WHILE the world is fixated, rightly so, on the war in the Gulf, another conflict closer to home is largely going unnoticed. True, the level of devastation in the hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan is nowhere near that in Iran. But, in many ways, it is a far more perplexing conflict. Given the long-standing animosity pitting Iran against the US and Israel, President Donald Trump’s exit from the nuclear weapons agreement in his first term, and US military build-up near Iran weeks before the attack, the American-Israel strike, say experts, was a matter of ‘when’ and not ‘if’. On the other hand, the 2021 Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was celebrated as a success of two decades of Pakistan’s covert foreign policy. Yet, just a few years later, heavy fighting between the two has broken out. This is surprising given that, historically, the Pakistani state has perceived the threat along its western border from communist and nationalist groups, not religious movements.

Since independence, the state has had a complicated relationship with nationalist groups in the smaller provinces and has largely been suspicious of them. Given that the main Pakhtun nationalist party at the time of independence, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Khudai Khidmatgar, campaigned against KP (then NWFP) joining Pakistan, advocating instead for the creation of Pakhtunistan, it is not difficult to see where this scepticism comes from. However, since then, Pakhtun nationalist groups, including Ghaffar Khan’s own party, have moved towards advocating for more autonomy within the larger federal structure than seeking a separate homeland. Even so, in the early years, separatist murmurs within these movements continued, if not amongst the leadership, then definitely among some supporters.

Against this backdrop, the state saw an opportunity in the Soviet-Afghan war to support religiously motivated militant groups in KP, not only to bolster jihad efforts in Afghanistan, but also to weaken nationalist voices at home. After the Soviet exit from Afghanistan, these groups continued to serve a purpose both as an important foreign policy tool to ensure a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan and to undermine regional nationalist voices in KP. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, covert support from the state to the Afghan Taliban continued. In fact, many Pakistani leaders lauded the Taliban takeover of Kabul in late 2021, proclaiming that the Afghans had ‘broken the shackles of slavery’.

But ironically, instead of the stabilising effect security experts in Pakistan had hoped for, insecurity in KP increased exponentially. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal,118 people (civilians and security forces) were killed in 2020 in acts of terrorism in KP. In 2025, the number of casualties had risen to 723 — an increase of over 500 per cent. Rather than being pro-Pakistan that Islamabad had hoped for, the new Afghan Taliban regime has been a greater threat to Pakistan’s security than any other previous Afghan regime. In the last three years, Pakistan has reportedly bombed targets in Kabul more than once, and numerous border skirmishes have taken place. The border crossings between the two countries have lately remained closed. The movement that was envisioned to unify the country and secure its western border, has now become a challenge to national cohesion here.

Since independence, the state has had a complicated relationship with nationalist groups in the smaller provinces.

In the meantime, the Pakhtun nationalist movement has been fractured into numerous political and apolitical societal groups, but almost all of them are striving for more rights and autonomy within the Pakistani federation. Regrettably, the benefits of accepting these goals on their own merit may be lost on the state, even though many of them share a common purpose: to bring peace and stability to Pakhtun hinterlands. While the government will have to take the lead role in restoring peace, local support is fundamental in the fight against terrorism. Unfortunately, the brunt of the negative consequences of the policy to influence affairs inside Afghanistan has been borne by Pakhtun society. This has resulted in a significant trust deficit between KP’s population and the state. There also appears to be no discernible effort or policy to rebuild trust.

At the same time, Pakhtun nationalist sentiments, which transcend political parties, have become very strong, especially among the youth. Arguably, an overwhelming majority of the new generation of Pakhtun youth have turned towards their ethnic identity and roots to explain their society’s current struggles as well as formulate solutions. The state should reach out to such nationalist communities and bodies. By engaging with their concerns and ideas, it can help win back the public and unite them against extremist militants. In the longer term, undoing decades of societal degradation resulting from support for extremist groups in the Pakhtun belt, will take even more engagement with the locals. Reversal of jihadi indoctrination that began in the 1970s will require promoting platforms to counteract this and curriculum reforms.

It is important for the centre to develop cultural sensitivity about minority ethnic groups. For example, ill-conceived media campaigns, such as the ‘acha ji’ advertisement, forget that there are twice as many Pakistani Pakhtuns than Afghan Pakhtuns. Hence, promoting negative stereotypes of the latter is not only offensive to a large part of Pakistan’s population but also damaging to national unity. The flawed notion that a homogenous Pakistani identity can be imposed on a diverse population should be jettisoned. History is replete with examples of disastrous consequences when countries repress ethnic identities or prefer some over others. The prudent way is to embrace Pakistan’s diversity and strengthen it. Government messaging and policymaking should make clear that Pakistan nationalism is multicultural. Genuine efforts to engage with Pakhtuns including nationalists can prove to be a key first step towards addressing the country’s ethnic fault lines. It is integral to winning back the trust of the local population in the fight against militancy.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, April 29th, 2026