AS Pakistan steps into 2026, seven questions dominate its foreign policy agenda and discussions. Will India once more launch hostilities against Pakistan this year given that Prime Minister Narendra Modi hasn’t ended Operation Sindoor? In fact, it might be difficult for India to act aggressively this year because the world is no longer prepared to accept its false accusations that Pakistan is perpetrating terrorism against it. Second, there is a growing perception in India that it is up against two fronts — Pakistan and China. Third, the Indian armed forces may need more time and capabilities to plug the gaps that led to their defeat in May. That said, Pakistan cannot be complacent and must keep up its military preparedness.

Will India allow the Indus Waters Treaty, that it has unilaterally held in abeyance, to function is the second important question. Water means life or death. Pakistan has declared that if India disrupts or diverts the rivers allocated to it, India’s action will be treated as an act of war. As attested by the recent UN report, the world community has not accepted India’s pretext of terrorism to suspend the treaty (ironically, it is India, which is committing proxy terrorism in Pakistan). If, at some point, India decides to restore the IWT, Pakistan could agree to negotiate demographic, environmental and other issues as an additional protocol.

Managing, and benefiting from, the recent reset in Pakistan’s ties with the US, without upsetting its partnership with China, is the third issue. Although this reset could be transactional, it is a welcome opportunity to build American stakes in Pakistan’s stability through US investments in the minerals, oil and gas sectors.

As for China, this is a time-tested strategic partnership which must not be undermined. What helps Pakistan maintain ties with both powers simultaneously is the fact that today’s inter-state relations are issue-based, and cooperation and confrontation can coexist. China’s willingness to launch CPEC 2.0 reflects its trust in this relationship. For its part, Pakistan must address China’s security concerns by asserting complete writ of the state and also addressing people’s grievances in Balochistan and elsewhere through effective local governments.

How will Pakistan manage its foreign ties in 2026?

The direction of Pak-Afghan ties is the fourth question dominating discussions here. Since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Pakistan is being constantly attacked by the TTP terrorists who enjoy protection in Afghanistan, with possible support from India. Pakistan has embarked on a multipronged strategy to defend itself: bilateral talks with the Taliban; multilateral diplomatic push; effective border management; and making the people in the tribal districts partners in defending Pakistan. Limited access to Pakistani ports, hospitals, and universities is beginning to hurt the Taliban amidst their internal challenges. The world is also concerned that Afghanistan is once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

Growing ties with the Gulf countries are a welcome development, particularly with Saudi Arabia with which Pakistan has signed a defence pact. Given the clause that aggression against one will be considered aggression against the other, will Saudi Arabia stand with Pakistan if India mounts another attack against it? This is the fifth question being asked by thought leaders. Although this agreement will operationalise mostly through peacetime defence-related activities, it adds another layer of deterrence for both countries. While Pakistan now enjoys higher esteem in the Middle East, it should stay clear of inter-Arab conflicts.

The sixth question is whether Pakistan and Iran will be better able to manage their borders and improve economic ties. After the 12-day war betw­een Iran and Israel, the former has come to better appreciate the political support that Pakistan extended. Questions have also arisen about India’s possible role in the Iran-Israel conflict. It is expected that Pakistan’s ties with Iran will improve considerably during 2026, with a focus on cross-border trade.

How should Pakistan benefit from its economic geography is the seventh question that must be addressed to serve national economic interests. While north-south connectivity has made steady progress, east-west connectivity is severely handicapped because of India’s decision to completely disconnect with Pakistan. However, this has opened up space for Pakistan and China to bilaterally and jointly promote cooperation with other South Asian countries, particularly Bangladesh.

For optimal results in the above seven foreign policy arenas, Pakistan would need to prioritise political stability, continuity of economic policies, ease of doing business, capacity to negotiate better deals, and the writ of the state.

The writer is chairman, Sanober Institute.

Published in Dawn, January 4th, 2026