THE Jamaatud Dawa (JD) is so far the only pro-militant organisation in Pakistan that has offered funeral prayers for Osama Bin Laden. None of the other militant organisations that had close links with the Al Qaeda chief have done so. Pakistan's religious-political parties have also been very guarded in their initial reaction to Bin Laden's killing by US forces in an Abbottabad compound.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) chief Fazlur Rehman — who launched a countrywide anti-US campaign in July 1999 to mount pressure against a possible strike in Afghanistan to target Osama Bin Laden and who the media referred to as Bin Laden's 'second' consequently — refused to comment on Bin Laden's death. He was in Brussels at the time of Bin Laden's death, where he was to address the European Parliament as head of the Pakistani parliament's Kashmir committee.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, head of the banned militant group Harkatul Mujahideen (HM), who had first declared jihad against the US in Pakistan after US cruise missiles targeted his militant training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, was also silent. HM camps were targeted in 1998 because the US suspected that the Al Qaeda chief was hiding in one of them.

Besides the HM, some other militant groups, including Harkatul Jihad-i-Islami, Jaish-i-Muhammad and Al Badar Mujahideen also had close ties with Bin Laden who had reportedly played a role in settling their internal disputes on more than one occasion. None of these organisations have publicly commented on the killing.

It may be argued that the absence of a public reaction might be due to the fact that these organisations are banned and their leadership is underground. However, most of these organisations retain a public face and continue to operate in the garb of charities. They have organised public events on issues closer to their heart on several occasions and the fact that they are banned has not been a hurdle in those instances. It is entirely conceivable that they do not want to attract attention towards themselves by making their views on Bin Laden's death public.

The JD, which is on the US list of terrorist organisations on account of links with the Lashkar-i-Taiba, has developed political credentials in recent years and is active in the politics of agitation in Pakistan, mainly on religious issues. It has tried to keep its distance from Al Qaeda since 9/11 and has apparently joined the opposing Saudi camp.

JD publications now sing praises of the Saudi kingdom, which had revoked Bin Laden's citizenship and has hoped that the Al Qaeda leader's death would boost efforts to counter terrorism. Amid Iran's criticism of Riyadh's role following the recent unrest in Bahrain, the JD came forward to defuse the anti-Saudi campaign by pro-Shia elements in Pakistan and launched rallies and demonstrations across the country in support of Saudi Arabia.

It seems confusing that, on the one hand, a state welcomes the killing of Bin Laden and on the other, a pro-militant group, which brands itself as an ally of the same state declares him a martyr. But then nothing is ever simple in Pakistan.

Stating his organisation's stance, a JD spokesperson has said that they had performed a religious duty by offering Bin Laden's funeral prayers as he was a fellow Muslim and that such prayers should not be interpreted as JD's affiliation with Al Qaeda. JD chief Hafiz Saeed has stated in several interviews that he had only met Bin Laden a few times, and that too during the Soviet-Afghan war. takfiris takfiris

The JD's equation with Saudi Arabia comes naturally as members of the banned group are of the same sect as the majority Saudi population. Secondly, Saudi Arabia's biggest terrorist challenge comes from (those who accuse other Muslims of apostasy) and Pakistan is also facing the wrath of the terrorist groups who have absorbed similar tendencies and developed a close association with Al Qaeda's led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri. These groups include the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the so-called Punjabi Taliban militant. takfir takfiri takfiri takfiri

Evidence suggests that was the issue that brought the JD closer to the Saudis. When the Saudi government launched a programme in 2003 to engage religious scholars to build a response against tendencies and terrorism, the impact on the Salafi clergy in Pakistan was immediately discernible. The JD took it upon itself to condemn the thought among militant groups and its affiliate Lashkar-i-Taiba distanced itself from the groups that had tendencies and even spurned any cooperation with the Pakistani Taliban. takfiris haram takfiri

In 2007, clashes were reported between the Lashkar-i-Taiba and Taliban militants in Mohmand Agency of Pakistani tribal areas. Opposition to the was believed to be one of the reasons behind the confrontation. The clash led to the Taliban killing the local Lashkar commander, Shah Sahib, and destroying the group's infrastructure in Mohmand. Many analysts were surprised when Hafiz Saeed declared that suicide attacks inside Pakistan were or forbidden. The statement was apparently aimed at condemning the militants in Pakistan.

However, this line on suicide attacks does not mean that the JD or the Lashkar-i-Taiba have abandoned their jihad ideology. They still strictly follow their prime objective of pursuing defensive jihad against oppressive infidel forces who have occupied Muslim lands. The JD does not support armed action in Muslim states, notwithstanding corrupt rulers and lack of enforcement of Islamic laws in those countries.

The JD believes that Bin Laden's prime objective was waging jihad against the US and that, unlike Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama had not announced jihad against Pakistan. But then Bin Laden had waged jihad against his own state, Saudi Arabia, over the US troops' presence there.

The JD's paradoxical views over Bin Laden's death do not seem all that strange in the context of the prevailing anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. Bin Laden was killed by US forces on Pakistani soil, which has provided an invaluable opportunity to incite anti-US feelings and anti-government demonstrations to anyone who fancies doing so. The JD considers itself the custodian of the jihad ideology and the protector of Saudi interests in the country, and is intent on pursuing both tasks. But keeping the balance is bound to be increasingly tricky.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com