Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey
By Farhatullah Babar
Lightstone
ISBN: 978-969-716-317-5
334pp.

Since its inception became public in the 1970s, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme has been mired in myths, controversies and apprehension. The global community was quick to link the country’s nuclear ambitions to its religious leanings. The “Islamic bomb” became the popular moniker for Pakistan’s nuclear goals.

Although eight countries have declared their possession of nuclear weapons and Israel is widely assumed to have them as well, the religious identity is only associated with Pakistan. We have not heard of Jewish, Hindu or Christian bombs — although the last (if bombs are to have a faith tag) are the only ones to have wiped out hundreds of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 during World War II.

Successive Pakistani rulers have also played politics with taking credit, or doling it out. In the process, the man the Pakistani establishment chose to recognise as the “Father of the Bomb” was Abdul Qadeer Khan. The pioneers have been practically air-brushed out of the history of Pakistan’s nuclear development. In Beyond the Bomb: Munir Ahmad Khan and Pakistan’s Nuclear Odyssey, Farhatullah Babar sets out to give belated recognition to one of the pioneers and to correct the course of Pakistan’s nuclear history.

A former senator and journalist, apart from being known as a human rights activist, Babar served as the director of information at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in the 1970s. This was the period when Munir Ahmad Khan was its chairman.

Former Senator Farhatullah Babar’s book of memoirs aims to set the record straight by putting the spotlight on the low-key Munir Ahmad Khan and his pivotal role in shaping Pakistan’s nuclear programme

The opening chapter makes for riveting reading, as Babar gives an account of a significant secret meeting held in 1972 in Multan, addressed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was president at the time. Dr Abdus Salam was also present at this meeting, as was Munir Ahmad Khan, who Bhutto handpicked to spearhead the programme. This meeting was held after the break-up of the country and India’s intentions to pursue a nuclear weapons programme had been confirmed. It was a time when perceived threats from India were at their peak.

Munir Ahmad Khan lived to see Pakistan conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 and, according to Babar, he was elated by their success. However, by this time, sadly, he had been sidelined. The newbies who had been installed managed to steal the limelight with the support of the Pakistani establishment. Babar writes in depth about Munir Ahmad Khan’s way of working — for him discretion, secrecy and remaining low-key were integral to the success of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

In the 1970s, the Pakistani establishment itself was paranoid about secrecy. The writer describes how he came under suspicion after meeting an Indian journalist (my guess is that it was Kuldip Nayar) at an Islamabad hotel with the permission of his boss, Munir Ahmad Khan. Another time, when he was returning at night from the PAEC chairman’s house, he was accosted by a group of young men who snatched his briefcase at gunpoint. His trauma was compounded by the police’s repeated questioning.

However, Pakistan’s paranoia could be understood to an extent — after all, the nuclear weapons programme had been undertaken in earnest in response to the Indian nuclear tests in 1974 and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had also threatened to teach Pakistan “a horrible lesson” for pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

While Munir Ahmad Khan was a model of discretion and shied away from the media, those who followed basked in the limelight they themselves helped create. Foremost among them was Abdul Qadeer Khan, who was obsessed with self-projection and, soon after joining the nuclear programme, managed to sideline Munir Ahmad Khan and other pioneers.

The writer acknowledges Abdul Qadeer Khan’s capabilities and contributions, but his role in pushing aside Munir Ahmad Khan clearly rankles him. Babar portrays the PAEC head as a strong believer and practitioner of discretion. Apart from it being a personal quality, he advocated restraint in the development of nuclear weapons.

Apart from Munir Ahmad Khan, Beyond the Bomb also focuses on the contribution of two lesser-known scientists — Professor Riazuddin and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood (SBM). Here’s how Babar describes them: “Professor Riazuddin’s life was one of quiet heroism, exemplifying those who build structures without seeking applause”, while SBM’s “invention of a sophisticated device to detect heavy water leaks, patented in his name as ‘SBM Probes’, earned him initial laurels and recognition.”

The author highlights the contribution of each and contrasts their attitudes towards nuclear tests. SBM, unfortunately, had to suffer persecution by the country’s intelligence agencies when he tried to do charitable work in Afghanistan after his retirement and was accused by the US of seeking to supply nuclear know-how to Al Qaeda. Another pioneer to be marginalised was Dr Abdus Salam. The later Nobel Laureate, who was present at the first secretive meeting called by Bhutto, was possibly victimised for his faith. However, envy of his abilities and intellect surely also played a part in Dr Salam being ignored from Pakistan’s nuclear history.

Munir Ahmad Khan continued his work with dedication and sound judgement in challenging circumstances, exercising restraint, as was his nature. Meanwhile, the flamboyant Abdul Qadeer Khan’s star was on the rise. As Babar writes, “An internal coup, driven by ambitions and rivalries within, had… taken place in Pakistan’s nuclear establishment in the mid-1970s.” Munir Ahmad Khan’s role was deliberately diminished. He was finally recognised (posthumously) and awarded the Nishan-i-Pakistan by President Asif Ali Zardari in 2012.

Beyond the Bomb may be a belated attempt to give credit where it is due, but Babar’s efforts to set the record straight should not be in vain. For scholars and students interested in how Pakistan began and continued its risky nuclear journey, this is an informative and fairly objective source of research. While the book is about Munir Ahmad Khan, the wider context of the nuclear programme and its actors are well-covered. It would perhaps surprise most readers that the head of PAEC was himself a pacifist and believed in the responsible use of nuclear power.

The writer seems to have had a relationship of mutual trust and respect with his boss, Munir Ahmad Khan. He writes of the PAEC chairman with admiration about both his personal and professional qualities. He notes that, even when denying him a pay raise, Munir Ahmad Khan balanced it by reminding Babar how fortunate he was to be part of this important chapter of the nation’s history.

Although he worked for the nuclear establishment, albeit as a media person, Babar remained committed to peace. The desire for regional peace is reflected in the dedication note that Beyond the Bomb carries: “To those who, even while possessing the bomb, see far beyond it, choosing restraint over recklessness and daring to imagine peace in a region haunted by brinkmanship and war.”

The reviewer is a human rights activist and a former chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, March 19th, 2026