would probably continue to hold significant influence in their respective bastions under the umbrella of a loose-knit federation that is weak enough to not threaten the respective sub-national power centres and strong enough to be able to take decisions in a small set of areas where a national policy is called for. However, desirable as that end may be, Afghanistans various domestic power centres are not known for making decisions that serve the collective good. The US and the Afghan government will need to try and balance the impossible, both in terms of domestic players and regional and extra-regional powers out to protect their interests or project power in Afghanistan. How far they succeed will have far-reaching consequences for this region, Pakistan in particular. Suffice to say, a dominant Taliban in Afghanistan will be adanger to everyone.