Struggling at home
AS Iran-US talks hit another snag, we must ask if a state with its own problems can successfully facilitate talks by itself on a conflict that persists despite years of strong mediation by many richer states. The losses from Islamabad’s closure last week add to the worry, more so as the talks didn’t take place given American obduracy. Given the impasse and the rise in our own problems due to the war, we must focus on the latter too — especially as our rulers show unity and speed on global problems but inertia on internal ones. So, the same-page synergy shown in talks hasn’t yielded any major steps for durable, broad progress yet since its start in 2022. Investment, exports and growth remain weak but poverty has risen sharply. Industrial growth to ensure jobs for a growing, restless youth population isn’t the focus, but areas that may impede it are, for example, mining, cryptocurrency and corporate farming. But pace even on these controversial areas has been glacial.
Inflation had fallen — but through IMF policies that cut growth and increase poverty. The war in the Gulf is refuelling inflation and may further lower growth. Even if talks do succeed, it is doubtful whether the outcome will bring in much investment and growth as there are deep internal problems. We may get more geostrategic rents, but even here, we should remember that the UAE recalled its loans due to the war. New Saudi loan terms may suck us into new wars. Large American inflows, like the ones in the past, are unlikely despite the bromance between President Donald Trump and the ruling elite here, except perhaps a little in mining that may, in fact, give more pain than gain.
Security remains poor. Conflict with Afghanistan and talks hosted by China have curbed but not ended TTP violence. But the complex legalities around such conflicts, the risks and costs of civilian deaths, and the failure of past talks reduce the efficacy of both options. Violence remains high in Balochistan. For years, force has been used by the state to suppress the symptoms while the root causes haven’t been addressed. This only leads to greater discontent and more violence. If war makes Iran unstable, militancy in Balochistan may increase. It may also increase as a result of mining in the province. Insecurity will be further intensified if we unwittingly get sucked into the three Middle East conflicts: Iran-Arab, Israel-Arab and intra-Arab.
Lastly, democracy is being undermined in key axes: electoral, parliamentary, oppositional, judicial, accountability, civilian sway and societal freedom. Even our current role on the international stage cannot hide the fact that thousands of poor residents are being evicted from their homes in the federal capital. There is concern over potential punitive moves — in the form of transfers — against some judges. Lawyer-activist Imaan Mazari-Hazir and her spouse were jailed, under the awful Peca laws, for simple ‘X’ posts. These trends may grow as external links with patron states are cemented.
We are acting with speed on global problems, not internal ones.
So, the war and even our role in it may exacerbate matters at home. If talks fail, blowbacks and a loss of face cannot be ruled out. If they succeed, further durable gains for the masses may be few. The global praise that is uplifting a nation which is not used to it and that is making even many level-headed voices ignore long-term costs may fade. A cruel, busy world showers durable praise on states that earn it through progress and peace. Aggrieved masses may then find themselves facing the ire of the state.
So, our international alacrity and internal inertia are not at odds but synergistic. The inertia is the result of rulers who don’t have the capacity to ensure broad progress nor the desire to share their riches, as the reforms require. This lack of change results in economic inertia which, in turn, fuels political grievances that the state then attempts to quell by force.
Not attending to these grievances can lead to unrest and militancy that is met through kinetic measures alone; indeed, one of the main drivers — elite wealth — is not addressed. The alacrity on external links helps gain geostrategic rents to ‘fix’ economic inertia, delay reforms and curb dissent. But as such rents are falling and dissent rising, this cycle may not last long. Will a better order or chaos replace it?
The writer has a PhD degree in political economy from the University of California, Berkeley, and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experience across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, April 28th, 2026