SMOKERS’ CORNER: CHANGING THE PARADIGM
A National Action Plan (NAP) was announced by the government of Pakistan in January 2015 to supplement the antiterrorism drive by the military and police. Even though the military operations have been largely successful, the NAP has often been caught napping, especially in areas where it is supposed to check hate speech in public and align the country’s ‘national narrative’ with the one now driving the military operation against extremists.
After the reprehensible terrorist attack on a school in Peshawar in December 2014, the ruling and opposition parties and the military establishment all agreed that the existing national narrative (which began to evolve from the late 1970s onwards) has contributed to the radicalisation of society.
Ever since the NAP was launched, the need to fully implement it has been emphasised more by the military, despite the fact that a majority of the NAP’s aspects are to be initiated by the civilian government.
The civilian leadership needs to be more proactive in implementing a change of narrative through the National Action Plan
But critics of the present Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) government have often lamented that the regime has only offered an ‘eyewash’ in the name of the NAP. They point out that some men and women are still free to indulge in hate speech on TV channels, many mosques are still misusing loudspeakers and that not all “radical madressahs” are being properly investigated. What’s more, recently, even a member of the ruling party was called out for using the National Assembly floor to “spread hatred” against an already besieged minority group.
Interestingly, the criticism against the government in this context has not always come from the opposition parties. Whereas opposition outfits in parliament are vocal against the government’s alleged corruption, very few from the opposition benches have been as vocal about the same government’s lukewarm attitude towards the NAP. Observers believe this is mainly because of the fact that even within the non-religious parties, such as the PML-N and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, are MNAs and MPAs who never really agreed with the many aspects of the plan. They regularly use rhetoric which can come under the purview of hate speech according to the NAP. Many of them were also opposed to the military operation against extremist groups.
What’s more, the same observers and critics go on to say that almost all mainstream political parties in Pakistan engage with far-right groups during elections so they can gain ‘religious’ votes in certain constituencies. Even in 2004 when the government of Gen Musharraf was aggressively disseminating its “liberal” ideas (through the expression of “enlightened moderation”), the general was asked by reporters about some of his ministers rendezvousing with certain far-right individuals. In response to the reporters’ query, Musharraf had cleverly passed the buck by saying that these men were politicians who interacted with far-right groups to appease their conservative constituents.
The criticism against the PML-N regime’s feeble attitude towards the NAP has also come from the military. During Gen Raheel’s tenure as COAS (2013-2016) and now during Gen Bajwa’s stint, almost all ISPR statements on the military’s operations against extremist outfits also emphasise the need for the civilian government to fully implement the NAP. Veteran defense analysts such as Dr. Hasan Askari, have suggested that the roots of the concern exhibited by the military high command in this context lie in the tenure of Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.