Weak state pillars
OUR state is a delicate structure consisting of diverse ethnicities and provinces that preceded its creation. They elected to join, in fact create, Pakistan in 1947. A reflection, though under different circumstances, can be found in the 13 colonies, that having gained independence, united under the American constitution in the late 18th century. Accepting the primacy of states, the US constitution gives the centre limited powers. The 1940 Lahore Resolution, too, promised democratic devolution, regardless of its legal shape (which it didn’t define), with matters of autonomy left for later. But this promise wasn’t kept despite our need for it.
New countries thrive on the strength of four foundational traits: statehood, nationhood, polity and economy. Pakistan differed from the nearly 100 decolonised states, being among the nine decolonised entities that split from other decolonised ones. Six split after decolonisation (Timor-Leste, Singapore, Bangladesh, Namibia, Eritrea and South Sudan) given ethnic/ racial tensions, mostly through conflict. Three (Pakistan, Lebanon and Israel) were split by the colonisers at the time of decolonisation along religious lines. Violence followed. All decolonised states had weak economies thanks to the effects of the colonial era; but most had existed earlier as distinct colonised states or at least united sub-units of the latter; many were ethnically homogenous and some had strong polities due to mass freedom drives.
We were among the handful of states that were arguably deficient vis-à-vis all four traits. We didn’t exist even as a united sub-unit earlier; we were ethnically diverse with one large dominant group, and had for the most part an elitist, rootless freedom leadership. Moreover, both our wings were, before Partition, among India’s poorest and most unequal regions. So, our most endemic problems arose from prenatal gaps and imposed a paradoxical reality: devolved democracy was imperative for us but also very hard to graft. Non-elected and non-civilian forces can easily overwhelm political forces but their hold further weakens all four traits, making democracy more critical.
We have oscillated between taking minor steps towards the imperative and being pulled back into its autocratic embrace by the inevitable. The era of four military dictators and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rule among civilians, covering half our existence, were the defining points of a centralised autocracy. Each era undercut societal pillars, such as media and civil society, and state pillars, including parliament and the judiciary and even the executive vis-à-vis the establishment. The outcomes were societal tensions, violence, stagnation, separatism and extremism. These eras also sapped trust, creativity, energy, freedom, tolerance, reason and vitality.
Devolved democracy was imperative but also very hard to graft.
We are now into our second overtly civilian and sixth overall era of dominant autocracy, with our pillars already too fractured to take more stress. Yet, autocratic forces are further weakening the pillars of state and society, ignoring lessons from past tragedies.
The current hybrid set-up poses two key problems. Firstly, its policies are undermining economic, external and security capacities. Secondly, it is eroding political institutions and processes — electoral, legislative, judicial, accountability and oppositional — that could otherwise have given timely feedback and applied checks on the rulers. The media has been silenced and civil society crushed. With a free hand, our inept rulers are simply pushing the state towards further crises.
The results are apparent. The sense of misplaced stability created by the regime since the May conflict has been overtaken by the crisis engendered by the TLP and Afghan issues as well as the Islamabad suicide attack and a damning IMF governance report. Further crises down the road mixed with lack of progress can convert it into the sorry spectacle that all our unelected or controversially elected regimes become.
In 1947, we started with major gaps in statehood, nationhood, economy and polity. Seventy-eight years later, those gaps are still large.
The state and economy have expanded but mainly serve the elites, while nationhood gaps are arguably growing and the polity remains elitist, inept and unaccountable. Meanwhile, demographic, ecological, external, social and economic threats look set to rise over the next 25 years. If the political arena remains unelected and inept, the threats may push us fast towards a point of no return.
The writer has a PhD degree in political economy from the University of California, Berkeley, and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experiences across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, November 25th, 2025