After prolonged controversy and public outcry, the Land Reform Act 2025 has finally been enacted by local legislators with a majority vote. Before engaging in a critical appraisal of the act, it is imperative to contextualise it within the historical aspect of the region’s political economy of land ownership.

Historically, the region’s land governance can be delineated into three distinct regimes. The first phase corresponds to the rule of local dynasties, which persisted until the mid-19th century. The second era emerged under the Dogra regime, operating within the broader ambit of colonial suzerainty, spanning from the 1840s to the partition in 1947. The third and ongoing phase commenced with the region’s accession to Pakistan in November 1947.

Throughout these three political regimes, the region has remained subject to an ambiguous land tenure system. During the era of local dynastic rule, land governance and resource management were intrinsically tied to the autocratic discretion of the ruling Rajas and Mirs. The political economy of land was characterised by the feudal structure wherein each Raja appointed a tax collector known as Munchi Jagir within his territorial domain or jagir. Notably, these tax collectors simultaneously served as the Trangpa (village chief), thereby consolidating fiscal and administrative authority at the village level.

Despite this hierarchical structure, communal land and natural resources, such as Shamilat Deh (common village land), forests, alpine pastures, water sources, livestock, wildlife, and minerals were regulated through local customary rule (Rivaj), with the village chief acting as the custodian and arbitrator.

Although the Rajas retained ultimate proprietary rights and exercised absolute authority to grant or allocate land at their discretion, local communities simultaneously maintained collective usufructuary rights over communal resources.

Following the conclusion of the First-Anglo Sikh War in 1846, the region was annexed by the Dogra forces with the strategic backing of the British Raj. This period marked the introduction of formal political and administrative restructuring, laying the foundation for a centralised governance model unprecedented in the region’s history. The Dogras institutionalised a revenue taxation department and initiated land settlements during the period from 1911 to 1916.

However, as noted by local historian Yousaf Hussain Abadi, no entirely new settlements were carried out during this period. Instead, the Dogra administration undertook the codification of long-standing customary rules that had historically governed communal land and natural resources. These local practices were reclassified and formalised under new legal terminologies.

After 1947, the region was further plunged into a constitutional and political deadlock. Although constitutional rights and land reforms were promised, colonial frameworks such as FCR and Rajgiri persisted until the 1970s. During this period, the State Subject Rule (SSR), which legally recognised indigenous identity and rights, was revoked. Simultaneously, the colonial construct of Khalisa Sarkar was increasingly invoked to legitimise the state-led land appropriation.

Moreover, the Nautore Rule 1979, originally introduced by the Dogras in 1936 to encourage the cultivation of barren lands, was historically manipulated to resettle politically favoured non-local communities across GB.

Since 1947, the region has endured persistent political marginalisation and entrenched bureaucratic control, which has historically hindered the emergence of robust resistance movements and institutionalised platforms for dissent.

However, a new wave of widespread resistance has now emerged due to large-scale land dispossession through accumulation-driven projects such as land appropriation via SEZs, as demonstrated in the Maqpon Das case; monopolisation of high-altitude forests and wildlife habitats through national parks; and the privatisation of public assets under the guise of ‘green tourism’.

The amended act offers minor concessions concerning communal lands; it remains fraught with ambiguities, particularly regarding the overriding authorities provided to state officials, classification of impartible commons, and government land.

The impartible common land includes high-altitude seasonal pastures, natural forests, lakes, nullahs, and their pathways, archaeological and heritage sites.

These land categories, central to the subsistence economy of indigenous communities, have historically been governed by customary tenure systems. However, under the expanding jurisdiction of the state, particularly through national parks, many high-altitude grazing lands have been placed under bureaucratic control. Furthermore, a multitude of common lands have been unilaterally acquired, leased, allotted to state institutions and other authorities without compensation or any informed consent of local communities.

The newly enacted legislation legitimised such acquisitions by formally recognising government-classified lands, thus providing legal cover to thousands of kanals usurped under the colonial-era construct of Khalisa Sarkar.

Surprisingly, this act designates the Khalisa Sarkar Land as partible, which means all the land grabbed under Khalisa Sarkar will be redistributed among Haqdaran-e-Arazee, while simultaneously shielding state control by firmly categorising them as government land.

This duality not only exposes the selective interpretation of ownership but also undermines any genuine commitment to socio-economic uplift. Also, the state legitimises Khalisa Sarkar over the Dogra’s State Subject Rule (SSR) and land settlement initiatives that safeguard local land and customary norms for its benefit.

Lastly, the legislation is conspicuously silent on instituting dispute resolution frameworks to address ongoing conflicts over land ownership, both within the communities and between local actors and the state. Those who advocate for land rights continue to face repression under the colonial-era legal instruments and coercive law enforcement.

Moreover, there is an urgent need for digitised and transparent land settlements, as existing records remain either obsolete or tampered with. The populace demands a robust and transparent land governance framework that modernises and rectifies the antiquated land records. The local communities recognise only two legitimate classifications of land: private and communal. They also possess a nuanced understanding of land ownership and entitlement.

The state’s land, according to the local intellectuals, pertains exclusively to territories either compensated, or acquired during historical wars. Any statutory imposition that contravenes local rights and customary practices is perceived as fabricated and indicative of large-scale land expropriation.

— The writer is an MPhil graduate from NIPS, QAU, and an independent researcher. He can be reached at ijlalhaider882@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, June 15th, 2025