ISLAMABAD, Sept 5: Tuesday’s bomb blasts in Rawalpindi were no ordinary terrorist attacks. Given the chosen target and timing — rush hour in a military garrison — the coordinated explosions were a clear message from terrorists that they can hit the nerve centre of the security establishment almost at will.

Taken in conjunction with the rapidly deteriorating situation in Waziristan, where the Mehsud militants are becoming more aggressive by the day, the suicide attacks have the potential of transforming the internal security dynamics of the country.

The deadly early morning explosions shook the country’s military and civilian leadership, and wild speculation gripped the country about the possible fallout from so brazen an attack.

The establishment, for its part, is pointing the finger of blame at ‘Al Qaeda’ and tribal militant leader Baitullah Mehsud. But irrespective of who is responsible, the attacks raise fundamental questions about lapses in intelligence gathering and the failure of a security apparatus that could not prevent terrorists from entering a cantonment area and hitting a bus carrying staff members of a premier intelligence service.

As was the case in the two failed attempts on President Musharraf’s life in December 2003, it seems such militants still have sympathisers deep inside the security establishment. Otherwise, knowing the schedule of an unmarked intelligence agency bus would be next to impossible, even for most people in the military. No doubt the Islamic militants regard Gen Musharraf as enemy number one, largely because of his policy to promote liberalism and to neutralise Islamic militant groups — including those raised and nurtured by the country’s security establishment for furthering its regional goals. In the early years, the militants thought that if they removed Gen Musharraf, the establishment would own them once again. But once the Pakistani military stepped up its operations in the tribal belt, the terror pattern in the country underwent a visible change.

For the militants, military installations and personnel outside the troubled tribal region also became legitimate targets. The bloodiest of such suicide attacks was on a military camp in Dargai in November last year in which scores of young trainees were killed or maimed. It came within days of a missile attack on a madressah in Bajaur Agency in which a large number of militants were said to have died.

There were a few more attacks on military targets, including one deep inside the Punjab, in Kharian cantonment. They were nothing, however, compared to the assaults seen in the aftermath of the security operation against the militants of Lal Masjid. From Dera Ismail Khan to Swat, military convoys and installations came under a series of suicide attacks, as did public places in Islamabad.

Whether these attacks were directly linked to the Lal Masjid affair may never be known. But the message from these horrific incidents was clear: the religious militants were well equipped with sophisticated explosives, had the capability to penetrate deep inside security zones, and commanded a sufficient number of indoctrinated youngsters willing to blow themselves up to bring down ‘enemy’ targets.

However, the terror attacks in Rawalpindi’s high-security zone seem to have taken the conflict to another dangerous level, making almost everyone associated with the security apparatus vulnerable. The irony is that the very people who are supposed to provide a sense of security in society are now the prime target of the militants.

Following earlier suicide attacks, some officials had abandoned their usual routines and, on instruction, even stopped using official insignia and government or military licence plates on their vehicles. The latest incident has further upped the ante and may result in an increase in such inward-looking security steps.

What makes Tuesday’s blasts more alarming is their possible link with the situation in Waziristan. There the militants have been constantly spreading their tentacles, and the largest number of security personnel ever held hostage in a peacetime situation are now in their custody.

No one in the military has been able to explain the circumstances in which over 200 troops, including several officers, were taken hostage by the Mehsud militants. The incident has raised new questions about the morale, if not the competence, of the troops fighting in the area, thus creating a really embarrassing situation for the military leadership. The indications are that Baitullah Mehsud’s men are in no mood to set the troops free unless their terms, including the release of all arrested militants, are met.

With the Waziristan issue unresolved, the Rawalpindi bombings are certain to bring more pressure on President Musharraf from all sides. The opposition groups have already started to blame him for the mess, and some in the West continue to question his intentions, with a few even accusing him of taking half-hearted measures to combat Islamic militancy.

The series of attacks on security forces may have weakened the authority of the government. But the question is, when faced with such a grave situation what choice does President Musharraf have?

He certainly cannot back away from the policy of countering those practising a violent brand of Islam in which suicide attacks and bombings are seen as part of the ‘jihad’ against the US and its allies. But President Musharraf also needs to acknowledge that the attempt to take on the Islamic militants, who were once encouraged and trained by the establishment, has been a complete failure, both at the tactical and strategic levels.

What the authorities need to realise is that the policing system in the major cities, including Islamabad and Rawalpindi, is incapable of checking the activities of common bandits, let alone highly-trained terrorists. And with a large section of the intelligence establishment involved in political manipulation, failure to get good intelligence on the activities of suicide squads is also understandable.

It is time for Gen Musharraf to rethink his priorities. Attempts at imposing an emergency or curtailing civil rights in the name of combating terrorism will not work in the present political situation, especially when his right to rule is being questioned. Perhaps what he needs is a collective strategy that has the support of civil society and the liberal political parties, and, if possible, the religious groups that believe in a democratic order. Even if it means coming down from a lofty pedestal, Gen Musharraf needs to make a serious attempt to build a national consensus on tackling the issue effectively, not for the United States but for Pakistan. Foremost among his priorities must be restoring the public’s lost sense of security. Given the current political impasse, this is a very difficult proposition. It is not impossible, however, and certainly is the need of the hour.