PESHAWAR: Upholding the formation of a special committee by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly speaker for probing ransacking and torching of Radio Pakistan building in Peshawar during a PTI protest in May 2023, Peshawar High Court has ruled that the legislative body has competence to conduct inquiries into matters of public concern.

A bench consisting of Justice Sahibzada Asadullah and Justice Inamullah Khan, while rejecting plea of Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) against the formation of the impugned committee, ruled: “Legislative and executive bodies possess constitutional competence to regulate internal affairs and, where authorised, to conduct inquiries into matters of public concern.”

“Such fact-finding processes often serve accountability, transparency and democratic oversight. They fall within the sphere of institutional autonomy and are generally insulated from judicial interference unless they transgress constitutional limits or directly encroach upon judicial authority,” the bench observed in its nine-page detailed judgement.

Rules legislative body empowered to conduct inquiry into matters of public concern

However, the bench ruled that the autonomy was not absolute.

“It cannot be exercised in a manner that supplants judicial determination of criminal liability or attempts to interfere with proceedings already seized by a competent court,” the bench observed, adding that the boundary between institutional inquiry and judicial adjudication must therefore be carefully maintained.

PBC had filed the petition through its Peshawar station director, Tufail Ahmad, requesting the court to declare as illegal and set aside a notification issued by KP Assembly Speaker Babar Saleem Swati on Dec 26, 2025, for probing the Radio Pakistan incident through a special committee.

Currently, an anti-terrorism court is conducting the trial in the attack case, with 75 accused, including both current and former lawmakers, being indicted on June 3, 2025, on multiple counts. The accused had pleaded not guilty and decided to face trial.

The petitioner apprehended that as lawmakers were members of the committee, they would be influencing the ongoing trial.

“It is also significant that even if an inquiry produces findings, such findings do not automatically acquire evidentiary status in criminal proceedings. Their admissibility, relevance and probative value remain subject to scrutiny by the trial court under the law of evidence,” the bench pointed out.

It ruled that criminal court retained exclusive authority to assess whether such material met the threshold for consideration or must be excluded. “Thus, the existence of an inquiry does not, by itself, determine its legal effect upon pending adjudication.”

“From a broader constitutional-philosophical perspective, democratic governance contemplates multiple institutions exercising overlapping oversight functions. Parallel processes, legislative inquiry and judicial trial may coexist without necessarily creating constitutional conflict,” the bench observed.

It further states: “Tension arises only when one process attempts to dominate or nullify the other. In the absence of such dominance or demonstrable interference, coexistence is constitutionally tolerable.”

In the present matter, the bench ruled that no such interference had been established. “No final inquiry report exists. No recorded findings have been shown. No transmission of material to the trial court has been demonstrated. The apprehension, therefore, remains in the realm of anticipation rather than actuality,” the bench maintained.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the petition was premature. “The constitutional threshold for intervention has not been met,” the bench observed, adding should circumstances change in the future, and should any inquiry report be sought to be utilised in a manner that demonstrably affects the fairness or independence of the pending criminal trial, the petitioner should remain at liberty to seek appropriate relief in accordance with law.

“For the present, no case for constitutional interference is made out. The petition stands dismissed,” states the judgement authored by Justice Sahibzada Asadullah.

The bench also discussed the independence and powers of trial court and observed: “Once a criminal court has taken cognisance, its jurisdiction over the determination of guilt or innocence becomes exclusive.

The trial court operates under procedural safeguards and evidentiary standards that protect against external influence.”

“The presumption under constitutional jurisprudence is that courts act independently and are not swayed by parallel institutional deliberations unless concrete material demonstrates actual interference,” the bench ruled.

The bench pointed out that no material showed that any alleged inquiry output had been transmitted to the trial court or relied upon in judicial proceedings.

The bench was of the opinion that “the grievance advanced by the petitioner is therefore prospective in nature, resting upon the apprehension that material may in the future be collected and potentially utilised in a manner perceived to be prejudicial.”

“Constitutional adjudication does not proceed on speculative fear but on demonstrable infringement. The judiciary does not intervene to prevent hypothetical harm; it intervenes to remedy actual or imminent violation of constitutional rights,” it observed.

“Where no concrete prejudice has crystallised, and no actionable misuse of inquiry material has occurred, judicial restraint becomes not weakness but fidelity to constitutional design.”

The bench also discussed the doctrine of separation of powers and distribution of authority among distinct state organs.

Published in Dawn, March 4th, 2026