THE insurgency in Balochistan has posed a different set of problems for the state, which is still struggling to fully understand its dynamics. Perhaps the biggest challenge is defining the unrest in the province and identifying the factors that are contributing to it.
Even as it tries to understand the insurgency, the state has become fixated on the youth, particularly the educated ones, whom it sees as leading the unrest. It sees them as the core of the problem, which it seeks to address through narrative campaigns and a few incentives. In its search for quick fixes, it expects rapid results; when these don’t materialise, it stigmatises the very youth it seeks to influence.
A recent statement attributed to Balochistan Chief Minister Mir Sarfraz Bugti that Baloch youth pursuing PhDs at the state’s expense were conducting misleading research and supporting militancy reflected a hasty attitude. The statement drew sharp criticism from Balochistan’s political and civil society leadership and was perceived as an attempt by the state to silence critical voices that question poor governance, highlight flaws in the system, and expose the cost of electoral manipulation to political stability.
Since the beginning of the new phase of the insurgency in Balochistan, dozens of leading intellectuals, writers and journalists have been killed — from Prof Saba Dashtyari to Prof Ghamkhwar Hayat, who was recently killed in Noshki. On the one hand, the state claims that it has invested heavily in the education sector and set up dozens of universities across the province. On the other, it remains apprehensive about political and intellectual activities on university campuses.
The security institutions have a better understanding of religiously inspired militancy, having engaged with it since the Afghan-Soviet war and having developed a deeper knowledge of its character. It emerged from narratives once nurtured by the state for strategic purposes. It mainly relied on madressah students and youth educated in public-sector institutions affiliated with religious parties. Their worldview is different from that of Balochistan’s educated youth, who are more influenced by leftist and anti-colonial intellectual traditions of the Global South.
Dialogue remains part of the solution, particularly with those who are still willing to talk.
It took nearly two and a half decades for the state to develop an effective approach to address religiously motivated terrorism, which state institutions had, at times, themselves helped nurture. Even today, such militancy continues to pose several visible and hidden threats. Yet state institutions appear eager to crush an insurgency they don’t understand as well, and to do so in a much shorter period.
The state has a reasonably accurate diagnosis of Balochistan’s issues, but it errs in identifying the factors behind them. It is aware that the Balochistan problem has three dimensions: genuine political representation, the issue of missing persons, and a sense of deprivation. However, it continues to rely on the same remedies that have failed to produce results since the era of Gen Pervez Musharraf. It was during that period that a policy of zero tolerance towards dissent in the province took shape. The assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti was a consequence of that approach.
For a brief period, the state softened its posture when the PPP government launched the Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan package. Over the following decade, however, the state pursued an ambiguous policy — involving neither carrot nor stick. Billions of rupees were spent on surrender schemes, many of which were viewed as dubious, while efforts to engage militant leaders in exile through dialogue were discouraged.
Ironically, that was perhaps the best time for negotiations, as the insurgency was still in the early stages of its transformation from a tribal-led movement into one increasingly driven by the educated middle class, particularly in the southern and western parts of the province.
Obviously, the time for talks with the exiled leadership has largely passed. The tribal leaders in exile no longer command the influence they once did, and those currently leading the insurgency appear unwilling to engage with the state. Yet dialogue remains part of the solution, particularly with those who are still willing to talk, whether they are nationalist groups, religiously inspired actors, rights-based pressure groups, or organisations such as the Baloch Yakjehti Committee.
However, the same confusion persists, and opinion within the state remains divided. Those who favour dialogue are in the minority, while proponents of a coercive approach continue to dominate policymaking. At the same time, the coercive strategy is not as muscular as many within the Balochistan government would like. The state continues to rely on familiar strategies and tactics that ordinary Baloch citizens understand all too well and are suspicious of — particularly regarding anti-terrorist squads.
At the narrative level, some institutions appear to be attempting to create divisions within Baloch society. This includes raising questions about a Baloch-Brahui divide. More recently, a Punjab-based activist associated with a banned religiously inspired terrorist organisation claimed that 40 per cent of insurgents belong to the Zikri faith. Many criticised this as another attempt to create rifts within Baloch society.
The question is whether such campaigns can achieve their intended purpose. Arguably, they strengthen the insurgents’ narrative by providing them with examples they can exploit to justify their position.
Another concern is that stigmatising Baloch youth fuels broader public resentment. A large number of young Baloch aspire to join public and private sector institutions across the country. In simple terms, they want to become part of the national mainstream. Narratives that portray them with suspicion can have a deeply negative impact on their aspirations and sense of belonging.
Running narrative campaigns is a delicate undertaking. If poorly conceived, they create more problems than they solve. This is particularly true when such campaigns emerge from an approach that itself lacks clarity and strategic coherence.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, May 31st, 2026
