THE latest episode of the US-Israel conflict with Iran is neither merely about another exchange of missiles between Israel and Iran, nor is it only about American involvement at a higher level than before. What has unfolded since Saturday morning has instead signified a shift in objective, in tactics, in timing and in political framing of this long-running conflict bet­ween the US and Israel, and Iran.

The US-Israel war aga­inst Iran has, since the last 12-day confrontation, mo­­ved from deterrence management to regime change and this transformation will determine the direction of this confrontation.

Only days ago, diplomacy was not dead. Under Omani mediation, discussions were progressing and technical talks involving the International Atomic Energy Agency were scheduled for Monday. Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Al Busaidi, had publicly spoken of near agreement on Iran not producing nuclear weapons, down-blending of existing stockpiles, not stockpiling in future and IAEA inspection and verification mechanism.

Moreover, despite Iran’s reluctance to discuss its support for regional non-state actors and its missile programme, there was an understanding that Tehran would discuss that with regional countries. By all standards, that was not empty signalling. Tehran may not have agreed to surrender, as US President Donald Trump wanted, but had almost agreed on a structured compromise.

Endurance, not spectacle, appears to be the guiding principle for Iranian leaders

The shift, however, began when rhetoric from Washington moved beyond enrichment caps and verification mechanisms. As President Trump spoke in terms that blurred nuclear rollback with political change inside Iran, it was clear that the goal post had been shifted.

Against that backdrop, the US and Israel launched strikes against Iran.

During the June 12-day war, the strikes were limited to degrading missile depots and eliminating military top brass for operational decapitation. This time, the targeting pattern suggested something deeper as sites linked not only to military command but to the political leadership, including buildings associated with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, were struck right at the start, signalling a widening of intent.

The difference is not that leaders were targeted in both wars; rather, it is about which layer of leadership and with what political implications.

The timing was also telling. Previous Israeli operations occurred under the cover of darkness, whereas this round began in broad daylight. It was meant to maximise disruption and expose the collapse of the system; in other words, strikes were designed for overt shock, not attrition.

The American role further distinguished this phase. During the June war, Washington initially stayed back before entering the fray to bomb the nuclear sites and then went back. This time, there was deeper operational coordination from the outset, which shaped Iran’s response.

Within hours, Iranian missiles struck not just Israel but also the US assets across the Gulf.

If the June retaliation was calibrated and largely symbolic, leaving room for de-escalation, this time horizontal escalation came early, which hints at prior authorisation and readiness.

This perception is reinforced by the maritime dimension. Saturday evening reports indicated that Iran had moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, warning vessels against passage. Introducing the long-feared Strait of Hormuz closure into the equation at an early stage signalled preparations for a protracted conflict.

This brings us to the central divergence in strategy.

Washington and Tel Aviv appear to pre­­fer compressed plans, with a quick vic­­tory involving a short, decisive campaign that eliminates leadership, degra­des Iranian military capability and avo­ids prolonged engagement. For Trump, duration carries domestic implications. A brief conflict framed as decisive stren­gthens his standing, whereas a long war erodes it. Similarly, Israel doesn’t prefer sustained attacks because of its ‘geography curse’ and the character of its economy.

Tehran’s calculus is almost the mirror opposite. Time can work in its favour by stretching interceptor stocks, raising energy prices and increasing regional economic pressure. In Iranian calculation if the conflict extends without the US ground involvement, Iran’s doctrine of endurance begins to look more viable than shock.

Iran’s layering strategy for missile use, deploying older systems first to saturate defences is another indication of preparation for sustained engagement rather than immediate maximal retaliation. Therefore, endurance, not spectacle, appears to be the guiding principle for the Iranian leaders.

The key question now is whether leadership cohesion in Tehran remains intact. If the upper tier fractures, the shock doctrine may succeed and the war could compress. If cohesion holds, the confrontation shifts into an endurance phase in which escalation control beco­mes more fragile with each passing day.

Three trajectories are likely: rapid containment with mediation resuming after calibrated exchanges; extended but controlled confrontation involving sustained strikes and avoiding full energy infrastructure destruction; and a reg­ional war, where proxies expand the theatre and maritime disruption intensifies.

All sides would certainly not like the third option, whereas this episode is already beyond symbolic exchange, leaving the sides with the second scenario.

Published in Dawn, March 1st, 2026